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“…if, before every action, we were to begin by weighing up  
the consequences, thinking about them in earnest, first the  
immediate consequences, then the probable, then the possible,  
then the imaginable, we should never move beyond the point  
where our first thought brought us to a halt.” 
 









The following study sprang from one simple thesis: the way you look at the world 
determines what you see and the action you are likely to take. This may seem like 
a fairly trivial idea, but it takes on a new meaning when applied to transforma-
tions in the boundaries of the political sphere and in the exertion of state power. 
The argument made in the following is that the prevention perspective has fun-
damentally altered the intervention repertoire of the contemporary Western 
European state. Whether it concerns issues of crime, child abuse, dropouts, terror-
ist attacks, welfare diseases, problem neighbourhoods, climate change, epidemics, 
warfare (pre-emptive strikes), technological accidents or natural disasters, the 
preventive gaze produces new problem definitions, opens up new domains for 
state intervention, and, as a consequence, transforms the relation between state, 
society and citizens. 
The following diagnosis of the state is an attempt to integrate public ad-
ministration and political philosophy. This may give the following chapters a 
somewhat eclectic character: almost anthropological observations are alternated 
with seemingly rigid theoretical elaborations. There is a purpose for this, how-
ever, which stems from the conviction that public administration can never be 
reduced to a matter of (public) management, but is also always related to the way 
political power is exerted.  
 
Such a focus on the aspect of power in government and policymaking also implies 
a way of seeing, which tends to produce its own set of specific problem definitions 
and conclusions. In that sense, the author is never completely absent from his own 
research. This is not necessarily contrary to scientific scrutiny – in fact, one could 
even argue that every social science study has to analytically reduce the complex-
ity of reality in order to properly understand it. However, this realisation does 
oblige a researcher to treat his own words with some caution. 
During my research, I experienced that the line between caution and 
doubt was often a thin one. How can one ‘catch’ a preventive gaze? How can one 
recognise it, define it or even begin to talk about its impact on the state? I would 
certainly not have been able to shake the feeling of chasing a ghost without the 
critical, constructive and, perhaps above all, engaged supervision of Stavros 
Zouridis. Working with you for the past five years has been both a professional 
and personal privilege. 
A special thanks also goes out to Mark van Twist, whose often ominous 
but always invaluable comments have profoundly shaped my thinking, and to the 
Netherlands School of Public Administration, which gave me the time and oppor-
tunity to realise this project. Furthermore, I am grateful for the trust, cooperation 
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and openness of all those involved in my case studies in Rotterdam, Tilburg and 
The Hague. Furthermore, this study would not have been possible without the 
support and critical comments of Ellen Wiemer, Gerard Drosterij, Casper Geurtz, 
Bert Berghuis, Hans Nijhuis and Hans Gribnau. And finally, I would like to extend 
my gratitude to my colleagues at the NSOB and the Tilburg School of Politics and 
Public Administration, who have either consciously or unconsciously helped me to 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PREVENTION PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
“As soon as we accept the state, the political factor, the 
acts of authority, as a natural element in our daily lives, 
we stop to perceive these phenomena as problematic, 
and they no longer attract our attention. Our existence 
has become political to such an extent that we can no 
longer isolate the political factor and are no longer 
inclined to study it as a separate and problematic object 
of interest.” 
 
(Ernst Kossmann, Politieke theorie en geschiedenis, 1987)1 
 
 
1. Tales of the prevention reflex 
 
1.1. A spree killer in Germany2 
It was 9.30 AM on a Wednesday morning in March 2009 when 17-year old Tim K. 
opened fire on his classmates at a German secondary school in the town of Win-
nenden. Tim was a quiet and solitary pupil. He spent most of his free time playing 
violent video games. His father was a member of the local rifle club and owned 15 
rifles, which he kept at home. With one of these, Tim killed nine of his fellow 
classmates, three teachers and another three people on his flight from the police. 
In a final shoot-out with the police, Tim was wounded and eventually committed 
suicide (SZ, 11-3-2009). 
This incident was not the first spree killing in Germany. Similar incidents 
in 2002 and 2006 led schools to take increased security measures to protect their 
students, such as deploying CCTV-surveillance, closing entrance doors and accost-
ing strangers on the premises (SZ, 12-3-2009a). Almost immediately after the 
events in Winnenden, questions arose as to what had brought Tim K. to commit 
his acts (SZ, 12-3-2009b) and how these could have been prevented. How could 
schools be protected without turning them into high-security compounds? Is it the 
task of the  schools to reinforce their pupils’ feeling of belonging and self-esteem, 
given today’s society that is characterised by a surging number of broken homes, 
pressure to achieve and media consumption (SZ, 12-3-2009c)? Should gun laws 
be tightened and more strictly enforced, especially with regard to rifle club mem-
bers (SZ, 13-3-2009a)? Should violent computer games, of the kind Tim K. used to 
                                                   
1 My translation, RP. 
2 All data from the following four examples have been retrieved from large daily newspapers in 
Germany, the UK and the Netherlands with national circulation.  
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play, be banned (SZ, 13-3-2009b)? Should the psychologists who were treating 
Tim K. for a depression have known how dangerous he was (SZ, 12-3-2009d)? 
Even though several politicians and criminologists stated that complete 
security was an illusion and a further tightening of gun laws ineffective, action of 
some kind was obviously required: “Der Tag nach dem Amoklauf ist der Tag für 
die Frage: Wie lässt sich eine solche Bluttat verhindern?” (SZ, 12-3-2009e). The 
Federal Chancellor called upon parents and educators not to encourage violence 
and demanded more stringent controls on the possession of weapons (SZ, 15-3-
2009). Demands were made for stricter enforcement of the law requiring rifle 
club members to store their weapons separately from their ammunition in a safe 
at home (SZ, 12-3-2009f). And politicians stressed the importance of more data-
sharing on potential spree killers among the various authorities such as youth 
care services, the police and schools, the need for improved support for children 
with mental problems, and for social work at schools (SZ, 13-3-2009c). A few 
months after the Winnenden massacre, new gun laws were passed in the German 
Parliament, which included the introduction of a national register for owners of 
firearms, and the possibility to perform compliance checks on owners of firearms 
at home without prior suspicion or notice (SZ, 10-7-2009). 
 
Reflection: 
The case of the Winnenden spree killer shows how a ‘lone wolf’ can, with the 
proper equipment, cause death and destruction in the seemingly safe environ-
ment of a secondary school. Moreover, the Winnenden case is not an isolated case. 
The 1999 shooting at Columbine High School in Colorado (US) has become the 
archetypal example of an adolescent spree killing. Every now and then, a seem-
ingly random local community is shocked by the vicious acts of their fellow citi-
zens.3 The extensive media coverage underlines the impact these brutal massa-
cres have on the affected communities, as well as on the population’s more gen-
eral feelings of security. Politicians are quick to respond to these spree killings: a 
reaction of initial disbelief quickly gives way to a firm determination to protect 
society against future massacres. 
 
1.2. Child abuse in The Netherlands 
On December 12th 2010, Dutch public opinion was shocked by the news of a wide-
spread child abuse case in Amsterdam. At a press conference, the mayor reported 
the arrest of a 27-year old man charged with abusing between 30 and 50 infants 
                                                   
3 Recent cases of spree killers include the 2002 massacre at a secondary school in the German 
city of Erfurt, the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre in the US, the 2011 massacre in the Dutch town 
of Alphen aan den Rijn, and the 2011 massacre on the Norwegian island of Utøya. 
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and small children over the course of a few years at two separate day nurseries in 
the capital. A picture of the suspect was released to the press, to enable parents of 
possible other, as yet unknown, victims to contact the police. A total of 150 detec-
tives were assigned to the case. The same day, the newspapers reported that the 
judiciary had been given information about the suspect by a number of parents of 
small children back in 2008. No further action was taken at that time (NRC, 12-12-
2010).  
The media then probed the current controls and regulations that were in 
place regarding day nurseries: should the screening procedure of professional 
daycare workers be revised? Should there be more stringent regulations for day-
care centres? Should men be allowed to work as childcare providers? (NRC, 14-
12-2010). Contributing to this controversy was the news that the Municipal 
Health Service had filed fourteen reports with the city district about the shortage 
of personnel at the two nurseries concerned in the years preceding the scandal. It 
was unclear what the city district had done with these reports (NRC, 14-12-2010). 
Furthermore, on December 16th 2010, the newspapers reported that the suspect 
had also been convicted a few years ago in Germany for the possession and distri-
bution of child pornography. Apparently, the background security check which is 
carried out following a request for a certificate of good character – a requirement 
for a job at a daycare centre – failed to include checking any prior conviction re-
cords abroad (NRC, 16-12-2010). 
A few days later, the Dutch State Secretary to the Minister of Justice an-
nounced his intention to negotiate an agreement in the EU on the exchange of 
criminal files, with a view to preventing the issuance of certificates of good char-
acter to individuals with prior convictions elsewhere in the EU (NRC, 20-12-
2010). Soon after the presentation of the investigation report on the child abuse 
case, the ministers of Social Affairs and Justice announced a proposal that would 
require daycare centres to ensure that each group of children is at all times super-
vised by two childcare providers, to reduce the risk of child abuse (NRC, 20-4-
2011). And in July 2011, the same two ministers decided to introduce the perma-
nent screening of child nursery staff for criminal behaviour: the Judicial Documen-
tation System, in which all criminal offences are registered, will be linked to the 
names of all Dutch child nursery employees (NRC, 11-7-2011). 
 
Reflection: 
The child abuse case in Amsterdam shares a number of striking similarities with 
the case of the aforementioned German spree killer. Here again, politicians quickly 
vowed to take measures to prevent similar atrocities in the future. Moreover, only 
a few days were needed for public opinion and politics to formulate their re-
sponse. In both cases, a similar reflex was exhibited, which consisted of the follow-
20 
 
ing three questions: how could this have happened? Who had failed to prevent 
this? And how can we prevent similar incidents in the future? This prevention 
reflex is the almost immediate inclination to address persons, practices or proce-
dures which could (in hindsight) have prevented the incident and, subsequently, 
to propose measures to prevent similar incidents in the future (cf. WRR, 2011).  
 
1.3. Child murder in the UK 
In November 2008, the details of the murder of the 17-month old toddler ‘Baby P’ 
were made public in the criminal case against his mother, stepfather and the cou-
ple’s lodger. “His spine was broken ‘like a hinge’ with the level of force usually 
only suffered by victims of a car crash. [...] A post-mortem examination showed 
that one of Baby P’s teeth had been knocked out and swallowed, a finger and toe-
nail had been torn off, he was infected with lice and had bruises and cuts on his 
face and ears” (DT, 11-11-2008a). 
In his short life, Baby P had been structurally abused. He came to the at-
tention of the social services when he was nine months old, when he was regis-
tered in a child protection register. Over the course of eight months, Baby P was 
visited 60 times by care workers and was monitored by 28 different social service 
employees, health visitors, doctors and police officers. Several reports of possible 
abuse and neglect were made and Baby P’s mother was arrested twice on child 
cruelty charges. Despite the various signs, no decisive action was taken to stop the 
abuse (DT, 11-11-2008b). Instead, the children’s services stuck with the assump-
tion that Baby P was ‘accident prone’ (DT, 14-11-2008a). 
According to the British children’s minister, the child council in whose ‘at 
risk’ register Baby P had been registered should be held responsible for the failure 
to prevent Baby P’s death (DT, 12-11-2008a). The Director of the local Children’s 
Services and Local Safeguarding Children Board quickly came under political 
pressure to resign (12-11-2008b). Several days later, a whistleblower’s lawyers 
revealed that four ministers had been informed of the failure of the children’s 
services to follow the child protection procedures (DT, 14-11-2008b). In addition, 
government inspectors had warned about the inconsistent implementation of the 
measures taken after a child murder in 2002 to prevent child abuse. No action was 
taken following this warning (DT, 14-11-2008c). 
In reaction to the failed efforts to prevent Baby P’s death, the Children’s 
Secretary proposed measures to increase preventive efforts. The focus was on 
increased cooperation between social work, the police, general practitioners and 
child care, and on an increased awareness of the early signs of abuse and neglect: 
“In some places, there is still too little emphasis on early intervention and preven-
tion. [...] Organisational barriers and competing priorities appear to be getting in 
the way” (DT, 18-11-2008). Furthermore, the Local Government Association pro-
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posed to promote early intervention by advising social workers on how to identify 
and support troubled families (DT, 26-11-2008). More rigorous and compulsory 
on-the-job training for both social workers and management, and higher wages 
for social workers in “tough front line areas” were other elements of the govern-
ment’s professionalisation plan (DT, 6-12-2008). 
 
Reflection: 
In reaction to failed prevention, more prevention is proposed. This political re-
sponse to the death of Baby P reveals several new elements in understanding the 
prevention reflex. First of all, the fact that prevention had already been institu-
tionalised in the child protection system for several years suggests that preven-
tion does not solely come in the guise of a reflex, but also in more structurally 
internalised ways of looking at social reality. And second, the failure to prevent 
the toddler’s death reveales how prevention implies responsibility: caught in the 
gaze of prevention, the death of Baby P was not just a tragedy or coincidence, but 
an avoidable event for which people other than the actual murderers were 
(partly) to blame.  
 
1.4. International terrorism 
On Christmas Day 2009, a terrorist on board flight NW253 from Amsterdam to 
Detroit failed in his attempt to detonate the explosive substances he was carrying 
on his body. The passengers remained unharmed but shocked, and almost imme-
diately the question arose of how the man had managed to smuggle the explosive 
substances aboard. The security checks at Schiphol airport complied with all in-
ternational standards. However, a spokesperson of the Dutch National Coordina-
tor for Counterterrorism stated that current technology, such as metal detection 
gates, was incapable of detecting all possible dangerous objects or substances 
(NRC, 26-12-2009). 
The following day, December 27th, a managing director of Schiphol airport 
claimed that the use of a new security scan would enable the detection of any ob-
ject a person might be carrying on his or her body. Schiphol already had fifteen of 
these machines, but used them only incidentally and on a voluntary basis. A ma-
jority in the Dutch parliament felt that all passengers should be checked with this 
new type of ‘body scan’ (NRC, 27-12-2009). On December 30th, the Dutch minister 
of Justice announced that within three weeks, the fifteen security scans would be 
used for flights to the United States. Speaking on behalf of the minister of Justice, 
the minister of Internal Affairs stated: “It is no exaggeration to say that the world 
escaped from disaster. If you reflect afterwards on what could have happened, 
and how many lives could have been lost” (NRC, 30-12-2009). In the meantime, 
the US government admitted that mistakes had been made in security procedures: 
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the man responsible for the failed attack was on a list of sympathisers of terrorist 
organisations, but counterterrorist agencies failed to pick him out (NRC, 28-12-
2009). 
A few days later, on January 5th 2010, Schiphol announced the purchase of 
60 more security scanners. According to airport management, the scans would not 
only improve security but also prevent the unnecessary frisking of passengers. 
The scans were claimed to improve customer service and pose no infringement on 
privacy, as passengers show up as ‘anonymous dolls’ on the control screens (NRC, 
5-1-2010). However, current (2010) EU-privacy regulations do not allow manda-
tory security scanning. Passengers may, therefore, refuse to use the security scan 
on flights to the US. But if they do, they will be considered suspect and subjected 
to a 100% check, which includes extensive frisking, according to a Schiphol 
spokesperson (NRC Next, 6-1-2010). 
 
Reflection: 
The responsibility of prevention provides an incentive for public authorities to 
introduce potentially far-reaching measures. In the face of a possible disaster, 
such as a terrorist attack, a more stringent control of potential criminals and more 
extensive screening for risk factors appears to be a logical course of action. Seen 
from the perspective of prevention, state interventions are justified and necessary 
on the basis of presumptions instead of established facts or specific suspicions. 
Based on this line of argument and equipped with the power to protect public 
order, authorities dedicated to preventing harm can have a substantial impact on 
the general public.  
 
1.5. Outline 
These four examples of the prevention reflex or “risk regulation reflex” (WRR, 
2011) suggest that the prevention perspective alters the way societal problems 
are defined and subsequent policy measures are developed. In reaction to inci-
dents such as spree killings, child neglect, child abuse and terrorist attacks, ques-
tions arise as to the preventive measures need to be put in place to protect soci-
ety. Incidents are not perceived as tragic accidents, but instead as avoidable 
events.  
As a consequence, questions of blame and responsibility enter the public 
discourse: something must be done to prevent similar incidents in the future. If 
public authorities are viewed as responsible for organising preventive interven-
tions, this may have a profound impact on the way the state perceives society and 
intervenes in society. For the sake of prevention, regulations are tightened, secu-
rity measures are increased, the monitoring of risk factors is introduced, and fam-
ily support is strengthened. 
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The examples of the prevention reflex given above merely describe the re-
sponse to individual incidents. However, they also spark the question of whether 
there is a broader underlying pattern of prevention in the way the state relates to 
society. Has prevention permeated into policy terrains such as crime policy, youth 
policy, public health policy and terrorism policy in a structural way? And if so, has 
the introduction of a prevention perspective fundamentally transformed the con-
temporary image or appearance of the Western European state?  
These questions are examined in the following study. The research ques-
tion and outline are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. First, however, 
several remarks are made on the nature of the prevention perspective, its specific 





2. Prevention and the state 
 
2.1. Through the gaze of prevention 
The prevention perspective has a transformative power. As the aforementioned 
examples of the prevention reflex show, the political reaction to incidents is not 
merely a symbolic or ritual gesture towards a shocked society. It is also a call for a 
type of state intervention, which stems from a specific perspective on social real-
ity. Prevention transforms the nature of political problem definitions and of sub-
sequent state interventions. In the face of avoidable tragedy, something must be 
done. The perspective of prevention reframes ‘bad luck’ into ‘blame’ and ‘fate’ into 
‘risks’. In the words of Stone: “The concept of risk has become a key strategic 
weapon for pushing a problem out of the realm of accident and into the realm of 
purpose” (Stone, 2002:200). A risk “refers to threats or dangers attributed to per-
sons, technologies, or nature” and “to the chance of probability that these threats 
or dangers will result in adverse consequences for a specified party” (Ericson & 
Doyle, 2003:2). Prevention, then, is the activity undertaken to avert a risk. 
The transformative force of prevention is evident on many levels of poli-
cymaking. Consider, for instance, the way street furniture is designed.4 While 
street-lighting, traffic signs, fences and benches appear to be merely functional 
elements in the design of public spaces such as roads and squares, upon closer 
inspection they often also serve preventive purposes. Bollards or other obstacles 
may be strategically placed to physically prevent people from parking or entering 
a road. The use of transparent glass and proper lighting in entrance halls of 
apartment blocks reduces the risk of crime. And public benches may be designed 
in such a way that they are impossible to lie down on (to prevent vagrants from 
using them) and uncomfortable to sit on for an extended period of time (to pre-
vent loitering by groups of adolescents). 
Similar transformations are also visible on a completely different level 
and in less ‘innocent’ practices. Prevention is not only infused into ‘everyday’ poli-
cymaking, but also into more ‘exceptional’ state activities, such as the reasoning 
for warfare – especially in the case of so-called ‘pre-emptive strikes’. The 2004 
BBC-documentary The Power of Nightmares analyses the rationale behind the US 
government decision to launch the ‘War on Terrorism’, which, among other 
things, led to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Ac-
cording to this documentary, fundamental to these and other decisions in relation 
to the threat of Islamist fundamentalism was a shift from ‘what is’ to ‘what if’ poli-
cymaking. In much the same way, the ambition to prevent terrorist attacks has in 
                                                   
4 See, for instance, the website of the Dutch Police Residential Security Warranty; http://www. 
politiekeurmerk.nl/keurmerk; consulted d.d. 7-7-2011. 
25 
 
various countries led to a justification of anticipative criminal investigations with-
out a prior reasonable suspicion or showing probable cause that a crime has been, 
is or will be committed (Hirsch Ballin, 2012). 
In this type of reasoning on national defence, presumptions, rather than 
established facts, become the basis for decisions to launch attacks. This has far-
reaching consequences for the justification of war: from a preventive perspective, 
a pre-emptive strike is considered a superior option to waiting to be attacked. 
From a preventive perspective, it is even irrational to wait for such an attack: once 
a rhetorical relation has been established between a presumed future harm and 
the possibility to prevent it by means of a lesser evil, it is difficult to argue against 
pre-emptive strikes. 
 
The way we perceive the world has major consequences for the way we are in-
clined to act. Michel Foucault uses the notion of ‘the gaze’ to underline the impor-
tance of the perspectives we use for the production and justification of our inter-
ventions in social reality.5 In his 1963 study The Birth of the Clinic, discussing the 
way medical knowledge from the 18th century onward created a divide between 
the patient as a body and the patient as a person, Foucault uses this concept to 
describe “[...] the relation of situation and attitude to what is speaking and what is 
spoken about” (1994:xi). In doing so, he refers to the psychoanalytic origins of ‘the 
gaze’ as a scientific concept. For psychoanalyst Jacuqes Lacan (1988), the gaze 
constitutes a relationship between the viewer, who has a desire to intensely ob-
serve a subject, and the subject, who is aware of the possibilitity that he may be 
gazed at. Gazing is more than looking – it often stems from a desire to control a 
subject in some kind of way. A subject ‘captures the eye’ of the viewer and is si-
multaneously captured by it. 
In Foucault’s analysis, the medical gaze produces a new type of relation 
between medicine and the human body. The specific medical perception of a per-
son emphasises certain elements and characteristics of the body, organises these 
                                                   
5 As such, Foucault’s notion of ‘the gaze’ is tightly related to the notion of ‘frame’, which is a 
common concept in social science (e.g. Goffman, 1974; Edelman, 1977; Schön & Rein, 1994). 
‘Frames’ are the perspectives through which people interpret and ‘make sense’ (e.g. Weick, 
1995) of the world surrounding them. ‘Framing’, then, is the process through which people, 
either consciously or otherwise, construct these perspectives. Moreover, the use of a specific 
‘frame’ affects problem definitions and the actual outcome or choices people make (e.g. Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974, 1981).  
The differences between the notions ‘gaze’ and ‘frame’ are, to a large extent, a matter 
of detail. The notion of ‘the gaze’ is used here since it has the connotation of a more inescapable 
and imperative ‘way of seeing’. The point here is that ‘a gaze’ is, by and large, blind to alterna-
tive ways of seeing – people are ‘caught’ in a certain ‘gaze’. By contrast, a ‘frame’ might also be 
considered a communication technique to deliberately and strategically build or ‘reframe’ a 
certain (political) message (e.g. Lakoff, 2004). 
26 
 
in causal schemes, makes them visible in medical language and research, and si-
multaneously suppresses alternative interpretations: “As soon as one used the ear 
or the finger to recognize on the living body what was revealed on the corpse by 
dissection, the description of diseases, and therefore therapeutics took a quite 
new direction” (Daremberg, cited by Foucault, 2003:164). The human body be-
comes understood as the source of illness and as object of intervention for medi-
cine. The medical gaze transforms the understanding of disease: “Disease breaks 
away from the metaphysics of evil, to which it had been related for centuries” 
(Foucault, 2003:169). As a consequence, the medical gaze also produces a new 
ideal, an image of man which is to be achieved by medicine: “Medicine must no 
longer be confined to a body of techniques for curing ills and of the knowledge 
that they require; it will also embrace a knowledge of healthy man, that is, a study 
of non-sick man and a definition of the model man” (Foucault, 1994:34). 
 
In much the same way, the ‘gaze’ or ‘act of seeing’ (Foucault, 1994:ix) underlying 
the prevention reflex shapes the way social reality is understood and acted upon. 
What is captured in the preventive gaze is a world filled with avoidable risks. The 
preventive gaze constitutes a relation between the viewer – in this study: the  
state – and the presumed causes of future harm. This structuring of perceptions 
and subsequent production of preferred interventions turns the gaze into “[...] the 
eye that knows and decides, the eye that governs” (Foucault, 1994:89). The pre-
sumption examined in this study is that the governing potential of the preventive 
gaze transforms the role of the state once the gaze takes hold of the political 
sphere. Different problems will be defined, different solutions will be proposed 
and different state interventions will be executed.  
This study mirrors the line of reasoning in James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a 
State (1998). His basic argument rests on the assumption that a basic belief pat-
tern is responsible for the production of certain kinds of policy outcomes. In 
Scott’s study, this belief pattern is the high-modernist ideal of improving the hu-
man condition by means of rational planning – as was executed in 20th century 
urban planning, in Soviet collectivisation in agriculture, or in Tanzanian compul-
sory villagisation of nomadic tribes. Seen through the eyes of rational planning, 
old medieval cities are chaotic, fragmented little farms are ineffective, and a no-
madic life is incompatible with modern citizenship. In other words, chaos, ineffec-
tiveness and tribalism are unacceptable in the modernist perspective.  
It is suggested here that the preventive gaze produces a similar mecha-
nism: an awareness of possible future harm and the identification of its determi-
nants create an imperative for the state to act. Once social phenomena have been 
identified as determinants of future harm, a state of blissful ignorance almost in-
evitably gives way to a state of prevention. In the face of known or conceivable 
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future harm, something must be done and prevention emerges as the logical 
course of action. Hence, the following is not an inquiry into what a risk is, but of 
“what is done in the name of risk” (Baker & Simon, 2002:18). 
 
2.2. A boundless concept 
Defining prevention is a necessary, but treacherous affair. In this study, preven-
tion will be understood to refer to intentionally taking measures with the objec-
tive of avoiding certain future events or to avert certain future developments. This 
definition focuses on an explicit preventive intention, not on the (unintended) 
preventive effect of an action.6 Prevention implies a belief in a certain ability to 
anticipate the future7 and in a certain ability to choose among alternative courses 
of action in order to avert this future. It depends on the construction of a causal 
scheme between future events and actions taken to avoid them. Consequently, 
prevention implies the potential of backward reasoning to avert a certain imagin-
able future. Prevention takes a not (yet) existing reality as the basis for interven-
tions in the present (cf. Van der Steen, 2009; In ‘t Veld, 2010). 
The interpretation of the future is inherently subject to perception and so-
cial construction. Complete foresight is almost never attainable. Moreover, the 
social interpretation of risks is subject to processes of underestimation and over-
estimation, and is therefore never completely rational or objective. People may 
have cognitive biases when assessing risks, perhaps because events which can be 
easily brought to mind are perceived as more likely than other events, or because 
people prefer risk aversion over a gamble with a higher expected utility, or be-
cause people have a greater concern for immediate than for long-term threats (e.g. 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Slovic c.s., 1982; Koger & Winter, 2010).  
Furthermore, the individual assessment of risks takes place in interaction 
with broader social and cultural processes and factors, such as public distortion or 
social amplification of risks as a result of intensive media coverage of crime or 
disasters (e.g. Kasperson c.s., 1988; Vasterman, 2004).8 In short, what exactly con-
                                                   
6 Which also makes this an explorative and not an evaluative study. 
7 Which relates prevention to the concept of risk, or the possibility that a certain activity or 
development will lead to an undesirable outcome. After all, “accidents happen, risks are caused” 
(Kemshall, 2002:8). 
8 Consider for instance the case of the 2009 flu pandemic. Ironically enough, the media attention 
sparked by the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus mimicked the dynamic of a typical epidem-
ic (Vasterman c.s., 2011:68). In April 2009, the discovery of the virus led to widespread concern 
about the possible consequences. A period of a few months followed in which both the virus and 
the media attention spread rapidly. Reports on new cases of the flu popped up all over the 
world and by June 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the flu outbreak an 
epidemic.  
This was also the period in which experts and governments started talking about the 
controlling the outbreak. For instance, the Dutch government not only started mass-media 
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stitutes a risk essentially remains contested. To some extent, the Thomas theorem 
is applicable here: “It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct 
– if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & 
Thomas, 1928). 
 
Prevention has a complex relation to knowledge. On the one hand, the selection 
and definition of risks depends more on social and cultural factors than on knowl-
edge (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). On the other hand, prevention implies the 
knowledge or at least awareness that certain risks exist and that these can be as-
sessed in terms of their probability and possible consequences. Risk analysis can 
sometimes even fall back on statistically calculated probabilities: the chance of an 
accident occurring times the expected loss in case the accident occurs. This for-
mula is, for instance, used in flood prevention, which is commonly based on the 
trade-off between the probability of a major flood occurring and the costs of fur-
ther protection to decrease this probability. Just as often, however, risks analysis 
is a matter of political, professional or personal assessment. 
A risk may be a conceptual construct, but it is to be distinguished from 
fundamental uncertainty. A risk, as subjective as it may be, always implies a cer-
tain theory with regard to future developments and possible courses of action to 
avert this development. This, of course, does not mean that this theory has to be 
correct to serve as a basis for preventive measures. A state of uncertainty, how-
ever, lacks even this theory. Uncertainty presumes an absence of knowledge of 
what might happen in the future and a fundamental incapability to reduce uncer-
tainty by gathering more knowledge (Knight, 1921). 
Uncertainty may, however, also be a basis for action or deliberate inaction 
to avert future harm. This is exemplified by the ‘precautionary principle’, which 
was developed in the field of climate change and codified in the 1992 United Na-
tions ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’: “Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation”.9 The three-fold negation constituting the precautionary 
                                                                                                                                 
campaigns and selected risk groups among the population, but also ordered the purchase of 34 
million vaccines – enough to vaccinate the entire Dutch population twice. During the last few 
months of 2009, the media attention in the Netherlands reached its peak as several deaths were 
reported, allegedly related to the flu outbreak. Only by the time the threat of the H1N1 virus had 
subsided in early 2011, did critical rather than worried media coverage began to filter through – 
for instance, on the conflict of interests of some leading virologists (Vasterman c.s., 2011). 
9 http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163  
consulted d.d. 9-7-2011.  
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principle (no scientific certainty is no reason not to intervene)10 serves as an ar-
gument to avoid any activity of which it is uncertain whether it will lead to future 
harm, or to take action if it is uncertain whether doing nothing will lead to future 
harm (cf. Harremoës c.s., 2001).11  
The conceptual distinction between ‘prevention’ and ‘precaution’ lies in 
the acceptance of uncertainty as a justification for action: whereas prevention 
depends on the identification of risks, precaution is already justified if it is uncer-
tain whether risks are involved (Trouwborst, 2009:117). The adage of precaution 
is: it is better to be safe than sorry (Wiener, in Paustenbach, 2002:1513). In the 
remainder of this study, the notion of ‘prevention’ will be used unless a certain 
practice qualifies as an obvious case of ‘precaution’. 
 
Prevention has several conceptual characteristics, which are important for under-
standing its transformative force. First of all, prevention is a boundless concept. 
There is no inherent boundary to the range of preventive interventions. Preven-
tion can have virtually any phenomenon as its object. There is no a priori limita-
tion to the number of risks which can be identified to avert a certain future devel-
opment or phenomenon. Seen through the gaze of prevention, a potentially infi-
nite number of phenomena can be relevant objects of intervention. Put differently, 
the perspective of prevention has the potential to render Mill’s ‘harm principle’ 
absurd: if a state may ‘only’ use its power against a citizen’s will to prevent harm 
to others, the preventive gaze transforms this principle into a license for unbri-
dled interventions instead of an argument to limit state interventions. 
Second, the boundless character of prevention suggests a sense of immun-
ity. There is no criterion to decide how much should be done: “one can never 
know whether one is doing enough to prevent a hazard from occurring. Even after 
                                                   
10 Wiener (in Paustenbach, 2002) identifies two other versions of the precautionary principle in 
the regulation of, for instance, environmental pollution and medicine. Next to the more or less 
modest interpretation of the principle as ‘uncertainty does not justify inaction’, he distinguishes 
two more ‘aggressive’ interpretations. First, precaution can also mean ‘uncertain risk justifies 
action’. Here, precaution becomes a ‘positive’ adage: “If there is (1) a threat, which is (2) uncer-
tain, then (3) some kind of action (4) is mandatory” (Sandin, 1999:889). Second, precaution 
may even mean ‘shifting the burden of proof’. This implies that an activity should be forbidden 
unless a certain standard of proof is met by the opponent (Wiener, in Paustenbach, 2002:1514-
1518). 
11 However, as Sunstein (2005) makes clear, there is an inherent contradiction in the precau-
tionary principle. The principle does not provide a means to select specific risks and hence 
treats all risks equally. Logically speaking, this would prevent us from undertaking any action 
whatsoever. After all, if we were to consider the possible consequences of all our actions, no 
course of action can be regarded completely free of risk (cf. Saramago, 2005:78). Instead of 
giving guidance, the precautionary principle paralyses: “it purports to give guidance, but it fails 
to do so, because it condemns the very steps that it requires” (Sunstein, 2006:14). 
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a hazard has occurred, one is still left with the question of how much more action 
would have been necessary to have prevented it, and whether such action would 
have been within the bounds of ‘reasonable’ behaviour” (Ravetz, in Dierkes c.s., 
1980:47). Consider the threat of terrorist attacks: how to evaluate the terrorist 
attack that never occurred? The absence of an attack might lead to a continuation 
of security measures: the problem is absent precisely because of preventive 
measures. And suppose a terrorist attack should occur. A probable reaction would 
be an increase in security measures: obviously, prevention has failed because not 
enough was done. In short, every outcome of an evaluation may in principle lead 
to arguments for the continuation or further increase of preventive measures. 
Since prevention rests on possibilities and presumptions rather than observable 
facts, the justification for state intervention threatens to become based on statis-
tics, assessment, subjectivity and fear. 
And third, prevention has a self-reinforcing logic. This self-reinforcement 
is not a determined natural law,12 but nonetheless a clearly recognisable imma-
nent characteristic of the concept of prevention. As there is no way of knowing 
whether enough is being done to prevent an undesirable future, prevention has 
the tendency to produce more prevention. At the very moment a causal scheme is 
constructed between an undesirable future and its possible determinants, this 
expansive logic may take effect: seen through a preventive gaze, the effectiveness 
of interventions is presumed to increase when measures are taken as early as 
possible and when the range of measures is as broad as possible to cover all iden-
tified risks. 
 
2.3. Prevention in the late-modern context 
Prevention can be applied to a seemingly unlimited range of human activities. 
Prevention is expressed in undisputed and everyday acts such as remembering to 
bring an umbrella when rain is expected, and using bicycle locks to prevent theft. 
Furthermore, prevention is certainly not a new or merely contemporary phe-
nomenon. The prevention of theft by means of locks or weaponry, for example, is 
by no means limited to a specific historical era. The plea for prevention in prov-
erbs such as ‘when the steed is stolen, the stable door is locked’ and ‘prevention is 
better than cure’ suggest a long tradition of prevention in the private sphere. Gov-
ernments have since long taken up preventive measures in their intervention 
                                                   
12 A possible counterexample here concerns developments in Dutch flood prevention. For a long 
time, flood prevention implied building dikes, dams and barriers against high water. However, 
recently a more ‘resilient’ strategy is being applied to prevent the major flooding of rivers. In-
stead of trying to prevent any flooding at all costs, government now appoints designated areas 
for ‘controlled flooding’ to prevent major flooding elsewhere (see http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ 
onderwerpen/water-en-veiligheid/ruimte-voor-de-rivier; consulted d.d. 6-6-2012).  
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repertoire as well. Examples include the Medieval practice of closing city gates at 
night to prevent attacks, or of late 19th century efforts in public hygiene (such as 
sewerage) to prevent epidemics in densely populated areas. Even the existence of 
the state itself can be understood as an effort to prevent “a war of all against all” 
(Hobbes, 1651). 
However, there are several arguments which suggest that the prevention 
perspective especially relates to the characteristics of our contemporary time and 
place. Prevention may be understood as an important ‘cultural undercurrent’ of 
late-modern Western European societies.13 The idea that prevention is a contin-
gent way of dealing with the future and with risks is based on cultural theory’s 
insight that the identification, definition and selection of risks is always the prod-
uct of a specific social order (cf. Douglas, 2002:44). What counts as a risk is the 
outcome of a contingent cultural setting or cultural bias.14 There is no such thing 
as a threat or risk ‘an sich’ (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
For instance, modern societies have a very specific way of reasoning in the 
face of risks, which sets them apart from pre-modern societies: “Moderns […] 
follow a line of reasoning from effects back to material causes, primitives follow a 
line from misfortune to spiritual beings” (Douglas, 2005:3). The causal schemes 
underlying preventive practices typically follow this modern line of reasoning. In 
the words of Dutch philosopher Jos de Mul, modern culture strives for a ‘domesti-
cation of fate’ (De Mul, 2006). This attitude is, for instance, in contrast with the 
attitude of the ancient Greeks, who in their tragedies incorporated it into their 
worldview as an inevitable element of human being; and with the Christian atti-
tude of ‘humble submission’, in which fate is understood as being the will of God.15 
                                                   
13 Hence, prevention can also have a therapeutical function: it provides a sense of control in a 
world in which we have lost faith in a divine ‘grand plan’. Whether or not prevention is effective 
does not matter in this perspective. 
14 For instance, while late-modern societies show a low risk tolerance for crime and terrorism, 
taking risks is the mainstay of the free-market economy. And Boutellier (2002) points out the 
peculiar combination in contemporary societies of a high level of demand for security and a 
high level of what he calls ‘vitality’ – a combination exemplified by the image of a bungee 
jumper on the cover of his book: on the one hand, people have a longing for action and danger, 
on the other hand, they expect the bungee cord to be subject to strict government regulation. 
15 An interesting example of the difference between the modern and the Christian outlook on 
fate comes from the reaction to the vicious acts of a Dutch spree killer. On April 9th 2011, a 24-
year old man with an automatic rifle fired roughly 100 times at a shopping crowd, killing six 
people and injuring a further seventeen before committing suicide. The man was a member of a 
local rifle club and had a permit to keep five firearms at home (NRC, 9-4-2011).  
Over the following days, Dutch public opinion was caught up in a prevention reflex. 
However, one explicitly religious Dutch newspaper expressed a different view. In its editorial it 
did not, as most other newspapers, focus on who might be held responsible. Instead, it re-
minded its readers that incidents like these urge us to reflect upon the meaning of death and life 
after death (Reformatorisch Dagblad, d.d. 11-4-2011). 
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Properly understood, prevention is not merely the domestication, but even the 
denial of fate. In the preventive gaze, the notion of fate is replaced by an idiom of 
blame and responsibility. The possibility of ‘fate’ is denied when the image of an 
undesirable future is not the outcome, but the starting point of human action. 
 
Several analyses of late-modern cultures and societies have pointed out how the 
optimistic Enlightenment origins of modernity have in recent years been comple-
mented by a more pessimistic outlook on the outcomes of (collective) human be-
haviour. The ‘domestication of fate’ (De Mul, 2006) implies a belief in the human 
capability to control the future, for instance through rational planning and taming 
of the forces of nature. According to Beck (1986), what characterises late moder-
nity is that exactly this belief in the positive outcome of human behaviour is called 
into question – even though the very idea of prevention suggests this belief is to 
some extent still intact. 
In the period of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck, 1986:14; cf. Beck c.s., 
1994), modernity has itself become the object of reflection and reconsideration. 
Human intervention is no longer safeguarded against the critical stance character-
istic for modern man. In the words of Giddens: “The reflexivity of modern social 
life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and rein-
formed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus con-
stitutively altering their character” (2009:38). Beck illustrates this by showing 
how the very efforts to liberate man from the forces of nature have caused the 
emergence of new and difficult to control risks. The process of industrialisation 
may have led to the extinction of mass poverty in the western world, but at the 
same time, it has produced new types of technological, environmental and nuclear 
risks. A ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1986) is a society in which the foundations of welfare 
are at the same time understood as important causes of potentially destructive 
risks.  
The idea of ‘reflexive modernisation’ is not necessarily limited to techno-
logical, environmental or physical risks. This study addresses the question of what 
negative effects contemporary society produces in terms of human interaction 
and direct human behaviour (cf. Garland, in Ericson & Doyle, 2003:69). These 
‘social risks’ include crime, unhealthy lifestyles, terrorism and child abuse. As with 
technological risks, ‘reflexive modernisation’ focuses on the risks ‘produced’ by 
contemporary late-modern society. This shift in perception from the upsides to 
the downsides of modernisation coincides with structural transformations of 
modern societies. Just as the focus on technological risks was sparked by the 
emergence of mass scale industrialisation and environmental pollution, the focus 
on social risks may be understood as a reaction to the way individualised and 
well-faring societies seem to ‘produce’ mass crime, as a reaction to the disintegra-
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tion of social cohesion and control, and new public health issues, as a result of the 
rise of non-physical labour and the availability of unhealthy food (e.g. Van Dijk c.s., 
2009; Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008). 
 
The emergence of ‘reflexive modernisation’ has important consequences for the 
way contemporary social reality is understood. Social risks are seen as an inevita-
ble part of late-modern societies. They are ‘among us’ and a part of everyday so-
cial life (cf. Wiener, in Paustenbach, 2002). Other people might cause annoyance, 
might commit crimes, might catch a contagious disease, might cause accidents, 
might raise their children poorly, might take advantage of welfare state provisions 
or might not contribute to the welfare of society according to their capabilities. A 
reflexive attitude transforms our experience of society into a form of living to-
gether which is inherently vulnerable to infractions caused by its very constitutive 
elements: social risks are perceived as an intrinsic by-product of human behaviour. 
The awareness of social risks does not imply acceptance of these risks as a 
‘fact of life’. Instead, the reflexive perspective is complemented by a preventive 
perspective. As the aforementioned examples of the prevention reflex suggest, the 
striving to ‘domesticate fate’ (De Mul, 2006) is still very much a dominant charac-
teristic of contemporary political culture. In other words, modernity is not a thing 
of the past. In late-modern societies, the modernist scheme of thought is not only 
applied to threats external to human behaviour (such as natural disasters and 
illness), but also to threats as a result of human behaviour. In a way, the preven-
tive gaze can be understood as the peculiar combination of a pessimistic outlook 
on the potential consequences of human action and the optimistic belief in the 
aversion of these undesirable consequences. 
 
2.4. Prevention and the state 
The following study is not a sociological diagnosis of the cultural meaning of pre-
vention, nor does it intend to suggest that prevention is something entirely new in 
the intervention repertoire of governments. Instead, this study aims for a diagno-
sis of the state and focuses explicitly on analysing the structural impact of the pre-
vention perspective on the role of the contemporary Western European state. The 
underlying premise is that the preventive gaze produces new problem definitions 
and identifies new objects of intervention, thereby altering our contemporary 
political reality and the way a state relates to society and citizens. 
Our present-day understanding of the state may be in need of re-
conceptualisation. The state, defined by Weber as “[…] diejenige menschliche Ge-
meinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes […] das Monopol legitie-
mer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht” (Weber, 
1994:36), is a crucial concept in contemporary political reality. The modern rela-
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tion between society, territory and governing authority is determined by the exis-
tence of a state. Citizenship depends on the recognition of individuals by the state. 
The rule of law is enforced by the state. Welfare services are provided by the state. 
Political power depends to a large extent on the existence of a state apparatus. In 
short, the state is a crucial entity for our security, welfare, rights and politics. 
Because the state determines to a considerable extent the outline of soci-
ety, transformations in the range and depth of state interventions may have sub-
stantial consequences for the structuration of society. The boundless, self-
referential and self-reinforcing tendencies of the preventive gaze have the poten-
tial to expand the range of state activities as a result of the potentially endless 
reservoir of risks, and to increase the depth of activities as a consequence of the 
ambition to intervene in society before actual problems occur.  
The increased incursion of prevention into the realm of the state is not 
necessarily a bad thing. However, it is never a neutral or innocent development. 
Its consequences can be assessed in both positive and negative terms. For in-
stance, Van den Brink (2006:23-28) sees surveillance and prevention as logical 
strategies for upholding public order in a society characterised by assertive be-
haviour in the public domain, by declining social control, and in certain 
neighbourhoods, by downward spirals of disorder and degradation. By contrast, 
Frissen (2007:90) links preventive interventions on the part of the state with 
practices of normalisation and discipline. On the one hand, prevention seems a 
logical and sensible course of action in the face of social risks. On the other, pre-
vention may, under specific circumstances, lead to undesirable situations, as when 
other values – such as privacy or the rule of law – threaten to become oppressed. 
Precisely this contested appreciation of prevention underlines the importance of a 
study designed to shed more light on the consequences of the prevention perspec-
tive for the contemporary state.  
 
A study into the transformation in state interventions is related to a broader body 
of knowledge and analysis in contemporary political, sociological and public ad-
ministration research. First of all, there are scholars who focus on vulnerability, 
risk and prevention as defining notions of contemporary political culture (e.g. 
Furedi, 1997; Garland, 2006; Schinkel, 2007; Pieterman, 2008). For instance, 
Pieterman (2008) introduces the notion of a ‘precautionary culture’ to mark a 
new phase in our attitude towards risks. In his view, the 19th century was marked 
by a culture of individual accountability to carry the burden of whatever fate 
brought, and the 20th century was characterised by the establishing of (collective) 
insurance schemes to accommodate the consequences of provable risks. However, 
the end of the 20th century saw the rise of a culture in which politicians have a 
moral responsibility for the prevention of risks. According to Pieterman, the risk 
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culture and the precautionary culture exist side by side at the beginning of the 21st 
century.16 Both cultures deal with risk, but insurance is a compensation mecha-
nism for harm, should this occur, whereas prevention and precaution aim to 
tackle the actual or perceived causes of harm in order to prevent this from occur-
ring in the first place.  
Second, there are scholars who focus on the emergence of prevention as 
an important strategy in specific policy domains. In the public health domain, sev-
eral authors have pointed out the increased importance of the social determinants 
of health to prevent obesity, cardiovascular diseases and cancer in affluent socie-
ties (e.g. Wilkinson & Marmot, 2003; Keller, 2008; Mackenbach, 2011). And in the 
field of criminology, a shift in focus to individual behaviour as an object of preven-
tive crime policies and integrated security policies can be discerned (e.g. Garland, 
2001; Boutellier, 2002; Sherman c.s., 2002; Welsh & Farrington, 2006).17 This 
study aims to broaden the scope to a more general understanding of the way the 
preventive gaze transforms the role of the state (cf. Van Gunsteren, 2008; Huster 
& Rudolph, 2008).18 
A third relevant body of knowledge does include prevention in analyses of 
more fundamental shifts in our understanding of the contemporary state. Two 
important strands of thought stand out. The first of these concerns the emergence 
of the ‘regulatory state’. True, the regulation of public hygiene and food safety 
originated in the late 19th century and environmental pollution regulations date 
from the 1970s, but it was not until the 1980s that a broader development to-
wards a ‘regulatory state’ was seen in response to concerns about the efficiency of 
the welfare state as provider of public goods (e.g. Majone, 1994; 1997). Instead of 
                                                   
16 There is much to be said for the thesis that the 19th century culture of individual responsibil-
ity still exists as well: “[…] a unitary, responsible self-agent must be supposed to exist because it 
is intellectually, juridically, and morally necessary [for our culture]” (Douglas, 2005:220). 
17 Besides attention for specific policy fields, there is also a substantial body of literature on 
actual preventive strategies covering various policy domains. These strategies range from crime 
prevention through environmental design (e.g. Jeffrey, 1971; Newman, 1972; Kelling & Wilson, 
1982; Atlas, 2008), to the monitoring of behaviour and surveillance in the public domain (e.g. 
Foucault, 1975; Lyon, 2001; 2007), and to various modes of ‘soft paternalism’ and ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ to influence the choice architecture in every-day decisions regarding health and 
wealth (e.g. Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; WRR, 2009; Schinkel & Van 
Houdt, 2010; Tiemeijer, 2011). 
18 While the latter authors focus mainly on the domain of ‘Gefahrenabwehr’, Van Gunsteren 
stresses the broad range of preventive interventions developed by the contemporary state: 
“Prevention marches on, not only in the domain of counterterrorism, but much broader: in the 
domain of youth and family, where families are monitored to make early interventions possible 
when children are in danger; in health care, where preventive services are part of the general 
health care insurance; in the issue of the ageing population, where politicians insist on taking 
measures now in order to prevent ageing from becoming an intractable problem in the future” 
(2008:446; my translation, RP). 
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directly intervening in society through ‘taxation and spending’, the state began to 
rely on ‘rule making’ (Majone, 1997:139): the regulatory state leaves the organisa-
tion and management of public goods (such as health care, social security and 
infrastructure) to (semi-)private actors and relies on sets of regulations to man-
age these actors ‘at a distance’ (e.g. Majone, 1994, 1997; Vonk & Tollenaar, 2010).  
A practical implication of regulation is a focus on the risks produced by 
the behaviour of (semi-)private actors. Risk-based monitoring and rule making 
are crucial in the regulation of such domains as food safety, environmental pollu-
tion, health care quality, financial markets and critical infrastructures (e.g. Power, 
1997, 2004; Braithwaite, 2000; Wiener, in Paustenbach, 2002; Gollier & Treich, 
2003). However, whereas prevention is seen as a by-product of a move towards 
rule making and governing ‘at a distance’ in the framework of the regulatory state 
(e.g. Majone, 1997:147), the present study focuses on prevention to understand 
the contemporary governing of social relations.19 Prevention is not studied as a 
by-product of another development, but as the dominant mode of governing itself. 
A second strand of thought with a strong focus on prevention centres 
around notions such as ‘positive welfare’ (Giddens, 1998), ‘enabling welfare’ (Gil-
bert, 2002), ‘new welfare’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2008) and ‘social investment state’ 
(Engelen c.s., 2007). These notions have been developed to grasp recent trans-
formations in the welfare state, which share the objective to move towards a new 
division of responsibilities between state and citizen to prevent risks related to 
unemployment, illness and welfare. The present study is related to this emergence 
of ‘social risk management’ (Schmid, 2006), but expands this analysis of state de-
velopment beyond the confines of the welfare state. The impact of the preventive 
gaze is also presumed to have an effect on such domains as crime and security 
policy. In doing so, it understands the contemporary image of the state not as a 
progression of the welfare state, but rather as the consequence of a specific way of 
looking at social reality – through the gaze of prevention. 
 
This study is related to the aforementioned strands of thought, but differs in the 
fact that it aims to explore the transformative effect of the preventive gaze on the 
characteristics of both the tasks undertaken by a state and the specific activities it 
develops to perform these tasks. Obviously, however,, this study does not mean to 
imply that all state activities can be understood as preventive as if this constituted 
the essence of government. Government is always much more heterogenous and 
hybrid than that. Instead, this study focuses on one aspect of contemporary gov-
                                                   
19 Even though there is considerable debate as to what can be covered by the term ‘regulation’. 
There are certain interpretations which do include broader attempts to manage social relations 
and modify behaviour (Black, 2002). 
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ernment, which is presumed to have substantially influenced our understanding 
of the state. The underlying assumption is that the logic of prevention differs fun-
damentally from the logic underlying common conceptualisations of the contem-
porary state, such as the constitutional and the welfare state (cf. Ewald, in Baker & 
Simon, 2002). If this assumption is correct, our traditional view of state activities 
– either as a constitutional or as a welfare state – is insufficient to describe the 
nature of preventive ambitions and activities. 
The constitutional state provides the legal framework for a state’s ‘Ein-
griffsverwaltung’ – that is, the administration of justice and subsequent punish-
ment of criminals. And the welfare state contains a state’s ‘Leistungsverwaltung’ 
or positive obligation to provide welfare services and social security (Schröder, in 
Seerden & Stroink, 2002). Whereas the administration of justice is a reaction 
mechanism to guilt, prevention implies acting before a crime is committed. And 
whereas welfare services are a compensation mechanism for fate (either in the 
form of a posteriori compensation for risks of illness and unemployment or in the 
form of a priori compensation for unequal opportunities), prevention implies 
acting upon the actual causes of potential future harm. 
More specifically, preventive interventions can take three distinct forms – 
analogous to the common distinctions made in public health and criminology be-
tween primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (e.g. Mackenbach & Van der 
Maas, 2008:192; Van Dijk c.s., 2009):  
1. Prevention as taking measures to avoid the occurrence of an undesirable 
phenomenon or development. 
2. Prevention as early detection of undesirable phenomena or developments 
in order to make early interventions possible.  
3. Prevention as taking measures to reduce the negative impact of harm af-
ter this has already occurred – in other words: to prevent further harm.  
On all three levels, the preventive gaze can ‘produce’ new state interventions or 
lead to new impulses for existing state activities, which do not fit into existing 
conceptualisations of the state. Primary prevention can take the form of informa-
tion campaigns to prevent obesity or of restructuring the public domain to reduce 
the risks of criminal behaviour. Examples of secondary prevention are population 
screening to detect early signs of cancer, and early intervention programmes for 
at-risk adolescents who are in danger of sliding off into a criminal career. And 
tertiary prevention can take the form of personalised trajectories to prevent alco-
hol addicts from relapsing or to prevent recidivism of juvenile offenders.  
 
2.5. Research question and outline 
The previous discussion suggests a transformation of the tasks undertaken by the 
state and of the specific activities it develops to perform these tasks – as a conse-
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quence of the introduction of the preventive gaze in the sphere of politics and 
policymaking. What was previously defined as a fact of life or a tragic incident has 
now been transformed into an avoidable phenomenon. Interventions are devel-
oped to come to grips with the identified risks underlying these undesirable phe-
nomena. Prevention may, historically speaking, not be a new phenomenon, but its 
increasing influence on the state is presumed to be of a recent date and its conse-
quences for our contemporary political reality have yet to be studied. 
Existing conceptions of the state fall short in describing the nature of in-
terventions ‘produced’ by the preventive gaze. For instance, instead of the a pos-
teriori administration of justice, prevention implies taking measures before 
crimes are committed. And instead of compensation for fate in the form of social 
security (a posteriori) or the creation of a level playing field (a priori), prevention 
in the realm of care and health implies taking measures before fate strikes or tak-
ing measures designed to eliminate the causes of unequal opportunities. In short, 
the preventive gaze has the potential to fundamentally transform both the repres-
sive and caring sphere of the contemporary Western European state. The central 
question to be examined in the following research is: How can the impact of the 
increasing dominance of the preventive gaze on the contemporary Western Euro-
pean state be understood? 
This study intends to be theory generating and has three main objectives. 
First and foremost, it aims to describe and reconstruct the way the preventive 
gaze has transformed the image and appearance of the state. Second, it aims to 
discuss this transformation in its spatial and historical context, more specifically 
late-modern Western European societies. And third, this study aims to discuss the 
broader implications of the rise of prevention for the relation between state and 
society.20  
 
Before rounding off this chapter, some remarks should be made regarding what a 
transformation of the state actually implies. According to political scientist and 
historian Samuel Finer, the nature and level of penetration of a state into society is 
constituted by two elements: the range of tasks and activities, and the depth of 
these tasks and activities (Finer, 1997:63). Taking this framework as a basis for 
the following analysis, two tentative or ‘sensitising’ (Blumer, 1954) presumptions 
on the transformation of our understanding of the contemporary Western Euro-
                                                   
20 It should be made clear from the outset that this study does not aim to pass judgement on the 
accuracy of the definition of societal problems within the analysed political or policy context. 
The definitions and perceptions of social reality used by politicians, policymakers and street-
level bureaucrats are the starting point of analysis. Moreover, this research does not intend to 
evaluate the effectiveness of preventive strategies in policymaking.  
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pean state are formulated. These sensitising ideas aim to give guidance in the 
analysis of the empirical data. 
The first sensitising presumption is that the preventive gaze leads to an 
expansion of state activities. Prevention implies a responsibility for a specific type 
of action, which expands state activities both in quantitative terms and in terms of 
a new type of activity. Based on the previous discussion, the state’s responsibili-
ties are presumed to expand beyond the existing frameworks of the constitutional 
and the welfare state. Neither the punishment of undesirable behaviour nor com-
pensation for fate are abandoned, but are now complemented by efforts to pre-
vent undesirable behaviour in the first place.  
The second sensitising presumption is that the preventive gaze leads to 
risk-oriented interventions in policymaking. The prevention ambition not only 
moves the state beyond the existing schemes of the constitutional and the welfare 
state, but also transforms the nature of its interventions. Whereas the administra-
tion of justice is a response to a criminal act and health care to a diagnosis of ill-
ness, prevention is based on the identification of determinants of a not (yet) exist-
ing reality. The intervention targets of prevention are risks. A preventive inter-
vention repertoire will therefore include measures and activities on the basis of 
‘possibility’ instead of ‘fact’. 
 
The aforementioned research question is discussed in the following five chapters. 
In chapter two, a theoretical framework is developed to understand the contem-
porary range and patterns of state interventions in society, as well as mechanisms 
and triggers for their historical development. The research design and selection of 
empirical data is discussed in chapter three. The empirical findings themselves are 
presented in two cases studies in chapters four and five. Finally, a summary of the 
findings, an analysis of the spatial and historical context in which the preventive 
gaze was able emerge and continues to exist, and a discussion of its implications 





2. THE SPHERES OF STATE INTERVENTION 
 
 
“Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a 
perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the 
eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream 
of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state 
of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a 
machine, not to the primal social contract, but to per-
manent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to 
indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to general 
will, but to automatic docility.” 
 





In the introductory chapter, we discussed the transformative power of the pre-
ventive gaze. What does the increased influence of the prevention perspective do 
with our understanding of the state? Does the concept of the constitutional state 
still suffice to describe practices of crime prevention, such as the treatment of 
habitual offenders or the approach applied in respect of non-delinquent problem 
adolescents? And does the concept of the welfare state still suffice to describe the 
way the state deals with issues of health and disease, i.e., not by means of health 
care but by promoting a healthy lifestyle? And if these concepts no longer suffice, 
how does a state in which prevention takes centre stage look? How does such a 
state relate to the existing constitutional and welfare state? And what does the 
emergence of such a state imply for the relation between state and society? 
A study into the social significance of the state “[…] hat die Aufgabe, die 
eigenartige Wirklichkeit des uns umgebenden staatlichen Lebens zu erforschen. 
Sie will den Staat begreifen in seiner gegenwärtigen Struktur und Funktion, sein 
geschichtliches So-Gewordensein und seine Entwicklungstendenzen” (Heller, 
1983:12). In order to fulfil this task, a theoretical understanding of the state, of 
state interventions and of state development is discussed in the following.  
 
First, the theoretical foundations of the idea of the state are described, building on 
authors such as Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Weber, Jellinek and Schmitt. In the 
context of this study, the state is understood to constitute the idea, which concep-
tually ties together the various institutions, organisations and persons, which 
make up the sovereign rule over a certain territory and its population. However, 
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the social significance of the state lies less in the idea of the state and more in the 
way sovereign rule is exerted. This is a matter of government, or the “general 
management of society” (Foucault, 2007:105), which, in the following, is concep-
tualised in two ideal-typical ‘spheres of state intervention’. A paternalistic sphere 
serves to outline state activities in terms of order and punishment. In a maternal-
istic sphere, state activities are outlined in terms of care and emancipation. 
Second, the nuclear definition of the state as holder of sovereignty and the 
ideal typical forms in which state power is exerted are placed in the context of 
late-modern Western European society. The actual forms of government can con-
ceptually be understood in terms of the aforementioned paternalistic and mater-
nalistic spheres of state intervention, but are at the same time – by necessity – 
contingent deviations from the ideal types. It is proposed that two concepts domi-
nate our understanding of the contemporary Western European state. First, the 
image of the ‘paternalistic’ constitutional state, which not only binds sovereign 
rule to the rule of law, but also legitimises the exertion of state power for the pur-
poses of law enforcement and administration of justice. And second, the image of 
the ‘maternalistic’ welfare state, which refers to the state’s role in compensating 
for fate by introducing equal opportunities for education and social insurance 
schemes to protect against unemployment, illness and disability. These two im-
ages provide the spatial and temporal context in which the preventive gaze is pre-
sumed to have emerged, and therefore provide the starting point for the empirical 
study. 
And third, an understanding of the historical context in which the preven-
tive gaze emerged and which the preventive gaze is presumed to transform 
should also include an effort “[…] to trace the forces that gave birth to our pre-
sent-day practices and to identify the historical and social conditions upon which 
they still depend” (Garland, 2006:2). The objective is to provide an understanding 
of the dynamic context in which the increasing dominance of the preventive gaze 
and its impact on the state is explicable and understandable. To this end, mechan-
isms and triggers of state development are discussed. Mechanisms of state devel-
opment conceptualise how state development takes place: the preventive gaze is 
presumed to actuate both the internal characteristics of the state and the societal 
pressures for state development (cf. Pierson, 2004). Triggers of state development 
aim to provide insight into the social conditions under which a specific state de-
velopment takes place, which can be either part of a contingent ‘belief system’ 
(such as specific ways of dealing with future and fate) or part of a contingent ‘so-





2. The idea of the state 
 
2.1. The sovereign state  
There are numerous ways to understand what is meant by the ‘state’. For in-
stance, the term ‘state’ can be applied to the entire order of a society and its gov-
erning organisations. In this conceptualisation, a state constitutes and is simulta-
neously constituted by three elements: 1) a physical territory (‘Staatsgebiet’), 2) 
the community of people living there (‘Staatsvolk’) and 3) the institutions ruling 
this territory and its population (‘Staatsgewalt’) (Jellinek, 1976:394-434). These 
elements can also be recognised in Weber’s definition of the state as “[…] die-
jenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes 
[…] das Monopol legitiemer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) bean-
sprucht” (Weber, 1994:36). 
Yet a more deliberate distinction between state and society can also be 
made, in the sense that rule is conceptually separated from those who are sub-
jected to rule. A state is understood to constitute the various institutions, organi-
sations and persons, which collectively make up the rule over a certain territory 
and its population. In this conceptualisation, which is also followed in this study, 
society is subjected to the state rather than a part of the state. The understanding 
of the state as a specific type of rule by has its origins in the works of Machiavelli 
(1513), Hobbes (1651) and Bodin (1576). 
 
The first modern author to explicitly use the notion of ‘the state’ was Florentine 
diplomat Nicollò Machiavelli (1469-1527) in his Il Principe (1513). In doing so, he 
reversed the medieval conceptual order between secular and ecclesiastical au-
thority. Central to Medieval Western European conceptualisations of rule and 
authority was the idea of the spiritual authority of Christianity. For instance, St. 
Augustine (354-430) argued in De Civitate Dei (420) that there could be no higher 
authority than God and that, consequently, earthly life and rule should be con-
cerned with the proper preparation for the afterlife. And even though late-
Medieval authors such as St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) in Summa Theolo-
giae (1274) and Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275- c. 1342) in Defensor Pacis (1324) 
stressed the importance of secular rule to provide order and stability, their think-
ing did not include a systematic conceptualisation of the state. 
Machiavelli’s intellectual innovation – to make the ‘state’ a core theoreti-
cal notion – was also an expression of the specific historical transformation secu-
lar rule had undergone towards the end of the Middle Ages. The types of rule 
which had characterised Western Europe for centuries in no way resembled the 
contemporary state, but could best be understood as “[…] a patchwork of small 
secular and ecclesiastical dominions, held together by kings and other rulers as 
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best they could through personal bonds between individual men or between fami-
lies, which we have given the name of feudalism” (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:5; my 
translation, RP). The relation between ruler and his vassals was of a personal and 
almost contractual nature (Poggi, 1978).  
However, the need for a different type of rule grew as commercial activity 
gradually increased, cities emerged and universities were founded during the 12th 
and 13th century. Faced with these developing powers and aware of their own 
powerful position, medieval rulers – of which the German emperor was a promi-
nent example – challenged the position of ecclesiastical rule during the Investiture 
Controversy of 1075-1122. During the late Middle Ages, rulers became more oc-
cupied with ‘earthly concerns’ (such as maintaining power over a certain terri-
tory, and keeping order within this territory). Also, societal groups became more 
organised and tried to serve their own ‘earthly’ interests, such as public order and 
hygiene (Poggi, 1978).  
It was, unsurprisingly, against the background of the geographically ho-
mogenous and wealthy trading city of Florence, that Machiavelli in his Il Principe 
realised the conceptual transformation in the subordinate nature of secular rule 
to ecclesiastical rule. Whereas St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas were con-
cerned with the “religiös-theologische Begründung des Staates” (Jellinek, 
1976:186), Machiavelli saw rule as the pragmatic answer to an ever-present ‘la-
tent anarchy’ in society (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:12). Instead of rule as a result of 
‘divine intention’, rule as a result of the acquisition of secular power arose. A 
ruler’s highest goal became the acquisition and preservation of power. For Ma-
chiavelli, rule was not justified by a higher moral or divine principle, but found its 
justification in a claim to power: “Politik ist für Machiavelli autonom, sie lebe nach 
eigenen Gesetzen, unabhängig auch von religiösen und moralischen Überzeugun-
gen und Geboten” (Barion, 1986:71). He emphasised the “Eigengesetzlichkeit der 
Politik” (Berber, 1978:198). 
 
Complementary to Machiavelli’s understanding of rule is Thomas Hobbes’s (1588-
1679) justification of supreme authority from a societal perspective. Whereas 
Machiavelli viewed the state as the result of the acquisition of power by means of 
politics, Hobbes saw state power as a necessary means to overcome ‘a war of all 
against all’. And whereas Machiavelli broke with the medieval notion of rule, 
Hobbes broke with the medieval notion of man. 
Hobbes wrote his Leviathan (1651) during the English civil war, which 
was one of the many religious and civil wars which plagued Western Europe dur-
ing the 16th and 17th century. A crucial element in these wars was the Protestant 
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Reformation,21 which challenged the spiritual authority of the Pope. Even though 
the Concordat of Worms (1122) had formally settled the aforementioned Investi-
ture Controversy, the separation between secular and ecclesiastical (papal) rule 
was far from complete: kings could invest bishops with secular power, but it was a 
prerogative of the Pope to invest bishops with spiritual authority. As a result, po-
litical and religious institutions remained intertwined. They were only definitively 
separated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the British Glorious Revolu-
tion of 1688 (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:13). From then on, the bond between ruler 
and population was established under the principle ‘cuius regio, eius religio’.22 
Confronted with civil war, Hobbes wrote about the condition of mankind 
and what this would be without the existence of a state. In this ‘state of nature’ he 
sees “[…] a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of 
Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death” (Hobbes, 1985:161). Without 
some kind of supreme authority he saw the life of man as a permanent struggle 
for self-preservation against other men. In this ‘war of all against all’ (‘bellum om-
nium contra omnes’), the life of man is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ and 
every man is every other man’s potential enemy (‘homo homini lupus est’).  
The only way, according to Hobbes, for man to escape this state of nature 
was to enter into a collective ‘covenant’ to erect a sovereign power – which he 
named ‘Leviathan’. People hand over their right of self-defence to this Leviathan 
and in return are guaranteed protection by the newly erected sovereign power – 
on the condition that all people associate themselves with this ‘covenant’ and the 
Leviathan is given enough power to maintain his sovereign position. For Hobbes, 
the choice is easy: to live in fear and anarchy, or to live without freedom under a 
sovereign ruler (Berber, 1978:211).23 
                                                   
21 The Reformation itself was not only the expression of religious principles, but also of a long-
standing Western European tradition in the organisation of rule. There is a tradition in Ger-
manic countries, dating back to the period of tribal communities, of societies being governed 
from the bottom-up as opposed to the Roman tradition of strong centralised rule. In the Ger-
manic tradition, power flows upwards instead of downwards (Ullman, 1965).  
In the words of Hall: “The Germanic peoples were essentially ‘clan’ societies […]. They 
were governed more loosely than Greece or Rome, through aristocratic-based councils with, 
below them, powerful assemblies of free warriors and, attached to them, retinues of soldiers in 
bands, often with their own ‘chiefs’ […]. In contrast with the formality of Roman law, Germanic 
law was said to belong to ‘the people’ […]” (Hall, in McLennan c.s., 1984:4). The Calvinist politi-
cal philosopher Johannes Althusius (1563-1638) expressed this tradition in his Politica      
methodice digesta (1603) when he stated that supreme authority rests in the hands of the peo-
ple and that, therefore, a people had a right of resistance against unjust rulers (Witteveen, 
1996:126). 
22 Which not necessarily implied religious tolerance for the population as well. 
23 The only exception to absolute compliance with the sovereign is, according to Hobbes, found 
in the very notion that necessitated the establishment of sovereign power: self-preservation. If a 
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Hobbes’s justification for the state lies in an explicitly pessimistic image of 
mankind and the presumption of every man’s interest in self-preservation and 
safety. The logical answer to this conflict between man’s nature and man’s inter-
ests is the establishment of a sovereign power, which accepts no higher authority. 
Whereas Machiavelli’s thinking focused mainly on the autonomous political strife 
for power, Hobbes developed a theory that bound together the interests of ruler 
and population.  
 
Machiavelli and Hobbes both emphasise absolute authority as the defining charac-
teristic of a state. A state is only a state if there is no higher authority within the 
same geographical territory. For Machiavelli, the state is the logical product of a 
ruler’s quest for power. For Hobbes, the state is the logical product of a popula-
tion’s quest for order and security. The dawn of the modern state lies in the rec-
ognition of the autonomy of rule over a certain territory and population.  
In the place of a Medieval claim to divine intention came a modern claim 
to ‘sovereignty’: “Erst da, wo [die] intensive Religiosität [des Mittelalters] 
erschlaffte oder verschwand, konnte das Bild des aboluten Herrschers auftauchen, 
der seine Souveränität aus eigenem Recht besaß” (Berber, 1978:196). The sover-
eignty of the state rests on its successful claim to absolute power, not on any ethi-
cal or religious principle. In Weber’s words: “Man kann […] den ‘politischen’ Cha-
rakter eines Verbandes nur durch das – unter Umständen zum Selbstzweck ge-
steigerte – Mittel definieren, welches nicht ihm allein eigen, aber allerdings spezi-
fisch und für sein Wesen unentbehrlich ist: die Gewaltsamkeit” (Weber, 2006:64). 
The existence of a state cannot be reduced to teleological arguments or justifica-
tions: its defining characteristic is not a specific function, but its successful claim 
to sovereign power.24 
In his Six Livres de la République (1576), Jean Bodin (1530-1596) system-
atically developed the notion of an inalienable, absolute, timeless and indivisible 
power of the state: the sovereign state permits no higher authority and no other 
                                                                                                                                 
state fails to provide security or even threatens security, citizens are allowed to resist (Gribnau, 
2009:45). 
24 Elsewhere, Weber states the following with regard to presumed ‘existential’ functions of the 
state: “Das, was wir heute als Grundfunktionen des Staates ansehen: die Setzung des Rechts 
(Legislative), den Schutz der persönlichen Sicherheit und öffentlichen Ordnung (Polizei), den 
Schutz der erworbenen Rechte (Justiz), die Pflege der hygienischen, pädagogischen, sozialpoliti-
schen und anderen Kulturinteressen (die verscheidenen Zweige der Verwaltung), endlich und 
namentlich auch der organisierte gewaltsame Schutz nach außen (Militärverwaltung), ist in der 
Frühzeit entweder gar nicht oder nicht in der Form rationaler Ordnungen, sondern nur als 
amorphe Gelegenheitsgemeinschaft vorhanden, oder unter ganz verschiedene Gemeinschaften: 
Hausgemeinschaft, Sippe, Nachbarschaftsverband, Marktgemeinschaft, und daneben freie 
Zweckvereine verteilt” (Weber, 1972:516). 
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authority within its territory (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:14). In the words of Carl 
Schmitt: a sovereign state has the ability to decide about ‘the state of emergency’ 
(and consequently about ‘the state of normality’) in a specific territory. If a state 
loses its decisional power to defend the drawn distinctions against external and 
internal threats, it loses its sovereignty (Schmitt, 1934). 
Sovereignty is a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. A sovereign state 
guards the boundaries of its geographical rule and decides upon the recognition of 
its subjects – whether or not in the formalised membership status of ‘citizenship’. 
The authority of the state over its territory and population is, in principle, abso-
lute. The state is the ultimate arbiter in societal conflicts. Otherwise, citizens of the 
state would be free to choose with which rules of the state they wish to comply. 
The essence of a state is that it does not allow citizens this choice.25  
 
2.2. State and government 
The state cannot be equated with politics. Whereas the state refers to the various 
institutions, organisations and persons that collectively make up the rule over a 
certain territory and its population, politics is the medium through which the con-
trol over state power can be acquired and exerted. Politics decides what is and 
what is not a political issue, and consequently, what is and what is not subject to 
state interventions:26 “[…] politics sets the boundaries between itself and […] 
other activities” (Pizzorno, in Maier, 1994:28). For this reason, Steinberger 
(2009:13) makes a distinction between the government of the state (e.g. policy, 
institutions, politics) and the idea of the state, which consists of a ‘structure of 
judgements’ about what the state is.  
The state as an idea fulfils an ontological function: “it is the entity that is 
presupposed for the purpose of gaining access to modern political reality” (Lough-
lin, 2009:6; cf. Pierson, 2004). The state cannot be physically touched or seen, it 
cannot be reduced to a single living person, organisation or institution, or to mere 
‘politics’, ‘government’, ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘policy’. However, the idea of the state is 
                                                   
25 In reality, a state does not constantly apply physical power, but it should have the ability to do 
so if necessary. Crucial for sovereign power is its control over the means of physical power 
(Poggi, 1990:4-5). Also, a state does not necessarily have to control every aspect of social life. 
However, practical limitations or institutional safeguards such as freedom rights aside, a state 
can in principle autonomously decide upon the range and depth of its control over the lives of 
its subjects.  
26 Politics also decides on the boundaries of others spheres of life – most importantly the public 
and private sphere (e.g. Arendt, 1958). These boundaries are not ‘naturally given’, but are a 
matter of politics. Following Van Gunsteren (1998), the political sphere is the space of social life 
where decisions are made concerning the organisation of society, backed and implemented by 
the authority of the state apparatus. The public sphere is the space where people freely interact 
with each other (cf. Habermas, 1962). And the personal (or private) sphere is the space where 
people live free from interference by others and by the state. 
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necessary to understand the way sovereign power is organised and exerted. Just 
as institutions such as the ‘church’ or the ‘university’ cannot be reduced to the 
people working there or to the buildings they occupy (cf. Douglas, 1986), an en-
compassing notion of the state is required to bind together the various organisa-
tions, institutions and persons through which sovereign power is exerted. 
 
This study aims to analyse transformations in the characteristics of contemporary 
sovereign rule. Therefore, the actual government of a population forms the core 
research object. Government comes in many forms and strategies, but always has, 
according to Foucault, the objective to “structure the possible field of action of 
others” (Foucault, cited by Hunt, 2009:4). ‘Governing’ and ‘government’ have their 
etymological antecedents in the notion of ‘managing a household’, or the way a 
traditional pater familias cares for his family and at the same time has authority 
over his family members.  
Given these etymological origins, Foucault stresses the similarities be-
tween the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, and of 
populations (Hunt, 2009:4). However, it was only from the 18th century onward 
that the notion of ‘government’ became conceptually connected to the activities of 
the state (Burchell c.s., 1991:92). Up to that point, many Western European states 
were occupied with establishing and defending their sovereignty against external 
threats. Only when the external threats were reduced could the attention of the 
rulers shift to society as a locus of relevant problems and as a crucial object of 
interventions. 
According to Finer (1997:63), an analysis of government should include 
both the range and the depth of state interventions. In the following, these are 
discussed in relation to each other in the notion ‘sphere of state intervention’.27 A 
                                                   
27 The term ‘sphere’ is derived from the works of Michael Walzer (1983) and Peter Sloterdijk 
(2007). To start with the latter, in his Spheres-trilogy (1998; 1999; 2004) Sloterdijk asks him-
self ‘where is man?’ instead of the more common philosophical question ‘what is man?’. Follow-
ing Heidegger, he investigates the way people deal with their ‘being’, their ‘Dasein’, or their 
being thrown into an already existing world filled with objects, cultures, institutions and fellow 
men. According to Sloterdijk, people constantly ‘build’ different spheres or ‘spaces of coexis-
tence’ around themselves, within which they relate, interact and live together with others in a 
shared time and place. A sphere is essentially an idea, a virtual construction meant to enclose 
certain ways of living together and exclude certain others – for instance, the sphere of a mar-
riage, of a family, of the workplace, of (global) society, of politics, and so on. People live within 
various spheres, some of them overlapping, some of them conflicting with each other, but each 
of them with their own characteristics, identity, shared values and dynamics.  
A notion of multiplicity of spheres, within which people live together, is also central to 
Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983). In his quest for the way the values of equality and 
pluralism constitute justice, he acknowledges that there is no one single answer to this ques-
tion. Instead, these values need their specific interpretation and application in every sphere of 
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‘sphere’ refers to the unity between a state’s definition power – or the determina-
tion of the appropriate range of governmental activities – and a state’s interven-
tion power – or the determination of the appropriate nature and depth of govern-
mental activities. For instance, if a state defines certain behaviour being as illegal, 
the logical intervention following a legal infringement is prosecution and punish-
ment. And if a state defines poverty and illness as public concerns, the logical in-
tervention is the creation of social security and health care services. 
A sphere is constituted by a cohesive whole of problem definitions from 
which certain state tasks follow, an organisational or institutional design to fulfil 
these tasks, and actual activities or interventions directed at the realisation of 
these tasks. A state is presumed not to act ‘at random’, but according to more or 
less explicit political considerations relating to the appropriate tasks a state 
should perform. The notion of a ‘sphere’ aims to capture the relation between 
these considerations and the actions undertaken by a state.  
 
2.3. A sphere as the unity between definition power and intervention power 
When studying state development, it is not enough to focus on a change in a 
state’s intervention power alone, as this will fail to reveal the normative element 
of government. The range and depth of state interventions is always infused by 
specific normative judgements on the responsibility of the state and the problem-
atic nature of certain societal phenomena. The act of governing implies a desire 
for “[...] a change in reality, to make it better or less bad or to keep reality the way 
it is: good enough. Hence, government and policymaking imply moral action” 
(Terpstra, 1997:12; my translation, RP). However, this  moral action is preceded 
by the moral assertion of a particular situation: “To define an issue is to make an 
assertion about what is at stake and who is affected, and therefore, to define in-
terests and the constitution of alliances. There is no such thing as an apolitical 
problem definition” (Stone, 2002:231). 
State interventions follow more or less ‘naturally’ from a specific percep-
tion or problem definition (e.g. Van Eeten 1999:6). For instance, perceiving social 
reality from the perspective of ‘positive freedom’, will lead to other measures be-
ing taken than perceiving this from the perspective of ‘negative freedom’ (cf. Ber-
lin, 2007). The frame of reference determines to a large degree the eventual inter-
ventions and activities, since it serves as a “perspective from which an amor-
phous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon” 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993:11). The description of a situation already favours a 
                                                                                                                                 
social life. The ways we relate to each other in spheres of education, of security and welfare, and 
of political power vary and result in differing organisations and dynamics. 
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specific solution. As such, political and policy arguments tend to produce their 
own ‘regime of truth’ (Garland, 1993:4).28 
At the same time, the normative political and policy arguments, which make up a 
state’s definition power, also cannot fully capture the way a state exerts its sover-
eign power. Throughout his work, Foucault stressed the importance of studying 
the actual exertion of power instead of the formal and juridical characteristics of 
the state. For him, the true impact of the state should be analysed on the level of 
concrete power relations, such as the treatment of the mentally ill and of delin-
quents by decentralised state apparatuses (Foucault, 1963; 1975): “One should 
study power where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the 
centre; explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than the intentions that 
guide attempts at domination; and recognize that power circulates through net-
works rather than being applied at particular points” (Jessop, 2007:36). 
A state’s ambition to influence a population’s field of action necessitates 
the development of an intervention repertoire. Commonly, a distinction is made 
between judicial instruments such as regulation and issuing licenses, financial 
instruments such as taxation and awarding grants, and communicative instru-
ments such as information and propaganda (e.g. Van den Heuvel, 2005; cf. Fenger 
& Klok, in Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003) – a typology which can at least be com-
plemented by the instruments of direct physical force by state officials, such as the 
police, prison administration, army and tax inspectors. 
 
                                                   
28 Policy arguments tend to be hermetical arguments. That is, they produce a tight means-end 
relation between problem, desired situation and solutions (cf. Van der Graaf & Hoppe, 2007:56). 
Policy arguments make sense of social reality and reduce the complexity of social reality 
through narrative constructs. According to ‘t Hart, interpretations of reality by governments 
always have the latent risk of becoming ‘totalitarian claims’ (‘t Hart, in Tjeenk Willink c.s., 
1994:62) or “a certain shared frame of reference, a shared code of interpretation, [which] be-
comes taken for granted, resulting in a loss of awareness of its interpretative character and 
resulting in a situation in which an interpretation of reality is confused with reality itself” (‘t 
Hart, 1995:21-22, my translation, RP).  
And according to Terpstra, governmental policy arguments and proposals have the fol-
lowing three characteristics, which serve as a rhetorical justification for the exertion of state 
power: 
1) The construction of a separation between government and the object of intervention, 
in order to place government and society oppositely of each other, thereby usually ex-
cluding government as a possible part of the definition of the problem (1997:175). 
2) The presentation of policy proposals as objective monologues, leaving no room for 
counterarguments or differing problem definitions (1997:177). 
3) The presumption that the proposed solution is in accordance with the defined prob-




In other words, for an analysis of state development both the factual exertion of 
power and the (implicit) normative choices and justifications that spark this exer-
tion of power are relevant. The latter aspect can be understood as a state’s defini-
tion power, or the capability of a sovereign state to determine the range of its own 
role and responsibility and the range of politically relevant societal phenomena. 
And the former aspect can be understood as a state’s intervention power, or the 
capability of a sovereign state to determine the nature of state interventions and 
the depth of the exertion of state power into society.29 
Given the basic principle that the normative choices underlying state ac-
tivities and the nature of the actual exertion of state power through various in-
struments, techniques and strategies are inseparable, the following discussion on 
the spheres of state interventions proposes to examine these two aspects to-
gether. The concept of ‘sphere of state intervention’ presupposes coherence be-
tween a state’s definition power and intervention power. A sphere describes the 
logical relation between a state’s self-definition and political problem definitions 
on the one hand, and the interventions and intervention apparatus, which follow 
from these on the other hand.30 What conceptually holds a sphere together is a 
basic – but not necessarily explicit – understanding of a state’s interests, func-
tions, responsibilities, rationale and modus vivendi. 
 
Before discussing the spheres of state intervention in more detail, it should be 
stressed that these spheres of state intervention have been formulated as Weber-
ian ‘ideal types’ (Weber, 1922). Ideal types are deliberate abstractions from social 
reality. They are concepts, which do not exist as such in social reality – they can-
not be directly observed or touched – but exist only in theory. However, in their 
                                                   
29 The distinction between definition power and intervention power is related to the analysis of 
‘policy theories’ or ‘cognitive maps’, ‘theories of action’ and ‘policy maps’ (e.g. Hoogerwerf, 
1984): the whole of presumptions underlying policy proposals. Hoogerwerf discerns three 
possible types of presumptions or judgements underlying public policy: 1) reality judgements 
on how a problem can be defined, 2) judgements on the values at stake and 3) instrumental 
judgements on the effective approach of a problematic social reality (Hoogerwerf, 1984:497). 
Van Heffen (in Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003:226-228; cf. Hoogerwerf, 1989) proposes a two-
fold distinction between 1) normative presumptions (concerning the problem definition, the 
determination of policy objectives, and the acceptability and effects of policy objectives) and 2) 
empirical presumptions (concerning the causal relationship between causes and effects, and the 
functional relationship between objectives and measures to be taken). 
30 However, it should be stressed that definition power and intervention power do not coincide 
with, respectively, policy formulation and policy implementation. Intervention power is both a 
matter of formulation and implementation, since it concerns decisions with regard to the organ-




theoretical existence, they allow us to understand patterns of actual, historical 
and contingent social phenomena and human behaviour.  
An ideal type is an unambiguous means of expression. The fact that social 
reality does not (and cannot) completely coincide and correspond with an ideal 
type does not necessarily influence the validity of the ideal type. Instead, the valid-
ity of an ideal type should be ascertained through the adequacy of the analytical 
construct for understanding social reality. For instance, Weber’s own notion of the 
‘bureaucracy’ is a useful analytical construct, not because it accurately describes 
the empirical forms of bureaucracy, but instead because the ideal type allows us 
to identify and understand dominant elements in the organisation and everyday 
practices of state administration.  
An ideal type does not pass judgement on the empirically ‘normal’ or most 
common type of a specific social phenomenon, nor does it correspond with an 
ethically preferable version of a specific phenomenon. An ideal type is not ‘a nor-
mative ideal’, but a conceptually ‘pure’ model of reality, with all ambiguity and 
historical contingencies stripped away for analytical purposes. In Weber’s own 
words: “Er ist nicht eine Darstellung des Wirklichen, aber er will der Darstellung 
eindeutliche Ausdrucksmittel verleihen” (Weber, 1988:190). 
In the following, two spheres of state intervention are distinguished. Both 
spheres revolve around parental metaphors. The first is the ‘paternalistic31 
sphere’, which revolves around the problem of order and engages in retribution; 
the second, the ‘maternalistic sphere’, which revolves around the problem of un-
desirable situations beyond the control of individual citizens and the activities of 
care and emancipation.  
 
2.4. The family as a model of the government-society relation 
 
2.4.1. Family metaphors and the state 
Metaphors of the family, motherhood, fatherhood and brotherhood are numerous 
in the understanding of social institutions such as church and state. A prime ex-
ample which leaps to mind is the veneration of the Virgin Mary in Catholic faith. 
She serves as a nurturing mother figure, as a human example of purity and piety, 
and as an accessible figure to whom we can address our prayers. Marian devo-
tions serve as intercessions to God through the mediation of Mary. Mary stands 
for love, motherhood, closeness, warmth and understanding. 
Another example is the ‘fraternité’ or ‘brotherhood’, which serves as an 
image of societies and nations. It was of course one of the central concepts during 
                                                   
31 The specific use of the term ‘paternalistic’ in this study should not be confused with the more 
common understanding of the term as any type of meddlesome state intervention. 
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the French Revolution, and expresses the idea of men living as brothers together 
in society, as if in a family. Furthermore, the country in which people live is com-
monly referred to as a ‘fatherland’ (‘vaderland’ or ‘Vaterland’). And the governing 
state can be perceived as inextricably intertwined with the fatherland and its in-
habitants and is subsequently described as ‘Vater Staat’, the father of the people, 
which gives the state an aura of fatherly care for its people (Popitz, 1992:137).  
Historical founders of a state are commonly referred to in fatherly meta-
phors: ‘father of the nation’, ‘pater patriae’, ‘Vater des Vaterlands’, ‘vader des 
vaderlands’ or – in the case of a several founders – ‘founding fathers’. Figures 
ranging from Romulus, William the Silent, Julius Nyerere, George Washington and 
Josef Stalin were granted this honorary title – a title which expresses their histori-
cal and symbolical role in uniting a people under one rule, with a shared identity 
and shared historical frame of reference (cf. Lakoff, 2002:153). Family metaphors 
express the idea of a ‘natural and biological’ inseparability of people, territory and 
state, as well as a certain division of tasks between the parenting state and the 
population in need of protection (cf. Lakoff, 2002:154). The image of a state or a 
ruler as a ‘father’ has its origins in a line of political thought in which sovereign 
rule is traced back to the biblical Adam as the primeval patriarch whom God has 
given authority (Pessers, 2003:2-3).32 
And finally, the origins of the word ‘economy’ lie in the Greek words ‘oiko-
nomos’, meaning ‘the rules of the household’, and ‘oikonomia’, meaning ‘govern-
ment of the household’. Only from the 18th century onward, was the meaning of 
the word gradually broadened from the level of the family to the level of the popu-
lation as a whole. However, this has not changed the basic principles behind the 
notion of household management, which is still “[…] concerned with answering 
the question of how to introduce […] the correct manner of managing individuals, 
goods and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in rela-
tion to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper 
– how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into 
the management of the state” (Foucault, cited in Burchell c.s., 1991:92). To govern 
means to manage a social unit as if it were a family – be it a household or an entire 
society: “the proper way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth, like the 
management of a family by a father who knows how to direct his wife, his chil-
dren, and his servants, who knows how to make the family’s fortune prosper, and 
how to arrange suitable alliances for it” (Foucault, 2007:94-95). 
 
                                                   
32 This image of the state can be found in Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha (1680), which served as a 
target for John Locke’s criticism in his Two Treatises of Government (1689).  
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The parental metaphors underlying the paternalistic and maternalistic spheres of 
state intervention do not claim to provide a faithful description of male and fe-
male character traits, and certainly do not aim to affirm certain stereotypes (e.g. 
Nelson, 2009). Instead, they have the purpose of drawing an analogy between the 
state-society relation and the archetypal relations within a nuclear family. A 
metaphor does not aim to make empirical judgements, but serves as a figure of 
speech to expose or emphasise certain traits or qualities of a less tangible empiri-
cal phenomenon. Metaphors serve as a means to conceptualise and understand a 
domain of experience with the language and concepts of another domain (Lakoff, 
2002:9). The validity of metaphors is determined by the extent to which they can 
explain variations in a specific domain of everyday life. 
The choice for a certain metaphor is not a neutral decision, but also im-
plies the choice for a specific worldview or outlook. This worldview shapes the 
way we think about certain phenomena and act upon them (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). By describing the relation between government and society in parental 
metaphors, government is viewed as a father or mother for its society, which has 
the role of the child.  
In the following, two arguments for choosing the family as a model of the 
relation between state and society are discussed. First, a parental metaphor cap-
tures the ambiguous nature of the relation between government and society as 
being simultaneously hierarchical and responsive. And second, the father/mother 
distinction is an appropriate means to expose the opposing moralities underlying 
the concepts of the constitutional and the welfare state. 
 
2.4.2. Pastoral power 
The modern state is understood to be a sovereign power and the ultimate arbiter 
of societal conflicts, while at the same time this power is justified by the claim that 
it serves the interests of society. The sovereign state is the expression of an 
autonomous quest for power as well as an entity whose existence is justified by 
abolishing the Hobbesian state of nature. Foucault tried to capture this ambiguity 
in the concept of ‘pastoral power’ – a concept developed in Christian thought to 
describe the position of the pastor as a shepherd for his flock: “[…] pastoral power 
is […] entirely defined by its beneficence; its only raison d’être is doing good, and 
in order to do good. In fact the essential objective of pastoral power is the salva-
tion […] of the flock” (Foucault, 2007:126). This form of power brings to mind 
parenting activities: “Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it 
looks after the individuals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer, it 
goes in search of those who have strayed off course, and it treats those that are 
injured” (Foucault, 2007:127).  
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This type of power does imply, however, ‘pure obedience’ from the sheep 
(Foucault, 2007:174), which can take the form of enforcing compliance, but also of 
a typically modern form of extracting obedience by “[...] working upon the ways in 
which individuals regulate their own behaviour to ensure this is consonant with 
the interests of the state” (Pierson, 2004:75).33 This is what Foucault calls the 
‘game of liberalism’: a style of thinking concerned with a restrained way of gov-
erning society through techniques of security (cf. Burchell c.s., 1991:15). Liberal-
ism or economic liberalism does not mean the absence of government in major 
areas of social life (such as the market), but simply a different technique of gov-
ernment, which is specifically concerned with the production of wealth and with 
‘the economy’ as the object of interventions and regulations (Burchell c.s., 
1991:92). Liberal government is, from this perspective, a strategy aimed at “get-
ting people to act” in specific, productive, ways (Burchell c.s., 1991:119), for in-
stance by promoting education for high-quality work or by establishing general 
social insurances against the loss of income in the case of unemployment (e.g. 
Ewald, in Burchell c.s., 1991). 
What Foucault exposes is that even underneath the relatively friendly and 
responsive image of a democratic welfare state there is still a sovereign power at 
play. No system of government is fully proof against the ‘totalitarian temptation’ 
(Revel, 1976) or against the use of state power for the private interests of the 
ruler and his class (Dewey, 1954:81). This temptation is latently present in every 
form of government – including liberal government. Consider, for instance, the 
welfare state practice of promoting higher education for every child (through 
financial incentives and equal opportunities). A common justification for this type 
of policy is that an individual’s life chances improve if he or she is properly edu-
cated. However, the question remains as to what extent this form of improving life 
chances is self-imposed by citizens, or forms a necessary consequence of a capital-
ist economy, a governmental strategy to guide citizens to their ‘true’ goal of being 
a productive and, hopefully, well-paid element in the economy (cf. Van der Steen 
c.s., 2010), or a combination of both. 
 
The hierarchical and responsive images of government are inherently intertwined. 
Foucault’s notion of ‘pastoral power’ (2007) captures this ambiguity: the shep-
herd cares for his flock but demands obedience in return. This element of obedi-
ence is evident in state activities of punishment, but is also more covertly present 
in welfare state activities: the state’s interests in social stability and prosperity are 
                                                   
33 The notion of ‘interests’ arose in the 18th century, more specifically in the liberal philosophies 
of Hume and Smith (Burchell c.s., 1991:130-134). In fact, the notion of the ‘invisible hand’ is 
based on the idea that people act according to their private interests – that is, the interests of a 
specific type of man, the ‘homo economicus’. 
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brought into line with a specific interpretation of individual interests and individ-
ual freedom in a capitalist system. 
This ambiguous relation between state and society resembles the arche-
typal relation between a child and its parents:34 the parental task is to protect, 
nurture and discipline a child for its own good. A child is dependent on its parents 
for protection, just as a population is dependent on the sovereign state for tran-
scending the state of nature. A child requires parental nurturance for its develop-
ment, just as a welfare state is responsive to societal interests for self-realisation. 
And a child needs to be taught discipline by its parents, just as a society requires 
the constitutional state as the ultimate arbiter of societal conflicts. 
 
2.4.3. Paternal and maternal morality 
A second argument for using a parental metaphor to describe the relation be-
tween government and society is that the father/mother distinction is an appro-
priate means to understand the different moralities underlying common activities 
of government. Again, it should be emphasised that this distinction does not aim 
to affirm certain stereotypes and does not claim to be a factual description of so-
cial reality (e.g. Nelson, 2009). Instead, the ideal-typical father/mother distinction 
has an analytical function: it is a means to stress certain elements and traits of 
other, less tangible phenomena.  
 
The ideal-typical masculine and feminine moralities have been described numer-
ous times in literature and science. A literary example can be found in Günter 
Grass’s novel Der Butt (1977).35 Here, the morality of man is described in the his-
                                                   
34 There are, of course, limits to every analogy. In the case of the comparison between the par-
ent-child relation and the government-society relation, an important difference is that a child is 
raised to be an independent adult. By contrast, government has a permanent task: society can-
not be raised to independence, but is inherently unable to survive without a sovereign authori-
ty. However, non-totalitarian governments have far less-reaching responsibilities towards their 
population than parents have towards their children: a constitutional state assumes its citizens 
to be individually responsible and legally accountable for their own acts, whereas children are 
perceived as legally incompetent.  
35 In Der Butt (1977), Günter Grass presents a phantasmagorical 4000-year history of the dia-
lectics between man and woman from the Neolithicum to the present (that is, the 1970s) via the 
Iron Age, Christian Middle Ages, early urbanisation, reformation, the Enlightenment era, indus-
trialisation and 20th century world wars. Der Butt is narrated as a fable. The major instigator of 
man’s ambitions to overthrow maternal rule is an immortal talking fish (the flounder of the 
book’s title), caught for the first time during the Neolithicum at the same place where millennia 
later the city of Danzig was founded on the shores of the Baltic Sea. In the course of centuries, 
man has, with the help of the flounder’s advice, managed to wrestle himself free from the grasp 
of female domination. 
According to the flounder, women have the biological capacity to create new life, 
whereas men have to resort to alternative ways of creation: “Denn weil die Männer nicht auf 
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torical quest for domination and progress, whether in warfare, arts, science, archi-
tecture or organisation. In masculine history, fire is a means to forge weaponry 
instead of a source of warmth and cooking, urban dwellings a means to break 
through life in confined family relations, and money and the rational organisation 
of labour means to increase trade and wealth. In contrast, feminine history re-
volves around the care for and nurturing of children and household. Whereas 
Grass’s ‘Männergeschichte’ is a story of looking forward, of expanding horizons, 
his ‘Frauengeschichte’ is a story of unconditional care in the here and now. The 
male political outlook is driven by power and authority; the female political out-
look is characterised by care and reciprocity. 
A scientific discussion of paternalistic and maternalistic morality is pre-
sented by George Lakoff in Moral Politics (1996).36 In his analysis of the American 
political discourse, he distinguishes between a ‘strict father model’ for conserva-
tive politics and a ‘nurturant parent model’ for liberal37 politics. Accordingly, the 
conservative political worldview is infused by the value of strictness: “This model 
posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility 
for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall 
policy, to set strict rules for the behaviour of children, and to enforce the rules […]. 
Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial 
                                                                                                                                 
natürliche Weise empfangen, austragen, gebären können […], müssen sie geistreiche Faxen 
machen, müssen sie vereiste Nordwände erklettern und Schmallmauern durchbrechen, 
schichten sie Pyramiden, graben sie Panamakanäle, sperren sie Täler ab, experimentieren sie 
wie unter Zwang, bis alles synthetisch ist, müssen sie in Bildern, mit Wörtchen, aus Tönen 
immerfort die Frage nach dem Ich, dem Sein, nach dem Sinn, dem Warum, Wozu und Wohin 
stellen, müssen sie allemann in der Tretmühle namens Weltgeschichte rackern, damit sie 
ausgemachte Männersache, datierte Siege und Niederlagen, Kirchenspaltungen und polnische 
Teilungen, Protokolle und Denkmäler ausspuckt” (2007:503). In male art, the woman is usually 
portrayed in suffering as ‘Heilige, Hure oder Hexe’ (2007:278), or as a passive and non-creative 
(‘nicht-schöpferische’) inspiration or muse for male actions and accomplishments (2007:326). 
36 Lakoff uses differing conceptions of the ideal family to understand the contrasting political 
worldviews in the United States between Conservatives and Democrats/Liberals. Conservatives 
tend to use a vocabulary filled with references to character, virtue, self-reliance, individual 
responsibility, authority, and entrepreneurship (2002:30). They prefer nature over nurture 
(2002:32) and they perceive the world as a competitive place. The role of the ‘strict father’ 
towards his children is based on the presumed inability of the child to know what is in its best 
interest, on the capacity of the parent to know what is in the best interest of the child, and on 
social recognition of this parental responsibility (2002:76). 
In the liberal vocabulary notions of social responsibility, human rights, care, health, se-
curity, and diversity are central (2002:30-31). Furthermore, liberals prefer nurture over nature 
(2002:32) and perceive the ‘nurturant parent’ as being responsible for protecting a child 
against dangers (2002:109). Empathy, fairness and interdependence are crucial virtues 
(2002:112). The legitimate authority of a ‘nurturant parent’ follows from the ability to nurture 
(2002:113). 
37 Not to be confused with a Lockean conceptualisation of liberalism. 
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things that children must learn” (2002:33). And: “The authority figure sets stan-
dards of behaviour and punishes those subject to authority if the standards are 
not met” (2002:78). In the ‘strict father model’ the most important role of gov-
ernment is to guarantee an acceptable level of security and to punish crime. 
In contrast, the liberal/democratic worldview revolves around the value 
of nurturance: “Love, empathy, and nurturance are primary, and children become 
responsible, self-disciplined and self-reliant through being cared for, respected, 
and caring for others […]. The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be 
fulfilled and happy in their lives […]. What children need to learn most is empathy 
for others, the capacity for nurturance, and the maintenance of social ties […]” 
(2002:33-34). And: “The obedience of children comes out of their love and respect 
for their parents, not out of fear of punishment” (2002:109). The ‘nurturant par-
ent model’ stresses a government’s responsibility to meet basic needs of citizens, 
such as food, shelter, education, health care and opportunities for self-
development (2002:179).38 
 
Ideal-typical paternalistic values are authority, order, discipline, strictness, pun-
ishment, individual responsibility, stability, and formalistic and impersonal rela-
tions. The corresponding image of government is one in which government looks 
after the safety of its population, upholds order and punishes infringements of this 
order. Moreover, government applies strict rules and treats all its subjects equally 
and with procedural justice.  
In contrast, ideal-typical maternalistic values are equality, self-
development, empathy, interdependency, care, nurturance, social responsibility, 
fairness, and personal and reciprocal relations. The corresponding image of gov-
ernment is one which looks after the wellbeing and welfare of its population by 
providing services. Moreover, such a government is responsive to the demands 
for collective action by the population and strives after the proper self-
development of each individual subject. 
 
2.5. The paternalistic sphere of state intervention 
The ideal-typical paternalistic sphere of state intervention is characterised by 
values of order and obedience. Order is something to be maintained, obedience is 
the desired attitude of the paternal subjects. Retribution follows any transgres-
sion of order. Retribution implies individual guilt and accountability. To be gov-
erned through the paternalistic sphere implies a constant appeal to obedience of 
                                                   
38 In her discussion of maternal and paternal images of the state, Pessers makes a similar dis-
tinction to that of Lakoff. The image of the state as a father refers to values such as stability, 
durability, the common good and the long term design of society, whereas the image of the state 
as a mother refers to the immediate, physical and emotional satisfaction of needs (2003:5).  
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the individual subjects, which can be either ‘voluntarily’ displayed through self-
discipline or enforced through activities of retribution. 
Paternal retribution has the objective to “discipline the free will” (Boutel-
lier & Lünneman, in RMO, 2007:91; my translation, RP). Discipline is a technique 
to structure human behaviour by means of repression, control, training and sur-
veillance: “Discipline is essentially centripetal. […] [D]iscipline functions to the 
extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a segment. Discipline concen-
trates, focuses, and encloses. [...] Discipline allows nothing to escape” (Foucault, 
2007:44-45). 
 
Whereas the paternal vision of the individual emphasises individual responsibil-
ity, its vision of society is characterised by a belief in the incapability of a society 
to provide for its own security. The latent anarchy in society requires control and 
correction. Individuals and society in general depend on the state for protection 
against infractions of life and property. In short, the fundamental reason of being 
(or justification) of the paternalistic sphere of state intervention is the capacity to 
uphold a form of social order and the capacity to penalise offenders or menaces to 
this order.  
The range of paternalistic interventions is determined by a specific defini-
tion of order on the one hand and the number and severity of infringements upon 
this order on the other hand. Consequently, the nature and depth of paternalistic 
activities is characterised by hierarchical and top-down interventions. Impersonal 
and general rules mark the boundaries of social order. For a credible execution of 
this task, a certain concentration of power is required. 
In terms of historical manifestations, the paternalistic sphere of state in-
terventions can typically be recognised in activities of law enforcement and the 
administration of justice. More broadly, these interventions are associated with 
the image of the constitutional state. Even though the constitutional state implies 
important limitations to the exertion of state power, it also provides the justifica-
tion for a broad range of interventions to protect the social order, to punish crimi-
nals, to hierarchically regulate social behaviour through rules and laws, and to 
arbitrate in social conflicts. This image of the state as ‘defensor pacis’ (Marsilius of 
Padua, 1324) requires an apparatus of armed forces, a police force, a judiciary, a 
penal system, and a system of laws and regulations. 
 
2.6. The maternalistic sphere of state intervention 
The ideal-typical maternalistic sphere of state intervention is characterised by the 
values of emancipation and care. Emancipation creates opportunities for self-
realisation; care follows when fate strikes. Subjects are assumed to require sup-
port for their personal development and for the compensation of financial or 
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physical harm. Whereas the paternalistic sphere of state intervention presup-
poses individual guilt and accountability, the maternalistic sphere assumes that 
certain phenomena are beyond the control of individual citizens and require a 
“treatment of fate” (Boutellier & Lünneman, in RMO, 2007:101; my transl., RP). 
Maternal compensation for fate walks a thin line between enabling self-
development and providing security against external threats. ‘Security techniques’ 
(Foucault, 2004), typical for the liberal form of government in a capitalist society, 
have this double function of care and emancipation. They protect against illness 
and poverty, but also ‘promote’ and ‘canalise’ social behaviour to realise certain 
objectives such as the improvement of wealth, commercial activity, social security, 
education and health: “The apparatus of security […] ‘lets things happen’. Not that 
everything is left alone, but laisser-faire is indispensible at a certain level” (Fou-
cault, 2007:45). 
 
Consistent with the maternal vision that the individual is vulnerable to external 
influences, the maternal vision of society is characterised by a belief in its incapa-
bility of dealing with fate. External factors are beyond the control of individuals 
and therefore require compensative activities on a collective level, such as protec-
tion against illness and poverty, the equal opportunity to pursue personal life 
plans, and spatial planning for the promotion of collective economical interests. In 
short, the fundamental reason of being (or justification) of the maternalistic 
sphere of state intervention is the capacity to provide compensation mechanisms 
for fate and the capacity to provide the opportunities for self-development.  
The range of maternalistic interventions is determined by a specific defi-
nition of collective needs on the one hand and the identification of external 
threats endangering these needs on the other hand. Consequently, the nature and 
depth of maternalistic activities is characterised by reciprocal and responsive 
relations. Collective needs and equal opportunities for all are protected. For the 
credible execution of this task, the distribution of wealth and organisation of ser-
vices is required. 
In terms of historical manifestations, the maternalistic sphere of state in-
terventions can typically be recognised in activities of social security, welfare 
state services, collective insurance schemes, education and spatial planning. More 
broadly speaking, these activities are associated with the welfare state. Even 
though the welfare state uses the hierarchical and impersonal methods of legisla-
tion and bureaucracy for the execution of its tasks, these are also infused by the 
values of care, support and emancipation. More specifically, maternalistic activi-
ties include health care services, opportunities for education, proper housing, 
public health, public goods (such as infrastructure, and cultural and recreational 
facilities), social security, and promotion of equal rights for all. 
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3. The historical appearance of the state 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The discussion above on the idea of the state refers to the nuclear definition of the 
state as sovereign ruler and to the ideal-typical forms in which state power is ex-
erted. This, however, says very little about the historical appearance of the state, 
which encapsulates the notion of sovereignty, but is also the product of a specific 
temporal and spatial context. And the actual forms of government can be under-
stood in terms of the aforementioned paternalistic and maternalistic spheres of 
state intervention, but are at the same time – by necessity – contingent deviations 
from the ideal types. 
The historical appearance of a state is constituted by the characteristics of 
the tasks a state undertakes and of the specific activities it develops to perform 
these tasks. The aforementioned discussion of the two spheres of state interven-
tion already hinted at two conceptualisations by which contemporary Western 
European forms of sovereign rule can be described: the ‘paternalistic’ constitu-
tional state and the ‘maternalistic’ welfare state. These conceptualisations are 
further developed in the following for two purposes. First, they express paternal-
istic and maternalistic values in practice and can, therefore, be understood as a 
means to further expand on the nature of the two spheres of state intervention. 
Second, they provide the spatial and temporal context in which the preventive 
gaze is presumed to emerge. The constitutional and welfare state provide the 
starting point for the empirical inquiry. 
 
This study is historically limited to the age of modernity, since this is constitutive 
of our contemporary understanding of the state,39 and geographically limited to 
                                                   
39 In his monumental study on the history of government from the Sumerian city-state (which 
first appeared around 3500 B.C.) up to the present day modern state, Finer attributes three 
constitutive characteristics to both modern and pre-modern historical appearances of the state: 
1. “They are territorially defined populations each recognizing a common paramount or-
gan of government. 
2. This organ is served by specialized personnel; a civil service, to carry out decisions 
and a military service to back these by force where necessary and to protect the asso-
ciation from similarly constituted associations. 
3. The state so characterized is recognized by other similarly constituted states as inde-
pendent in its action on its territorially defined – and hence confined – population, 
that is, on its subjects. This recognition constitutes what we would today call its inter-
national ‘sovereignty’” (1997:2-3). 




Western Europe, since “[...] the development of states in Europe is – in a world-
historical perspective – highly idiosyncratic” (Finer, 1997:5). ‘Modernity’ not also 
refers to the era following the Middle Ages, but also to a specific type of society 
and culture, which typically exists in what is generally known as the ‘western 
world’.  
In sociological terms, “[...] modernity is a shorthand term for modern soci-
ety, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with 1) a 
certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to trans-
formation, by human intervention; 2) a complex of economic institutions, espe-
cially industrial production and a market economy; 3) a certain range of political 
institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy. Largely as a result of 
these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of 
social order. It is a society — more technically, a complex of institutions — which, 
unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future, rather than the past” (Giddens, 
1998:94).40  
At a more empirical level, modern societies can be commonly identified by 
the transition from an agrarian to an industrial and urbanised society, by the 
commercialisation and commoditisation of economic relationships and the rise of 
capitalism, by a rationalisation in the social division of labour, the use of technol-
ogy and the development of scientific modes of thought, by detraditionalisation of 
social relations and subsequent rise of a more individualised and egalitarian cul-
ture, and by a democratisation of political processes (e.g. Pierson, 2004:28). 
This sociological understanding of modern society is closely connected to 
the intellectual understanding of ‘modernity’. Grounded in Enlightenment ideas, 
modernity refers to “a progressive force promising to liberate mankind from igno-
rance and irrationality” (Rosenau, 1992:5). “Man’s emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity” (Kant, 1784) implies a cultural emphasis on the use of hu-
man reason for the organisation and government of society. This idea finds its 
expression in, for instance, the typically modern rational division of labour. More-
                                                                                                                                 
4. “Ideally at least, but to a large extent in practice also, the population of the state forms 
a community of feeling – a Gemeinschaft based on self-consciousness of a common na-
tionality. 
5. Ideally at least, and again to a large extent in practice, the population forms a commu-
nity in the sense that its members mutually participate in distributing and sharing du-
ties and benefits” (1997:3). 
40 Van den Brink (2006:12) understands modernity to refer to a way of life or attitude which 
takes into account four revolutions in the western world. First, the 17th century scientific revo-
lution, which stresses the use of human reason. Second, the 18th and 19th century political revo-
lutions, which ended the ‘ancien régime’ and made the emergence of democracy possible. Third, 
the 19th century industrial revolution, which brought about massive transformations in econo-
my. And fourth, the 20th century sexual revolution, which wrought a fundamental transfor-
mation in family life and marriage. 
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over, crucial to intellectual modernity is the idea of individual equality. Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative’ (1788) provided the argument for an organisation of au-
thority based on moral laws that are grounded in reason, and for universal legisla-
tion that treats every individual equally and accepts no higher authority than the 
rule of law. 
 
Within this context of modernity, Western European states have developed a spe-
cific range and depth of activities, which can to a large extent be conceptualised in 
the notions of the constitutional state and the welfare state. These are not the only 
conceivable images41 and they have been preceded by other expressions of similar 
state interventions,42 but they do represent contemporary systems of paternalistic 
and maternalistic state interventions. The constitutional state – understood here 
to refer to the contemporary form of a state as ‘defensor pacis’ (Marsilius of Pa-
dua, 1324) – determines the legal boundaries of behaviour, holds individuals ac-
countable for their own behaviour, and punishes infringements of the legal order. 
The notion of the constitutional state represents the cohesive whole of freedom 
rights, judiciary, public prosecutor, police, law enforcement, administering justice 
and detention. 
In contrast, the welfare state structure introduces equal opportunities for 
education and social insurance schemes to protect against unemployment, illness 
and disability. The welfare state’s intervention repertoire consists of social rights 
and welfare legislation, collective insurance programmes, financial means to fa-
cilitate health care and education, and a broad range of welfare organisations. 
Whereas the constitutional state structures a population’s field of action by set-
ting boundaries, the welfare state does so by opening up opportunities and pro-
viding services. The activities associated with the constitutional state can, to a 
large extent, be termed paternalistic, since the majority of activities is punitive or 
enforcing in nature. Conversely, the welfare state domain has predominantly ma-
ternalistic characteristics – evident in the facilitative nature of many welfare state 
institutions.43 
                                                   
41 These are, however, not the only possible concepts by which to refer to the notion of the 
contemporary state, nor do they claim to capture the full range of state tasks and activities. By 
focusing on different aspects of the state’s intervention repertoire, other conceptualisations of 
the state can be identified, such as the ‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994), the ‘surveillance state’ 
(Lyon, 2007), the ‘panoptic state’ (Bannister, 2005) or the ‘empty state’ (Frissen, 1999). 
42 I.e., pre-modern and early modern punishment (e.g. Spierenburg, 1984) and collective action 
for health and education (e.g. De Swaan, 1988). 
43 However, the paternalistic sphere does not coincide with the constitutional state, nor does 
the maternalistic sphere coincide with the welfare state. The two spheres function as the ahis-
torical and abstract conceptions from which actual government practices and state interven-
tions can be understood. This also implies that the preventive gaze does not alter these spheres. 
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3.2. The constitutional state 
 
3.2.1. Basic definition 
In its most basic definition, a constitutional state is a state bound by the laws of its 
own making. A constitutional state is a sovereign state that has deliberately lim-
ited its exertion of power to legally defined competences and through legally de-
fined procedures. In a constitutional state, there is no higher authority than the 
authority of the law. This principle of lawfulness denies a sovereign state the op-
portunity for an arbitrary exertion of power. In the words of Neumann, the 
‘Rechtsstaatsidee’44 is characterised by “[…] the postulate that the administration 
of the state is bound by its own laws, and that every interference of the state must 
be reducible to such laws. This implies the supremacy of the law and only of the 
law; but of a certain type of law, namely of the general laws” (Neumann, 
1986:182).  
What the exact content and range of law in a constitutional state should be 
is a subject of discussion and prone to historical development and interpretation, 
but usually includes a set of freedom rights and political rights for every citizen of 
the state, a division between a state’s judicial, legislative and executive powers, an 
impartial and equally accessible judiciary, a separation between church and state, 





                                                                                                                                 
Instead, actual policies and activities prompted by the preventive gaze consist of a different 
contingent manifestation of paternalistic and maternalistic spheres of state intervention. All 
state activities are presumed to follow from the two spheres developed in the above. 
44 The notion of a ‘Rechtsstaat’ refers to Germanic tradition of a constitutional state in which the 
state is bound by general codified laws. In the British tradition, however, emphasis is placed on 
the ‘sovereignty of Parliament’. Both the English and the German constitutional state are part of 
a broader tradition of government in their respective states. The ‘English model’ also has a 
preference for ‘common law’ and for jurisprudence to fill in the constitutional character of the 
state, whereas the ‘German model’ prefers codification of laws and the formulation of general 
rules (Zouridis, 2009:126-127).  
The Dutch constitutional state, while tending more to the ‘German model’, occupies the 
middle ground: while it, too, prefers the formulation of general rules, it does not have a Consti-
tutional Court and tends to formulate laws that are less precise and more open to policy inter-
pretations (Zouridis, 2009:124) – thereby expressing the primacy of Parliament over laws. In 
the words of Neumann: “In the British doctrine, the centre of gravity lies in the determination of 
the content of the laws by Parliament. The German theory is uninterested in the genesis of the 
law, and is immediately concerned with the interpretation of a positive law, somehow and 
somewhere arisen. The German theory is liberal-constitutional; the English democratic-
constitutional” (Neumann, 1986:185). 
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3.2.2. The quest for a state-free domain 
The image of the constitutional state is introduced in the context of this study to 
describe the contemporary forms of government in the paternalistic sphere. How-
ever, the constitutional state is as much associated with a limitation of state 
power as it is with ‘law and order’. The historical development of the Western 
constitutional state is inextricably intertwined with the protection of individual 
citizens against the potentially tyrannical powers of the state. 
Contemporary Western European political reality is constituted by the 
conceptual distinction between a private, public and political sphere (e.g. Arendt, 
1958). Without these distinctions, every human activity in a society would be “in-
terpreted through politics and seen as transformable by politics” (Pizzorno, in 
Maier, 1994:27). This is the defining characteristic of a totalitarian state,45 which 
leaves no room for discussion or criticism from the public sphere, and no room for 
personal autonomy or withdrawal in the private sphere (Lefort, 1986).46 
With regard to the public sphere of life, Habermas has noted that the free 
interaction between citizens forms a counterbalance to the state, and as such 
                                                   
45 Totalitarian rule is “[..] a form of society, that form in which all activities are immediately 
linked to one another, deliberately presented as modalities of a single world; that form in which 
a system of values predominates absolutely, such that every individual or collective undertak-
ing must necessarily find in it a coefficient of reality; that form in which, lastly, the dominant 
model exercises a total physical and spiritual constraint on the behavior of private individuals. 
In this sense, totalitarianism claims to negate the separation of the various domains of social life 
[…]. Thus every activity, from the most modest to the most important, is actualized and pre-
sented as a moment of a collective project” (Lefort, 1986:79-80). 
46 Lefort also describes the role democracy can have in preventing a development towards 
totalitarian rule. Properly functioning democracies do not permanently monopolise the general 
will or a specific concept of the ‘good life’ (as, for instance, communist regimes do). In democra-
cies, the political arena is ‘open’ to a variety of views on the good life, to a variety of representa-
tions of the general will, and to changes in the holders of political power through popular elec-
tions. Political will formation in democracies is the process of the free interaction between these 
representations.  
The essential characteristic of democratic states in comparison to totalitarian regimes 
is that the place of power remains ‘empty’. Democracies do not have a fixated power in an elite, 
party or individual, but a power circulating in politics and society: “The legitimacy of power is 
based on the people; but the image of popular sovereignty is linked to the image of an empty 
place, impossible to occupy, such that those who exercise public authority can never claim to 
appropriate it. Democracy combines these two apparently contradictory principles: on the one 
hand, power emanates from the people; on the other, it is the power of nobody. And democracy 
thrives on this contradiction. Whenever the latter risks being resolved or is resolved, democ-
racy is either close to destruction or already destroyed. If the place of power appears, no longer 
as symbolically, but as really empty, then those who exercise it are perceived as mere ordinary 
individuals, as forming a faction at the service of private interests and, by the same token, le-
gitimacy collapses throughout society” (Lefort, 1986:279). 
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forms a core characteristic of the liberal constitutional state:47 “Die sozialstaat-
lichen Massendemokratieen dürfen sich, ihrem normativen Selbstverständnis 
zufolge, nur solange in einer Kontinuität mit den Grundsätzen des liberalen 
Rechtsstaates sehen, wie sie das Gebot einer politisch fungierenden Öffentlichkeit 
ernst nehmen” (1962:33). And with regard to the private sphere, Isaiah Berlin 
stated that liberal societies are founded on the idea that “[…] there ought to exist a 
certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated. 
[…] It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and 
that of public authority” (Berlin, 2007:171). 
Faced with an almighty Leviathan, both the public and the private sphere 
require some sort of protection against political usurpation. As Machiavelli had 
previously made clear, politics determines its own boundaries. As a result, politics 
also determines the boundaries of the public and private spheres of life. The con-
temporary constitutional state provides institutional safeguards for these 
boundaries, such as a set of equal freedom rights for every citizen, including free-
dom of speech and assembly (Poggi, 1978:104-105; cf. Marshall, 1950), and an 
organisation of the state apparatus according to the principle of “le pouvoir arrête 
le pouvoir” (Montesquieu, 1748).48 
 
As such, the contemporary constitutional state is the product of a longstanding 
Western European quest for the limitation of state power, and more specifically a 
                                                   
47 The liberal constitutional state emerged from the 18th century onwards (Habermas, 1962). 
This development was a very general and gradual one, with very distinct trajectories in the 
various Western European states. For instance, in France, the 17th and 18th century were 
marked by absolutist rule, most notably that of Louis XIV. Generally speaking, the revolutionary 
year of 1848 was a watershed in many Western European countries for the establishment of a 
democratic rule and/or of individual rights against the state (e.g. France and the Netherlands), 
following the American example of 1776. However, in many cases the ‘democratic turmoil’ also 
proved to be the starting point for fascist and communist movements and their eventual claim 
to authority, lasting until deep in the 20th century. 
48 Montesquieu distinguishes three powers, which should be kept in balance in order to prevent 
tyranny and arbitrariness: without a separation between the executive and legislative power 
there is no possibility to prevent tyrannical legislation or implementation, and without a sepa-
rate judiciary there is no possibility to stop arbitrary and repressive government. 
Noteworthy is Montesquieu’s warning against well-meaning rulers: “Tout homme qui 
a du pouvoir est porté à en abuser: il va jusqu’à ce qu’il trouve des limites. Qui le dirait! La vertu 
même a besoin de limites” (cited by Van der Pot c.s., 2001:27). Fareed Zakaria (2003) makes a 
similar point in his discussion of J.S. Mill: “Mill opened his classic On Liberty by noting that as 
countries became democratic, people tended to believe that ‘too much importance had been 
attached to the limitations of [governmental] power itself. That … was a response against rulers 
whose interests were opposed to those of the people’. Once the people were themselves in 




quest for a ‘state-free domain’49 in which the state should not intervene – a quest 
almost as old as the founding of sovereign states during the 17th century. The 
Westphalian Peace (1648) and the Glorious Revolution (1688) ended long periods 
of civil and religious wars and marked the beginning of a period of consolidation 
of state power (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:21). While this period of civil war convinc-
ingly demonstrated that peace and order would be unattainable without the con-
struction of a Leviathan (Hobbes, 1651), it was also clear that establishing a sov-
ereign state was by no means a safeguard against tyranny and repression: “[…] die 
Macht, die stark genug war, den Bürger zu schützen und das Recht zu gewährleis-
ten, war auch stark genug, den Bürger zu bedrücken und willkürlich über das 
Recht zu verfügen” (Zippelius, 1999:296).  
In the intellectual and factual “struggle between Liberty and Authority” 
(Mill, 2002:1), the notion of individual freedom takes central stage. For instance, 
John Locke’s (1632-1704) conceptualisation of the ‘state of nature’ in his Two 
Treatises of Government (1689) is – contrary to Hobbes’s interpretation – a state 
where ‘natural law’ reigns: “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law teaches all mankind who 
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his life, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 2003:271). A sovereign state 
does not take the place of this natural law. Instead, a sovereign state should be 
understood as an entity to which individuals entrust certain powers – a consent in 
the form of a social contract. 
 
According to authors such as George Sabine and Friedrich von Hayek, Locke can 
be placed at the beginning of a tradition in political thought that emphasised lib-
erty over equality. As such, it should be distinguished from another tradition, 
which emphasises individual equality. According to Sabine, “[…] there have been 
two democratic traditions, or at least two distinguishable strands in the demo-
cratic tradition; […] one has been more characteristically Anglo-American and the 
other more characteristically French; […] the first gave primary importance to 
liberty while the second gave primary importance to equality” (1952:452).  
The archetypal representative of the second strand of thought is Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who sought to abolish social inequalities by 
means of political citizenship and representation. In his interpretation, a social 
contract did not constitute the primacy of particular freedom, but instead the in-
stitution of a popular or general will:50 “A l’instant au lieu de la personne particu-
                                                   
49 I have derived this term from Georg Jellinek in his Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürger-
rechte: ein Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte (1895). 
50 An obvious objection to Rousseau’s conception of the social contract and the general will, is 
its absolute character, which resembles Hobbes’s Leviathan – no matter how much Rousseau 
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lière de chaque contractant, cet acte d’association produit un corps moral et col-
lectif” (cited by Van der Pot c.s., 2001:30).51  
Whereas Locke stressed the importance of a state-free domain to prevent 
tyranny, Rousseau stressed the importance of rule through the popular will to 
prevent tyranny. Put differently, the former feared the state and a tyranny of the 
majority, the latter feared society and a tyranny of a minority52. Both strands of 
thought have been constitutive of contemporary Western European rule: the ‘con-
stitutional state’ finds part of its theoretical underpinnings in the intellectual tra-
dition following the footsteps of Locke, and the ‘democratic state’ owes much of its 
inspiration to authors in Rousseau’s tradition. The former is closely related to the 
development of freedom rights, the latter to the development of political rights 
(cf. Marshall, 1950). 
 
3.2.3. The quest for justification of authority 
Especially relevant for our inquiry into the paternalistic sphere of state interven-
tion is the other side of the image of the constitutional state: the law as a justifica-
tion for the exertion of state power (Gribnau, 2009). The constitutional state is not 
only a break with the absolutist Leviathan, but also a continuation of the sover-
                                                                                                                                 
himself detested this comparison and no matter how much their conceptions of the ‘state of 
nature’ differed (Berber, 1978:214; cf. Talmon, 1952). For both Hobbes and Rousseau, the ‘cov-
enant’ or ‘contrat’ also serves as an ‘Unterwerfungsvertrag’ for individuals to a newly instituted 
sovereign (Jellinek, 1976:212-213). 
51 In the words of E.H. Carr: “In the feudal period of European history the rôle of the individual 
in society was determined by hereditary status combined with ownership of land, and social 
relations were woven round a traditional framework of mutual obligation founded on hierar-
chy. […] It was left to the French Revolution […] to strike the final blow. […] The new society 
was to be in principle a society of free and equal individuals. Relations between them were 
henceforth to be determined not by status, but by contracts entered into by them of their own 
free will” (Carr, 1951:40). 
52 Sabine stresses the historical context in which Locke and Rousseau expressed their ideas – 
the former writing against the background of the English Glorious Revolution of 1688, the latter 
writing on the eve of the French Revolution of 1789. Both these revolutions ended feudalism, 
but they differed fundamentally. The Glorious Revolution resulted from a struggle for religious 
tolerance and was consistent with the Germanic (and to some extent British) tradition of self-
government and self-organisation of society. This revolution was also an expression of ac-
knowledgement of a private sphere of life, of a limitation of state powers, and of a confidence in 
the ability of individuals and social associations to ‘regulate’ social life and economy (cf. Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’) (Sabine, 1952:457-459).  
The French Revolution aimed to overthrow ‘l’ancien régime’, which had maintained 
social inequalities based on personal privileges and fixed social stratifications. Revolutionaries 
sought to replace this with a system of equal citizenship and equal rights. This also resulted in 
scepticism towards social associations and forms of self-organisation, since these were poten-
tial sources of social inequalities. Therefore, according to Sabine, the British democratic tradi-
tion emphasises the boundaries between state and society, whereas in the French tradition “the 
state overlaps and includes every phase of society” (1952:463).  
69 
 
eign state’s role in the protection of social order. The historical passage to the 
constitutional state can be understood as the depersonalisation of sovereign rule: 
“[…] the moral ideal that ultimately legitimizes the modern state is the taming of 
power through the depersonalization of its exercise” (Poggi, 1978:101). In a mod-
ern state, sovereign rule is transferred from the hands of a mortal king into the 
hands of an impersonal state apparatus – or from the king’s ‘body natural’ to a 
‘body politic’ (Dean, 2007:140), from ‘rex’ to ‘regnum’ (Jellinek, 1976:330). 
 
In a constitutional state, rule is exerted through bureaucracy and law:53 a system 
of impersonal and transparent institutions, of generally applicable codified rights 
and duties, and of official and generally accessible offices. According to Max We-
ber (1864-1920), authority in the form of impersonal rules and laws is typical for 
the 20th century modern Western European state, which is embedded in a broader 
societal development towards rationalisation: modern capitalist and industrial-
ised societies with a complex division of labour have an tendency towards ra-
tional, formal, stable and predictable rule (Weber, 1922). Therefore, the typical 
everyday appearance of modern rule is not the sovereign king, but impersonal 
and technical administration or ‘Verwaltung’ (Weber, 2006:222). 
The constitutional state fits the development of a specifically modern type 
of authority. In his tripartite conceptualisation of authority (‘Herrschaft’) or le-
gitimate exertion of power,54 Weber distinguishes pre-modern traditional55 and 
charismatic authority56 from modern rational-legal authority. ‘Rational-legal au-
                                                   
53 This is, however, not limited to the image of the constitutional state. For instance, many wel-
fare state services are organised through bureaucratic organisations and procedures. 
54 Weber defines ‘power’ as follows: “Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen 
Beziehung den eignen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese 
Chance beruht” (2006:62). And authority exists when power is obeyed: “Herrschaft soll heißen 
die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbahren Personen Gehorsam zu 
finden” (2006:62). And: “’Gehorsam’ soll bedeuten: daß das Handeln des Gehorchenden im 
wesentlichen so abläuft, als ob er den Inhalt des Befehls um dessen selbst willen zur Maxime 
seines Verhaltens gemacht habe […]” (2006:217). 
55 ‘Traditional authority’ rests in the hands of an individual ruler, passes from generation to 
generation, and is based on long-established habits, routines and social structures: “Traditional 
soll eine Herrschaft heißen, wenn ihre Legitimität sich stützt und geglaubt wird auf Grund der 
Heiligkeit altüberkommener (‘von jener bestehender’) Ordnungen und Herrengewalten” (We-
ber, 2006:227). Hereditary monarchies are characterised by this type of authority. 
56 ‘Charismatic authority’ is an individual and non-hereditary form of authority, which rests on 
the belief of followers in the extraordinary qualities of a certain person, such as a prophet, guru 
or hero: “’Charisma’ soll eine als außeralltäglich [...] geltende Qualität einer Persönlichkeit 
heißen, um derentwillen sie als mit übernatürlichen oder übermenschlichen oder mindestens 
spezifisch außeralltäglichen, nicht jedem andern zugänglichen Kräften oder Eigenschaften oder 




thority’ is not vested in an individual like traditional or charismatic authority, but 
is exercised by individuals or institutions by virtue of formal rules and laws. The 
legally defined office creates legitimacy, rather than the individual holding the 
office: politicians have authority on the basis of their formal position as represen-
tatives, and state officials have authority on the basis of their functional position 
in a state bureaucracy. Rules, not rulers, are the basis of rational-legal authority 
(Weber, 2006:219-222).  
This also makes ‘bureaucracy’ the most appropriate structure of rule for 
rational-legal authority,57 since it features the requisite qualities to exert power in 
a formal way: a strict hierarchy, a division of competences, personnel appointed 
on the basis of technical qualifications, and an impartial execution of tasks (We-
ber, 2006:222). In the words of Weber: “Das Entscheidende bliebe doch: dass die-
se ‘frei’ schaffende Verwaltung (und eventuell: Rechtssprechung) nicht, wie wir 
das bei den vorbürokratischen Formen finden werden, ein Reich der freien Will-
kür und Gnade, der persönlichen motivierten Gunst und Bewertung bilden würde. 
Sondern dass stets als Norm des Verhaltens die Herrschaft und rationale Abwä-
gung ‘sachlicher’ Zwecke und die Hingabe an sie besteht” (1972:573). 
 
Taking the Lockean state-free domain and the Weberian rational-legal authority 
together, the contemporary constitutional state serves as a structure for the simul-
taneous limitation and the justification of rule in modern society (cf. Gribnau, 
2009). The notion of the constitutional state by no means refers solely to the ab-
sence of state interventions (cf. Hirsh Ballin, in Bovens c.s., 1987). The constitu-
tional state is also responsible for protecting citizens against infringements on life, 
liberty and property by fellow citizens.  
This responsibility already follows from Hobbes’s notion of the Leviathan, 
but is transformed into a legal matter in the constitutional state.58 The previously 
discussed notion of the state as sovereign ruler already implied a basic task of the 
state in the protection of public order in order to prevent a Hobbesian ‘war of all 
against all’. Within the context of the Western European constitutional state, this 
                                                   
57 Moreover, the bureaucratic organisation fit perfectly in the 19th century industrial age and its 
demands for efficient, standardised and mass-scale production of goods (e.g. Morgan, 1992:21). 
The phenomenon of the bureaucracy is therefore by no means limited to state administration – 
it emerged everywhere in the 19th century, as an answer to a quest for machine-like methods of 
control and production. 
58 In 1885, Albert Dicey formulated an interpretation of the rule of law, which remained close to 
the original notion of the constitutional state since it emphasised the restriction of the state and 
its citizens to a set of impersonal laws. Three aspects are highlighted by Dicey: 1) no one can be 
punished or be made to suffer except for a breach of law proved in court, 2) no one is above the 
law and everyone is equal before the law regardless of social, economic or political status, and 
3) the rule of law includes the results of judicial decisions (Dicey, 1885). 
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task is legally attributed to public authorities, breaches of the public order are 
legally defined, and no one can be punished or be made to suffer except for a 
breach of law proved in court (Dicey, 1885).  
The judge and the law are the modern guises of the state as the ultimate 
arbiter of societal conflicts: “For much of modern history, what characterized gov-
ernments in Europe and North America, and differentiated them from those 
around the world, was not democracy but constitutional liberalism. The ‘Western 
model of government’ is best symbolized not by the mass plebiscite but the impar-
tial judge” (Zakaria, 2007:20).59 As a consequence, state interventions in the lives 
of citizens to fulfil the task of sovereign ruler are, within the context of the consti-
tutional state, mainly justified when they are a reaction to prior violations of the 
law (cf. Zouridis, 2009:176-177 on a state’s ‘Eingriffsverwaltung’). This basic logic 
underlying the contemporary paternalistic forms of government is taken as the 
starting point for this study. 
 
3.3. The welfare state 
 
3.3.1. Basic definition 
Next to the image of the constitutional state, that of the welfare state is centre 
stage in contemporary conceptualisations of the Western European state. Over 
the course of the 20th century, Western European constitutional states have sub-
stantially increased their formal competences and tasks in this maternalistic 
realm. After the allocation of freedom and political rights in the 19th and early 20th 
century, the ‘night watchman state’ (Lasalle, 1862) has, especially in the years 
following the Second World War, incorporated (often constitutional) social rights 
in its repertoire, as well (Marshall, 1950; Vonk & Katrougalos, in Vonk & Tolle-
naar, 2010:74). A welfare state has “[...] fairly explicit commitments to the broad 
goals of economic development, full employment, equality of opportunity for the 
young, social security, and protected minimum standards as regards not only in-
come, but nutrition, housing, health and education, for people of all regions and 
social groups” (Myrdal, 1960:45).60  
The welfare state is characterised by a duty of care instead of by a clearly 
defined set of competences such as in the case of the constitutional state.61 In the 
                                                   
59 This does not imply that the notion of government ‘by law and not by men’ dates from mod-
ern Western Europe. The idea can be dated back to Aristotle’s Politica, but was, according to 
Hayek, temporarily lost after the fall of the Roman republic (Hayek, 2006:142-146). 
60 To fulfil these objectives, distribution of wealth by the state is a necessity. 
61 An example of a broad understanding of the welfare comes from the Dutch Scientific Council 
for Government Policy, which identifies four key functions or objectives. A first function is in-
surance against illness and unemployment. Second, a welfare state must provide care in the 
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context of this study, welfare state interventions will be defined as interventions 
that have been designed to compensate for fate, either by creating services to sup-
port citizens in the event fate should strike – such as health care in the case of 
illness and social security in the case of unemployment – or by developing meas-
ures to create equal opportunities – such as equal access to higher education and 
emancipation of minority groups. The intervention repertoire of a welfare state is 
decidedly different than the repertoire of the 19th century constitutional state. 
Instead of punishment following a breach of law, the welfare state compensates 
citizens for threats to their welfare and wellbeing. And instead of individual guilt 
and responsibility, the existence of harmful externalities beyond the realm of con-
trol of individual citizens is assumed as the basis for interventions in the welfare 
state.62 
 
3.3.2. The social question 
Even though the origins of collective action for the promotion of health, welfare 
and education can be placed in the Middle Ages (De Swaan, 1988), the roots of the 
actual welfare state lie in late 19th century Germany and England, where the first 
social laws were passed with a view to improving the financial and social position 
and physical wellbeing of the working class in terms of housing, public health, 
education, and old age and unemployment facilities (Bruce, 1968:17-24). Before 
that time, welfare services did exist – however, not in the form of involuntary col-
lective insurances, but in the form of private charity by local aristocracy, churches, 
civil organisations and religious orders (Nentjes & Woerdman, in Vonk & Tolle-
naar, 2010:27).  
The development of the welfare state can be understood as a response to 
the structural societal transformations from the 19th century onwards brought 
                                                                                                                                 
form of public health and welfare services. Third, welfare states aim to create equal opportuni-
ties and promote emancipation, for instance through equal access to higher education. A fourth 
and final function of the welfare state is community organisation through social work and facili-
ties to make full participation in society possible, such as sporting and recreational facilities, 
libraries and proper housing and infrastructure (WRR, 2006).  
Especially the last two functions show that the welfare state is not only concerned 
with material welfare, but also with mental wellbeing and individual self-realisation – functions 
which are usually presented as a compensation for an ever more individualised, automated and 
urbanised society (De Haan & Duyvendak, 2002:161). 
62 However, this does not imply that the welfare state is incompatible with the constitutional 
state. In fact, contemporary Western European constitutional states usually have incorporated a 
set of legal obligations for the state to perform certain tasks (cf. Zouridis, 2009:176-177 on a 
state’s ‘Leistungsverwaltung’). Even though these obligations to act have a different character 
than the aforementioned limitations of state power, there is no inherent conflict between the 
welfare state and the basic constitutional demand that every state activity should be based on a 
legal competence.  
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about by the rise of capitalism, industrialisation and urbanisation in previously 
agrarian societies. The social consequences of these transformations were im-
mense: the ‘social question’ included a broad range of problems, including pov-
erty, poor housing, detraditionalisation, child labour, unemployment, poor health 
and hygiene, social stratification, and poor labour conditions. The welfare state is 
“the practical answer to the practical problems of industrial development and 
mass society” (Bruce, 1968:30).63 As the private charities that constituted pre-
industrial social welfare proved insufficient to cope with a massive rise in welfare 
demands, the state eventually stepped in. 
An outline for the “[...] drastic widening of the range of social interests on 
which state action was brought to bear” (Poggi, 1990:65) to which we today are 
accustomed was developed by economist and social reformer William Beveridge 
in two reports to the British government: Social Insurance and Allied Services in 
1942, followed by Full Employment in a Free Society in 1944. Five ‘great evils’ 
were the main concern of the 1942 Beveridge Report: squalor, ignorance, want, 
idleness and disease. Beveridge proposed measures providing for social insurance 
schemes (‘want’), health care (‘disease’), housing (‘squalor’), education (‘igno-
rance’), and measures for stabilising and developing the economic system (‘idle-
ness’) (Bruce, 1968:309). All these measures were designed to make life less arbi-
trary and less subject to chance or fate (Maier, 1994:14). 
Along these lines, Western European countries such as England, (West-) 
Germany and the Netherlands, introduced various social regulations and subse-
quently implemented, coordinated and ‘planned’ these through large administra-
tive organisations of state bureaucracy within a relatively short time span (e.g. 
Myrdal, 1960:45). The 1960s and 1970s can be seen as the ‘Glorious Age’ of the 
welfare state (Leibfried & Mau, 2008:x): Western Europe was recovering from the 
Second World War, reconsidering its attitude towards market regulation after the 
economic crisis of the 1930s, and had explicitly broken with 19th century politics 
of ‘laissez-faire’.  
Since the 1980s, when the financial viability and efficiency of the welfare 
state began to be questioned, three major shifts have taken place in the organisa-
tion of the welfare state (Yeung, in Baldwin c.s., 2010:64-83). These are commonly 
referred to as the emergence of a ‘regulatory state’64 (Majone, 1994; 1997). First, 
                                                   
63 In The Road to Serfdom (1944), Hayek claims that this is a typical argumentation for the ex-
pansion of state activities: the more complex a society, the more regulation, as a result of which 
individual freedom must be reduced to maintain order (1976:32). 
64 The regulatory state covers a broader realm of state activities than commonly associated with 
the welfare state. Besides regulating welfare activities such as health care, regulation may also 
apply to financial markets, technological risks, food safety, environmental pollution and critical 
infrastructures. In all these cases, the state monitors and regulates the relations between pri-
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the privatisation of welfare state provisions, such as health care services, and the 
internationalisation of market regulation, in the form of European Union institu-
tions, have led to a ‘hollowing out’ of the state. Second, the state has shifted its role 
from direct welfare provider to one that is more regulatory by demanding that 
other, non-state actors provide proper services (e.g. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
And third, the practice of governing ‘at a distance’ or ‘indirect government’ (Ma-
jone, 1997:147) has led to a shift in policy instruments from hierarchical planning 
and control to the use of rules and specified standards for service provision by 
private actors: “rule making is replacing taxing and spending” (Majone, 
1997:139).  
 
An important trigger for the development of the welfare state was a transforma-
tion in the normative attitude towards poverty and social mobility. The constitu-
tional state may have brought legal equality for every citizen, but did not prevent 
the continuation of old and the rise of new social inequalities. Whereas Bernard de 
Mandeville, whose Fable of the Bees inspired Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, 
could state in 1714 that these were a natural and necessary part of social life, so-
cial inequalities became the subject of moral reflections from the 19th century 
onwards. 
The rise of the constitutional state was tightly interwoven with a quest for 
personal freedom and a state-free domain. However, as societies industrialised, 
this state-free domain gradually broadened from the realm of household and re-
ligion to the realm of economy. The fact that the notion of the ‘private sphere’ can 
refer both to the realm of the family household and to the realm of the economy 
may help to explain why the classical liberal notion of ‘laissez-faire’ was a ‘logical’ 
normative attitude with regard to state interventions during early industrialisa-
tion. 
During the 19th century, other interpretations of individual freedom 
emerged, which were critical of the social inequalities produced by industrialised 
societies: the desire to be socially acknowledged as a human being with individual 
and unique characteristics, desires, qualities, life plans and life expectations is a 
typically modern interpretation of freedom (Popitz, 1992:151).65 From this per-
                                                                                                                                 
vate actors. However, the regulatory role of the state with regard to welfare provisions has not 
led to the disappearance of the main idea underlying the welfare state: compensating harm 
caused by externalities. 
65 Clarifying in this respect is the distinction made by Russian-British political philosopher 
Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) between negative (‘freedom from’) and positive freedom (‘freedom 
to’). Negative freedom is the answer to the question within which sphere of life an individual is 
free to act according to his own will without intervention by others: “I am normally said to be 
free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty 
in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am pre-
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spective, the fixed social stratifications of capitalist society appear to be no less 
severe or coercive than traditional medieval stratification mechanisms. According 
to Weber (1922), a person’s place in the social hierarchy of modern industrial 
societies is the result of a certain societal-economical demand for certain knowl-
edge, qualities and capacities on the one hand, and the ‘life chances’ an individual 
has in terms of his qualities and the resources he can employ, on the other hand.  
Whereas philosophers of the constitutional state were concerned with the 
prevention of a tyrannical exertion of power, many 19th century authors became 
concerned with the needs of the industrial society and the necessity for state in-
terventions. This was reflected in the expansion of social sciences, such as sociol-
ogy and psychology (Van der Pot c.s., 2001:46), and in what more broadly can be 
understood as “the discovery of the social” (Donzelot, 1984): the idea that ‘society’ 
is a significant analytical entity to empirically understand the development and 
characteristics of modern life. Social and economic circumstances were viewed 
more and more as the driving forces behind individual behaviour and living condi-
tions (Dean, 1999:53).  
 
This development is reflected in the works of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who 
in his early works was a renowned and passionate champion of the rights of indi-
viduals and the protection of every citizen’s private life against state interven-
tion.66 In his later works, he availed himself of a more subtle liberalism than his 
                                                                                                                                 
vented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this 
area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, 
or, it may be, enslaved” (Berlin, 2007:169). This, however, does not imply a complete absence of 
state interventions. The adage to be “unobstructed by others” can result in a responsibility for 
the state to protect individual freedom against threats from other citizens, since “freedom for 
the wolves has often meant death to the sheep” (Berlin, 2007:38).  
In contrast, positive freedom is the answer to the question of which form of self-
realisation or autonomy an individual wants to pursue: “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘lib-
erty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and 
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instru-
ment of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as 
it were, from outside” (Berlin, 2007:178). 
According to Berlin, both these conceptions of liberty stem from the same source. The 
Enlightenment’s instruction for man to be autonomous and use his reason implies that an indi-
vidual takes control of his own life and future – ‘self mastery’ in the words of Berlin (2007:192). 
Precisely this desire to live according to one’s own life plan implies both an absence of interfer-
ence by others or by the state in the realisation of this plan, as well as an active involvement of 
the state to remove barriers and create equal rights for self-realisation: “Freedom is self-
government – whether in politics or in individual life – and anything that increases the control 
of the self over forces external to it contributes to liberty” (Berlin, 2007:259).  
66 For instance: “[…] the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection” (Mill, 2002:8). 
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utilitarian colleagues and teachers (such as Jeremy Bentham): he did not adhere 
to a ‘Weltanschauung’ according to a universal utilitarian pattern, but instead to 
the idea of individual freedom of choice for the purpose of self-realisation and to 
the idea of the individual person as a merit in itself (Schaper, 1963:92).67 
Especially in his later works, Mill argued in favour of state interventions 
that sought to realise actual possibilities for self-realisation of every citizen. He 
argued, among other things, for state support of education (On Liberty, 1859), for 
equal women’s rights (The Subjection of Women, 1869) and for various social 
regulations, taxation and provision of public services and goods (Principles of Po-
litical Economy, 1848) (Schaper, 1963:97): “The first element of good government, 
therefore, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the 
community, the most important point of excellence which any form of govern-
ment can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people them-
selves” (Mill, 2008:25).68 
A more recent philosophical argument for a balance between liberty and 
social equality was provided by John Rawls (1921-2002). In A Theory of Justice 
(1971), he formulated two principles for distributive justice. Especially the sec-
ond, ‘difference’ principle is important for understanding the logic of the welfare 
state as a ‘compensation for fate’: “social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged […], 
and b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equal-
ity of opportunity” (1999:266). From this principle, it follows that a state should 
intervene in society to correct inequalities produced by the free market, if these 
inequalities stem from an unequal starting position, such as origin, financial status 
or the possession of certain natural talents. According to Rawls, contingently ac-
quired advantages provide no moral justification of rights. 
 
 
                                                   
67 Hence, we can understand why Mill chose as the motto of his On Liberty (1859) a saying by 
the German humanist Wilhelm von Humboldt: “Der wahre Zweck des Menschen – nicht der, 
welchen die wechselnde Neigung, sondern welchen die ewig unveränderliche Vernunft ihm 
vorschreibt – ist die höchste und proportionierlichste Bildung seiner Kräfte zu einem Ganzen” 
(Von Humboldt, 2006:22). 
68 Following in Mill’s footsteps were ‘new liberalists’, such as T.H. Green (1836-1882), who 
perceived individual freedom as ‘self-realisation’ and strived “[…] to remove hindrances to the 
development of individual character, in the sense of an independent, self-respecting, responsi-
ble, self-helping individual” (Freeden, 1978:58). Green places the ‘welfare’ of human life central 
in an “attempt to reassert the quality of human life in the face of industrialism” (Freeden, 
1978:15). Green and his sympathisers urged for state interventions “[…] to maintain the condi-
tions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible”, such as regulation of 




3.3.3. A new model for social order and prosperity 
A second important motive for the rise of the welfare state is of a more pragmatic-
political nature. Whereas the former argument for the welfare state stems from a 
positive concern for the wellbeing of society, this second argument stems from a 
concern for social order (cf. Vonk & Tollenaar, 2010:7). Social inequalities caused 
social turmoil, which threatened the social and political order. The temptations of 
socialism mobilised the working class masses who were, in some countries such 
as Russia, able to overthrow the existing rule. Socialism was an, albeit extreme, 
example of political will formation, which was in sharp contradiction with the 
politics of ‘laissez-faire’. Exemplary here is the motto of the 1944 Beveridge report 
Full Employment in a Free Society: “misery generates hate”.  
On a social (and economical) level, the age of industrialisation created 
new interdependencies between the various social classes: for instance, factory 
owners and working class were tied together in the economical activity of mass 
production, and the lower and higher social classes shared the same urban envi-
ronment in which epidemic diseases and crime threatened social order. These 
interdependencies spark what Norbert Elias (1939) calls the civilisation process 
(cf. De Swaan, 1988; Donzelot, in Burchell c.s., 1991). 
And on a political level, the socialist-revolutionary summons threatened 
the existing balance of power in society. In the words of Jacques Donzelot, the 
question for liberal-constitutional states in the light of massive political move-
ments following the emergence of the ‘social question’ was: “How can the […] 
state lay down for itself a consistent line of intervention that runs between the 
revolutionary summons to act as the instance for reorganizing society, and the 
combined liberal-traditionalist animosity to any state infringement of the pre-
rogatives of civil society?” (cited in Burchell c.s., 1991:171). According to Don-
zelot, ‘solidarity’ was the conceptual (rather than moral) invention which justified 
state interventions in economic and social relations without sacrificing the liberal-
constitutional framework (in Burchell c.s., 1991:172-173). 
In the light of this concern for social order, industrialised society de-
manded a political agenda, which the 19th century constitutional state did not 
provide.69 Moreover, the late 19th and early 20th century democratic state was in 
many countries a far cry from contemporary universal suffrage.70 And even if uni-
                                                   
69 As Carl Schmitt noted in his Verfassungslehre (1928): “Die Prinzipien der bürgerlichen Frei-
heit können wohl einen Staat modizifieren und temperieren, aber nicht aus sich heraus eine 
politische Form begründen. […] Die Freiheit konstituiert nichts” (cited by Zippelius, 1999:302). 
70 In most Western European countries, a process of democratisation or, in other words, the 
extinction of political inequalities, preceded the development of the welfare state (Marshall, 
1950). This meant, of course, an increased influence of the ‘ordinary’ citizen in politics and, 
consequently, in the development of the state: “[The state] was no longer an organ whose 
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versal suffrage was introduced, the democratic state itself merely provided the 
framework for political will formation – it also did not constitute a political 
agenda in itself.71 The welfare state can therefore also be understood as an effort 
to establish a political agenda compatible with the already existing constitutional 
and democratic state, which aimed at preserving the existing social order.  
 
The concern for welfare and prosperity of the entire population was transformed 
from a purely private to a shared political and private matter. Economic welfare 
became an interest of both state and population. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) 
called this ‘the game of liberalism’ (2007:48). Liberalism depends to a certain 
extent on a politics of ‘laissez-faire’, but also on ‘apparatuses of security’ of the 
state (2007:45): a state lets things happen and allows freedom of goods circula-
tion to enable people to gather personal wealth, but a state also aims to manage 
the welfare of the general population, for instance through a distribution of 
wealth, social security, health care and proper education (2007:105). 
The basic idea behind this form of liberal government is that in the con-
text of modern industrialised societies, the stability of the state is inherently inter-
twined with the economic productivity and material welfare of the population. 
The sovereign state no longer fears external threats, but focuses on potential in-
ternal upheaval and on gaining strength by managing its population: “No longer 
the safety […] of the Prince and his territory, but the security […] of the population 
and, consequently, those who govern it” (2007:65). And elsewhere: “In contrast to 
sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but 
                                                                                                                                 
weakness was its virtue and whose activities should be restricted to a minimum in the interests 
of freedom. It was an organ which one sought to capture and control for the carrying out of 
necessary reforms; and, having captured it, one sought to make it as powerful and effective as 
possible in order to carry them out” (Carr, 1951:67). 
There is, however, no necessary relationship between democracy and the expansion of 
state activities (the US are a case in point), nor is democracy the only explanation for cases 
where expansion of state activities have taken place. But for instance in the Netherlands, demo-
cratic representation of the interests of dominant societal groups (such as social-democrats and 
Catholics) did lead to an expansion of state activities: “The state, seen as a goal-oriented organi-
sation, which can produce safety and security, goods and services, has served many lords in the 
course of history. The coming of a parliamentary system meant a system leap. For the first time, 
representatives of the state’s population had access to the political arena and could use their 
power to compel the state to realise new and extensive tasks in the interest of the people. To-
gether with democracy, the intervention state was created” (Van Doorn, 2009:437; my transla-
tion, RP). 
71 In the words of Schumpeter: “[…] the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1950:269). 
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the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
wealth, longevity, health, etc.” (Foucault, cited in Burchell c.s., 1991:100).72  
From this perspective, the welfare state is not just the product of a moral 
transformation (as discussed above), but also the product of a political transfor-
mation. Society is made less arbitrary and less open to fate for reasons of social 
mobility and prosperity, thereby simultaneously serving individual interests in 




                                                   
72 Even though Foucault places the origins of this move towards ‘government’ in the 16th cen-
tury, and sees the 19th century as an important period of development, the 20th century welfare 
state can be understood as a full-fledged expression of government. 
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4. The mechanisms of state development 
 
4.1. Mechanisms and triggers 
The aforementioned images of the constitutional and welfare state provide the 
historical context in which the impact of the preventive gaze is studied. But in 
order “[…] to trace the forces that gave birth to our present-day practices and to 
identify the historical and social conditions upon which they still depend” (Gar-
land, 2006:2), an understanding of this historical context should include a further 
discussion of the mechanisms, forces and triggers of state development.  
This can provide insight into the conditions which gave birth to the pre-
ventive gaze, and provide an understanding of the specific impact of the preven-
tive gaze on the image of the state. The objective here is not to establish a fixed, 
necessary or causal relation between a certain historical context and the impact of 
the preventive gaze, but to describe the dynamic context in which its increasing 
dominance and its impact on the state is explicable and understandable. The pri-
mary objective of this study is diagnosis, not explanation. 
 
In the following, two types of dynamic contextual factors are identified. These are 
revisited in the concluding chapter of this study in order to develop an under-
standing of the empirical findings. First, a discussion of mechanisms of state devel-
opment aims to provide insight in the question how state development occurs. 
These are the mechanisms which the preventive gaze is presumed to actuate. 
Without claiming to be complete or exhaustive, two different sets of mechanisms 
and the interaction between them may be distinguished. The first set of mecha-
nisms stresses the importance of the internal characteristics of the state to under-
stand state development, while the second set focuses on the societal pressures 
for state development (cf. Pierson, 2004).  
The ‘state-centred approach’ (Hanneman & Hollingsworth, in Torstendahl, 
1992) comprises the idea that a state is an autonomous force and has its own in-
terests, and to some extent determines the development of society. Conversely, 
the ‘society-centred approach’ (Hanneman & Hollingsworth, in Torstendahl, 
1992) operates on the idea that society is dominant in shaping or even determin-
ing the nature of the state. This distinction between two sets of mechanisms is 
partly artificial, since state and society are, in reality, highly interrelated entities 
(e.g. Abrams, 1977). However, an analytical distinction enables the identification 
of the specific nature of the state as sovereign rule, which fundamentally differs 
from the nature of societal actors and organisations. Moreover, the analytical dis-
tinction between state and society is fundamental to contemporary liberal socie-




Second, a discussion of triggers for state development aims to provide insight into 
the social conditions within which a specific state development takes place, and of 
which this state development is a logical or understandable consequence. 
Whereas the mechanisms of state development aim to shed light on how and 
along which lines state development occurs, the triggers for state development 
aim to offer indications for the reasons why a specific development takes place at 
a certain time and place. 
Based on sociological and philosophical literature, two different sets of 
triggers are discussed. First, triggers from the contemporary Western European 
‘belief system’, which include notions of freedom and equality, ways of dealing 
with future and fate, and cultural sensibilities with regard to risks. And second, 
triggers from the ‘social system’, which include structural societal characteristics 
and transformations in, for instance, wealth and poverty, in the organisation of 
labour, in technology, and in cultural cohesion and fragmentation. 
Triggers for state development shape the contingent forms of state devel-
opment. The relation between these triggers and the mechanisms of state devel-
opment can thereby be understood as follows: 
 




The nature of state power 
(such as the organisation 
of rule and the objectives 
of governing) 
 
The complexities of rule and gov-
ernance (such as the availability of 
power resources and the govern-




The attitude towards state 
power (such as the justifi-
cation and limitation of 
state power) 
 
The demands and interests of soci-
ety (such as the consequences of 




4.2. State mechanisms: power, preservation and justification 
 
4.2.1. Reason of state and ‘governmentality’ 
Authors such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt and Weber placed the notion of 
power central in their understanding of the state. In Hobbes’s words ‘autoritas, 
non veritas facit legem’ (cited by Hall, in McLennan c.s., 1984:15), and in Machia-
velli’s worldview – at least the one he developed in Il Principe – the basic concern 
for rulers was the development of techniques and strategies to stay in power. 




This mechanism is commonly referred to as the ‘reason of state’: “[…] the 
type of rationality that will allow the maintenance and preservation of the state 
once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its everyday management” 
(Foucault, 2007:238). The only objective of the reason of state is the state itself: 
“Das Wohl des Staates und der in ihm beschlossenen Volksgemeinschaft ist, so 
heißt es, Wert und Ziel, und Macht, Machtbehauptung, Machterweiterung das un-
entbehrliche, unbedingt zu beschaffende Mittel dafür. Unbedingt insofern auch, 
als es erforderlichenfalls, nach vieler Meinung wenigstens und nach einer häufi-
gen, immer wieder geübten Praxis, auch ohne Rücksicht auf Moral und positives 
Recht zu beschaffen ist” (Meinecke, 1976:3; cf. ’t Hart, 1995).  
 
The notion ‘reason of state’ fits an age in which the main concern for rulers was 
the defence of their sovereignty. However, as state formation in Western Europe 
took on a more stable form and the sovereignty of states became less disputed 
from the 17th century onwards, a gradual shift occurred in the focus of rulers. In-
stead of asking ‘how to defend the power of the sovereign?’ (Machiavelli’s core 
question in Il Principe), the dominant modern political question becomes ‘how to 
control the population?’: “[W]e see the emergence of a completely different prob-
lem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory [...]. No longer the 
safety […] of the Prince and his territory, but the security […] of the population 
and, consequently, those who govern it” (Foucault, 2007:65). “The problem for 
government is not the Prince’s rivals but the people […]” (Foucault, 2007:272). 
The reason of state falls short of explaining the activities rulers undertake 
to govern their population. Veyne (in Davidson, 1997) makes this point clear in 
the following example. Suppose a prince approaches a busy crossroad. According 
to a mere reason of state he will only arrange a free passage for himself, for in-
stance by stopping other vehicles, and leave it at that. Now suppose a traffic po-
liceman approaches the same crossing. He will, according to Veyne, try to regulate 
traffic into an orderly flow through the use of impersonal instruments such as 
traffic lights, speed bumps and the like.  
This modern variant of the reason of state is what Foucault calls, with a 
neologism, ‘governmentality’: “[…] the ensemble formed by institutions, proce-
dures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as 
its essential technical instrument” (2007:108). Especially from the 18th century 
onward, Western European states have seen a “governmentalisation of the state” 
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(Dean, 1999:73) or the process of sovereign rulers73 becoming more occupied 
with the “effective and productive management of populations” through disciplin-
ing techniques, observation, punishment, policing74 and surveillance (Pierson, 
2004:75).75 
Government is the “general management of society” in order to gain 
strength and stability through wealth, health, commercial activities and so on 
(Foucault, 2007:105). The integrity, stability and strength of a state not only de-
pends on the political skills of its leaders, but also on the capacity to control the 
potentially dangerous and state-undermining population, and on its capacity to 
promote economic prosperity: “In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its 
purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare of the population, the 
improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.” 
(Foucault, cited in Burchell c.s., 1991:100). 
Whether in the form of policing or in the form of (welfare) policies, goal-
oriented interventions are a characteristic of government: “Here […] it is not a 
matter of imposing a law on men, but of the disposition of things, that is to say, 
employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as possible employing laws as 
tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain 
number of means” (Foucault, 2007:99). The ‘governmentalisation’ of the state has, 
since the 19th century, led to a large increase in the Western European state’s ad-
ministrative capacities. The actual means for the exertion of state power are ac-
                                                   
73 Rulers are not necessarily individual persons, but can also refer to a ruling elite (e.g. Mosca, 
1896) or to a ruling social class (e.g. Marx & Engels, 1848). 
74 According to Pasquino, it was only from the 19th century onward that ‘police’ gained some-
thing of its current meaning as “the concern to avert future ills, and also maintenance of order” 
(Pasquino, in Burchell c.s., 1991:109). However, in the 18th century, ‘police’ referred to a broad-
er concern, which Pasquino sums up as “the concern to develop or promote happiness or the 
public good” (1991:109-110).  
Typical for this earlier and broader understanding is the definition given by Beccaria 
in his Elements of Public Economy in 1769: “[…] the sciences, education, good order, security and 
public tranquility, objects all comprehended under the name of police” (1991:109). And a brief 
look by Pasquino at the table of contents of Duchesne’s Code of Police of 1757 also gives an 
impression of the broad range of activities originally brought together under the term ‘police’ 
(1991:110): religious affairs, health issues, nutrition, public roads, public order, commerce, and 
science and art are included by Duchesne under the same moniker. 
75 The contemporary welfare state can also be understood in terms of ‘governmentality’. How-
ever, an important early expression of ‘governmentalisation’ was the late 19th and early 20th 
century Prussian ‘Polizeistaat’ – not to be confused with our present day understanding of the 
term ‘police state’. Here, ‘the science of police’ (best understood in relation to our present day 
notion of ‘policy’) developed techniques and apparatuses not only to provide safety and crime 
control, but also to care for the population’s basic needs such as food, clothing, housing, heating, 
work, productivity and health (Foucault, 2007:324-325). 
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cumulated in an intervention apparatus, from which a state can draw to pursue 
certain objectives.76 
 
4.2.2. Justification through law and representation 
The concepts ‘reason of state’ and ‘governmentality’ describe the exertion of state 
power to promote the interests of the state itself.  Just as old as this quest for the 
establishment and preservation of authority is the quest for justification of power. 
For instance, St. Augustine already famously asked himself in City of God (420): 
“justice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers?” Just as 
robbers, a state inflicts harm through the physical exertion of power (punish-
ment) and through the theft of property (taxation).  
According to Popitz (1992:186), the fact that few hold power over many 
can roughly have three explanations: 1) consensus on the way power is to be used 
and by whom, 2) the acknowledgement by the many of the authority of the few, or 
3) the use of physical force of the few over the many. For a state to hold power it 
must have either the consent of the population, the authority to do so, or the ca-
pability to use physical force to extort obedience – or a combination of the three. 
The first two explanations refer to the idea that the justification of power is com-
monly understood as being crucial to the survival of a state. Since justified power 
is stronger and more stable than power that is required to be enforced time and 
time again, an important mechanism for state development is that power strives 
for justification (cf. Popitz, 1992:244).  
Over the course of Western European state development, legitimacy has 
been a core concern for sovereign rule. In medieval Christian thought, the claim to 
                                                   
76 However, a large state apparatus is not only evidence of a strong state, but also limits the 
possibilities of politics to radically change existing policies. The bureaucracy itself is an impor-
tant factor in the development of the state. Several arguments suggest that large modern state 
apparatuses autonomously reproduce existing patterns of thought and action. First, Weber 
(1922) pointed out that a bureaucracy’s instrumental rationality (‘Zweckrationalität’) tends to 
push out value rationality (‘Wertrationalität’).  
Second, large organisations are subject to processes of ‘institutionalisation’: the organ-
isational structure and the historically developed patterns of action and thought determine to a 
large extent the behaviour of individual employees and make these organisations in general 
‘path-dependent’ (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; Douglas, 1986).  
Third, large organisations (or ‘social systems’) shield themselves off from an infinitely 
chaotic environment by reducing complexity: information is selected and processed into mean-
ing on the basis of a certain frame of reference or task. As such, each social system reproduces 
its own identity and becomes ‘autopoietic’ or self-referential (Luhmann, 1984).  
And fourth, professionals working at the base of the organisation have relative auton-
omy: contrary to Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucracy, state apparatuses not only depend on an 
impartial and impersonal execution of formal tasks, but also on professional qualities and 
strategies of individual employees or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (e.g. Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1973; Lipsky, 1980; Tops, 2007).  
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legitimacy of authority came in the form of an appeal to a divine will or divine 
instruction. But as society and rule became more and more entwined, legitimacy 
was sought in an appeal to the voluntary obedience of a significant part of the 
state’s population: “Alle Herrschaft über Menschen hat letztlich ihr Korrelat im     
– so oder so motivierten – Gehorsam. […] Herrschaft im gesamten Staat hat aber 
nur dann Aussicht auf Bestand, wenn sie wenigstens zu einem guten Teil auch von 
willigem Gehorsam getragen ist” (Zippelius, 1999:55).  
The aforementioned writings of Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Kant and 
Mill can be understood as a quest for a rationalised consent with authority. Even 
though earlier, Machiavelli had viewed self-limitation in the exertion of sovereign 
power as one of the many possible strategies to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population (cf. Gribnau, 2009), these authors sought to replace the ruler-based 
perspective with a population-based perspective for the justification of state 
power.  
 
Two important strategies in modern Western Europe to justify state power are 
the rule of law and political representation. Both strategies have their conceptual 
origins in the notion of ‘natural law’ – an imaginary ‘pre-state law’, which no sov-
ereign rule can violate and, moreover, forces the state to justify its own existence 
and every activity it aims to undertake: “Das Naturrecht hatte die kritische Frage 
aufgeworfen: Wie is der Staat sittlich und rechtlich möglich, wodurch kann er sich 
rechtfertigen?” (Jellinek, 1964:94).  
The justification strategy of the rule of law follows from the awareness 
that sovereign power (as a concept) is in essence limitless, arbitrary and totalitar-
ian. At the heart of the development of Western European states – usually learnt 
by bitter experience – lies the idea that this power should be limited and exerted 
in an equal manner for all citizens. As discussed above in the analysis of the con-
stitutional state, the rule of law provides an institutional framework for the limita-
tion of state power and the protection of man’s ‘natural law’.  
The justification strategy of political representation77 does not strive for a 
limitation of state power, but instead for a more ‘positive’ expression of man’s 
                                                   
77 Representation can be understood as “[…] the making present in some sense of something 
which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (1972:8-9). Pitkin (1972) discusses four 
interpretations of the notion of representation – of which the first two are relevant here. The 
first of these is ‘representation as authorisation to act’, as developed first by Thomas Hobbes: a 
representative acts for another person on grounds of a covenant. An important shortcoming of 
this conception is covered by a second conception: ‘representation as accountability for actions’, 
which introduces the idea of holding a representative accountable for his actions ex post. As a 
result, the relation between a political representative and his constituents can be characterised 
by ‘responsiveness’ (Pitkin, 1972:155).  
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‘natural law’. The exertion of state power does not find its justification in law, but 
in the general will of the people. Democratic representation gives the population a 
say in the exertion of sovereign power, and thereby aims to stabilise sovereign 
power since it is accepted as such by its population (Gribnau, 2009). On the one 
hand, the political quest for legitimacy can be described as a “quest for a public” 
and democratic politics as the struggle for a claim to speak “on behalf of” a pre-
sumed public (Van Middelaar, 2009). On the other hand, representation is also a 
task for the public itself: “The prime difficulty [of democracy] is that of discover-
ing the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize 
itself as to define and express its interests” (Dewey, 1954:146). Without some 
kind of shared experience of common interests, the state can easily become the 
plaything of the private interests of a ruler or a ruling class.78 
                                                                                                                                 
In Pitkin’s words: “representing […] means acting in the interest of the represented, in 
a manner responsive to them. The representative must act independently; his action must in-
volve discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be 
(conceived as being) capable of independent action and judgment, rather than of only being 
taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and rep-
resented about what is to be done, that conflict must not normally take place. The representa-
tive must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for” 
(1972:209). This also implies that representation is essentially ‘performative’: the popular will 
is not already ‘out there’ waiting to be expressed, but is constituted in the dynamic correlation 
between the utterances of politicians and the extent to which a population recognises these 
utterances as an expression of its will (cf. Ankersmit, 1997). 
Pitkin’s third and fourth conceptions of representation do not deal with representa-
tions as ‘acting for’, but with representations as ‘standing for’: the acts themselves do not consti-
tute representation, but specific characteristics or features of the representative. Pitkin distin-
guishes ‘descriptive representation’ – the idea of representation through resemblance or reflec-
tion between representative and represented actor – and ‘symbolic representation’ – the idea of 
representation through symbols to express certain values or features (such as the pope repre-
senting Christ on earth, or Lady Justice representing the morality of the judicial system). 
78 Dewey stresses the importance of an active and well-informed public opinion for the identifi-
cation of public concerns (1954:177-180). The most important task for a democratic society is 
the quest for what counts as a public problem and what the nature of this problem is. Following 
Stone (1988), at least four important inherently contested – and often interrelated – objectives 
should be point of concern in this quest for what constitutes a ‘polis’, which transcends the idea 
of society as a marketplace where every form of human interaction can be reduced to a com-
mercial relationship between buyers and sellers.  
First, the meaning of equity and its complications, such as the inclusion of members in 
the political community, the criterion for distribution, the objects or items of distribution and 
the process by which to arrive at a fair distribution. Second, the meaning of efficiency, which 
includes the choice for specific objectives and the identification of market imperfections (e.g. in 
the production of collective goods). Third, the meaning of security, which implies the identifica-
tion of needs to be protected by government (economical, physical, psychological, military, 
educational, medical and so on) and wants to be pursued through private action. And fourth, the 
meaning of liberty, which implies the question of when and under what circumstances individu-
al freedom may be limited by public authorities (for instance to protect citizens or society in 
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4.2.3. The construction of consent 
Justification is not only something a state is granted by a population, it is also 
something that states to a certain extent can actively ‘construct’. According to Van 
Middelaar (2009), authorities can deploy three strategies in the active quest for 
popular consent: a claim to a shared history and identity, a claim to effectiveness 
and delivery of promises, and a claim to the exertion of the general will. All three 
strategies can, in part, be understood as manifestations of the state mechanism to 
strive for the governability of its subjects. 
An example of the first strategy is the 19th century ‘invention’ of the na-
tion-state. This can be understood as the purest expression of an inextricable rela-
tion between population and sovereign power: the ethnic or cultural unity of a 
nation and the territorial and political unity of a state coincide geographically. 
Even if an ethnically pure nation is factually unattainable – especially in contem-
porary multicultural societies – the idea of an ‘imagined political community’ 
(Anderson, 1983) can serve as a strong argument for a state as the legitimate 
ruler of a population. Strengthening a society’s cultural or normative homogeneity 
can be an effective strategy to increase the governability of society (cf. Drosterij & 
Peeters, 2011). 
An example of the second strategy is what Talmon (1952) calls ‘political 
messianism’: the idea that only political leaders can lead a people to true enlight-
enment or freedom. A claim to effectiveness and delivery of promises coincides 
with the argument that state interventions are in the best interests of a popula-
tion. The rhetorical or factual construction of dependency increases the govern-
ability of a population: a population’s wellbeing is rhetorically presented as de-
pendent on the acts of its rulers, and is factually made dependent on the physical 
protection and security mechanisms of the state (e.g. Foucault, 2007). 
And an example of the third strategy is populist politics. Even though de-
mocratic representation inherently has a populist element, what is commonly 
understood as ‘populism’ is the political claim to represent the pure and undiluted 
will of an entire people. Moreover, the will of the people is understood as the 
highest form of authority: vox populi, vox dei (e.g. Mudde, 2004; Zijderveld, 2009). 
An active claim to represent the people can also be understood as a justification 
mechanism for state interventions (cf. Peeters & Drosterij, 2011). 
 
The construction of voluntary consent, compliance and obedience increases a 
population’s governability, but is in itself insufficient for the preservation of a 
state’s sovereignty and for the realisation of government objectives. Even though 
                                                                                                                                 
general against certain types of harm) or should be actively promoted by public authorities to 
enable citizens to increase the control over their own life. 
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Weber’s definition of the state does not imply the constant exertion of power, its 
preservation is grounded in the ability to wield physical power (Bobbio c.s., 1983, 
quoted by Poggi, 1990:4). In this respect, Gramsci speaks of “consent backed by 
coercion” (cited by Pierson, 2004:21). If necessary, compliance of subjects can be 
enforced through the actual exertion of power or through the threat to exert 
power. As a result, an important mechanism of state development is that sovereign 
power strives for the acquisition of resources for its preservation and exertion.  
Hood (1983) distinguishes four sources of power: 1) the position to ex-
tract information from society and analyse societal phenomena (‘nodality’), 2) 
adequate financial means (‘treasure’), 3) the ability and power to implement and 
enforce (‘authority’), and 4) the adequate personnel and equipment to intervene 
(‘organisation’). The extent to which a state is capable of acquiring these re-
sources is to a large extent dependent on the general characteristics of state and 
society, such as specific traditions with regard to authority, the role of solidarity, 
the strength of existing organisations (including police and bureaucracy), the sta-
bility of the existing order, the presence of competitors (including neighbouring 
states, war lords or mafia), and the practical means of enforcement (ranging from 
statistical knowledge of a population to arms and weaponry). 
 
4.3. Societal mechanisms: demands for collective action 
 
4.3.1. Protection and self-preservation 
Whereas the state mechanisms of power and justification view the state as the 
dominant factor in its own development, societal mechanisms assume society or 
certain powerful groups within society as dominant in shaping the development 
of the state. From the latter perspective, it is not the state’s quest for a legitimate 
exertion of power, but societal interests and demands for collective action that 
determine what the range and depth of state activities is and should be. In other 
words, the state is assumed not to act on its own behalf: the power of the state is 
only to be exerted for the realisation of societal demands. 
Dewey presents a strong argument for such an understanding when he 
places a notion of ‘the public’ at heart of his definition of the state: “the state is the 
organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the inter-
ests shared by its members” (Dewey, 1954:33). What the exact nature of ‘the pub-
lic’ is remains essentially contested and is prone to historical, cultural and geo-
graphical differences (1954:47). According to Dewey, the quality of a state can be 
assessed by the extent to which it succeeds in protecting or realising collective 
interests: “A measure of the goodness of a state is the degree in which it relieves 
individuals from the waste of negative struggle and needless conflict and confers 
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upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes” 
(1954:72). 
Since the emergence of the modern state, the justification of its existence 
has been sought in a societal demand for protection and self-preservation. In the 
Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. 
Only the establishment of a sovereign by means of a covenant, in which men enter 
out of their own free will, would enable an escape out of this ‘state of nature’ into 
a state of security. The imaginary covenant justifies the existence of the state and 
simultaneously appoints an important task to the state: the protection of each 
contracting party’s life.  
In more liberal conceptualisations of this quest for self-preservation (such 
as Locke’s quest for the protection of life, liberty and property), the state has the 
role of ultimate arbiter in societal conflicts. Seen from the perspective of the popu-
lation, a state loses its legitimacy when it fails to protect its inhabitants against 
external enemies or against infringements carried out by other inhabitants. The 
mechanism at play here is that a population calls upon authorities for protection if 
threats to the existing order are perceived as being beyond the control of individual 
inhabitants. 
 
4.3.2. The promotion of interests 
Whereas the sovereign rule of the Leviathan is a response to a societal quest for 
protection against fellow citizens, this sovereign rule can also be called upon for a 
more ‘positive’ demand for collective action. Here, the popular will is perceived as 
the catalyst for the exertion of state power and for the promotion of certain socie-
tal interests (cf. Rousseau, 1762). A democratic state is “[…] an organisation which 
meets the demands of a community of people for collective action” (Van der Pot 
c.s., 2001:147; my translation, RP). Politics is the business of deciding ‘who gets 
what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1936). And representation is an orderly and in-
stiutional means for citizens to express and promote their interests. 
The modern-day mechanism of democratic representation creates “[…] a 
reversal of the relationship between state and (civil) society as seen from the 
ruler’s standpoint. Far from society being treated as an object of political man-
agement by a state operating chiefly in the light of interests exclusive to itself and 
to which those of society had to be subordinated, the state itself had to become an 
instrumentality of society’s autonomous, self-regulating development. The state’s 
very existence, and its mode of operation, would have to seek justification in the 
extent to which it allowed that development to unfold according to its own logic, 





Political representation notwithstanding, societal pressures have been a major 
influence in the development of the Western European state. For instance, mod-
ern demands for social mobility, life chances and self-development (Weber, 1922; 
Berlin, 2007) are accommodated by welfare state interventions to create health 
care, social security, education and proper housing for all. Moreover, the welfare 
state accommodates the free circulation of commodities in the capitalist economy, 
which forms an effective system for the creation of material welfare and depends 
on the promise of social mobility for its infinite ‘creative destruction’ (Schum-
peter, 1950).  
Historically, collective action mostly follows from shared interests be-
tween various population groups and from shared problems, which cannot be 
solved or avoided by means of private action. According to authors such as Elias 
(1939) and De Swaan (1988), interdependencies between population groups 
spark demands for collective action. For instance, the age of industrialisation cre-
ated new social and economical interdependencies between the various social 
classes. More specifically, factory owners and working class became tied together 
in the economical activity of mass production, and the lower and higher social 
classes shared the same urban environment in which epidemic diseases and crime 
threatened social order (Donzelot, in Burchell c.s., 1991): “the interdependence 
between the rich and the poor, or between the strong and the powerless, is central 
to the collectivizing process” (De Swaan, 1988:3). The underlying societal mech-
anism for state development is that a population calls upon authorities for the re-
alisation of interests that are perceived as unattainable by individual or private 
action. 
 
4.3.3. Resistance, avoidance and alternatives 
Besides forming an instrument for the realisation of societal interests, the limit-
less power of the sovereign state can also be a threat to certain societal interests. 
This ‘invasive’ (Poggi, 1990) image of the state generates two further societal 
mechanisms, which form the flipsides of the two aforementioned societal mechan-
isms of state development. The first of these mechanisms is that a population seeks 
to limit, control, avoid or resist the power of authorities if it is perceived as a threat 
to societal interests. The democratic-constitutional state is, according to Rosanval-
lon (2008), also an organisation of distrust. The power of the state and of the 
‘general will’ of the population are kept in check by institutional checks and bal-
ances (such as the separation of powers), and by social manifestations of protest 
(or the right to resist), evaluation (such as auditing and calls for transparency), 
agenda setting, criticism (for instance by a free press) and circumvention of rules. 
The second mechanism is that a population seeks alternative forms of col-
lective action to realise societal interests if a state lacks the ability or legitimacy to 
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do so. This mechanism is clearly evident in cases of a failed state: the sovereign is 
unable to perform its task as society’s ultimate arbiter. A more everyday expres-
sion of societal resistance or avoidance of state power is tax noncompliance. Also, 
many states have to tolerate the existence of semi-autonomous regions or separa-
tist movements within their territory, or the presence of alternatives for the pro-
tection of societal interests, such as the mafia, the market, the church or the com-
munity. 
 
4.3.4. The serviceable and invasive state 
In the above, eight mechanisms of state development have been discussed. These 
should be understood as historical movements and not as ahistorical axioms: 
1. Power strives for preservation 
2. Power strives for justification 
3. Power strives for the governability of its subjects  
4. Power strives for the acquisition of resources for its preservation and ex-
ertion 
5. A population (or certain parts thereof)79 calls upon authorities for protec-
tion if threats to the existing order are perceived as being beyond the con-
trol of individual inhabitants  
6. A population (or certain parts thereof) calls upon authorities for the reali-
sation of interests which are perceived as being unattainable by individual 
or private action 
7. A population (or certain parts thereof) seeks to limit, control, avoid or re-
sist the power of authorities if it is perceived as a threat to societal inter-
ests 
8. A population (or certain parts thereof) seeks alternative forms of collec-
tive action to realise societal interests if the authorities lack the ability or 
legitimacy to do so 
 
In contemporary democratic states, the societal demands for collective action are 
often difficult to distinguish from the state mechanisms of power and justification. 
To some extent, it is a matter of perspective whether one sees state development 
as a consequence of societal pressures or as a consequence of autonomous ‘gov-
ernmentality’ (Foucault, 2007). Therefore, Poggi (1990) claims that there is a fun-
damental ambiguity present in the image of the contemporary Western European 
                                                   
79 The development of the state is not necessarily determined by the majority of the population, 
but can also be determined by a minority, such as a powerful ruling elite (e.g. Mosca, 1896) or 
ruling class (e.g. Marx & Engels, 1848). 
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welfare state.80 The opposing images of the ‘serviceable’ and ‘invasive’ state are 
often tightly interlocked. 
On the one hand, there is the image of the ‘serviceable state’: “[…] the state 
expands and diversifies its activity to fill a vacuum of regulation and to remedy a 
shortage or a maldistribution of resources engendered by spontaneous socio-
economic change and by the lag in the development of the attendant norms” 
(1990:120). This ‘serviceable state’ deploys three types of activities. First, activi-
ties directed at the protection and support of economically weaker social groups, 
such as the regulation of working times, of minimum wages, of safety standards in 
factories and so on. Second, activities designed for the economically stronger so-
cial groups aimed at generating a well-functioning free market economy, for in-
stance, by creating facilities for the further development of an advanced industrial 
society in terms of physical infrastructure and the need for a highly educated la-
bour force. And third, the ‘serviceable state’ concedes to the claims of various so-
cial groups, varying from environmental protection to affirmative action (Poggi, 
1990). 
On the other hand, there is the image of the ‘invasive state’: “besides re-
sponding […] to the pull of interests emanating from the outlying society, the dy-
namic of the expansion and diversification of state activity expresses the push of 
interests lodged inside the state itself, whether as a whole or in its parts” (Poggi, 
1990:120). There are three elements to this ‘invasive state’ (Poggi, 1990:121-
125). First, it is the nature of every form of ‘social power’ to increase its autonomy 
at the expense of other organised forms of social power. Especially the form of 
social power known as political power has an expansive nature. Second, all large 
differentiated social systems have the tendency to become self-referential (e.g. 
Luhmann, 1984): the idea that every division of, for instance, a bureaucratic or 
professional organisation perceives the surrounding world in terms of its own 
specialised perspective and profession. People in those organisations develop 
their own language, concepts and theories to understand the world and hence 
                                                   
80 This ambiguity was also addressed by Foucault. He describes a permanent tension between 
two ‘games’ the state simultaneously plays with its citizens: the ‘city-citizen game’ where the 
image of society as a ‘polis’ and the concern for the ‘res publica’ are dominant, and the ‘shep-
herd-flock game’ where ‘pastoral power’ is exerted as if the state were a shepherd who has the 
responsibility to look after the wellbeing of his flock. Modern western states inhabit two images 
of the citizen – one corresponding with depersonalised and institutionalised power, the other 
reflecting the image of the state as a father or a mother for its citizens: 
1.  “the individual as citizen who exercises freedoms and rights within the legal and politi-
cal structure of the political community on the basis of equality with other citizens 
2. the individual as a living being whose welfare is to be cared for as an individual and as 
a part of a population, as one who must be integrated within complex forms of social 
solidarity” (Dean, 1999:82). 
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reproduce their own identity and ‘raison d’être’. And third, democratic politics are 
a driving force behind expansive policies: politicians aim to realise their political 
agenda and thereby trigger a further state expansion. 
 
4.4. Triggers for state development 
 
4.4.1. Belief system 
The aforementioned state and societal mechanisms explain how a state evolves. 
These mechanisms have, to a certain extent, an autonomous dynamic: power ac-
tively and continuously strives for preservation and justification, and representa-
tion actively and continuously seeks approval for the exertion of state power. 
Moreover, these mechanisms are understood as the points of application or actua-
tion points for the preventive gaze. 
However, these mechanisms do not provide an understanding of why the 
preventive gaze has become a defining characteristic of the state. The temporal 
and spatial context – or social conditions – of the state can function as external 
triggers for the mechanisms of state development. More specifically, the preven-
tive gaze is itself such a trigger, since it determines our contemporary outlook on 
the future. Based on sociological and philosophical literature, two types of triggers 
are discussed in the following: triggers from a specific historical ‘belief system’ 
and triggers from the characteristics of a social system. 
 
To start with the former, a ‘belief system’ can be constructed from the paradigms 
and values that make up a society’s general outlook on social reality, such as reli-
gious values, concepts of justice and cultural sensibilities (cf. Finer, 1997:28).81 
Human behaviour is always infused by specific meanings and moods. People be-
have in a certain way because those actions have a specific meaning for them. The 
characteristics of such a specific ‘belief system’ are “tightly congruent” with the 
social stratification and the nature of political institutions (Finer, 1997:29). With-
out claiming to be complete or exhaustive, three elements of the contemporary 
Western European belief system are highlighted in the following. 
First, specific conceptualisations of freedom and equality form the basis of 
our contemporary organisation of the state. According to Berlin (2007), a defining 
characteristic of liberal societies is the value they attach to the individual: the 
Enlightenment placed individual autonomy and equality at the heart of political 
philosophy and, consequently, at the heart of conceptualisations of the ideal state.  
                                                   
81 At the end of the 19th century, French sociologist Durkheim described this shared belief sys-
tem as a ‘conscience collective’, or “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average 
citizens of the same society” (cited by Garland, 1993:50). 
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For instance, several constitutional principles can be derived from Enlightenment 
philosophers such as Kant: 1) the principle of civil liberty for the autonomous 
individual, 2) the principle of equality before the law and 3) the principle of politi-
cal freedom (i.e., the right of every autonomous individual to contribute to his 
country’s legislation) (Witteveen, 1996:200). And the values of individual equality 
and self-development find their expression in the contemporary welfare state: 
every individual should have equal opportunities for self-development and equal 
compensation for illness or unemployment, and the financial burdens accompany-
ing the organisation of the welfare state should be equally shared (cf. Frissen, 
2007). 
Individual freedom is tightly connected with individual responsibility: a 
person is said to be free when he is able to make his own decisions in life. As such, 
conceptualisations of responsibility are a core element of state development. For 
instance, the constitutional state presupposes that individuals can be held per-
sonally accountable for their acts. And the welfare state presumes the existence of 
harm beyond the sphere of individual control and responsibility – consequently, 
collective instead of individual action is justified. 
 
Second, modern societies place human reason and rationality at the heart of their 
efforts to understand and control social reality. The Enlightenment agenda to lib-
erate mankind from ignorance sparked the idea of man being capable of under-
standing and controlling the natural world surrounding him through the applica-
tion of reason. The Enlightenment is the subjection of the world to rational 
thought, which perceived social reality as something to systematically fathom as if 
it were a machine in which every little element has its specific and instrumental 
place and function. In the words of Horkheimer and Adorno: “Das Programm der 
Aufklärung war die Entzauberung der Welt” (2007:16).  
In terms of state development the idea of dealing with disorder through 
rational interventions82 has, since the 19th century, led to a rationalisation of gov-
ernment and economy. Instrumental rationality (Weber’s ‘Zweckrationalität’) 
forms the paradigm for the design of large organisations. The bureaucracy, which 
was the basic model for the development of large organisations (such as the army 
and the state apparatus), is characterised by a rational division of labour and by 
the capability to produce large quantities of impersonal, standardised and pre-
                                                   
82 That said, authors such as Hayek emphasise the (normative) importance of understanding 
societies as a form of ‘spontaneous order’: “The fundamental principle that in the ordering of 
our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and 
resort as little as possible to coercion […]” (Hayek, 1976:13). Fittingly, one of Hayek’s favourite 
quotations comes from Adam Ferguson, who in 1767 spoke of society as “[…] the result of hu-
man action, but not the execution of any human design”. 
95 
 
dictable outcomes. Moreover, instrumental rationality is also an important model 
for the development of state interventions: ‘central planning’ rests on the belief 
that the world can be rationally organised by means of state interventions (e.g. 
Van Gunsteren, 1976; Scott, 1998; Blokland, 2001). This requires the construction 
of causal schemes (i.e. thinking in terms of means and ends) and knowledge of the 
object of interventions.  
For Foucault, the exertion of power and use of knowledge are so inter-
twined that he considers these to be indivisible, referring to ‘power/knowledge’ 
(Foucault, 1980). For the realisation of policy goals, states collect knowledge and 
statistical data on a wide range of policy terrains: knowledge about economic 
conditions and prospects, about effective disciplinary measures in prisons, about 
demographic developments in society, about crime rates, about the gross domes-
tic product, about the living conditions in poorer neighbourhoods, and so on. Fur-
thermore, states employ various types of ‘experts’ such as criminologists, (foren-
sic) psychiatrists, architects, social workers, and planners to run policing, penal, 
medical and welfare institutions (among others) in an effective manner. And 
many contemporary states today aim for ‘evidence-based policy making’ – the 
idea that government interventions should be validated by objective science (e.g. 
Pawson, 2006). 
 
Third, every ‘belief system’ has its specific cultural sensibilities with regard to 
risks and vulnerabilities.83 These sensibilities determine the way a society per-
ceives and deals with the future. Every society defines, selects and assesses its 
own risks and, consequently, has its “own typical risk portfolio” (Douglas & Wil-
davsky, 1983:8). Risks cannot be calculated fully objectively,84 but are a product of 
a specific social order85 and outlook. From an anthropological perspective, risk 
                                                   
83 According to Douglas, every society has its own ways of dealing with threats to its moral and 
social order (2002:45). For instance, in medieval Europe, societies were faced with the threat of 
lepers and witchcraft – the former a threat to public health, the latter to public order (Douglas, 
2005:90). The typical reaction to lepers was to isolate them within society if cure proved im-
possible, while the reaction to witches was expulsion from society by death sentence or ban-
ishment. Taking these examples to a more general level, societies faced with inappropriate 
elements may either decide to try to isolate and normalise them (cf. Foucault, 1975), or try to 
expel them from society (cf. Girard, 1982). 
84 Does a society fear the forces of nature or does it trust in man’s ability to tame them? Does a 
society fear nuclear technology or does it hold faith in technological advancement? Does a soci-
ety have a negative or a positive outlook on mankind? To what extent does a society accept 
crime and insecurity as a fact of life? Science and knowledge may provide some explanations, 
but in the end the answer comes down to perception: more information cannot provide an-
swers to questions about ambiguous phenomena (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983:63-64) 
85 ‘Order’ presumes a form of unity, normality and purity and consequently implies the exis-
tence of abnormalities, ambiguities and anomalies. Metaphorically, these latter phenomena can 
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selection is understood to refer to a mechanism to reinforce the existing social 
order: “Whatever objective dangers may exist in the world, social organizations 
will emphasize those that reinforce the moral, political or religious order that 
holds the group together” (Rayner, in Krimsky & Golding, 1992:87). 
Every society develops its own coping mechanisms to deal with the risks 
they have defined. The typical modern coping mechanism is the “domestication of 
fate” (De Mul, 2006): an active quest for the control of risks and harms. This atti-
tude contrasts heavily with the ancient Greek ‘tragic attitude’ towards fate, which 
was incorporated in their worldview as an inevitable element of human action, 
and with the Christian attitude of ‘humble submission’, in which fate is under-
stood as the will of God.86 The preventive gaze can be understood as an expres-
sion of the active modern attitude towards risk.  
According to Beck (1986), this modern attitude has its origins in the 
Enlightenment ambition to organise society and control nature in a rational man-
ner. The ontological separation between ‘man’ and ‘nature’ was an invention of 
the Enlightenment in order to control phenomena external to man. However, in 
late modernity man has come to realise that the Enlightenment agenda has itself 
produced new and difficult to control risks (Beck, 1986:9-10). The late-modern 
highly technological industrial society produces risks for the environment and for 
public health, such as depletion of traditional energy resources, the consequences 
of environmental pollution, and the dangers of nuclear energy. 
This awareness is what Beck terms ‘reflexive modernisation’: “Der Mod-
ernisierungsprozeß wird ‘reflexiv’, sich selbst zum Thema und Problem” 
(1986:26). And because the threats of modernisation are self-made, man is both 
victim and culprit – Beck speaks of the “Einheit von Täter und Opfer” (1986:50). 
The ‘domestication of fate’ no longer merely applies to natural threats, but also to 
man-made threats: “Handelte es sich früher um extern (Götter, Natur) bedingte 
Gefahren, so liegt die historische neuartige Qualität der Risiken heute in ihrer 
zugleich wissenschaftlichen und sozialen Konstuktion begründet [...]” (1986:254). 
                                                                                                                                 
be described as ‘dirt’: “[…] dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it 
exists in the eye of the beholder” (Douglas, 2002:2). Dirt is “matter out of place” and as such 
“the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering in-
volves rejecting inappropriate elements” (Douglas, 2002:44). 
86 A different conceptualisation is presented by Douglas (1970), who distinguishes four cultural 
types: hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalistic. Each type has its own specific out-
look on the vulnerabilities of society (cf. Douglas, 2005:263). A hierarchical society gravitates 
towards a robust image of society, where obedience is a key value to keep the existing order 
intact. An individualist society tends towards a benign image of society, in which people are 
expected to take opportunities and self-regulation is the major regulative force. An egalitarian 
society tends to perceive social order as a fragile balance, and requires integrity and prudence 
in the relation between societal groups. And finally, a fatalist society gravitates towards a capri-
cious image of social order, where people are left to deal with their own fate.  
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As such, ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck, 1986) implies an increased sensitivity 
for the vulnerabilities of contemporary society and can therefore further trigger 
demands for collective action. 
 
4.4.2. Social system 
State development is not only triggered by values, meanings, moods and cultural 
sensibilities, but also by specific characteristics, which construct a ‘social system’, 
and by the reciprocity between belief system and social system. For example, the 
previously discussed notion of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck, 1986) should not 
only be understood as a product of transformations in a society’s risk perception, 
but also of transformations in economy and technology. Late modern industrial 
society is a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1986), which produces new types of environ-
mental and technological risks. Hence, the cultural perception of risks and the 
‘factual’ production of risks are two tightly interconnected phenomena. In the 
following, three sets of societal triggers for the mechanisms of state development 
are discussed: developments in society, economy and technology.  
 
First, since the emergence of the sovereign state, developments in the structure 
and basic characteristics of society have been important triggers for state devel-
opment. For example, the horrors of the Hobbesian state of nature and the 16th 
and 17th century Western European civil wars offered strong arguments for the 
establishment of sovereign rule. And conversely, social unrest and civil war can 
also threaten the very existence of a state.  
But also in more stable forms of rule, structural societal transformations 
can give rise to demands for collective action or for state activities to compensate 
for divergent social forces. Especially relevant for the context of the modern 
Western European state are developments in urbanisation and individualisation. 
Urbanisation is – especially from the 18th century onwards – to a large extent a 
consequence of the transformation from a rural to an industrial economy. The 
concentration of large quantities of people on a small geographical area caused 
new problems in, for instance, social order and public health. According to De 
Swaan (1988), interdependencies between several population groups are the 
main explanatory factor for collective action:87 if people cannot ‘escape’ threats to 
their wellbeing by means of private protection, they have an incentive to turn to 
collective action instead.  
                                                   
87 De Swaan (1988) also points out how early examples of collective action in medieval Europe 
were the result of interdependencies between the rich and the poor and between the powerful 
and the powerless, such as measures to control the plague. 
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Individualisation is a process both separate from and connected to ur-
banisation. The disintegration of traditional forms of living together in family and 
rural communities as a result of urbanisation is an important contributing factor 
to the individualisation of society. At the same time, individualisation is also an 
expression of a specifically modern mindset, one that emphasises equal rights and 
opportunities, individual self-development and social mobility (e.g. Weber, 1922; 
Berlin, 2007). However, governments may also feel compelled to compensate for 
the decline in social control and social support in terms of crime prevention (e.g. 
Garland, 2001) and welfare support (e.g. De Haan & Duyvendak, 2002:161). At the 
same time, the disintegration of traditional societal structures and the subsequent 
emergence of a ‘network society’ (Castells, 1996), in which social interaction is 
organised around virtual and dynamic networks instead of around territorially 
bound and fixed modes of living together (cf. Bauman, 2000),88 make societies less 
‘governable’, ‘legible’ and ‘knowable’ (Van Gunsteren & Van Ruyven, 1993) and 
less susceptible to effective top-down interventions (e.g. Frissen, 1996). 
 
Second, the transformation from a rural to an industrial and capitalist89 economy 
since the 18th century (and to a post-industrial economy since the late 20th cen-
tury) has fundamentally altered the modes of production and circulation of com-
modities. The capitalist market is an important factor in the daily lives of people 
and in the development of social order, since it encourages the acquisition of 
wealth by maximising efficiency and productivity, for instance by organising pro-
duction in large enterprises, by exploring new consumer markets and by increas-
ing the efficient division of labour.  
The emergence of capitalism is closely interrelated with the aforemen-
tioned emphasis on rational modes of thought and organisation, and more specifi-
cally on the rational organisation of work through a division of labour (Durkheim, 
1893; Weber 1904/1905). The assembly line is the archetypal image of early capi-
                                                   
88 In some ways, the notion of an individualised society is not specific enough. New communi-
ties have emerged in the place of old ones. Important differences are that these new communi-
ties are often not bound to geographical territories or state boundaries, that individuals are a 
member of a broader variety of communities, and that they are often free to choose to withdraw 
from a certain community (Duyvendak & Hurenkamp, 2004). Moreover, the notion of an indi-
vidualised society is misleading in the sense that it does not fully correspond with the fragmen-
tation and multiculturalisation of Western European societies: instead of a dominant and un-
contested ‘Leitkultur’, a broader variety of religions, cultural habits, lifestyles, identities and 
social conventions characterises the contemporary public sphere (Baumann, 2011). 
89 Capitalism is the ideal-typical economic system in which the means of production are pri-
vately owned and coordination is brought about by a price-mechanism instead of central plan-
ning (that is, market forces constitute the relation between demand and supply). Goods and 




talism, since it expresses the process of differentiation: the production of goods is 
organised effectively and rationally by breaking up the production process in 
separate elements.90 The contemporary equivalent of the assembly line is the as-
sembly of products by using materials and components from all over the world 
(Friedman, 2005). The globalisation of production processes (and subsequent 
exchange of commodities) is a logical consequence of the rational division of la-
bour. The contemporary division of labour has ‘simply’ transcended the bounda-
ries of the factory and of the geograpohical territory of the state, thereby creating 
new and complex forms of interdependency between national economies. 
The capitalist system itself has become a semi-autonomous force:91 on the 
one hand, states control and regulate the market (for instance through anti-cartel 
legislation and monetary policies), but on the other hand, the state allows and 
often even stimulates the free circulation of goods, capital services and people for 
the production of material prosperity (cf. Foucault, 2004). Moreover, economic 
activities are, to a considerable extent, beyond the influence of individual sover-
eign states since, for instance, decisions of multinational businesses influence 
national unemployment rates and the interrelated global economic system deter-
mines to a large extent the welfare of peoples. In this respect, the capitalist global-
ised economy has reduced the governability of Western European societies by 
individual sovereign states. 
 
Third and finally, technological developments can trigger state development. In its 
most basic form, weapons of attack, defence and deterrence form a core element 
in a state’s quest for the preservation of its sovereign power against external and 
internal threats. Technological developments, such as the pre-modern invention 
of gunpowder and the recent invention of nuclear arms, play a crucial role in state 
conflicts over a certain territory. The same goes for internal threats, such as sepa-
ratist movements or more ‘everyday’ criminal behaviour: technologies of surveil-
lance, criminal investigation and data analysis are core elements of the state appa-
                                                   
90 According to some authors, the Enlightenment movement, which first aimed to liberate man-
kind from ignorance, also has the potential for a new enslavement of man. This time man does 
not become the slave of tradition or nature, but of the fruits of his own reason: the capitalist 
market (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944) and the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy (Weber, 1904/1905). 
In the end, the systems, which man has built with the aid of reason, are driven only by man’s 
will for self-preservation (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2007:104). Man is reduced to a ‘homo 
economicus’, and follows sentiments of ‘pain and pleasure’ instead of moral guidelines. Follow-
ing the argument in Horkheimer & Adorno’s Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944), the struggle for 
self-preservation instead of the categorical imperative is the consequence of radical Enlighten-
ment.  
91 In contrast, the communist alternative for capitalism sought to incorporate the economy into 
the realm of the sovereign state. 
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ratus. Technological advancement generates new means for the effective exertion 
of state power or for the credible threat to do so: “Der Angelpunkt jeder 
Machtkontrolle in modernen Gesellschaften ist die Kontrolle technischen Han-
delns” (Popitz, 1992:181). 
However, technology is not merely an instrument of the state. It is a more 
general instrument of man for the realisation of certain objectives. The rise of 
capitalism was not only a process of economical rationalisation and societal ur-
banisation, but also of industrialisation: the 18th century Industrial Revolution was 
in many ways a technological revolution. Technological advancements produce 
new challenges and new opportunities – consider, for instance, the demands of 
industrialised societies for a rational and efficient spatial planning, including in-
frastructural interventions in railroads and waterways (e.g. Van der Woud, 1987; 
2006).  
Contemporary western societies are not only characterised by industriali-
sation, but also by developments in communication and information technology, 
including mass media and the internet (Webster, 2006). The mediatisation of soci-
ety refers to the increase in the use of technology in the mediation of the relation 
between man and his physical and social environment. This broad understanding 
of ‘media’ is based on McLuhan’s study Understanding Media (1964), in which he 
describes media as “the extensions of man”. These ‘extensions’ can take the form 
of an automobile (as the extension of feet and the activity of walking), but also the 
form of printed words, radio and television (as the extension of the mouth, the 
ears and the activity of talking). Through the use of these extensions, the world 
becomes ‘smaller’ and ‘decentralised’, since interaction between a greater number 
of people over longer distances and in a shorter time span becomes possible (cf. 
Castells, 1996). Especially in the current age of internet and social media, man is 
permanently globally ‘connected’ to multiple streams of information and interac-
tion. 
The mediatisation of society is not a ‘neutral’ process, but influences social 
relations and the relation between society and state in a number of ways. Media, 
in the broadest sense of the word, create new means for the state to exert power: 
public communication, surveillance techniques, data analysis and monitoring sys-
tems are typical expressions of a highly mediatised relation between state and 
society. The ‘eye of the state’ has many extensions to penetrate into society. 
Hence, Lyon speaks of a ‘surveillance state’ (2007) and Bannister of a ‘panoptic 
state’ (2005).  
At the same time, the use of media is not limited to the state. For instance, 
mass media are not only the mouthpiece of politicians, but (at least in countries 
with a free press) they also have an important disciplining effect on politics. By 
the beginning of the 21st century, the ‘business’ of covering and ‘making’ news by 
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media corporations in printed press, television, radio and internet had turned into 
an important force of its own, dedicated to telling gripping stories, covering disas-
ters and small, everyday life tragedies, and holding politicians accountable for 
their actions or lack thereof (e.g. Elchardus, 2002; RMO, 2003; Lloyd, 2004). Social 
reality is constructed before the eye of the camera (Gamson c.s., 1992).  
 
The aforementioned description of mechanisms and triggers of state development 
is by no means exhaustive, but it does provide some insight into several important 
and well-documented characteristics of the contemporary state and develop-
ments of contemporary society. It is within this specific dynamic historical context 
that the preventive gaze emerges and makes its presumed impact on the state. In 
the concluding chapter of this study, which follows the empirical analysis, these 
mechanisms and triggers are revisited in order to show how the impact of the 
preventive gaze is an understandable development in the historical and spatial 




3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
“Just as a stuffed rabbit in a showcase does not reveal 
how he once found food, procreated, took fright at a fox 
or hopped around the forest, so a formal profile of a 
political system says little of its concrete workings in 
history. One can say: this is the mouth, here are the sexu-
al organs, or these are the voters and there is the su-
preme court, but you will miss out on what pushes life 
forward and makes it interesting: time, the locomotive of 
renewal.” 
 





How to study the way the preventive gaze changes the state? Before tackling this 
methodological question, several remarks are in order about the difficulty of study-
ing the state. The ontological status of the state is contested: “If inquirers confine 
themselves to observed phenomena, the behavior of kings, presidents, legislators, 
judges, sheriffs, assessors and all other public officials, surely a reasonable con-
sensus is not difficult to attain. Contrast with this agreement the differences which 
exist as to the basis, nature, functions and justification of the state, and note the 
seemingly hopeless disagreement. If one asks not for an enumeration of facts, but 
for a definition of the state, one is plunged into controversy, into a medley of con-
tradictory clamors” (Dewey, 1954:4).  
The state cannot be physically touched or seen, and it cannot be reduced 
to a single person, single organisation or single institution; and likewise, nor to 
mere ‘politics’, ‘government’, ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘policy’. However, as stated in the 
previous chapter, the state can be understood to constitute an idea, which fulfils 
an ontological function: “it is the entity that is presupposed for the purpose of 
gaining access to modern political reality” (Loughlin, 2009:6; cf. Pierson, 2004). 
This contested ontological status of the state might lead some to conclude 
that the state is an archaic concept which should be abandoned as a research ob-
ject. Instead of presupposing an entity such as the state, we should focus on the 
actual exertion of power in the business of politics, in policymaking, in policy im-
plementation, in the influence of pressure groups, and so on (e.g. Van der Hoeven, 
                                                   
92 My translation, RP. 
104 
 
1958; Van Maarseveen, 1971; Abrams, 1977; Easton, 1981; Almond c.s., 1988). In 
this perspective, the notion of the state is the façade for underlying political prac-
tices and the exertion of power. Michel Foucault, for example, was not interested 
in issues of sovereignty, but in ‘the art of governing’ and ‘governmentality’ (Fou-
cault, 1998; Pierson, 2004:4-5). And Abrams sees the state as an ‘ideological pro-
ject’ (1988:76): an imaginary construction designed to justify the exertion of 
power and to conceal practices of domination. 
 
We should not treat the state as a material object of study – here, other less elu-
sive notions such as government, policymaking and policy implementation are 
epistemologically more appropriate. However, we should take conceptualisations 
of the state seriously (Abrams, 1988:75). An understanding of the state provides 
the conceptual coherence necessary to understand political reality and the way 
power is organised and exerted.  
An understanding of the state on the one hand reduces the complexities 
and variances in the practices through which power is exerted, but on the other 
hand enables a better understanding of these practices by giving them an unam-
biguous means of expression (cf. Weber, 1988:190). For instance, the notion of the 
‘welfare state’ captures the rationale behind specific forms of rule in post-war 
Western Europe, even though the idea of ‘welfare’ grossly simplifies the variety of 
the ways power is exerted. 
An understanding of the state is based on empirical observations, but can 
at the same not be reduced to these empirical phenomena. Instead, a variety of 
empirical phenomena is tied together by a shared understanding about what the 
state is or what it should be – the same way other institutions such as the church 
or the university cannot be reduced to the people working there or to the build-
ings they occupy (cf. Douglas, 1986). At the same time, an image or an institution 
cannot ‘be’ without its visible appearances or embodiments, such as buildings, 
rituals, physical exertion of power, courts, policies, et cetera. 
In the following research design, practices of governing, policymaking and 
implementation are the core objects of study. This study focuses on “that dimen-
sion of our history composed by the invention, contestation, operationalization 
and transformation of more or less rationalized schemes, programmes, tech-
niques and devices which seek to shape conduct so as to achieve certain ends” 
(Rose, 1999:20). However, the analysis of these practices aims to draw inferences 
on the development of the state – on the underlying and overall characteristics of 
the way power is exerted by the institutions which make up or are associated with 
sovereign rule. Such an understanding of the state is more than a characterisation 
of a specific type of government. Instead, it aims to conceptually capture a struc-
tural and fundamental transformation (brought about by the preventive gaze) in 
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the way power is organised on both the level of definition power and intervention 
power. In more general terms, this study aims to theorise on “the ways in which 
certain aspects of the conduct of persons, individually or collectively, have come 
to be problematized at specific historical moments, the objects and concerns that 
appear here, and the forces, events or authorities that have rendered them prob-





2. Methodological approach 
 
2.1. Research objectives and question 
The research presented here has three basic objectives. The first is to describe 
state development, the second to understand state development in its specific 
spatial and temporal context, and the third to discuss the broader consequences of 
state development for the relation between state and society. In short, this study 
is aimed at a diagnosis rather than an explanation of the contemporary state.  
The research intends to be theory generating. It does not aim to test or fal-
sify existing theories of state development. Nor does it aim to pass judgement on 
the effectiveness of preventive interventions. The basic challenge for theory-
generating research is not hypothesis testing, but building a new theory or hy-
pothesis from empirical data (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). It emphasises ‘conjecture’ 
over ‘refutation’ (Popper, 1963). This implies a highly iterative research process. 
Empirical phenomena in the social world never fully ‘speak for themselves’ and 
can never be analysed from an ahistorical standpoint. In the words of Lakatos: 
“there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by expectations” (1978:15).  
This is not merely the ontological acknowledgement that full objectivity is 
unattainable and knowledge is essentially constructed, but also an acknowledge-
ment of the fact that the social world is ‘epistemologically interpretive’ (Yanow, in 
Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006:6). Interpretation does not imply the end of ration-
ality. Rationality should be at the heart of an inquiry and the subsequent analysis. 
However, it does urge the researcher to lay bear the assumptions and steps which 
led him to his specific interpretation of social reality. 
 
Before outlining the methodological approach and research design, we will short-
ly revisit the central research question set out in the introductory chapter. Based 
on a discussion of the transformative potential of the preventive gaze, the follow-
ing question was formulated: How can the impact of the increasing dominance of 
the preventive gaze on the contemporary Western European state be understood? 
Furthermore, two ‘sensitising’ (Blumer, 1954) presumptions were formu-
lated with regard to the consequences of the increasing dominance of the preven-
tive gaze. These presumptions aim to give guidance in the analysis of the devel-
opment in range and depth of a state’s tasks and activities (Finer, 1997:63). With 
regard to range, the preventive gaze is presumed to expand the range of state activi-
ties. The logic of prevention is fundamentally different than the logic of the previ-
ously discussed historical appearances of the contemporary Western European 
state. Whereas the range of state activities in the constitutional state is deter-
mined by the reaction to infringements of the law, prevention implies an interest 
of the state in potential infringements. And whereas the range of state activities of 
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the welfare state is determined by the need to compensate for fate, prevention 
implies an interest on the part of the state in the determinants of undesirable fu-
ture events or developments. 
Regarding depth, the preventive gaze is presumed to produce risk-oriented 
interventions in policymaking. Neither the constitutional nor the welfare state is 
concerned with intervening in societal processes or citizen behaviour. The consti-
tutional state has a reaction mechanism for unlawful behaviour and the welfare 
state has a compensation mechanism for unequal starting positions and for dis-
ease and unemployment. By contrast, prevention is aimed at the causes of unlaw-
ful behaviour and fate. These causes have the nature of risks, or chance of future 
harm. As a result, preventive interventions are justified on the basis of ‘possibility’ 
rather than ‘fact’. 
 
2.2. Research methodology 
A research design should fit the question at hand: “choosing a research model is 
not about deciding right from wrong, or truth from falsehood; instead, the goal 
should be to select an approach that is suitable for the task at hand” (Marvasti, 
2004:8). A theory-generating inquiry into the impact of the preventive gaze on 
Western European state development requires a methodological approach which 
enables the researcher to study developments in depth, on multiple levels and 
over an extended period of time. And, since the emergence of prevention is a his-
torical development, it requires a methodological approach which enables the 
researcher to study the prevention perspective within the context of specific spa-
tial and temporal patterns in the exertion of state power. From these criteria, it 
follows that ‘case study research’ is an appropriate methodological approach. After 
all, “[t]he product of a good case study is insight [...]” (Gerring, 2007:7).  
 
According to Yin, “[a] case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a con-
temporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(2009:18). A case, then, is “[...] a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) ob-
served at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring, 2007:19). 
A case study research design should take the criteria of validity and relia-
bility into account (e.g. Yin, 2009:40). However, the interpretative nature and the-
ory-generating purpose of this study should lead the researcher to be cautious 
when speaking of validity and reliability. Full validity – isolating prevention as the 
dominant explanatory factor for state development – is unattainable for this 
study: plausible causal mechanisms instead of statistically determined causal ef-
fects are identified (Gerring, 2007:44). This study also falls short of full reliability 
– in terms of reproducibility of the research activities – because of the highly per-
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sonal and iterative process of interpretation (e.g. Yanow, 2000; Gerring, 2007:71). 
This does not imply that the criteria of validity and reliability are unusable, but 
does lead to the recognition that they should be understood as guidelines for a 
sound and convincing argument.  
A strategy for building theories from case study research was proposed by 
Eisenhardt (1989). The eight steps she distinguishes represent the research pro-
cess followed in this study. The core elements of this process are: 1) the formula-
tion of a research question without a fixed theory or testable hypotheses in order 
to retain theoretical flexibility; 2) the selection of theoretically useful cases; 3) 
triangulation or choosing multiple data collection methods; 4) flexible data collec-
tion to take advantage of emergent themes; 5) comparing the empirical findings in 
the selected cases in order to identify similar patterns; 6) developing hypotheses 
or theoretical constructs from the data; 7) contextualising empirical findings and 
theoretical constructs by analysing existing literature; and 8) iteratively going 
back and forth between data and constructs until theoretical saturation has been 
reached.  
The final element makes it clear that these eight steps are not a linear pro-
cess, but are subject to constant reflection and adjustment as the processes of data 
collection and analysis proceed. Deskwork and fieldwork often overlap in a re-
searcher’s efforts to make sense of the data (Yanow, 2000:84-86). Therefore, 
Yanow (2000:84) stresses the importance of ‘iterative loops’ to allow for the for-
mulation of a rich and simultaneously structured set of empirical findings. 
Interpretation of the data is an unalienable element in this process. Em-
pirical data do not speak for themselves, but require a researcher’s analysis. In-
stead of accepting the positivistic assumption of gathering knowledge through 
pure, objective and verifiable sensory experience, the assumption here is that an 
investigation into social phenomena always requires careful consideration of the 
possible ‘meanings’ people – including politicians and policymakers, but certainly 
the researcher as well – attach to them (Yanow, 2000). For instance, the nature of 
policy problems is inherently contested: what qualifies as a problem is not reduc-
ible to objective knowledge, but is determined by political, subjective and norma-
tive interpretations of reality. Making these subjective human meanings and 
judgements explicit is, given the criterion of reliability, a crucial element in the 
analysis and presentation of the empirical findings.  
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3. Research strategy 
 
3.1. Case selection 
When aiming to make inferences about the impact of prevention on the image of 
the state, the research should follow the introduction of the preventive gaze in 
government. And when aiming to make inferences about state development, the 
research should take into account both the range and the depth of a state’s tasks 
and activities (Finer, 1997:63). It should furthermore take into account both the 
paternalistic and the maternalistic sphere of state intervention, since these are 
presumed to cover the entire repertoire of the modern state. 
A sphere of state intervention is an ideal-typical model to describe the 
unity between a state’s definition power and a state’s intervention power. These 
two types of power are closely related to what Finer understands as the range and 
depth of state activities (1997:63). A state’s definition power is the capability of a 
sovereign state to determine the range of its own role and responsibility, as well 
as the range of politically relevant societal phenomena. A state’s intervention 
power is the capability of a sovereign state to determine the nature of state inter-
ventions as well as the depth to which state power penetrates in society. 
Two spheres of state intervention have been distinguished: a paternalistic 
sphere, which is characterised by values of order and obedience, and by the objec-
tive to discipline the free will, and a maternalistic sphere, which is characterised 
by values of emancipation and care and by the objective to compensate, ‘treat’ or 
‘domesticate’ fate (De Mul, 2006). These two spheres form the ideal types from 
which the nature of the actual exertion of state power can be understood. 
 
Following these theoretical notions, a first criterion for the research design is the 
possibility to study state development in both the paternalistic and the maternal-
istic sphere of state development. This implies opting for a multiple case study. 
Two or more cases enable the researcher to show comparative patterns in empir-
ical data (e.g. Yin, 2009:60; Gerring, 2007:27). This increases external validity and 
generalisation of the empirical findings, which is especially useful for theory-
generating studies. The cases should be representative or ‘typical’ for each sphere 
of state intervention, but polar or ‘diverse’ in terms of a distinction between their 
paternalistic and maternalistic characteristics (cf. Gerring, 2007:91-101). 
 
A second criterion for the research design is a focus on coherent patterns of state 
activities. These patterns should not only be representative for the two spheres of 
state intervention, but should also enable an inquiry into both the state’s defini-
tion power and intervention power. State power can be exerted in many forms, 
but is relatively stable and coherent if it is exerted through policy. Moreover, poli-
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cymaking concerns decisions on both the range and depth of state interventions. 
By taking policies or policy domains as research cases, both elements of the two 
spheres of state intervention can be studied in relation to each other. 
 
A third criterion is the probability of the preventive gaze being a core element in 
these coherent patterns of state activities. Instead of statistical or random sam-
pling, which is common in a hypothetical-deductive research approach, a more 
iterative approach favours ‘theoretical sampling’: “[...] the goal of theoretical sam-
pling is to choose cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theo-
ry” (Eisenhardt, 1989:537). 
Based on this and the previous criterion, crime policy and public health 
policy are selected as appropriate policy domains. Crime policy is representative 
for the paternalistic sphere, since it includes activities of law enforcement and 
administration of justice. Moreover, prevention is a well-documented strategy in 
efforts to control crime (e.g. Van Dijk c.s., 2009). Public health policy is repre-
sentative for the maternalistic sphere, since it includes activities of health care 
and promotion of healthy living circumstances. Moreover, disease prevention is a 
central pillar of public health (e.g. Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008).93 
 
A fourth criterion is a temporal focus able to allow a historical reconstruction of 
state activities from the moment prevention was first introduced. Since this study 
is concerned with state development, a study that looks only at the state’s pre-
sent-day definition and intervention power would be insufficient. Instead, the case 
study should enable a longitudinal analysis of state development and the role of 
prevention therein. Developments in crime policy and public health policy should 
be traced back to the time when prevention entered policy formulation. The spe-
cific temporal selection is discussed in the introductory remarks for both case 
                                                   
93 There are not many alternative policy domains available for the paternalistic sphere. One 
possibility might be anti-terrorism policies, but these can be said to focus on a specialised do-
main of the broader crime policy domain. Another paternalistic policy domain is national de-
fence policy, but this focuses on external threats instead of interventions within society. 
In contrast, several other maternalistic policy domains have been considered, such as 
housing policy, welfare policy, education policy, social security policy and youth policy. Several 
of these did not pass muster, because it was not immediately evident that prevention played a 
major role in these domains, such as housing policy, social security and education policy. These 
domains tend to focus on regulation and on the provision of services and not on the prevention 
of social ills. Other policy domains were not selected because they form less of a coherent pat-
tern of activities than public health policy. Welfare policy and youth policy may both be suitable 




studies, but both are roughly concerned with the period from the early 1980’s 
onwards.94 
 
And a fifth criterion for the research design is a spatial focus on one or more 
states. Since the objective is to study Western European state development, the 
case selection should be representative for the specific historical trajectories in 
this part of the world. Ideally, two or more states should be selected, since this 
strengthens the external validity and generalisation of the research findings and 
analysis (Yin, 2009:60; Gerring, 2007:27). However, practical time constraints 
have necessitated the case selections to be limited to one state only.  
The two selected policy domains are studied in the Dutch context. Even 
though the Netherlands has its own distinctive (political) culture, traditions and 
structures,95 it is at the same time very much at the heart of Western European 
state development: it has been a sovereign state since 1648 (with two short peri-
ods of occupation), it has a longstanding constitutional tradition (Zouridis, 
2009:124), and is a typical example of a welfare state (Schuyt c.s., 1986). Even 
though this research focuses on the Dutch case, there are strong indications that 
prevention also plays a dominant role in the government of other Western Euro-
pean countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom (e.g. Garland, 2001; 
Krasmann, 2007; Huster & Rudolph, 2008; Boutellier, 2011:87): “[in] many re-
spects crime prevention in the Low Countries resembles that in other western 
countries” (Van Dijk & De Waard, in Crawford, 2009:130). 
An in-depth analysis of developments in one state enables a more general 
theory of Western European state development to be built (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The structure of this study is – in methodological terms – as follows: chapters one 
and two are theoretical chapters and they have a Western European focus. They 
                                                   
94 This period is debatable for public health policy. Even though crime prevention also has its 
antecedents, the origins of prevention in public health can be traced back to the late 19th centu-
ry. Important preventive measures in public hygiene (such as the introduction of sewerage 
systems) date form this period. However, the early 1980’s marked an important transformation 
in public health policy. Attention shifted from mere protection against external, epidemiological 
threats to the prevention of lifestyle diseases. This transformation is taken as the starting point 
for the analysis. See the introductory paragraph of the chapter on public health policy for a 
further discussion of this selection. 
95 For instance, the pragmatic Dutch political culture and tradition of ‘loyal’ citizenship 
(Verhoeven, in Verhoeven & Ham, 2010:179), instead of the tradition of ‘dissent’ seen in the US 
(Kennedy, in Verhoeven & Ham, 2010:211-223), might lead to a very specific social acceptance 
of state interventions. Also, Dutch culture is sometimes characterised as highly ‘feminine’, 
which might explain a tendency towards prevention instead of a more masculine repression 
(Hofstede, 1980). Moreover, the 16th and 17th century process of state formation in the (north-
ern) Netherlands coincided, among other things, with the development of collective action to 
prevent floods, which had especially plagued the Low Countries in the 16th century (Schama, 
2006:48). To some extent, prevention and state formation are intertwined in the Dutch case.  
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are followed by two empirical chapters from one state, on the basis of which the 
theory on Western European state development – as presented in the second 
chapter – is expanded on in the concluding chapter. 
 
3.2. Data collection 
In order to reach a plausible and convincing argument, several issues regarding 
data collection, data analysis and data presentation needed to be tackled. In terms 
of data collection, the basic question involved determining which empirical evi-
dence was required to make plausible inferences on state development and the 
role of prevention therein. As the above remarks make clear, the empirical data 
should enable an inquiry into the long-term development of definition power and 
intervention power of the Dutch state in the crime policy and public health policy 
domains. 
 
3.2.1. Definition power 
With regard to definition power, the two policy domains have a primarily national 
governmental tradition. National government can be considered to be the primary 
actor in determining the range of state interventions in crime and public health 
policy. Even though municipalities have a crucial role in policymaking, the Dutch 
state’s definition power is most explicitly visible in policy considerations on the 
level where sovereign power is predominantly concentrated. 
Furthermore, the data collection should enable a historical overview of 
policymaking. A genealogy of crime policy and public health policy should cover 
the period from the moment when prevention was first introduced up to the pre-
sent. Official policy memoranda are the most obvious source of evidence for such a 
historical inquiry. The genealogy of Dutch crime policy and public health policy is 
reconstructed through the analysis of important national government policy 
memoranda, annually held Queen’s speeches,96 Government Declarations of Policy 
on Taking Office97 and coalition agreements98 from, roughly, the last thirty 
years.99  
Relevant policy memoranda have been selected in two phases. First, avail-
able secondary literature was studied to identify the most important memoranda 
                                                   
96 In Dutch: ‘troonredes’. References to quotations in the case descriptions are abbreviated as 
‘QS’, followed by the year of proclamation. 
97 In Dutch: ‘regeringsverklaringen’. References to quotations in the case descriptions are ab-
breviated as ‘GD’, followed by the year of proclamation and page number. 
98 In Dutch: ‘regeerakkoorden’. References to quotations in the case descriptions are abbreviat-
ed as ‘CA’, followed by the year of publication and page number. 
99 A more specific account of this time span is discussed in the individual case descriptions. 
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in the general development of the two policy domains.100 Second, several com-
plementary memoranda were selected on the basis of an explicit or implicit refer-
ence in a previously selected policy memorandum.  
 
Contrary to interviews, which may also be used for historical inquiries, written 
words do not depend on the memories of individual persons, nor are they influ-
enced by the reflexivity of the research object. Reflexivity is a specific characteris-
tic of the research objects in social science. Social phenomena can only to a very 
limited extent be studied by means of experiments. Instead, social science re-
search often implies an intervention by the researcher in his object of study or an 
interaction between the researcher and his object of study. As a result, the re-
search object ‘talks back’ to the researcher – an individual is aware of the fact that 
he or she is the object of study and may therefore, consciously or unconsciously, 
adapt his or her behaviour. Written words, however, do not ‘talk back’ and are 
therefore a fairly objective source of data collection (cf. Segers & Hagenaars, 
1980).101  
However, the use of ‘objective’ empirical data cannot rule out a research-
er’s own bias in the analysis of the data. Therefore, the two case descriptions were 
commented on by experts in the field of crime policy (drs. Bert Berghuis, chief 
policy adviser at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice) and public health pol-
icy (dr. Harry Nijhuis, currently strategic development officer at the Municipality 
of The Hague, and formerly extraordinary professor of Big Cities and Health Care 
at the University of Amsterdam). 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that a focus on documents for 
the historical policy analysis (or policy genealogy) excludes potential relevant 
historical policy practices. Even if prevention was to a certain point in time absent 
from explicit policymaking, this does not necessarily imply that prevention was 
also absent from the exertion of state power altogether. In fact, we know from a 
broad body of literature of the existence of preventive antecedents. Preventive 
practices have characterised public health since its very emergence in the late 19th 
century, such as the construction of a water and sewerage system (e.g. 
Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008). And antecedents in the realm of crime policy 
(e.g. Foucault, 1975) include preventive elements inherent to police patrols 
                                                   
100 See Boot & Knapen (2005:207-280) for public health policy and De Haan (1997), Van Ruller 
(1999), Muller (2004), Boutellier (2005:236) and Van den Brink (2006:19-20) for crime policy. 
101 However, written words are still the product of human construction and can therefore never 
be studied outside their historical context. The specific characteristics of the research objects of 
social science still apply, which can be contrasted with the research objects of natural sciences 
by drawing a “[...] distinction between facts which condition human activity and facts which are 
conditioned by human activity” (Dewey, 1954:7). 
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(Zedner, 2007:264), the functions, next to retribution, of incapacitation and deter-
rence inherent to criminal punishment (e.g. Franken c.s., 1999:442-443; Tebbit, 
2000:165), as well as a late 16th century correctional facility in the city of Amster-
dam (the ‘Rasphuis’), which aimed ‘to tame what men fear’ (Schama, 2006:28).102 
 
3.2.2. Intervention power 
With regard to intervention power, an analysis of the aforementioned documents 
at the level of Dutch national government is a necessity, but also insufficient. On 
the one hand, policy memoranda, Queen’s speeches, government declarations and 
coalition agreements offer insight into the statements of intent regarding the exer-
tion of state power. On the other hand, statements of intent do not necessarily 
fully correspond with the actual exertion of state power. A large body of public 
policy and administration research has shown that policy formulation and policy 
implementation are not necessarily fully consistent (e.g. Kaufman, 1960; Press-
man & Wildavsky, 1973; Lipsky, 1980). Therefore, additional data has been col-
lected directly at the local level of policy practices. 
These policy practices are examples of present-day state activities and as 
such do not contribute to an analysis of the historical development of intervention 
power. These practices are not necessarily representative of all policy implemen-
tation activities in Dutch municipalities. Instead, they have been selected on the 
probability of the preventive gaze being a core element in the exertion of state 
power.  
The methodological status (or function) of the selected policy practices is 
twofold. First, they serve as a check on the statements of intent by national gov-
ernment: if the characteristics of the selected policy practices coincide with the 
characteristics of the statements of intent, this supports the status of the latter as 
a valid representation of the Dutch state’s intervention power. And second, the 
selected practices offer a complementary insight in the actual exertion of state 
power. Whereas statements of intent offer a broad understanding of intervention 
power, the policy practices offer in-depth insight. The inferences made on the 
impact of the preventive gaze on the Western European state in the concluding 
                                                   
102 The complete slogan on the entrance gate to the ‘Rasphuis’ is: “Virtutis est domare quae 
cuncti pavent” (Schama, 2006:28). This roughly translates as ‘it is a virtue to tame what all fear’. 
Even though the measures to discipline instead of merely punish criminals in the ‘Rasphuis’ 
were crude and largely failed to have the originally intended effect, they do express an early 
example of a different way of thinking about crime and punishment.  
This is clearly voiced in a 1607 writing by Dutch poet P.C. Hooft, who in one of his 
works lets an employee of the ‘Rashuis’ declare: “Schrik niet [...], ik wreek geen quaat maar 
dwing tot goet. Straf is mijn hant maar lieflyk myn gemoet” (Schama, 2006:28). This roughly 
translates as: ‘do not fear, for I do not avenge evil but impel the doing of good. Punishment is my 
hand but mild is my soul’. 
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chapter of this study are solely based on the two policy genealogies and not on the 
three policy practices. 
 
The policy practices have been selected according to ‘theoretical sampling’ (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989:537), that is, on the probability of the preventive gaze being a 
core element in the exertion of state power. Another selection criterion was a 
certain volume and importance: the practices could not consist of isolated activi-
ties, but were to be part of a broader set of activities with a considerable range 
and size. Based on these criteria, the following three practices have been selected 
– two for the crime policy case and one for the public health policy case:103 
- Crime prevention in the city of Rotterdam: Rotterdam’s municipal crime 
policy is known in the Netherlands for its innovative, comprehensive and 
decisive approach (e.g. Tops, 2007). Prevention is an important element 
in this approach. Activities with regard to crime prevention in the public 
domain in Rotterdam-South were studied between September and De-
cember 2011.  
- Care and Security House104 in the city of Tilburg: in 2002, Tilburg was the 
first Dutch city to establish a so called Security House, a location where 
various organisations (such as the police, municipality, public prosecutor, 
compulsory education bureau, and youth care) cooperate to develop per-
sonalised approaches for criminals and risk adolescents. In 2009, there 
were 45 of these Security Houses in the Netherlands. The various activi-
ties in and around the Care and Security House in Tilburg were studied 
between March and June 2011. 
- The programme ‘Healthy Together’105 in the city of The Hague: the im-
plementation of public health policy is often characterised by fragmenta-
tion, since the various activities are carried out by a large number of wel-
fare organisations, schools, general practitioners and other organisations 
or professionals. The programme ‘Healthy Together’, developed by the 
city of The Hague, is an example of a more coordinated approach to local 
public health issues. The activities in the programme ‘Healthy Together’ 
were studied between June and November 2011. 
 
                                                   
103 The Care and Security House focuses on personalised approaches of crime, whereas crime 
prevention in the city of Rotterdam focuses on territorial approaches. The programme ‘Healthy 
Together’ combines personalised and territorial approaches. This is the reason only one prac-
tice is selected for the public health policy case, whereas two are selected for the crime policy 
case. 
104 In Dutch: Zorg- en Veiligheidshuis. 
105 In Dutch: ‘Samen Gezond’. 
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Three strategies were used for the data collection in these three policy practices. 
First, semi-structured interviews were held with employees or officials directly 
involved with the organisation or execution of measures and interventions. Se-
cond, direct observation of activities was employed as much as possible. And third, 
additional documentation on the general outline of the various activities and their 
municipal policy context was studied.106 
Management representatives of the three practices played a crucial role in 
the research. The research was conducted with their prior consent, they were 
consulted about the selection of the interviewees and the activities for direct ob-
servation, they checked the description of the empirical findings, and they granted 
consent for the publication of the findings.107 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
The basic question for the actual analysis of the empirical data was how to identi-
fy state development and the role of prevention therein. Based on previous con-
siderations, this required an understanding of what determines a state’s definition 
power and intervention power, and an interpretation of what prevention means 
in the context of crime policy and public health policy. To start with the former 
requirement, several elements of definition power and intervention power can be 
distinguished.  
In this study, the nature of a state’s definition power is viewed as being 
composed of the following three elements: 
- Problem definition: the state determines what qualifies as a policy prob-
lem and what the nature of this problem is 
- Policy objectives: the state determines the goals it wants to achieve 
through policymaking 
- State responsibility: the state determines the boundaries of its own re-
sponsibility or task, and thereby also determines what is left for society 
and individual citizens to deal with 
                                                   
106 A more specific account of the observations, conversations and documentation for each 
selected practice is included in the presentation of references in an appendix of this study. 
107 The following management representatives were involved in the three selected practices: 
- Crime prevention in Rotterdam: Emile Goyvaerts, coordinator/manager at the city dis-
trict Charlois 
- Care and Security House Tilburg: Frans Swinkels (manager of the security policy unit 
municipality of Tilburg), Remco Jansen (programme manager ‘Security’ municipality 
of Tilburg), Sandra Timmermans (manager Care and Security House) and John 
Wauben (manager Care and Security House) 
- ‘Healthy Together’ The Hague: Erik Ruland (programme manager Healthy Together), 
Annette de Graaf (health broker municipality of The Hague) and José Loof (health bro-




And the nature of a state’s intervention power is understood to be composed of the 
following three elements: 
- Organisation: the state determines the organisation of the intervention 
repertoire necessary for the realisation of policy objectives 
- Objects of intervention: the state determines the relevant points of applica-
tion for its interventions 
- Techniques and instruments: the state determines what tools and tech-
niques it applies for the realisation of policy objectives 
 
These six elements form the core of the analysis of official government memoran-
da on crime policy and public health policy. Developments in all six of these ele-
ments are indications of state development. The genealogies of the two selected 
policy domains are based on the words used by government itself to describe its 
definition power and intervention power. The three contemporary policy practic-
es focus on the analysis of intervention power – definition power is only relevant 
here in so far as it is necessary to describe the local policy context in which inter-
ventions take place. 
 
The identification of prevention in the developments of a state’s definition and 
intervention power is largely a matter of interpretation. Three guidelines for this 
interpretation have been followed. The first of these is the definition of prevention 
which was presented in the introductory chapter of this research: intentionally 
taking measures with the objective to avoid certain future events or to avert cer-
tain future developments. This broad definition rules out reactive measures and 
measures with an unintended or unanticipated preventive effect.  
Specific conceptualisations of prevention in both criminological and pub-
lic health research form a second guideline. In each field, three forms of preven-
tion are distinguished: primary prevention is the aversion of undesirable phe-
nomena, secondary prevention is the early detection of and early intervention in 
manifestations of undesirable phenomena, and tertiary prevention is the mitiga-
tion of the negative effects of undesirable phenomena which have already mani-
fested themselves. These conceptualisations are discussed in more detail in the 
introduction to each case description. 
A third guideline for the identification of prevention is formed by the 
words used by government, local authorities and professionals involved in policy 
implementation. Many of the analysed memoranda deal explicitly with preven-
tion, but at the same time do not distinguish between the scientifically defined 
forms of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Since the actual words of 
government and professionals involved in policy practices form the basis of the 
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case descriptions, their explicit references to prevention are not ‘forced’ into ex-
ternal conceptualisations. The case descriptions are primarily structured along 
the lines of government’s own problem definitions and policy objectives, and gov-
ernment’s own conceptualisations of prevention. 
 
3.4. Data presentation 
An important justification for theory building is the persuasiveness of the empiri-
cal analysis and of the subsequent composition and presentation of empirical find-
ings. A ‘show don’t tell’-strategy is followed in the two case descriptions. Exten-
sive quoting of source material – policy memoranda, interviews and additional 
documentation – enables the reader to reconstruct the analysis as much as possi-
ble given the interpretative nature of this study.108 
Both case descriptions have the following composition. First, an introduc-
tory paragraph outlines the general context of the policy domain. Special attention 
is given to conceptualisations of prevention in criminological and public health 
research, and to the specific Dutch characteristics of the two policy domains. A 
more general outline of the Dutch political context is presented in an appendix to 
this study. 
The policy genealogy follows the introductory paragraph. Since this is the 
most important source of evidence for the impact of the preventive gaze on the 
state, each genealogy is extensively discussed according to a chronological struc-
ture. For both the crime policy case and the public health policy case, several peri-
ods of development in definition power and intervention power are discerned. 
This division into separate time spans, which is discussed in more detail in each 
case description, allows new elements and crucial developments to be highlighted 
amidst the continuities. 
The third part of each case consists of a description of policy practices. 
The structure of these descriptions is determined by the identification of different 
types of preventive interventions and activities. As said above, these local practic-
es are not necessarily representative of policy implementation in general. Instead, 
their methodological function is to support the validity of government’s state-
ments of intent on policy implementation in the various selected documents.  
  
                                                   
108 The quotations have been translated from Dutch to English by the author (RP). 
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men wesentlich mit, was wir in einem fundamentalen 
Sinne ‘Vergesellschaftung’ nennen. Die Sorge, Furcht, 
Angst voreinander ist als ein Modus des Vergesellschaf-
tet-Seins niemals ganz wegzudenken. Zusammenleben 
heißt stets auch sich fürchten und sich schützen.” 
 





1.1. Crime, criminology and crime prevention 
Crime is a social construct. It is citizen behaviour defined as such by a sovereign 
state. Formally speaking, the state ‘produces’ criminal behaviour by determining 
the rules of conduct for a population. Criminal behaviour is a form of deviance 
from a shared social norm: “social groups create deviance by making rules whose 
infraction creates deviance, and by applying these rules to particular people and 
labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of 
the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others 
of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to whom that label has 
been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label” 
(Becker, 1973:9). 
Crime is a necessary by-product of the sovereign state: the very estab-
lishment of a state as a society’s ultimate arbiter implies that certain behaviour by 
the population becomes unacceptable. This is behaviour that threatens the very 
preservation of the state, and, following Hobbes’s ‘covenant’, which created the 
Leviathan, behaviour that threatens the basic security of other inhabitants. Under 
sovereign rule, punishment as a reaction to an infringement of basic societal 
norms is transferred from the hands of individual citizens into the hands of the 
state, thereby transforming private punishment into illegal vigilantism. 
Every society has its behavioural norms and many have some sort of legal 
code – an early example being the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi of roughly 
1780 BC. The specific characteristics of these norms in a constitutional state are 
legality, equality and humanity (Franken c.s., 1999:42-45). In other words: the 
norms are codified, are equally applicable to all citizens, and are not characterised 
by a ‘lex talionis’ or an ‘eye for an eye’ system of corporal punishment. The onto-
logical basis for the contemporary constitutional state is the idea of the rational 
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individual, who can be held responsible for his own actions. As such, the constitu-
tional state does not aim to understand or explain crime. Instead, it is only inter-
ested in the attribution of individual guilt (‘mens rea’) (e.g. Tebbit, 2000:129). 
 
Whereas legal codes and punishment by sovereign rule date back several millen-
nia, the study of criminal behaviour and its societal reactions only emerged in the 
19th century (Van Dijk c.s., 2009:16), and can be understood as part of a broader 
‘discovery of the social’ (Donzelot, 1984). According to the social sciences – psy-
chology, sociology and criminology – the ‘social’ should be seen as a crucial entity 
in our quest to understand human behaviour. This emphasis on understanding 
criminal behaviour as a social phenomenon is an important precondition for the 
eventual development of preventive instead of mere reactive or punitive state 
activities. 
In the classical 18th century utilitarian school of criminology, scholars 
such as Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria did not yet view crime as a social 
phenomenon, but rather as the result of deliberate action by a rational and calcu-
lating human being. According to this view, an effective punitive reaction to crime 
by the state should emphasise deterrence. If criminal behaviour is the result of a 
rational trade-off between ‘pain and pleasure’, an increase in the potential amount 
of ‘pain’ should persuade rational man to show law-abiding behaviour. In that 
case, the objective benefits of law-abiding behaviour outweigh those of deviant 
behaviour. 
However, from the 19th century onwards, criminology became interested 
in determining the causes of criminal behaviour through empirical inquiries, in-
stead of ontological constructs of rational man. Various schools and theories have 
been developed since, several of which are discussed in the following. A first 
criminological strand focuses on a delinquent’s physiological traits. Cesare Lom-
broso suggested in his L’Uomo Delinquente (1876) that certain physiological traits, 
such as disproportional cheekbones or a low forehead, were important indicators 
of delinquent behaviour (e.g. Gibson, 2002). A contemporary equivalent of this 
biological school is the study of delinquents’ genetic characteristics.  
Contrary to this physiological explanation is the strand of criminological 
thought that focuses on psychological explanations, i.e., not the human body, but 
the human mind becomes the object of study. Delinquent behaviour is understood 
to result from a particular psychological development or certain psychological 
characteristics. This school in criminology includes learning psychology, devel-
opmental psychology, social psychology and personality disorders. Freudian in-
sights are important in this respect, as well as theories on the relation between 
personality traits (or temperaments) and criminal behaviour (Eysenck, 1964), 
and on the relation between ‘nurture’ and ‘nature’ (e.g. Harris, 1998). 
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Other strands of thought do not focus on individual characteristics of de-
linquents, but on the social structures in which delinquents live, such as delin-
quent subcultures (e.g. Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), or on the demographical and ar-
chitectural characteristics of certain neighbourhoods (e.g. Shaw & MacKay, 1942), 
and the level of social disorganisation in highly urbanised environments (e.g. 
Sampson & Laub, 1993). Another variant of this school of thought is the focus on 
the ‘strain’ between what a society expects of its citizens on the one hand (such as 
success, productivity and welfare) and actual means available to citizens to meet 
these social pressures on the other hand (Merton, 1949). Social and economic 
inequalities and the legal means available to citizens to overcome these are seen 
as important determinants of crime in this respect. 
A final strand of criminology theory to be discussed here stresses the way 
social judgements and labels form the identity of ‘the criminal’. Labelling a person 
as a criminal can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, can socially stigmatise an 
individual, or can lead to a specific treatment of certain population groups (e.g. 
Becker, 1963). For instance, cultural minorities might become socially associated 
with criminal behaviour, or the labelling of certain types of criminals as ‘habitual 
offenders’ might justify a different policy approach to the individuals who fit this 
label. 
 
The study of the causes of criminal behaviour from the mid-19th century onward 
implies the introduction of a causal scheme between criminal acts and preceding 
explanatory variables. Unravelling the causes of crime is a necessary first step 
towards intervening on these causes. In a way, prevention is already latently pre-
sent in the objectives of modern criminology. 
According to the Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, drawn up by the 
UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2002, crime preven-
tion is the aggregate of “strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of 
crime occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, 
including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes. The en-
forcement of laws, sentences and corrections, while also performing preventive 
functions, falls outside the scope of the Guidelines” (cited in Van Dijk c.s., 
2009:169). As a consequence, the “defining characteristic of prevention is […] the 
interventions in certain processes before a crime has been committed” (Van Dijk 
c.s., 2009:169). Seen from the perspective of prevention, the administration of 
justice is mere ‘symptom control’ (Van Dijk c.s., 2009:170).109 
                                                   
109 Besides retribution, the judicial reaction of punishment also serves preventive objectives. 
Deterrence and incapacitation have long constituted important functions of punitive measures 
(e.g. Franken c.s., 1999:442-443; Tebbit, 2000:165). However, what sets crime prevention apart 
from these presumed preventive effects of penalising certain behaviour is, first, its focus on 
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Crime prevention is directed at the risk factors for criminal behaviour. 
These factors can refer to the underlying causes of crime, but also to ‘damage con-
trol’ or putting a stop to criminal behaviour in cases where these causes cannot be 
fully taken away. Important risk factors according to current international crimi-
nological insights include age composition, the degree of urbanisation and afflu-
ence of a society. Young men are by far the most ‘active’ criminals. Highly urban-
ised environments are vulnerable to crime. And affluence coincides with a broad 
circulation of commodities such as cars and bicycles, which can be vandalised or 
stolen. Important risk factors specifically for crimes of violence are conditions of 
economic deprivation among young men, gender inequality, alcohol abuse and the 
availability of guns (Van Dijk, 2008:91-212). 
 
Following Van Dijk c.s. (2009:174-176), three different types and three different 
strategies of crime prevention can be distinguished. The three types of crime pre-
vention refer to the object of intervention. This can be offender-specific (such as 
potential criminals or habitual offenders), situation-specific (such as disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods or other places with an increased risk of crime) or victim-
specific prevention (such as people with a hazardous occupation or people with 
property vulnerable to theft or vandalism). 
The three strategies of crime prevention refer to the nature of interven-
tion. Primary prevention refers to the aversion of criminal behaviour in general, 
usually by means of collective interventions. Secondary prevention is the early 
detection of problematic behaviour to prevent continuation or worsening of the 
problem. And tertiary prevention aims to reduce the negative consequences of 
problems that have already occurred. Whereas primary prevention is usually di-
rected at the population level, secondary and tertiary prevention are directed at 
specifically identified places (such as neighbourhoods) or specifically identified 
people (such as habitual offenders).  
These distinctions between various types and strategies of crime preven-
tion lead to a broad repertoire of potential interventions, including (Van Dijk c.s., 
2009:176-192):110 
- Primary offender-specific prevention: information on alcohol abuse in 
traffic or general welfare policy; 
- Secondary offender-specific prevention: support for at-risk adolescents 
and early interventions in problem families; 
                                                                                                                                 
possible future criminal behaviour instead of the single committed crime at hand, and second, 
the transformation of punishment from being the archetypal reaction to being one of many 
possible strategies. 




- Tertiary offender-specific prevention: probation work and prevention of 
recidivism; 
- Primary situation-specific prevention: improvement of technical preven-
tion (locks et cetera), traffic regulations, design of the built-up environ-
ment and functional surveillance; 
- Secondary situation-specific prevention: same as primary situation-
specific prevention, but directed at places or neighbourhoods with in-
creased crime risks; 
- Tertiary situation-specific prevention: surveillance and regulations for 
very specific known problem areas, such as bar districts or public trans-
port; 
- Primary victim-specific prevention: information on means to prevent 
burglary, bicycle theft and vandalism (target hardening); 
- Secondary victim-specific prevention: information and education for peo-
ple with hazardous occupations or for vulnerable groups such as the eld-
erly; 
- Tertiary victim-specific prevention: prevention of repeated victimisation 
and victim services. 
 
1.2. Prevention and Dutch crime policy 
Forms of crime prevention by public authorities have early historical precedents, 
such as the closing of town-gates at night in medieval times. Moreover, crime pre-
vention is not limited to state activities – consider, for instance, societal practices 
to protect property of installing locks on doors, and constructing walls and fences 
around private premises. However, from roughly the 1970s onwards, political 
attention for crime as a societal phenomenon arose in Western European countries, 
such as Germany, England, Belgium and the Netherlands (Van Dijk c.s., 2009:169; 
Garland, 2001). Two important characteristics of Dutch crime policy since 1985 
are highlighted in the following – both are discussed in more detail in the geneal-
ogy of crime policy. 
 
A first crucial element is the preventive turn made by the Dutch national govern-
ment in 1985. The first crime policy memorandum published by the Dutch gov-
ernment in 1985 had the telling title Society and Crime.111 This was the birth of 
what was to become structural attention in Dutch politics for crime prevention 
through interventions in societal processes and in the places where crime occurs 
(Van Dijk c.s., 2009:196). Before 1985, crime policy in the Netherlands was lim-
ited to gathering crime statistics, managing the capacity of the police, public 
                                                   
111 In Dutch: Samenleving en Criminaliteit; TK 1984-1985, 18995/2. 
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prosecutor, courts and custodial institutions, and setting priorities in police tasks 
and law enforcement: “The activities of the judicial system were directed at ar-
resting and judging the largest possible number of criminals” (Van Ruller, 
1999:19; my translation, RP). Up to 1985, crime policy had been the nearly 
autonomous domain of the police and the justice authorities, and hence was char-
acterised by a judicial approach (SCP, 2008:36). However, public and politicians 
became increasingly dissatisfied with this approach to crime in the years prior to 
the publication of the Society and Crime memorandum (Brizée, 1985). 
Crucial in this preventive turn was the construction of an analytical dis-
tinction between ‘serious’ crimes and petty crimes, such as vandalism, bicycle 
theft and shoplifting (Christophe & Clement, 1988:23). Preventive strategies were 
specifically directed at the category of petty crime, which had grown explosively 
since the 1960s: the Dutch police registered 130.000 crimes in 1960 and over 
1.000.000 in 1984.112 Moreover, the number of unsolved crimes mounted consid-
erably. According to government, merely expanding the capacity of the police, 
public prosecutor and judiciary would be insufficient to reduce crime levels. In-
stead, crime prevention was introduced as a complementary strategy. After 1985, 
crime levels continued to rise, albeit more slowly than the years before. Recent 
years have seen a decrease in crime levels, with the exception of crimes of vio-
lence (Van Dijk c.s., 2009:40). 
 
A second crucial element in Dutch crime policy emerged during the 1990s: ‘secu-
rity’ gradually became the dominant notion in the government response to unde-
sirable societal phenomena (e.g. Muller, 2004). Security implies more than the 
absence of crime. It refers to a certain status or characteristic of social life, 
whereas crime refers to individual acts. More so than crime, the notion of security 
is related to situations or accidents that affect people in their daily lives (Muller, in 
Huisman, 2006:138). In the 1999 Integral Security Programme,113 the Dutch gov-
ernment defines security “[...] as the presence of a certain order and peace in the 
public domain and as the protection of life, health and property against acute or 
potential infractions” (ISP, 1999:9).  
According to Boutellier, this broad notion of security serves as a ‘semantic 
dragnet’ (Boutellier, 2002), which incorporates not only crime, but also terrorist 
                                                   
112 Although the rise in crime levels cannot solely be attributed to a rise in crime. For the Dutch 
case, Van den Brink (2006:20) mentions contributive effects of increased police efforts, im-
proved registration of crime, an increased willingness of citizens to report crimes, increased 
media attention for crime and insecurity, and increased norms with regard to the quality of the 
public domain. 
113 In Dutch: Integraal Veiligheidsprogramma; TK 1998-1999, 26604/1. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘ISP, 1999’, followed by the page number. 
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threats, nuisance in the public domain and the deterioration of living environ-
ments. Moreover, security is a subjective notion. Unlike the legally defined notion 
of crime, security also includes subjective feelings of insecurity: if citizens per-
ceive a situation as being insecure, the situation is insecure in terms of policy con-
sequences. Subjective feelings of insecurity, next to objective crime figures, be-
came an important indicator for the state of security in the Netherlands (e.g. Huis-
man c.s., 2006:2). 
The paradigm shift from crime to security has broadened the potential 
range of state activities. More specifically, ‘security’ and ‘prevention’ share an 
important characteristic: both notions are boundless and can be applied to a po-
tentially infinite number of phenomena and developments. Moreover, both no-
tions are closely connected. First of all, security implies, at the very least, the ab-
sence of crime, which is also the objective of crime prevention. Furthermore, pre-
vention is not necessarily limited to crime, but can be applied or ‘attached’ to se-
curity, as well. Understood in relation to security, prevention is the aversion of 




The following case study of crime policy in the Netherlands consists of two parts. 
The first part is a policy genealogy, which takes the aforementioned 1985 memo-
randum Society and Crime as starting point. However, the actual policy genealogy 
starts in 1982: several coalition agreements, Queen’s speeches and government 
declarations preceding 1985 are analysed to describe the developments which led 
to the publication of Society and Crime. In total, three time periods are discussed: 
1982-1992, 1993-2001 and 2002-2011.114 This serves an analytical purpose: even 
though actual policy development occurs more ambiguously and with more nu-
                                                   
114 These three periods in crime policy are roughly similar to a common division made in Dutch 
political history. From 1982 to 1994, three cabinets under Christian-democratic Prime Minister 
Lubbers formed the Dutch government: up to 1989 in a coalition with the liberal-conservative 
party, and from 1989 onwards with the social-democratic party. In the period from 1994 to 
2002 two cabinets under social-democratic Prime Minister Kok held office, both in a (secular) 
coalition with the liberal-conservative and the liberal-progressive parties. After 2002, an unsta-
ble period began. Even though Christian-democrat Balkenende was Prime Minister from 2002 
to 2010, the successive governments were of a varied nature: from 2002 to 2003, the Christian-
democrats formed a coalition with the liberal-conservatives and the party of populist leader 
Fortuyn (who was murdered days before the 2002 parliamentary elections), from 2003 to 2006  
a coalition with the liberal-conservative and the liberal-progressive parties, from 2006 to 2007 
a coalition with the liberal-conservative party, and from 2007 to 2010 a coalition with the so-
cial-democrats and a protestant-democratic party. In 2010, a coalition was formed between the 
liberal-conservatives and Christian-democrats under liberal-conservative Prime Minister Rutte. 
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ance, this division into three distinct periods allows new elements and crucial 
developments to be identified and highlighted amidst the continuities. 
The second part of this case study is an analysis of two local preventive 
practices in policy implementation. The first of these is crime prevention in the 
public domain in the city of Rotterdam, which focuses on a situation-specific or 
territorial approach to prevention. The second practice is the Care and Security 
House115 in the city of Tilburg, which focuses on an offender-specific approach to 
prevention. In an appendix to this study, an overview is presented of the observa-
tions, interviews and documentation underlying the empirical findings. 
The description of the local practices in the cities of Rotterdam and Til-
burg serve as examples of the contemporary crime policy intervention repertoire 
of Dutch local government. As such, they do not propose to be representative of all 
local crime policy practices; instead, their methodological function is to support 
the validity of the government’s statements of intent on policy implementation in 
the various selected documents: if the characteristics of the selected policy prac-
tices coincide with the characteristics of the statements of intent, this supports the 
status of the latter as a valid representation of the Dutch state’s intervention 
power.  
                                                   
115 In Dutch: ‘Zorg- en Veiligheidshuis’. 
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2. Policy genealogy: from judicial reaction to problem-oriented proaction 
 
PART 1: A PREVENTIVE TURN IN CRIME POLICY (1982-1992) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Before the 1980s, the Dutch approach to crime can best be described as ‘reactive’. 
Crime policy consisted of making the decisions required to administer, manage 
and, if necessary, increase the capacity of the institutions of the police, public 
prosecutor, judiciary and prison system. In the 1977 coalition agreement, the gov-
ernment stated that it was “concerned” about the steadily climbing crime figures, 
especially the rising number of offences involving violence. The subsequent policy 
reaction was a strictly managerial one: “Harsher punishments in general do not 
lead to improvements, increasing and strengthening the police does” (CA, 
1977:90). Again, in the 1981 government declaration, in which government ex-
pressed concern about the overtaxed police forces and the strain on the judicial 
system, qualitative and quantitative reinforcements were proposed in response to 
the increase in work load (GD, 1981:337). 
However, a year later, in the 1982 coalition agreement, the government 
not only referred to measures to strengthen the institutions of justice (CA, 
1982:70), but committed to do more: “At short notice, a committee will be in-
stalled with the assignment to look at means to improve prevention and settle-
ment of [the] types of crime which occur in large numbers” (CA, 1982:71). During 
the annual general political considerations of 1984, parliament urged government 
to develop a policy proposal based on the findings of the aforementioned commit-
tee. This eventually led to the policy memorandum entitled Society and Crime116 in 
the following year, which proved to be a significant turning point in Dutch crime 
policy: for the first time, crime was regarded as a societal problem and not merely 
as an administrative or managerial issue. 
 
In the opening statements of this memorandum, the government summarised the 
developments which had led to the publication of Society and Crime: “[…] growing 
disturbance amongst the population concerning rising crime figures, the immi-
nent diminishing of the people’s trust in government’s role as protector of per-
sonal and collective interests, and the imminent decay in citizen norm compliance 
and social control” (SC, 1985:13). In this statement, the government acknowl-
edged the state’s inherent responsibility to maintain public order, uphold the law 
                                                   
116 In Dutch: Samenleving en Criminaliteit; TK 1984-1985, 18995/2. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘SC, 1985’, followed by the page number. 
128 
 
and canalise public emotions through the administration of justice (e.g. SC, 
1985:21).  
Moreover, the way in which this responsibility was being fulfilled was in 
need of an overhaul: crime figures had risen dramatically in the preceding 15 
years, there was an imminent threat of citizens taking justice into their own 
hands, and citizens had started taking their own limitative measures in daily life 
(such as avoiding public roads) out of fear of crime (SC, 1985:21). Moreover, the 
government was concerned that the state was no longer able to fulfil its funda-
mental task of deterrence and enforcement of norms and laws, which could 
threaten the legitimacy of the state and the rule of law in Dutch society (SC, 
1985:28-31). In other words, crime was not only a concern of the state, but also a 
concern for the state: “Nothing less than the credibility of the democratic and so-
cial constitutional state is at stake” (EL, 1990:52), declared the government in the 
1990 successor to the Society and Crime memorandum, Evolving Law.117 
The Society and Crime memorandum set an agenda for government meas-
ures to curb burgeoning crime figures, with particular focus on the type of crime 
that threatened and burdened Dutch society the most (SC, 1985:103). This agenda 
was characterised by the introduction of crime prevention as a complementary 
strategy to the existing practices of law enforcement and administration of justice. 
The government’s approach was “[…] aimed at strengthening social control and 
citizen norm compliance, intensification of crime prevention and further im-
provement of investigation, prosecution and execution of sentences” (SC, 
1985:13). 
The explicit shift from a merely reactive crime policy to a complementary 
preventive crime policy can be traced in a series of policy memoranda. These in-
clude the aforementioned Society and Crime and Evolving Law memoranda, but 
also Security and the Quality of the Urban Public Domain118 (1985), School Truancy 
Absenteeism119 (1986), implementation plan of the Society and Crime memoran-
dum120 (1987), With a firm hand: improving the quality of law enforcement121 
(1991), and Fighting Crime122 published in 1992.  
                                                   
117 In Dutch: Recht in Beweging; TK 1990-1991, 21829/2. References to quotations in the text 
are abbreviated as ‘EL, 1990’, followed by the page number. 
118 In Dutch: Sociale Veiligheid en de Kwaliteit van de Openbare Ruimte in de Stad; TK 1985-1986, 
19321/1. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘SQUPD, 1985’, followed by the 
page number. 
119 In Dutch: Schoolverzuim; TK 1985-1986, 19409/1-2. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘SA, 1986, followed by the page number. 
120 TK 1986-1987, 18995/19. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘IPSC, 
1987’, followed by the page number. 
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1.2. Definition power 
 
1.2.1. Individualisation ‘bites back’ 
The government’s problem analysis starts with a description of the basic facts 
about crime in the Netherlands, based on police statistics (SC, 1985:19-33). Since 
1960, registered crime had multiplied almost tenfold, from 130,000 to over a mil-
lion in 1984 (SC, 1985:20). The increase in particular of offences such as theft, 
burglary and vandalism had grown explosively (SC, 1985:20). However, even 
though they only made up a fraction of the total number of offences, serious felo-
nies such as murder, manslaughter, rape and violent robberies had also increased 
tenfold since 1960 (SC, 1985:21). Furthermore, government expected crime fig-
ures to rise even further (SC, 1985:8). 
According to the government, this situation was problematic for a number 
of reasons. First, citizens experienced crime as “an infraction on an essential be-
havioural norm”. Without a proper policy or police reaction, “emotional reactions 
can be the breeding ground for citizens to take the law into their own hands. Law 
enforcement has the task of channelling these emotions” (SC, 1985:21). Second, 
citizens may feel directly threatened by crime in their daily lives: “research has 
shown that a large and increasing number of citizens modify and put restrictions 
on their behaviour and lifestyle out of fear of crime” (SC, 1985:21). And third, 
crime is problematic since it causes financial damage to society (SC, 1985:21-22). 
 
The government listed a number of structural causes for the rise in crime: “The 
higher level of prosperity has resulted in many more commodities entering circu-
lation, which can potentially be stolen or destroyed [...]. In particular, private car 
ownership has expanded, which has increased the possibilities to commit of-
fences. At the same time, traditional social bonds, such as family, social life, church 
and school, in which individual behaviour was effectively regulated, have been 
steadily weakening since 1960. Society has become more individualistic. In some 
cases, this individualism has led to an urge to seek to satisfy personal needs at the 
expense of others or at the expense of society as a whole. The increased use of 
alcohol and drugs also fits this pattern of individualisation. Moreover, the willing-
ness to comply with rules set by government or other authorities has become less 
self-evident. […] A factor of a more recent date, which according to some is linked 
to crime, is the long term unemployment of adolescents” (SC, 1985:22). Further-
                                                                                                                                 
121 In Dutch: Met vaste hand: verbetering van de kwaliteit van de rechtshandhaving; TK 1990-
1991, 22045/1-2. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘AFH, 1991’, followed 
by the page number. 
122 In Dutch: Criminaliteitsbestrijding; TK 1991-1992, 22355/2. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘FC, 1992’, followed by the page number. 
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more, as a result of the open character of the Dutch economy, the Netherlands has 
become a haven for smuggled prohibited goods, such as drugs (SC, 1985:23). 
These “important and irreversible” (EL, 1990:19) developments have led 
to more opportunities for criminal behaviour, which in turn has led to an in-
creased work load for the institutions responsible for public order, law enforce-
ment and the administration of criminal justice (EL, 1990:4). However, spending 
on the judicial apparatus and law enforcement has not kept pace with the rise in 
crime over the past 15 years. Compared to other countries, the Netherlands has a 
relatively small budget for law enforcement and justice administration, even 
though crime levels no longer stand out favourably (SC, 1985:25; EL, 1990:13). 
This has lead to an overburdening of the authorities responsible for law enforce-
ment, crime investigation, prosecution and execution of sanctions (SC, 1985:26-
29). 
 
Despite the multiple causes for the rise of crime identified, the ‘sour fruits of indi-
vidualisation’ received by far the most attention in the period between 1982 and 
1992, especially in the policy memoranda Society and Crime (1985) and Evolving 
Law (1990): “Not only was government confronted with capacity shortages, the 
respect for law, police and judge declined. Compliance with legal norms and sen-
tences was no longer an elementary legal duty for many citizens, but instead a 
behavioural option to be assessed through pragmatic pros and cons” (EL, 1990:7). 
Society was, to some extent, perceived as the victim of its own structural 
development. The idea of society as the simultaneous cause and victim of crime 
was reflected in the government’s ambiguous attitude towards society. On the one 
hand, “[g]overnment believes it can assume that a large majority of Dutch citizens 
considers the legal order, as set down in criminal law, completely as its very own” 
(SC, 1985:37). On the other hand, government feared it could no longer uphold its 
role in deterrence and the affirmation of norms, and as a result could no longer 
oppose “[…] the always present inclination of citizens to take justice into their 
own hands” (SC, 1985:31). 
This ambiguity was most clearly expressed in 1990’s Evolving Law memo-
randum. According to government, the citizen was no longer merely a passive 
element in the maelstrom of societal developments, or someone ‘pushed towards 
evil’ as a result of government’s failure to live up to its task. Instead, government 
signalled a lack of “willingness of the individual citizen to comply with legal norms 
for the benefit of mutual relations and/or the common good” (EL, 1990:6). Re-
spect for the law, the police and the judiciary was on the decline, and citizens 
mostly perceived the law as being instrumental in furthering their own personal 
interests and in keeping authority at a distance (EL, 1990:4-8). In a culture which 
seemed to approve an “anything goes” attitude (AFH, 1991:11), and which 
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showed signs of “norm negligence” (EL, 1990:7), the organisations responsible for 
the administration of justice had “more work to do under increasingly difficult 
circumstances” (EL, 1990:7). 
 
1.2.2. A preventive turn 
In the face of the rise in crime and its structural societal causes, investments in 
law enforcement alone were considered insufficient: “Despite major efforts by the 
police, judiciary and administration, society experiences serious damage as a re-
sult of traffic violations, vandalism and shoplifting occurring on a massive scale. A 
more coherent approach in the repressive, preventive and legislative domain is 
necessary” (GD, 1982:643). This coherent approach consisted of two basic strate-
gies. First, government aimed to improve the quality and increase the capacity of 
the organisations responsible for law enforcement and the administration of jus-
tice.123 And second, a complementary strategy of crime prevention was intro-
duced.124  
The ‘classic’ judicial approach to crime appeared to have reached its limits 
of effectiveness: “In the current situation, a major increase in the capacity of the 
various parts of the judicial apparatus seems logical. [However,] government re-
jects the idea that a mere quantitative strengthening of police and judiciary will 
suffice. The strong increase in criminal behaviour in the past decades has also 
been caused by structural changes in Dutch society. […] Simply doing more of the 
same would result in substantial financial sacrifices without any guarantee of 
success” (SC, 1985:35).125  
 
Reducing crime levels is not simply a matter of arresting and convicting more 
perpetrators (SC, 1985:44): “For too long, government relied on two interrelated 
presumptions without bearing in mind the reality of these presumptions. The first 
                                                   
123 For example: “Because of the growing gap between the number of committed crimes and the 
number of legal corrections, and because of the overburdening of various parts of the judicial 
apparatus, a strengthening of the judiciary is necessary” (SC, 1985:8). 
124 Elsewhere, government distinguishes three “guiding concepts” for crime policy: 1) intensi-
fied execution of legal core tasks with regard to legislation, law enforcement and administration 
of justice; 2) increased involvement of citizens and local authorities in the prevention of crime; 
and 3) modernisation of the entire administration of criminal justice (EL, 1990:3). 
125 Besides the argument of effectiveness, prevention is also justified from a budgetary and 
managerial perspective: “[…] a policy aimed to decrease the burdens on the [judicial system] 
through prevention and alternative punishments” (CA, 1989:46). The overburdening of the 
judicial apparatus is partly accommodated by an increase in its capacity, but can never be 
enough to reduce crime. Moreover, “[the] judicial apparatus does not, in principle, strive to 
increase its own production. On the contrary, the execution of criminal law is a necessary evil 
which should be limited as much as possible through greater efforts by administration and 
private initiatives” (SC, 1985:52). 
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presumption was that people will abide by the law, because violation of these 
rules is a punishable act. […] The second presumption was that the threat of laying 
down severe punishments would enforce law abidance, should penalising a cer-
tain act alone proves insufficient” (AFH, 1991:11-12). With these two presump-
tions overturned, protecting society called for a different approach: “Protecting 
citizens against violence and theft by fellow citizens is one of the oldest and most 
fundamental functions of the state. For this purpose, the state possesses institu-
tions for the administration of criminal law […]. The use of other legal means – 
administrative prevention – is also [...] justified by the state’s basic function of 
protection” (IPSC, 1987:9).  
Underlying the new preventive policy approach to crime was a conceptual 
distinction between serious crimes, such as assault and battery, murder, and rape 
on the one hand, and petty crimes on the other hand: “Simple traffic violations, 
small vandalism and other types of petty crime on the streets threaten the safety 
in traffic and the security on the streets due to the massive scale on which they 
occur” (CA, 1982:71). These violations may be small (in terms of possible sanc-
tions), but can have a significant impact on victims and can pose a threat to public 
order as a result of the large numbers in which they occur (SC, 1985:21). This 
conceptual distinction enabled government to develop specific strategies towards 
serious crime and towards petty crime. Whereas the judicial strategy remained 
dominant in the approach to serious crime, preventive strategies were developed 
for the approach to petty crime. 
 
1.2.3. A division of responsibilities 
Government increased its activities in administrative prevention, but at the same 
time did not want to take full responsibility for the problem of petty crime. In-
stead, society itself was to take responsibility for controlling petty crime:126 “A 
renewed division of responsibilities in the field of petty crime leads to the conclu-
sion that society as a whole, including particularly local government, has to have a 
larger role in the prevention and control of this type of crime” (SC, 1985:57). Up-
holding the legal order is “[…] the capstone of a general societal effort for the 
maintenance of norms and for prevention” (SC, 1985:15). Therefore, reducing 
                                                   
126 This division of responsibilities concerns the approach to petty crime. With regard to the 
problem of more serious crimes, however, the government made it clear that this remained an 
exclusive task of the state (SC, 1985:47; 57): “As crime takes on a more serious nature, […] the 
centre of gravity should shift [from prevention] to criminal investigation and the judicial au-
thorities” (SC, 1985:39). In particular, the approach to organised crime (mainly associated with 
illegal drug trading) became a government priority, because of the soaring crime rates in this 
area and consequent undermining of citizens’ trust in law enforcement. 
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crime levels by means of prevention became a matter of “shared responsibility” 
(SC, 1985:37). 
The government formulated two reasons why citizens should be aware of 
their responsibility in this area– one fundamental and the other pragmatic. The 
fundamental reason was that the administration of justice and law enforcement 
should always be limited responsibilities. Citizens are not only responsible for 
obeying the law, but also for enforcing norms in their direct environment: “Just as 
the primary responsibility of citizens to provide for their own maintenance is not 
taken away by the welfare state, so the constitutional state does not discharge 
citizens from their duty to uphold the legal order as much as they can through 
norm enforcement in their own living environment” (EL, 1990:34). 
Government’s more pragmatic reason for appealing to the citizens’ re-
sponsibility was the impossibility of reducing petty crime by means of interven-
tions on the part of the state alone: “[…] it is not realistic to believe that the insti-
tutions charged with enforcing the legal order can compensate the consequences 
of the (imminent) crumbling of societal norms and social control, which manifests 
itself, among other things, in an extensive and explosive increase in petty crime, 
without the specific support of society and administration” (SC, 1985:14). There-
fore, “enforcement of norms is a task which confronts society as a whole. If society 
does not accept this responsibility, which it shares with government, then the use 
of criminal law will also be insufficient” (SC, 1985:15).  
 
1.3. Intervention power 
 
1.3.1. Identifying and intensifying core tasks 
The problem definitions described above led to two distinct policy strategies: 
improvements in the capacity and quality of the police and judicial apparatus on 
the one hand, and administrative crime prevention on the other hand. To start 
with the former: the credibility of the state depends on a proper functioning of its 
judicial apparatus and on “an optimal execution of its core tasks” (EL, 1990:20). 
High standards should be set for law enforcement and the administration of jus-
tice: “Only then will the state set an example for society” (EL, 1990:20). 
Quantitative investments in police and judicial apparatus should make “an 
increase of the actual interventions” in law enforcement possible (SC, 1985:43). A 
consistent and swift execution of financial sanctions and imprisonment was es-
sential for a credible crime policy (SC, 1985:39). And “[…] capacity enlargement of 
the institutions responsible for the administration and execution of criminal law” 
(SC, 1985:103), including a much needed increase in the number of prison cells 
(SC, 1985:11; 16), were also deemed necessary to ease the overburdening of the 
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judicial apparatus. These and other quantitative investments aimed to increase 
the “handling capacity” of the judicial apparatus (SC, 1985:57). 
In 1990, government claimed a few policy successes, achieving, for exam-
ple, an improved treatment of victims and a decrease in the number of ‘nolle 
prosequi’ because of capacity shortages or a lack of cooperation between police 
and public prosecutor (EL, 1990:9; cf. SC, 1985:53-54). However, “[…] the institu-
tions tasked with jurisdiction, legal assistance and law enforcement still show the 
symptoms of overburdening” (EL, 1990:3). Moreover, even while the rise of crime 
had come to a halt, “[…] Dutch crime rates have in totality not shown a real de-
cline” (EL, 1990:13). The administration of justice still suffered from, among other 
things, overly long proceedings for legal settlements (on average nine months), 
poor solved crime rates, and an overburdened public prosecutor’s office as a re-
sult of large numbers of violations (EL, 1990:12). A further increase in capacity 
and financial means was therefore required (EL, 1990:20; 48).127 
 
Next to a quantitative intensification of state activities, government also proposed 
to modernise the administration of criminal justice. The ambition to make the 
various parts of the judicial apparatus function more coherently required the me-
ticulous collection and distribution of relevant data on crime figures and the 
number of cases handled by police, public prosecutor and courts: “The functioning 
of the administration of criminal justice depends to a large extent on swift and 
efficient information services. Automation of the entire administration of criminal 
justice is much needed” (SC, 1985:82).  
Other means to improve the performance of the apparatus were the ex-
pansion of the competences of Single Judge Divisions (SC, 1985:90), the increase 
of the possibilities to impose pecuniary penalties (SC, 1985:92-93), and a simplifi-
cation of the handling of common violations to relieve the overburdened system, 
for instance by introducing the possibility of a police transaction or out-of-court 
settlement to deal with minor traffic violations (SC, 1985:84; EL, 1990:23-24; 
AFH, 1991:20).  
 
                                                   
127 It is important to realise that an increased capacity of, for instance, the police can have seri-
ous consequences for the public prosecutors and the courts: more capacity to investigate crimes 
means a higher workload for other authorities. Therefore, “[…] it is appropriate to perceive the 
activities of police and judiciary as if they were part of a factory production process, a factory 
line” (SC, 1985:51). This image makes clear that there are four relevant ‘links’ in the chain: the 
police, public prosecutor, courts and sanction apparatus. Their activities should be coordinated 
to prevent barriers and the overburdening of one or more of these links, and they should coop-
erate intensively to promote the quality and efficiency of the judicial apparatus – for instance by 
organising consultations between the police and the public prosecutor to decide which viola-
tions to prosecute (SC, 1985:51; 86). 
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1.3.2. A new strategy: administrative prevention 
The aforementioned investments in the capacity and quality of police and judicial 
apparatus fit with the traditional reactive approach to crime. Complementary to 
this strategy, the government developed a preventive approach to crime from 
1982 onwards. Prevention, however, required less of a judicial approach, and 
more of an administrative one. After all, crime prevention refers to activities 
which are undertaken by the state before, not after, a crime has occurred. Hence 
the basis for preventive interventions is not a breach of the law, but an adminis-
trative objective. 
In the Society and Crime memorandum, government presented two forms 
of crime prevention. First, “action-oriented prevention”, which referred to a set of 
administrative measures and activities with the specific purpose of preventing 
criminal behaviour (SC, 1985:36-37). And second, “norm-oriented prevention”, 
which referred to activities aimed at approaching the structural causes of crime in 
an individualising society (SC, 1985:37-38). 
 
‘Action-oriented prevention’ had two tiers: increased technical prevention and 
increased surveillance in the public domain. Technical prevention implied inter-
ventions in the built-up environment to influence the opportunity structure in 
which petty crimes are committed. Locks, door furniture and alarms can help to 
prevent theft and burglary in private homes, shops and the public domain (where 
cars and bicycles are vulnerable goods). This was an aspect regarding which citi-
zens, companies and shop owners bore a large responsibility. Police and local 
authorities supported their efforts through information campaigns and assistance 
in the installation of technical prevention (SC, 1985:37).  
Technical prevention was also a matter of spatial planning: “the develop-
ment of a built-up environment characterised by planning and building technol-
ogy offering the least possible opportunity to commit crimes” (SC, 1985:58). Ar-
chitectural interventions can make the public domain less vulnerable to crime and 
more open to effective police surveillance (SC, 1985:40). Specific interventions 
included (re)designing streets, squares, parks, entertainment areas, business ar-
eas, town centres and red light districts, but also installing street-lighting and 
making neighbourhoods attractive places to spend time outdoors (SQUPD, 
1985:2-5; cf. IPSC, 1987:12-13). Even though “there is no such thing as a secure 
city”, local authorities were made aware of their responsibility to focus on crime 
prevention in their development plans and land settlement policy (SQUPD, 
1985:3-4; SC, 1985:41).  
The second tier of ‘action oriented prevention’ involved “strengthening 
functional surveillance of potential perpetrators by ticket inspectors, caretakers, 
shop staff, sports coaches, youth welfare workers and others” (SC, 1985:9). Com-
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plementary to technical prevention, the government called for a “[…] further mo-
bilisation of individual citizens and societal organisations, including local public 
authorities and private business, against the forms of petty crime which take place 
on a massive scale. The measures to be taken by citizens and organisations to 
prevent crime should not be limited to installing technical protection systems. […] 
The most important objective is the gradual introduction of an adequate level of 
personal or functional surveillance on all societal terrains which are susceptible to 
petty crime” (SC, 1985:37).  
Increased police surveillance was necessary, as well, to compensate for 
the negative consequences of a “complex and [...] more anonymous” society (EL, 
1990:4). In the more traditional society of the past, the “possibilities for deviant 
behaviour and crime were […] small” (EL, 1990:5). However, the current “more 
selfish and non-conformist society” required more surveillance by police and pub-
lic transport inspectors, as well as by store personnel, sports trainers, janitors of 
apartment buildings and school teachers to keep an eye out for criminal behav-
iour and for problems which might lead to crime (such as school absenteeism) 
(IPSC, 1987:15-17). 
 
The second form of crime prevention – ‘norm-oriented prevention’ – referred to 
efforts to strictly affirm legal norms in order to stop the general decay of social 
norms and social control. Next to societal processes of individualisation, persis-
tent norm violations in citizens’ direct living environment were felt to lead to the 
erosion of social norms, as well (SC, 1985:36). Therefore, the government publi-
cally stressed the importance of social norms, for instance through stringent 
large-scale police controls on drunk driving: even though these activities might 
have little effect on the number of perpetrators actually caught, they aimed to 
have a broader societal impact through deterrence and norm enforcement (SC, 
1985:37).  
In general, public authorities sought to make it clear that “[…] the viola-
tion of the criminal code is still perceived as an objectionable act” (SC, 1985:38) 
through a varied set of interventions, including information campaigns, educa-
tional projects on vandalism at schools, and improving the information provided 
to victims of crime on the progress of their case (SC, 1985:37-38; 81; cf. EL, 
1990:35). 
Furthermore, ‘norm-oriented prevention’ included “strengthening the ties 
of the young generation to society” (SC, 1985:58). Specific measures to be imple-
mented were the reduction in the number of cancelled classes at secondary 
schools (SC, 1985:61), the early detection and registration of problems and ab-
sence from school, adequate enforcement of the Compulsory Education Act, im-
provement of after school activities and services, development of projects to guide 
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drop-outs back to school (SA, 1986:13-20), and welfare policies for specific target 
groups such as “[…] long term unemployed adolescents, adolescents from minor-
ity groups, drop-outs and fringe group adolescents” (SC, 1985:63; IPSC, 1987:13-
15).128 
 
1.3.3. The organisation of prevention 
Whereas the traditional reactive approach to crime depended on a judicial appa-
ratus, the newly adopted preventive approach depended on the development of 
administrative interventions. Local authorities, in particular, assumed a large 
responsibility in crime prevention (SC, 1985:49). For instance, the government 
urged local authorities to establish tripartite consultations between the mayor, 
chief of police and public prosecutor for the prioritisation of crime issues and the 
development of policy plans (SC, 1985:8; 79). Especially the mayor, as the author-
ity responsible for public order and security, was assigned a “pivotal role” in these 
consultations (SC, 1985:49).  
Crime prevention required a customised policy tailored to local condi-
tions. Hence, the municipal level was crucial for the implementation of preventive 
measures. As such, local authorities (and especially the mayor) played a role in 
development plans to influence the built-up environment and zoning restrictions; 
they were made responsible for managing school truancy and were authorised to 
grant subsidies to institutions relevant for crime prevention (such as neighbour-
hood and youth centres) (SC, 1985:41-42). 
National authorities played a supportive role (SC, 1985:9) in the form of 
regulation, empowerment, financial support,129 collecting and analysing crime 
data, and the coordination of preventive programmes (SC, 1985:41). This was no 
longer an exclusive task of the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs, but in-
stead, now required a broader effort.130  
                                                   
128 The adolescents involved are mostly “[…] from the lowest socio-economic strata. Their posi-
tion is characterised by poor housing, family issues, a poor level of educational achievement, 
long-term unemployment, poor mental and physical health and problems with pastime. These 
adolescents often end up in social isolation. Their problems result in deviant behaviour, such as 
aggression, apathy, excessive drug or alcohol use and crime. The majority of these adolescents 
runs into trouble with the police and judiciary” (SC, 1985:63-64). 
129 By 1990, as a result of the Society and Crime memorandum, over 250 prevention projects in 
about 80 municipalities were being subsidised. Partly as a result of this, crime prevention has 
become structurally embedded in local crime policy (EL, 1990:9). 
130 However, the organisational challenges posed by the ambition of prevention hinder an effec-
tive implementation. In the 1992 memorandum Crime Control, the government concluded that 
crime prevention had become a structural element in local crime control, but that difficulties 
remained in the organisation of cooperation between the various elements of the judicial sys-
tem (the police, prosecutor, courts, custodial institutions), between mayor, local police and 
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The range of preventive activities comprised, among other things:  
- Cooperation between the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management, the local authorities and Dutch Railways to control vandal-
ism, aggression, bicycle theft and fare dodging (for instance by increasing 
access control and surveillance, especially in the larger cities) (SC, 
1985:59-60). Furthermore, road safety was improved and traffic viola-
tions were tackled through an alcohol moderation policy and an improved 
monitoring and inspection of insurance status, driving licenses and acci-
dents (SC, 1985:75-77); 
- Acknowledgement of the need for improved surveillance capacity at 
schools during odd hours, lunch breaks, and school parties to prevent 
vandalism, littering and absenteeism by the Ministry of Education131 (SC, 
1985:60-62);  
- the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture called for an improved moni-
toring of children and adolescents by youth welfare work, the (re)opening 
of neighbourhood and youth centres, the reduction of football vandalism, 
and a strategy to combat alcohol- and drug-related crime (for instance, 
through an alcohol moderation policy132 and recovery programmes for 
addicts) (SC, 1985:62-68; 80); 
- the Ministry of Economic Affairs supported private initiatives to prevent 
shoplifting through information campaigns and research on effective 
technical prevention (SC, 1985:68-70); 
- the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment promoted 
housing maintenance and attention for crime issues in urban planning, 
and provided information for project developers and municipalities on 
architectural interventions which help to prevent crime (SC, 1985:70-71); 
- and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment supported crime pre-
vention by tackling youth unemployment (SC, 1985:73-74). 
 
1.3.4. The law-abiding citizen and the public domain as objects of intervention 
The shift from a mere judicial approach to an administrative-preventive approach 
also implied a shift in the objects of intervention. While a judicial approach is tar-
                                                                                                                                 
public prosecutor, and between the activities of the various national policy departments in-
volved in crime prevention.  
131 To further control absenteeism, a new Compulsory Education Act increased the possibilities 
for monitoring and strict enforcement. The approach to absenteeism also included reducing the 
number of cancelled classes (SC, 1985:61-62). 
132 Specific issues for public order included limiting the availability of alcohol, a stricter control 
on drunk and disorderly conduct, the use of breath analysers in alcohol tests, and restricting the 
availability of alcohol in football stadiums (SC, 1985:66). For a further discussion of the alcohol 
moderation policy, see the analysis of Dutch public health policy. 
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geted at criminals, society as a whole is the object of a preventive approach. Soci-
ety was perceived to be both part of the solution and part of the problem: “[...] 
society on all levels needs to be more strongly involved in preventing crime. [Also 
important] is the necessity to prevent a gradual decline in the ethical awareness of 
the majority of citizens due to repeated confrontation with norm violations as 
much as possible. Compliance with legal norms is no longer natural in our present 
varied society with high crime figures. Therefore, these norms need to be visibly 
ratified to as many citizens as possible” (SC, 1985:36).  
More specifically, law-abiding citizens became relevant for policymaking, 
since they can prevent crime through improved technical protection against theft 
or vandalism. The public domain also became a relevant entity for policymaking, 
since surveillance and interventions in the opportunity structure can help to pre-
vent crime. And finally, society as a whole had become relevant for crime policy, 
as norm affirmation in general could help to compensate for the decrease in social 
control and cohesion in an individualised society. In short, the introduction of 
crime prevention implied the involvement of “citizens for whom the compliance 
with legal norms is more or less natural and citizens who belong to the group of 
potential or incidental perpetrators” (SC, 1985:36).  
 
1.4. Synopsis 
A growing public concern about rising crime figures during the 1970s and 1980s 
and a concern about the hollowing out of the state as credible enforcer of justice 
and public order led the Dutch government to rethink the role of the state in the 
approach to crime. Crime moved from solely constituting a concern of the state as 
a result of societal demands, to being a concern for the state itself. In particular, 
petty crimes – relatively small offences such as burglary, vandalism and traffic 
violations – became the focal point of attention, since these are committed on a 
massive scale. The resultant overburdening of the justice administration appara-
tus urged government to rethink its existing approach to law enforcement.  
 
In its analysis of the rise in petty crime, the government commented on the lack of 
investments in the administration of justice, as well as the increased number of 
opportunities for theft and burglary in a prosperous society with a large circula-
tion of commodities. However, the focal point of the analysis was the process of 
individualisation taking place in society since the 1970s. For the first time, the 
Dutch government explicitly perceived crime as a societal rather than a mere judi-
cial issue.  
The decrease in social control and decline in social norms now led citizens 
to become more assertive and caused respect for law, police and government to 
wane. Individualisation bites back: society had become the victim of its own devel-
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opment. Government held on to a naive belief in criminal law as a sufficient means 
to prevent people from violating the law for too long. From 1985 onwards, the 
government realised that the ‘sour fruits of individualisation’ would have to be the 
starting point for new strategies in crime policy. 
A logical consequence of this problem analysis was that investments in the 
police and judicial apparatus were insufficient to reduce crime levels. The prob-
lem was not merely an underperforming state, but also structural societal charac-
teristics. Therefore, a preventive approach to these societal characteristics was 
deemed necessary. The explicit preventive turn in crime policy implied a move 
beyond quantitative and qualitative investments in police and judicial apparatus. 
Furthermore, it implied, at least ideally, the transformation of the administration 
of justice from the primary mode of intervention into a last resort for the cases in 
which prevention failed. The basis for prevention was not a breach of the law, but 
an administrative objective. 
 
Prevention does not replace the administration of justice. Instead, it is a comple-
mentary or ‘preceding’ strategy. While increasing the handling capacity of the 
‘judicial chain’ is insufficient to structurally reduce crime levels, a credible level of 
law enforcement and administration of justice nonetheless remained a necessity. 
Therefore, the government intensified the state’s core tasks by expanding the 
capacity of police and judicial apparatus and by improving the quality and effi-
ciency of their work. However, the previously held assumptions that people would 
abide by the law simply because a violation of the law constituted a punishable act 
or because the threat of severe punishment outweighed the benefits of criminal 
behaviour were rejected. 
The complementary preventive strategy consisted of two tiers: action-
oriented prevention and norm-oriented prevention. The former tier included tech-
nical prevention, which required citizens, companies and shops to take measures 
to protect their property against theft or burglary. The government supported 
citizens and raised awareness through information campaigns. Also, public au-
thorities could design the built-up environment (public squares, streets, apart-
ment blocks) in such a way that opportunities for criminal behaviour were re-
duced. And finally, the action-oriented tier included increased police and non-
police (such as city watchers, janitors, shop owners and sport coaches) surveil-
lance in the public domain to compensate for the decrease in social control in an 
individualised society. 
The latter tier of norm-oriented prevention consisted of measures to 
strengthen social norms and prevent further norm decay among the general pub-
lic. The government hoped to set an example for society through improvements in 
the quality of the legal core business, the proper treatment of victims by the po-
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lice, and consistent penalisation of small violations. In short, it sought to get the 
message across that every violation of the law was still perceived as an objection-
able act.  
 
Prevention not only involved increased efforts by the state: “Preventing crime is 
not only a concern of justice and police, but also of society as a whole” (GD 
1989:32). Society was perceived as part of the problem, but also as a necessary 
part of the solution. Besides abiding by the law, citizens were called upon to take 
responsibility both in terms of technical prevention and in terms of norm en-
forcement. If not, the state would be unable to compensate for the decay in socie-
tal norms. This state expanded its approach to crime, but at the same time limited 
its activities through the construction of a division of responsibilities between state 
and society. 
Whereas the traditional judicial approach viewed criminals as objects of 
interventions, the preventive approach transformed society as a whole into an 
object of intervention. The law-abiding citizen became the object of interventions, 
for instance with regard to his or her responsibility in the realm of technical pre-
vention and norm enforcement. And the public domain became the object of in-
terventions, since surveillance and design of the built-up environment were con-
sidered important means to reduce the opportunities for criminal behaviour. 
Moreover, an administrative, rather than judicial approach to prevention 
necessitated the development of a different intervention repertoire. Prevention 
transformed crime into an administrative issue. The local authorities in particular 
were to play a major role in the development of preventive policies and interven-
tions tailored to local conditions. Whereas the judge was the pivotal actor in jus-
tice administration, the mayor became the pivotal actor in crime prevention.
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PART 2: THE SLOW RISE OF THE SECURITY PARADIGM (1993-2001) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Following the preventive turn in 1985, crime prevention steadily continued to 
develop during the period between 1993 and 2001. Even though an explicit cae-
sura, in the sense of the 1985 Society and Crime memorandum, is lacking during 
this period, two important developments stand out. First, the government showed 
a more action-oriented or interventionist attitude towards petty crime. Instead of 
calling upon society to turn back or undo the negative effects of individualisation 
and other structural societal developments, the government stressed the impor-
tance of its own role and activities. In practice, this led to a more problem-
oriented and a more personalised intervention repertoire: citizens’ direct living 
environments instead of legal infringements, and offenders – such as habitual 
offenders and problem adolescents – instead of offences became the main objects 
of preventive interventions.133 
Second, the period between 1993 and 2001 saw the slow rise of the secu-
rity paradigm. Whereas ‘crime’ was the dominant notion in the period up to 1992, 
a second tier of preventive policies started to emerge from 1993 onwards, which 
took the broader perspective of ‘security’ as a starting point. ‘Security’ also in-
cludes notions of annoyance and degradation, while ‘crime’ is limited to legally 
defined prohibitions. The concept is introduced in the 1993 Security Report, a 
memorandum that serves as “[…] a call to public authorities to take responsibility 
in security issues” (SP, 1995:10). During the 1990s, ‘crime’ and ‘security’ re-
mained two largely separate notions in policymaking. However, from 2002 on-
wards, ‘security’, which can be understood as a certain quality of the public do-
main, became the dominant policy paradigm, incorporating the notion of ‘crime’. 
This paradigm shift to security led to a broadening of the scope of preventive in-
terventions. 
 
The fact that Crime Control (2001)134 became the first major policy memorandum 
to be published since Evolving Law (1990) would seem to suggest that no new 
developments occurred during the 1990’s. However, in various smaller and more 
specific policy memoranda, as well as in various coalition agreements and gov-
ernment declarations between 1993 and 2001 (a period marked by little political 
                                                   
133 The first signs of this shift in focus were already present in Society and Crime and Evolving 
Law (e.g. SC, 1985:63-64).  
134 In Dutch: Criminaliteitsbeheersing; TK 2000-2001, 27834/2. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘CC, 2001’, followed by the page number. 
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polarisation),135 a gradual but significant change in thinking was taking place 
about the problem of crime. In this respect, Crime Control marked the very end of 
a development: it was still limited in scope to the prevention of and the judicial 
approach to crime. Not long after its publication, the security paradigm, which had 
been ‘lurking in the shadows’ from 1993 onward, would lead to another signifi-
cant change in crime policy.  
In addition to the Crime Control memorandum, a variety of policy memo-
randa are discussed in the following. A first group of memoranda concentrates on 
‘crime’ as the dominant policy paradigm: the 1993 Off to a Good Start memoran-
dum136, Juvenile Delinquency137 (1995), Law Enforcement and Security138 (1996), 
Community Services139 (1996), Implementation Plan Drop Outs140 (1999), Reducing 
Recidivism141 (2001), and the 1997, 2001 and 2002 memoranda on Crime and 
Integration of Ethnic Minorities142. A second group of memoranda focuses on the 
slow rise of the security paradigm. The Security Report 1993,143 Security Policy 
1995-1998144 and Integral Security Programme145 are a product of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs.  
 
 
                                                   
135 In the period between 1994 and 2001, two cabinets were in office – both were coalitions 
between social-democrats, liberal-conservatives and liberal-progressives. These cabinets were 
the first in modern Dutch parliamentary history without a confessional party, and incorporated 
what until then were seen as two opposite sides of the political spectrum (social-democrats and 
liberal-conservatives). 
136 In Dutch: Een goed voorbereide start; TK 1992-1993, 22994/1. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘OGS, 1993’, followed by the page number. 
137 In Dutch: Jeugdcriminaliteit; TK 1995-1996, 24485/1. References to quotations in the text 
are abbreviated as ‘JD, 1995’, followed by the page number. 
138 In Dutch: Rechtshandhaving en Veiligheid; TK 1995-1996, 24802/1-2. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘LES, 1996’, followed by the page number. 
139 In Dutch: Taakstraffen; TK 1995-1996, 24807/1-2. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘CS, 1996’, followed by the page number. 
140 In Dutch: Plan van Aanpak Voortijdig Schoolverlaters; TK 1998-1999, 26695/1-2. References 
to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘IPDO, 1999’, followed by the page number. 
141 In Dutch: Recidivevermindering; TK 2000-2001, 27834/4. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘RR, 2001’, followed by the page number. 
142 In Dutch: Criminaliteit in relatie tot integratie van etnische minderheden; TK 1997-1998, 
25726/1; TK 2000-2001, 25726/9; TK 2001-2002, 25726/20. References to quotations in the 
text are respectively abbreviated as ‘CIEM, 1997’, ‘CIEM, 2001’ and ‘CIEM, 2002’, followed by 
the page number. 
143 In Dutch: Veiligheidsrapportage 1993; TK 1992-1993, 23096/1-2. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘SR, 1993’, followed by the page number. 
144 In Dutch: Veiligheidsbeleid 1995-1998; TK 1994-1995, 24225/1-2. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘SP, 1995’, followed by the page number. 
145 In Dutch: Integraal Veiligheidsprogramma; TK 1998-1999, 26604/1. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘ISP, 1999’, followed by the page number. 
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2.2. Definition power 
 
2.2.1. The visible state 
Even though several successes had been notched up since the 1980s – such as an 
increased efficiency of the judicial apparatus and a slowing down of the rise in 
crime – crime figures remained at a high level, with over a third of the population 
experiencing feelings of  insecurity and a quarter of the population becoming the 
victim of crime. Moreover, juvenile delinquency had climbed dramatically in re-
cent years (CC, 2001:5). Another cause for concern was the increase in violent 
crime: “While the total number of registered crimes has decreased, a coarsening 
of crime in the public domain is clearly visible” (ISP, 1999:16).  
Government sought to explain the burgeoning of violent crime as the re-
sult of structural developments of society, albeit in a different manner than the 
analysis of an individualising society in Society and Crime and Evolving Law: “The 
rise of violent crimes has fundamental social and cultural causes, such as in-
creased inequality, lack of social cohesion and coarsening of manners. The breed-
ing ground for violence is partly the concentration of social problems such as un-
employment, dropping out, one-parent families, pollution and littering in the pub-
lic domain, addiction and crime in certain metropolitan neighbourhoods. Accord-
ing to analyses […], these new metropolitan problems of poverty and social exclu-
sion are often interrelated with issues of integration of cultural minorities” (LES, 
1996:18). The government expressed fear that “no go areas” could develop if 
nothing were done about the current situation (LES, 1996:18). 
 
Confronted with these problems, government stressed the necessity for the police 
and judicial apparatus to step up their performance in law enforcement: “Short-
ages in capacity often compel police and justice to give no for an answer. This 
affects the legitimacy of both justice administration and government policy as a 
whole” (CC, 2001:13). Insufficient law enforcement or prison capacity can lead to 
a decay of social norms, to a decrease of respect for the law, and to a violation of 
citizens’ sense of justice (LES, 1996:7). This is a potential threat to the rule of law: 
“if the state is unable to perform its task for a prolonged period of time, the mo-
ment at which citizens start to take justice into their own hands cannot be far 
away” (LES, 1996:8). The state must intervene more146 to demonstrate its com-
mitment to crime control: “A high percentage of non-interventions harms the in-
                                                   
146 For this purpose, a capacity increase of 8000 FTE was proposed in the realm of detective 
work and surveillance, as well as improvement of the information household, the use of new 
technologies and knowledge, and professionalisation of staff (CC, 2001:3). 
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terests of victims for adequate settlement, the credibility of the state and the effec-
tiveness of the cases in which a penalty is imposed” (CC, 2001:3).147 
At first sight, this would seem a mere continuation of the investments in 
the judicial core tasks set out in the 1985 memorandum Society and Crime. How-
ever, upon closer inspection, the investments proposed from 1993 onwards had a 
specific focus. The capacity increase was not merely meant to boost the objective 
handling capacity of the judicial apparatus, but also to “increase the visible pres-
ence of the police in the streets” (CA, 1994:26; cf. CA, 1998:69). Whereas the gov-
ernment stressed a division of responsibilities in the period between 1982 and 
1992, the calls upon citizens to take responsibility abated somewhat between 
1993 and 2001. This did not mean that citizens should remain passive,148 but in-
stead pointed to the emphasis placed by the government on the importance of an 
increased role of the state in the public domain.  
In practice, this implied increased police and non-police (such as city 
watchers and private security officers in shops and bars) surveillance in the pub-
lic domain (ISP, 1999:3-4; 22-27; 33-36): “Increased surveillance contributes to 
security. […] Citizens want more surveillance in the streets, in shopping centres, 
parks and other (semi-)public areas. Surveillance contributes to a feeling of secu-
rity and increases the actual security as well. In the presence of surveillants, peo-
ple feel less inclined to act in an inappropriate way towards fellow-citizens” (SP, 
1995:29).  
 
Surveillance simultaneously served the objectives of law enforcement and preven-
tion through deterrence. “The first objective is the enforcement of so called ‘small 
norms’: behavioural norms with a relatively small moral burden which are rela-
tively often violated. Examples include graffiti, illegal littering, parking violations, 
cycling in pedestrian areas, public drunkenness. These are ‘small nuisances’ […] 
which can lead to discontent and concern as a result of the large numbers in 
which they occur” (CC, 2001:46).  
                                                   
147 The need for a proper treatment of citizens, and especially of victims of crime led the gov-
ernment to introduce a ‘compulsory reasonable effort of investigation’. This effort did not di-
rectly contribute to an increase of the probability of apprehension nor did it make police work 
more effective. What it proposed to do was increase the credibility of the police and govern-
ment as a whole: “[...] a method of working which only rests on considerations of efficiency 
deprives the interests of victims [...]. Therefore, every report of a serious, heavy crime must be 
responded to with a reasonable effort of investigation” (CC, 2001:20). 
148 This does not imply that previous calls to take responsibility had completely vanished: “Citi-
zens are also expected to contribute to increasing security. Examples of this are preventive 
measures against burglary and fire. Besides this, a sense of good neighbourship and keeping an 
eye out for the goings on in the neighbourhood can also contribute to security in the own living 
environment. Finally, appealing on citizens to ‘stick to the rules’ is of great importance (such as 
complying with speed limits and not drinking when driving)” (SR, 1993:17). 
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Furthermore, the government required a presence when and where prob-
lems of crime are likely to occur: “The second objective is the enforcement of or-
der and security in specific areas and/or specific times, for instance in bar dis-
tricts on Saturday nights. This surveillance strives for prevention of more serious 
offences, such as violence or vandalism […]” (CC, 2001:46). For the latter kind of 
offences, government proposed more specific surveillance at ‘hot times’ and ‘hot 
spots’ (CC, 2001:56). 
 
2.2.2. Crime prevention as socialisation and integration 
Next to surveillance, a second preventive strategy was developed from 1993 on-
wards. In many ways, this could be seen as a logical progression of the aforemen-
tioned norm-oriented prevention, which took the entire population as object of 
intervention. However, instead of influencing society in general, the objective was 
now to integrate deviant individuals and specific target groups into society. And 
instead of looking for causes of crime in structural developments of society, the 
focus was now on crime and the role of individual behaviour and living circum-
stances. 
The government’s preventive focus was determined by the places and the 
target groups with the highest crime rates. Crime often occurred in poorer 
neighbourhoods where levels of education were lower and living conditions 
worse than in other parts of the major cities: “Often, [...] people [living in these 
circumstances] become isolated, and some of them, including adolescents, end up 
in criminal environments” (CA, 1998:7). According to government analysis, the 
local and mostly urban “concentration of social problems such as unemployment, 
drop outs, one-parent families, pollution and littering in the public domain, addic-
tion and crime” could be traced back to “new metropolitan problems of poverty 
and social exclusion and integration of cultural minorities” (LES, 1996:18). 
The objectives of preventive measures in these neighbourhoods were in-
tegration and socialisation: making disadvantaged people part of society by im-
proving their living conditions (for instance, through urban renewal) and by try-
ing to activate them socially and economically: “The strength of a society is de-
termined by the extent to which citizens and population groups are prepared and 
able to participate in economical and societal contexts. […] For too many Dutch-
men and cultural minorities, this is not the case. They cannot meet the high stan-
dards and are sidelined because of a poor education, too little labour productivity 
or poor health. […] It is a core task of the state to prevent or reduce these types of 
arrears” (CA, 1998:7). 
The government made the following argument for prevention: “Strength-
ening the judicial apparatus is of great importance, but is still not enough. En-
forcement of criminal law is by nature reactive and can therefore influence behav-
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iour to a limited extent only. For optimum effect, the response of criminal law 
should be coordinated with other measures, such as improved and increased sur-
veillance in the public domain [...], administrative prevention, preventive meas-
ures by businesses and by citizens. […] But the approach is even broader. Delin-
quent behaviour is also highly associated with disadvantaged living circum-
stances, limited possibilities for self-development, negative group pressure, poor 
educational skills of parents, and so on. Government policies and interventions 
should constantly create the conditions for a favourable development of people 
according to their capabilities” (CC, 2001:15). Without prevention, “the judicial 
apparatus will remain the dumping-ground of social issues in the welfare state” 
(LES, 1996:20). 
 
2.2.3. The rise of the security paradigm 
The 2001 Crime Control memorandum was deliberately limited in scope. It fo-
cused on the prevention of recidivism (which is discussed further on) and on the 
visible presence of the state in the public domain. Moreover, the limited notion of 
‘crime’ – referring to legally prohibited acts – formed the starting point for both 
reactive and preventive interventions. 
Throughout the 1990s, the notion of ‘security’ cropped up in various pol-
icy memoranda. Whereas ‘crime’ could be clearly defined by reference to criminal 
law, ‘security’ was a boundless notion. Security referred to a certain status or 
quality of the public domain: “Security can be defined as the presence of a certain 
order and peace in the public domain and as the protection of life, health and 
property against acute or potential infractions” (ISP, 1999:9). The absence of 
crime is merely one aspect of security. Security can refer to a potentially endless 
range of phenomena, which are perceived as threats to order and peace in the 
public domain, and which include subjective phenomena such as nuisance and 
degradation of the public domain.  
Security shares its boundless conceptual characteristic with prevention, 
which can be applied to a potentially infinite number of phenomena as well. 
Moreover, prevention and security have a certain affinity. Security implies, at the 
very least, the absence of crime – which is also the objective of crime prevention. 
Furthermore, every perceived threat to public peace and order is a security issue, 
as well as a preventive issue as soon as measures are taken to avert these 
threats.149 
                                                   
149 An example of the affinity between prevention and security is the discussion of a number of 
recent large accidents in the Netherlands in the 1993 Security Report memorandum. For every 
accident discussed, government laid down several points of interest for policy – for instance, a 
traffic accident due to heavy fog led to the introduction of a fog detection system; a plane crash 
led to a risk analysis and improved emergency action plans; a department store fire led to in-
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Before 1989, the notion of ‘security’ was reserved for matters of foreign policy 
(e.g. CA, 1982). Later on, the concept was increasingly applied to social problems. 
For instance, the 1994 government declaration stated: “Government will […] con-
tinue its policy of social renewal in the major cities. More attention will be given to 
security in the streets, support of a tolerant society and the liveability in the cities, 
where societal problems accumulate” (GD, 1994:5809-5810). In this new context, 
security incorporated issues such as “language education, societal orientation, 
parenting support and [...] the problem of drop-outs” (CA, 1998:69) as well as “an 
integrated approach to the prevention, treatment and repression of crime” (CA, 
1998:69).  
The 1993 Security Report, which was “[...] published because of the rising 
social demand for security and safety” (SR, 1993:4), played a crucial role in the 
rise of the security paradigm. In the memoranda Security Report, Security Policy 
1995-1998 and Integral Security Programme, government (still)150 tackled the 
issues of safety and of security together. However, safety issues caused by “coinci-
dence, bad luck or fate” (SR, 1993:55), which included accidents, illness, natural 
disasters and so on, were conceptually distinguished from security issues caused 
by “deliberate human behaviour” (SR, 1993:55), such as crime and annoyance. In 
addition to registered crime and annoyance, from the outset the government un-
derstood the notion of security to include “subjective security” or “feelings of in-
security” (SR, 1993:4).  
Simultaneously discussing security and safety created a “varied pattern-
card of phenomena dealing with infractions of social life” (SR, 1993:4). What both 
notions shared, however, was their outlook on society: “Our society is a vulner-
able society” (ISP, 1999:7).151 In terms of safety, society was vulnerable due to 
factors such as complex communication technology, industry and traffic. And in 
terms of security, society was vulnerable as a result of an “impersonal public do-
main” in which the behaviour of fellow citizens seems unpredictable and in which 
the state must intervene to compensate for a lack of social control (ISP, 1999:7-8). 
                                                                                                                                 
creasing risk awareness of firemen; an explosion in a firework factory led to the conclusion that 
neighbouring municipalities should improve their cooperation; and an explosion in a chemical 
factory led to increased attention for safety regulations and a standardised report system for 
near-accidents (SR, 1993:33-44). In all these examples, a perceived threat to security was tack-
led by a preventive measure. 
150 From 2002 onward, security and safety policy have been kept separate. The simultaneous 
discussion of safety and security issues up to 2001 was also a consequence of the fact that Dutch 
language has only one word for both phenomena (‘veiligheid’). 
151 In terms of safety, the government referred to a ‘vulnerability paradox’: “On the one hand, 
our systems of production, transportation and communication are becoming ever more com-
plex and specialised. […] At the same time, we are becoming ever more dependent on each 
other, on the systems we created ourselves, and on foreign countries” (SR, 1993:60). 
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A substantial part of the 1993 Security Report deals with the description of the 
status of safety and security in the Netherlands (SR, 1993:19-33). Three sets of 
issues were distinguished. In the first place, this concerned ‘registered insecurity’ 
or objective data on phenomena such as traffic and parking violations, noise nui-
sance or nuisance by drug addicts or drunk people, accidents in the public and 
private domain, and vandalism, burglary and robberies. A second set of issues 
referred to ‘possible insecurity’ or the risk of large accidents or disasters, and the 
third to public ‘feelings of insecurity’ or the percentage of people who feel inse-
cure – a number which depends to a large extent on the quality of one’s 
neighbourhood, previous victimhood and gender.152 In general, several considera-
tions were important for prevention: 
- Fragmented knowledge: “The insight into the status and underlying 
causes of safety and security is incomplete and limited” (SR, 1993:9). 
- Law enforcement alone is insufficient: “A large part of the approach to in-
security in our society is – still – left to the police and the judicial authori-
ties to deal with. […] The capacity of the police and the judiciary will never 
be sufficient to deliver an adequate level of security” (SR, 1993:10).  
- Risk awareness is too low: “The last couple of years, all sorts of small and 
large accidents have made painfully clear that our society is vulnerable” 
(SR, 1993:10). 
- Providing security and safety has not been sufficiently understood as a 
specific administrative task: “There is too little structural attention for law 
and order and security as an independent result of administrative actions” 
(SR, 1993:12). 
 
2.2.4. From a task-oriented to a problem-oriented approach 
Crime prevention implied moving beyond a judicial approach alone: “In the 1980s, 
it became obvious that a reactive and solely control- and enforcement-based ap-
                                                   
152 In the 1984 Safety in the Private Sphere memorandum, government provided an interesting 
insight into the nature of ‘risks’ in relation to safety issues. According to government, these are 
inextricably interrelated with subjective and dynamic perceptions: “It is a generally accepted 
principle that risks should be kept within proportions. What these proportions are can rarely be 
strictly determined. […] This is partly a result of the fact that the notion of risk has an objective 
and a subjective element. Objectively, risk is the result of a calculation of odds that a certain 
event with specific consequences will occur. […] But there is also the subjective character of 
risks: the personal perception of risks. […] Contrary to the objective notion of risks, risk percep-
tion also deals with the assessment of chance and consequence: if there is a small chance of a 
potentially very large consequence, the severity of this consequence is of greater importance to 
the decision of whether to accept a risk or not than in the case of a large chance of a minor con-
sequence. […] Moreover, the perception of risks is culturally determined or embedded in a 




proach was ineffective for fighting petty crime, even with an increased effort by 
police and judiciary. The Society and Crime policy plan called attention to the un-
derlying causes, such as decreasing social control and functional surveillance, and 
to ‘safe’ city planning and architecture. The Evolving Law memorandum placed 
new accents such as decaying normative awareness and the necessity of con-
structing networks [between authorities and social actors]. This approach has 
proven to be successful” (SR, 1993:13).  
Examples of preventive activities outside the judicial realm included co-
operation between shops and police to prevent shoplifting, Safe Homes Warran-
ties to prevent burglary, the use of surveillance cameras, early detection of sexual 
violence by welfare organisations, insurance premium discounts for people who 
take preventive measures, prevention of drop outs, taking security issues into 
account when planning housing projects, tunnels, recreational areas and roads, 
and sharing knowledge with local governments and the public on best practices 
through a national centre for crime prevention (CC, 2001:17-19). 
 
Reactive approaches to crime are confined to legally defined tasks. Law enforce-
ment activities by the police, public prosecutor and judiciary deal with infractions 
of legally defined norms. The introduction of crime prevention in the 1985 Society 
and Crime memorandum not only led to the identification of a broader range of 
social phenomena relevant for crime policy, but also to the introduction of a new 
strategy of government. Instead of performing prescribed tasks in terms of law 
enforcement and administration of justice, prevention implies a “problem ori-
ented” (SP, 1995:10) approach and goal-oriented administrative interventions in 
society.  
The introduction of the security paradigm further intensified this move 
towards more goal-oriented policymaking and administration-centred ap-
proaches. ‘Security’ deals with a broader range of human activities than those 
mentioned in criminal law. Insecurity implies an infraction of social life (rather 
than an infraction of the law) and is therefore a notion which directly relates to 
people’s lives and takes place in direct living environments: “The basic idea is that 
people feel at home, that they find their living environment attractive and that 
people feel secure at home and in the streets” (SP, 1995:25). Neighbourhoods 
should be “clean, well-kept and secure” (SP, 1995:30). In short, government does 
not take the law, but societal problems as point of departure for the organisation 







2.3. Intervention power 
 
2.3.1. The strategy of proximity 
The problem-oriented approach to prevention had several implications for the 
state’s preventive intervention repertoire. A first, logical consequence was the 
focus on the geographical places where crime and security issues occurred: “Inse-
curity is always seen in municipalities, in close proximity to citizens” (SR, 1993:7). 
The various measures and interventions proposed by the government shared a 
preference for implementation in citizens’ direct living environments: “Recently, 
government has striven for an integrated approach to crime at the neighbourhood 
level via projects, by involving municipal services, the police, the judicial authori-
ties, welfare organisations and citizens, all working together on the implementa-
tion of a coherent set of measures to reduce both objective and subjective insecu-
rity” (SR, 1993:74). 
An approach at the local level can be made to fit the actual situation at 
hand: every city, or even neighbourhood, has its own characteristic problems 
which call for customised approaches (SR, 1993:82-83): “In some neighbourhoods 
public order and security are under permanent pressure and correlate with an-
noyance and social disadvantages” (SP, 1995:7). To gain control of local situations 
and get close to specific problems, the government proposed to establish 
branches of the public prosecutor’s office in problematic neighbourhoods (LES, 
1996:2). These offices were to function as “forward defences” of the state’s re-
sponsibility for public order and security (ISP, 1999:19).  
 
As a consequence of the local approach, all relevant parties were obliged to coor-
dinate their efforts at the municipal or neighbourhood level. Instead of simply 
performing their formal tasks, various actors and organisations were urged to 
develop a shared problem definition and a shared policy approach. Cooperation 
between “[…] police, public prosecutor, the municipal administrative department, 
and organisational units responsible for economic policy, welfare, traffic and 
transportation, spatial planning, education, public housing and so on” (SR, 
1993:15) enabled a robust, integrated and non-fragmented approach (SR, 
1993:14).  
For instance, the establishment of local networks between child care or-
ganisations, schools and police made early detection and a personalised approach 
to adolescents possible (LES, 1996:19). And strengthening the tripartite consulta-
tions between mayor, police and public prosecutor, as was also laid down in the 
new (1993) Police Act, could help to further effective crime policy: “The public 
prosecutor is responsible for the offender-specific prevention of criminal acts 
(such as the approach to certain risk groups, including drug addicts who often 
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commit serious crimes). Upholding public order is the responsibility of the mayor, 
which also includes the general administrative prevention of criminal acts that 
affect public order and peace in the municipality. Mutual cooperation for the ful-
filment of these tasks is needed and justly becoming more common” (SR, 
1993:16). 
 
In short, “local authorities are the pivot on which the security policy hinges” (ISP, 
1999:27). A broad range of local actors bore responsibility for investing more in 
municipal integrated security plans, analyses of security situations per 
neighbourhood, and mobilisation of ‘security partners’, such as the public prose-
cutor’s office, police, schools, welfare organisations and housing corporations 
(ISP, 1999:28; 41). Such an approach to crime and insecurity not only required 
the development of a broad intervention repertoire, but also depended on knowl-
edge of the problems it aims to solve or mitigate. One of the government’s main 
challenges in the implementation of its preventive ambitions was to gain insight 
into the nature and causes of security issues (SR, 1993:15) – this was “the basis 
for policy making” (SR, 1993:79). Local authorities were urged to gather data at 
the neighbourhood level to develop specific approaches for “attention neighbour-
hoods” and “problem neighbourhoods” (SR, 1993:106).  
National government mainly had a supportive role, in that it determined 
the repressive margins for law enforcement, created the necessary organisational, 
technical, professional and financial preconditions for police forces, supervised 
the proper functioning of the entire system, and stimulated and supported other 
authorities in their task to increase security (SR, 1993:17-18).153 Specific actions 
included the expansion of the capacity of police forces and cooperation with mu-
nicipalities to draw up ‘neighbourhood security plans’ (SP, 1995:25).  
National government also supported municipalities by gathering data on 
national trends, by developing possible effective interventions and by making 
standardised templates for security reports154 (SR, 1993:88). Another effort was 
the development of a national ‘youth monitor’ to gain permanent and longitudinal 
insight in the relevant developments among adolescents, and to identify risk fac-
tors and risk groups which enable a prioritisation of preventive interventions (SP, 
1995:18). A variant of this youth monitor was the national ‘recidivism monitor’ 
(RR, 2001:6), which aimed to gain “structural insight into the development of 
                                                   
153 National government’s supportive role required, at the very least, the efforts of the Minis-
tries of Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Social Affairs, and Housing (SR, 1993:83). 
154 For instance, a conceptualisation of the category ‘subjective insecurity’ can be made along 
the lines of data on the quality of one’s neighbourhood, risk perception, fear of victimhood, 
concern for imminent developments, actual victimhood, feeling of insecurity, avoidance and 
wellbeing (SR, 1993:95-96). 
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recidivism” by “monitoring the behaviour of specific groups of ex-convicts 
through the years” (RR, 2001:6). 
 
2.3.2. The strategy of coordination 
As stated above, a problem-oriented approach required cooperation and coordi-
nation between a broad range of actors and organisations. So-called ‘integrated 
approaches’ referred to coordinated efforts by, for instance, the police, the public 
prosecutor’s office and municipality. Integrated approaches were also character-
ised by their combination of several preventive strategies. Prevention did not 
necessarily imply a strategy of care and support. More repressive interventions, 
such as surveillance and active prosecution, could be deployed for preventive 
purposes as well. 
An effective crime prevention policy would cover “[…] the entire spectrum 
from specific repression, for instance to control street robberies, to broad pro-
action in the form of neighbourhood management and renewal, urban renewal, 
employment [programmes] and so on. Neighbourhood management and urban 
renewal are pre-eminently activities that call for an integral approach. Only thus 
can something be structurally done to lower the incidence of nuisance and crime 
to an acceptable level” (SR, 1993:78). 
Repressive, facilitative and supportive interventions can be useful for pre-
vention. The preventive repertoire covered a broad range, including surveillance 
by neighbourhood police officers, alternative punishments for adolescents, repair-
ing street furniture, installing extra street lighting, intensifying the frequency of 
public cleansing, taking names and addresses of offenders, and after-school care 
facilities (SR, 1993:123-124). Moreover, an effective crime policy would combine 
prevention with existing enforcement strategies: “Security issues can best be 
solved or controlled by employing a permanent combination of several ap-
proaches: law enforcement, administrative enforcement and prevention” (SP, 
1995:12). 
 
An example of a mixed preventive approach to crime – and the coordination re-
quired to implement such an approach – is the treatment of detainees within the 
judicial system. The period of detention is used for prevention of recidivism, 
hence combining repressive punishment (the consequence of a legal infringe-
ment) with supportive efforts to socialise offenders with a high risk of recidivism, 
such as habitual offenders and juvenile delinquents. The period of detention itself 
can be used to treat drug addictions or psychological disorders. And aftercare in 
the form of intensive support and monitoring can improve a phased reintegration 
into society (CC, 2001:39-41). 
154 
 
The basic strategy is to align the police, public prosecutor, correctional fa-
cilities and probation in such a way that they form an imaginary ‘chain’ or ‘assem-
bly line’, constructed for a seamless transfer of the detainee from one organisation 
to the next: “The effectiveness of interventions benefits from probation activities 
for suspects and convicts during every phase of the criminal proceedings, from 
early support at the time of apprehension and police detention through to court 
advice, the actual trial and the execution of the punishment, and up to the phase of 
aftercare” (CC, 2001:12). Adequate indication and screening in the early phases 
enables the development of an effective reintegration programme.  
Another example of coordination in crime prevention was evident in the 
approach adopted for dealing with problem adolescents, who had a high risk of 
developing criminal behaviour in the future. Here, the basic idea was to align all 
relevant organisations in such a way that problem adolescents could be identified, 
permanently kept in view, and approached for personalised interventions. Spe-
cific activities included early detection of possible problems at school, tackling 
educational disadvantages and school absence, and informing adolescents and 
parents on the dangers of alcohol, drugs, smoking, vandalism and violence. Local 
cooperation between schools, welfare work, police and youth care was a prereq-
uisite for this to succeed (SP, 1995:17).  
 
2.3.3. The strategy of personalisation 
A final organisational implication of the problem-oriented approach is a focus on 
the people behind petty crimes. From a preventive point of view, this was a logical 
progression of the approach to petty crime: instead of merely ‘stopping’ crime by 
means of technical prevention or reducing the opportunities for crime by redes-
igning the built-up environment, government expanded its approach in order to 
tackle the perceived causes of crime.155 In the 2001 memorandum Crime Control, 
government broadened its perspective from petty crime and the places where 
these crimes tended to be committed (such as on public transportation and in 
residential areas) to the people behind these petty crimes and the conditions in 
which they live. Specific targets groups were identified on the basis of a statisti-
cally higher chance of delinquent behaviour, mainly encompassing habitual or 
repeated offenders (CC, 2001:10), adolescents, younger generations of cultural 
minorities, and drug addicts (SR, 1993:64; SP, 1995:15; SP, 1995:19). 
 
The target group of habitual offenders was selected because of the disproportion-
ate number of crimes they commit: “A large part of crime is committed by a small 
                                                   
155 However, influencing the opportunity structure, intensifying surveillance and promoting 
technical prevention are still part of the intervention repertoire (e.g. CC, 2001:16). 
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part of all perpetrators; recidivism after a criminal sanction is high for this group” 
(CC, 2001:2). In terms of statistics, the top five percent of perpetrators with the 
highest number of police reports was found to be responsible for 26% of the total 
number of cases. And the top 1% alone was responsible for 12% of all cases – in 
total, a group of 12,000 persons (CC, 2001:11). Reducing crime among habitual 
offenders should focus on the prevention of recidivism and on reintegration into 
society: “[...] normal sanctions have little effect on these people” (CC, 2001:11). 
Instead, government proposed “to make use of the time in detention through pro-
grammes and treatment” (CC, 2001:40). 
In the actual execution of sanctions, personalised approaches were pro-
posed: “A personal approach in the form of support and monitoring appears to be 
of great importance for the effectiveness of sanctions. Investments are required in 
customised and in personalised approaches” (CC, 2001:3). More specifically, ‘indi-
vidual routing support’ was to be implemented nationwide for the treatment of 
the most difficult group of habitual offenders (CC, 2001:14). Furthermore, after-
care by the probation office was necessary to enforce conditions for early release 
from prison and for early interventions in case of relapse indications (especially 
for sexual offenders) (RR, 2001:11-13). 
 
A second important target group were “problem adolescents” (CA, 1998:6206). 
The explosive rise in juvenile delinquency had become a major cause for concern 
during the 1990s (SP, 1995:15; CC, 2001:38). Apart from the fact that adolescents 
were responsible for a large percentage of all crime, they were also the logical 
focal point of prevention for reasons of effectiveness: “More so than adults, ado-
lescents are susceptible to behavioural interventions. The earlier interventions 
against signs of criminal behaviour take place, the greater the chance of success” 
(JD, 1995:6). 
Starting with the 1995 Juvenile Delinquency memorandum, the govern-
ment developed a specific policy to prevent adolescents from becoming tomor-
row’s habitual offenders: “For most adolescents the availability of positive role 
models and corrective reactions by parents and occasionally the police or health 
care are adequate to prevent the development of a maladjusted lifestyle. The cur-
rent individualistic society does not always provide these conditions. Of course, 
the state cannot take over parenting responsibilities. But it can support parents as 
much as possible” (JD, 1995:5). Especially for children with multiple problems, 
“the state has the responsibility to go to great lengths for the social integration of 
this risk group” (JD, 1995:6).156 
                                                   
156 Besides measures and approaches for individual problem adolescents by social work, police 
and probation, government also developed a policy for the general prevention of juvenile delin-
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The Ministry of Justice set up collaborations with the police, local authori-
ties, adolescents, schools and youth care to intervene at an early stage of develop-
ing delinquency (CC, 2001:39). As with habitual offenders, here too, “[…] a per-
sonalised approach seems to be the most promising, especially if interventions are 
possible at the very beginning of a criminal career” (CC, 2001:11). A first require-
ment for such an approach was to make early detection of problem adolescents 
possible, for instance, through a national electronic data system, which could be 
accessed by the police, public prosecutor’s office and childcare authorities (JD, 
1995:12). Early detection should be followed by early interventions, to prevent 
criminal behaviour.  
Welfare work could offer support to parents in the upbringing of their 
children: “The early detection of serious problems in the upbringing, and support 
for parents can help to prevent derailment and crime at a later age” (QS, 1996). 
Also, schools were expected to take responsibility for helping to prevent school 
absenteeism and dropouts. It was felt that education offered one of the most effec-
tive means to integrate adolescents into society, thereby preventing them from 
sliding into delinquency. Hence, adolescents were monitored and dropouts of-
fered a chance to return to school or an alternative form of education (OGS, 
1993:3; IPDO, 1999:3). Government’s ambition was for nobody to leave “[school] 
without a starting qualification for the labour market” (OGS, 1993:1). 
If, in spite of these preventive activities, adolescents should fall into 
criminal ways, an “early, swift and consistent” response was required (JD, 
1995:11). Moreover, the judicial reaction should be tailored to individual circum-
stances and be directed at the prevention of recidivism. For instance, alternative 
punishments, such as community services, could be appropriate, especially for 
adolescents receptive to the pedagogical intent of this type of punishment. For 
juvenile delinquents sentenced to detention, reintegration into society was pur-
sued through individual support with a focus on social skills, education, work 
experience and guidance to the labour market (JD, 1995:17).  
 
A third target group identified by the government consisted of adolescents from 
several cultural minorities. Even more so than adolescents in general, these spe-
cific groups of adolescents are overrepresented in crime figures: “[…] government 
can and should not close its eyes to the fact that, especially in the larger cities, 
migrant adolescents have derailed or threaten to do so. Less well known, but 
equally important, is the fact that cultural minorities are also the victim of various 
                                                                                                                                 
quency. This included proposals to reduce violent images on television and the number of coffee 
shops, to enforce age limits in coffee shops and to intensify information activities on (soft) 
drugs (JD, 1995:14-16). 
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kinds of insecurity. Both phenomena indicate a poor integration process, which 
not only has to do with belonging to a minority group, but also with social arrears 
[…]” (SR, 1993:65).157  
Of the total number of apprehended adolescents in the cities of The 
Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht in 1990 (mostly for petty crimes such 
as shoplifting and burglary), 70% belonged to a cultural minority – while minority 
adolescents in these cities only make up 40% of the entire adolescent population 
(SR, 1993:70). Moroccan and Antillean adolescents were particularly overrepre-
sented in these crime figures – groups that also exhibited a high degree of social 
disadvantage, such as a low level of educational attainment, low level of social 
participation, language arrears and poor living environment: “People without 
bonds to society feel less inclined to follow the rules of this society” (CIEM, 
1997:10). Moreover, specific traditional family situations and child rearing prac-
tices clashed with the characteristics and norms of Dutch society (CIEM, 1997:16-
20). 
Early detection of problems, early interventions and personalised ap-
proaches were required to stop these adolescents from causing problems in the 
future. The adage was: “early intervention and no letting go” (CIEM, 2001:2). This 
was not only a crime issue, but was related to broader social issues of integration: 
“We must prevent these groups from turning away from society, or even worse, 
turning against society” (GD 1998:6212). Language and family support at an early 
age were considered crucial, as was preventing adolescents from dropping out of 
school (CIEM, 1997:28-33). Furthermore, municipalities developed “unorthodox 
preventive strategies” including teaching material, individual routing for juvenile 
delinquents and risk adolescents, pre-school language support, neighbourhood 
consultations, after-school activities, dialogues with parents, intercultural activi-
ties, street corner work and so on (CIEM, 2002:2-9). 
 
The fourth and last specific target group mentioned by government was that of 
the delinquent drug users, who also tended to be habitual offenders and the 
source of a great deal of annoyance and crime, from drug tourism to selling drugs 
on the streets, begging, littering syringes and causing nuisance and feelings of 
insecurity in neighbourhoods (SP, 1995:19). One of the proposed measures was to 
separate the markets for soft and hard drugs, as well as to separate the policy 
                                                   
157 As early as 1990’s Evolving Law memorandum, government indicated that the trend towards 
a ‘multicultural society’ could pose new crime issues. On the one hand, fighting discrimination 
was becoming increasingly important, and on the other hand, tensions between the norms of 
some migrant groups and Dutch law could arise. Especially threatening was the development of 
some adolescents from migrant groups (especially Moroccan adolescents), who abandoned 
their own traditional norms and rejected Dutch legal norms (EL, 1990:15-16). 
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approach to both categories of drugs. Also, the government aimed to provide care 
for addicts, take repressive action against crime involving hard drugs, control 
nuisance resulting from the sale of soft drugs, and inform adolescents about the 
dangers of drugs (SP, 1995:19-21). 
 
2.4. Synopsis 
Two important developments in Dutch crime policy between 1993 and 2001 
stand out. The first was the emphasis on increased interventions by the state in 
the public domain. Instead of a more or less principled stance on the range of state 
responsibility, as was the case between 1985 and 1992, a pragmatic and problem-
oriented understanding of state responsibility emerged. This development towards 
a broader understanding of state responsibility can be understood as a logical 
consequence of the prevention perspective. Prevention is by definition problem-
oriented: instead of executing a formal task or competence, it aims to avert unde-
sirable phenomena. A strict limitation of state responsibilities for public order 
may be justified from, for instance, a legal point of view, but can be perceived as 
irrelevant or ineffective from a preventive point of view – the limitation of state 
responsibilities is only relevant in so far it contributes to a desired solution. The 
prevention perspective leads to a focus on the causes of criminal behaviour and 
therefore to a move beyond the legal framework. 
This broadening of state responsibility was expressed in the proposed in-
crease of surveillance and law enforcement in the public domain. This was not 
merely a response to objectively identifiable personnel shortages in police and 
judicial apparatus, but was also designed to have a more societal effect. A visible 
presence of the state in the public domain would simultaneously serve law en-
forcement, enable prevention of crime through deterrence, and contribute to the 
credibility of the state as law enforcer. 
Another expression of the problem-oriented approach was the focus on 
deviant elements in society. In contrast to the previous period, in which govern-
ment confronted the individualising society in general, crime prevention was now 
directed at the specific geographical places and target groups which showed sig-
nificantly higher levels of criminal behaviour. Instead of looking for causes of 
crime in structural developments of society, the focus was now on the causes of 
crime in individual behaviour and living circumstances. And instead of trying to 
turn back the tide of individualisation through norm-oriented prevention, gov-
ernment now aimed to integrate and socialise deviant individuals into society. 
A second important development in crime policy moved the dominant 
problem definition even further beyond the confines of the legal framework. From 
1993 onwards, the notion of ‘security’ was developed to describe a certain desir-
able status or quality of the public domain: “Security can be defined as the pres-
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ence of a certain order and peace in the public domain and as the protection of 
life, health and property against acute or potential infractions” (ISP, 1999:9). Even 
though crime remained the dominant notion up to 2001, the slow rise of the secu-
rity paradigm implied a substantial broadening of the government’s scope of at-
tention. 
Whereas crime is a legally defined concept, security can be applied to a 
potentially limitless range of societal phenomena that are perceived as a threat to 
the order and peace in the public domain. Crime is but one of these threats; others 
are nuisance, the degradation of the public domain, and subjective feelings of in-
security. Insecurity implies an infraction of social life rather an infraction of the 
law. 
Furthermore, security and prevention share a conceptual affinity. First of 
all, both notions are boundless and can be applied to a potentially infinite number 
of societal phenomena. And second, security implies the absence of infractions of 
public peace and order. The measures taken to avert threats to public peace and 
order are preventive in nature. Prevention is no longer solely associated with 
crime, but with a broader range of threats to security. Security refers to a certain 
status or quality of the public domain, prevention encompasses the aversion of 
threats to this status or quality. 
 
These two developments in definition power had consequences for the state’s 
intervention power. A first consequence regarded the focus on geographical loca-
tions where the risks of crime and insecurity were the highest. Petty crime and 
other security infractions often occur in citizens’ direct living environments. The 
government therefore developed a strategy of proximity: the ‘forward defences’ of 
law enforcement became organised at municipal and even at neighbourhood level. 
While a judge is the pivotal figure in the administration of justice, the mayor be-
came the pivotal figure in crime prevention and security policy. 
A second consequence was the development of a broad intervention rep-
ertoire around a shared problem definition. Police, municipality, public prosecu-
tor, correctional facilities, probation office, schools, youth care and welfare work 
were all acknowledged as being relevant actors in the organisation of prevention. 
Crime prevention was seen as not being limited to a specific task or formal au-
thority, but as having have many different faces: deterrence through surveillance, 
reparation of street furniture, reintegration programmes in detention to prevent 
recidivism, early detection of school absenteeism, family support for parents with 
problem adolescents, and so on. Therefore, a strategy of coordination was re-
quired to develop an effective set of interventions between formally separated 
organisations and policy domains. 
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A third consequence was the shift in focus from petty crime to the people 
committing these crimes. Instead of merely ‘stopping’ crime by means of technical 
prevention or reducing the opportunities for crime by redesigning the built-up 
environment, the government focused on the perceived source of the problem: 
deviant individual behaviour. And instead of taking society in general as the object 
of norm-oriented prevention (such as in the previous period), the government 
focused on the socialisation of individual deviant citizens. Targets groups and 
areas were identified on the basis of a statistically higher chance of delinquent 
behaviour: habitual offenders, delinquent drug addicts, problem adolescents, the 
younger generations of certain cultural minorities, and the characteristics of their 
urban living environments became the objects of intervention. This strategy of 
personalisation aimed to structurally prevent crime by reintegrating offenders 




PART 3: CRIME PREVENTION AS BEHAVIOURAL INTERVENTION (2002-2011) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Although just one year apart, the 2001 Crime Control memorandum and its 2002 
successor Towards a Safer Society158 seem, at first sight, miles apart in content and 
tone. Whereas the dominant notion in the former is ‘crime’, the latter incorporates 
crime into a broader notion of ‘security’. And whereas the former is almost tech-
nocratic in nature, the latter expresses an attitude of decisiveness in the face of 
societal problems. 
The first difference is a result of a paradigm shift from crime to security. 
The broad notion of security had been gaining traction since the 1990s, but only 
became the conceptual basis for policymaking from 2002 onwards. As a conse-
quence, the scope of Towards a Safer Society and its successors was considerably 
broader than the scope of Crime Control.159 
The second difference between Crime Control and Towards a Safer Society 
is an intensification of the problem-oriented approach, which followed hard on 
the heels of the unexpected emergence of populist leader Pim Fortuyn on the eve 
of the 2002 Dutch parliamentary elections. Fortuyn, who was murdered days be-
fore the elections, focussed on immigration, integration and security issues. Fol-
lowing the tumultuous 2002 elections, these issues would come to dominate the 
political discourse and agenda in the years to come:160 “Citizens have given ex-
pression to an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, of discontent and of shaken trust; 
discontent with politics, in which so many citizens’ problems such as annoyance 
and insecurity go undiscussed, […]” (GD, 2002:5466). The very first words of the 
2002 coalition agreement were: “The Netherlands must become more secure […]” 
                                                   
158 In Dutch: Naar een veiliger samenleving; TK 2002-2003, 28684/1. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘TSS, 2002’, followed by the page number.  
159 This paradigm shift is exemplified by the change of name of the Dutch Ministry of Justice into 
the Ministry of Security and Justice in 2010 (http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/venj; 
consulted d.d. 6-2-2011).  
160 However, it is highly unlikely that the issue of security had become a major societal issue 
overnight. To explain its sudden emergence as a core political issue, the interplay between 
politicians and electorate should also be taken into account. Politicians do not only describe 
social problems that are already ‘out there’ merely waiting to be ‘discovered’ in social reality, 
they also define social problems by articulating them in the political arena. To be more precise, 
political representation is both; a political issue only comes into being when it is expressed as 
such in the political arena, but can only be said to be representative when this issue is recog-
nised as a relevant social problem by a certain number of citizens. Problems are not ‘there’, just 
as politicians do not simply ‘create’ problems – rather, societal problems and political issues are 
a result of a subtle interplay between perceptions, articulations and public recognition of con-
tested societal phenomena. 
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(CA, 2002:3).161 The government’s redoubtable attitude was reflected in the use of 
language such as “tackling the problem by the root” (TSS, 2002:17), “taking up the 
gauntlet” (TSS, 2002:17) and “reclaiming the public domain”162 (TSS, 2002:18). 
 
While these two discontinuities had important consequences for the actual policy 
approach (as is discussed in the following), it is also important to stress the conti-
nuities between the previous period and the period from 2002 onwards. In many 
ways, the Towards a Safer Society memorandum is a progression and intensifica-
tion of earlier developments and directions. For instance, the dominance of the 
security paradigm can be understood as being a logical result of an evolution, 
which was set in motion by 1993’s Security Report.  
Furthermore, the government’s decisiveness in tackling security issues 
fits with the problem-oriented approach inherent to a strategy of prevention. In 
1985, the government’s ambition was to make the administration of justice an 
‘ultimum remedium’. In 2001, government stated that “[c]rime control starts with 
prevention” (CC, 2001:2). And in 2007, this adage was repeated – even in the title 
of the 2007 memorandum Security Starts with Prevention.163 Moreover, the strate-
gies of proximity, coordination and personalisation – developed between 1993 
and 2001 – were also brought to their logical conclusion from 2002 onwards: the 
government’s preventive intervention repertoire was designed to organise activi-
ties in citizens’ direct living environments, to cross organisational boundaries 
which are ineffective from a preventive point of view, and to realise behavioural 
change in risk citizens. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned Towards a Safer Society and Security Starts with 
Prevention memoranda, the analysis of the post-2002 period is based on the fol-
lowing policy memoranda: Private Violence – A Public Concern,164 Plan of Attack 
                                                   
161 Echoing a line from 1999’s Integral Security Programme: “The Netherlands must become 
more secure” (ISP, 1999:7). 
162 Compare this with its more modest equivalent in 1998’s government declaration: “the 
streets should be given back to citizens” (GD, 1998:6206). ‘Reclaiming’ instead of ‘giving back’ is 
not a merely semantic difference, but expresses the drive and urgency behind government’s 
crime policy from 2002 onwards. 
163 In Dutch: Veiligheid begint bij Voorkomen; TK 2007-2008, 28684/119. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘SSP, 2007’, followed by the page number. 
This memorandum is the successor to the memorandum published in 2002 called Towards a 
Safer Society. By and large, Security Starts with Prevention builds upon the foundation laid by 
Towards a Safer Society: the objectives remain intact and are pursued “full speed ahead” (SSP, 
2007:3). 
164 In Dutch: Privé Geweld – Publieke Zaak; TK 2001-2002, 28345/1-2. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘PVPC, 2002’, followed by the page number. 
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Public Transport Security,165 Persistent and Effective166 and Action Programme 
Juvenile Delinquency,167 all published in 2002, the 2003 memorandum Intensive 
Approach Habitual Offenders,168 Operation Young169 (2004), Action Plan Against 
Violence170 (2005), Offensive on Drop Outs171 (2007), Action Plan Annoyance and 
Degradation172 (2008), and Nuisance Youth under the Age of 12173 (2008). 
 
3.2. Definition power 
 
3.2.1. The security paradigm 
‘Security’ became the dominant policy paradigm in the 2002 memorandum To-
wards a Safer Society – also known as the ‘security programme’. This marked an 
important step in a conceptual development, which had started with the introduc-
tion of administrative prevention in 1985’s Society and Crime. The prevention 
perspective transformed crime from a strictly legal issue into a societal issue. And 
the paradigm of security broadened the scope from the limited notion of crime to 
a potentially infinite number of (subjectively identified) threats to peace and or-
der in the public domain.174  
As discussed in the analysis of crime policy between 1993 and 2001, the 
notions of prevention and security have a strong conceptual affinity. Not only can 
both notions apply to a potentially limitless range of social phenomena, they can 
in many cases be understood as forming two sides of the same coin: whereas se-
curity refers to a certain status or quality of the public domain, prevention is the 
aversion of threats to this status or quality. 
                                                   
165 In Dutch: Aanvalsplan Sociale Veiligheid Openbaar Vervoer; TK 2002-2003, 28642/1. Refer-
ences to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘PAPTS, 2002’, followed by the page number. 
166 In Dutch: Vasthoudend en Effectief; TK 2001-2002, 28292/1-2. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘PE, 2002’, followed by the page number. 
167 In Dutch: Actieprogramma Aanpak Jeugdcriminaliteit; TK 2002-2003, 28741/1. References to 
quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘APJD, 2002’, followed by the page number. 
168 In Dutch: Intensieve Aanpak Veelplegers; TK 2002-2003, 28684/10. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘IAHO, 2003’, followed by the page number. 
169 In Dutch: Operatie Jong; TK 2003-2004, 29284/1. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘OY, 2004’, followed by the page number. 
170 In Dutch: Actieplan Tegen Geweld; TK 2005-2006, 28684/65. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘APAV, 2005’, followed by the page number. 
171 In Dutch: Aanval op de Schooluitval; TK 2007-2008, 26695/42. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘ODO, 2007’, followed by the page number. 
172 In Dutch: Actieplan Overlast en Verloedering; TK 2007-2008, 28684/130. References to quo-
tations in the text are abbreviated as ‘APAD, 2008’, followed by the page number. 
173 In Dutch: Overlast door 12-minners; TK 2007-2008, 28684/167. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘ACA, 2008’, followed by the page number. 




While a clear definition of ‘security’ was lacking in the various policy memoranda, 
the government listed crime, nuisance and the deterioration of the public domain 
as three core objects of security policy in Towards a Safer Society and Security 
Starts with Prevention (e.g. TSS, 2002:11; SSP, 2007:8). In practice, several issues, 
which had long been dealt with through traditional social policy, including urban 
renewal,175 social renewal,176 major cities policy,177 youth policy,178 and the inte-
gration of cultural minorities and migrants,179 also became relevant for the secu-
rity paradigm and, as a consequence, were assessed in terms of (crime) preven-
tion. 
Moreover, subjective feelings of insecurity among the population were an 
important justification for increased state activities:180 “The insecurity which 
many citizens experience is intolerable. There is often a great deal of discontent 
about robberies, violence, vandalism and annoyance by other citizens, not to men-
tion the high levels of material and immaterial damage. This was the clear mes-
sage sent out by the public during the [2002 parliamentary] elections. This gov-
ernment takes up the task of doing justice to this powerful call by society” (TSS, 
2002:5). Previous policy memoranda had usually stressed objective crime figures 
(e.g. CC, 2001:4-5), but in Towards a Safer Society, reference is instead made to the 
level of public discontent to justify policy ambitions: society must become more 
secure, “not just in objective figures, but especially in the subjective feelings of 
citizens” (TSS, 2002:7).181  
 
3.2.2. From legal order to public order 
A logical consequence of the security paradigm was a focus on the quality of the 
public domain. Of course, law enforcement and previously developed preventive 
activities, such as surveillance and technical prevention, also took place in the 
public domain. However, these activities were justified by reference to crime and 
thereby to the legal order. From this perspective, the public domain was the geo-
                                                   
175 See for instance the memorandum Urban and Rural Renewal, TK 1980-1981, 16713/2. 
176 See for instance the memorandum Social Renewal, TK 1989-1990, 21455/4. 
177 See for instance the memorandum Major Cities Policy, TK 1988-1989, 21062/2. 
178 See for instance the memorandum Youth Policy, TK 1983-1984, 18545/2. 
179 See for instance the memorandum Action Programme Immigrant Policy, TK 1990-1991, 
21971/2. 
180 Furthermore, “feelings of insecurity” became, next to objective crime figures, an equally 
important performance indicator for policy in the aptly titled 2007 memorandum Security 
Starts with Prevention (SSP, 2007:50). 
181 Objective crime figures have, generally speaking, not increased in the previous years, except 
for in certain domains such as juvenile delinquency: “Although the increase has stopped, the 
level of crime in general remains high. Violent crime – mainly offences which cause societal 
agitation – has not decreased; juvenile violence has even undergone an explosive growth in 
recent years” (CM, 2001:4-5). 
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graphical site where criminal behaviour could be detected or prevented. By con-
trast, the security paradigm took the public domain as the object of interventions. 
State interventions were no longer a response to violations of the rule of law, but 
were now justified by concerns for general public order. The government’s objec-
tive was not only to reduce crime figures, but more in general to create an “at-
mosphere of security” in citizens’ direct living environment (TSS, 2002:40).  
Even though the dangers of “neglecting the public domain” (ISP, 1999:7) 
had already been emphasised in 1999’s Integral Security Programme, it was not 
until 2002 that the government made it the central concern of its policies: “Nui-
sance and degradation of the quality of the living environment need to be stopped 
and, if possible, prevented” (TSS, 2002:40; 65). Violence in the public and semi-
public domain, whether in traffic, in sports, in public transport, during nights out, 
at work, at school or in one’s own neighbourhood (SSP, 2007:4), was a particular 
concern, since this directly affects the feelings of insecurity and personal freedom 
of citizens. 
According to government, nothing less than the foundations of society 
were at stake: “Where the feeling of security disappears and a climate of insecu-
rity grows, solidarity diminishes, suspicion grows, and trust among citizens and 
between citizens and the state disappears” (CA, 2002:9). These issues were most 
urgently felt in the major Dutch cities, such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague. Hence, government set out to “protect society” (TSS, 2002:32) and “re-
claim the public domain” (TSS, 2002:18).  
Society was vulnerable to crime, violence, annoyance and degradation, 
and was in need of “[...] a government which stands firm, acts and guards” (CA, 
2002:6). In general, the government resolved to take a firmer stance against in-
fractions of public order: “We are currently experiencing a partially outdated cul-
ture of tolerance with regard to annoyance and behaviour conducive to crime in 
the (semi-) public domain. […] Misguided tolerance should be driven back and the 
social structure should be enforced” (TSS, 2002:13). 
 
Even though prevention and the security paradigm are tightly related, govern-
ment focus on public order did not only imply an increase of prevention. Improv-
ing security required investments in law enforcement, as well. A familiar strategy 
was employed in this respect: the capacity of the police, public prosecutor, courts 
and detention centres was increased, a modernisation of the institutions en-
trusted with law enforcement and forensic research (such as use of DNA-
techniques) was carried out, and the efficiency of courts and detention centres 
was enhanced to guarantee an adequate response to all reported crimes (TSS, 
2002:8; 13-14; 23-24; 28-30; SSP, 2007:6). These increased capacities were im-
plemented with a view to “the issues contributing the most to feelings of insecu-
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rity among the public” (TSS, 2002:5), such as violence, mugging, vandalism, and 
misbehaviour in public transport (TSS, 2002:5).  
Furthermore, the government was “[…] also prepared to take some unor-
thodox measures to realise its ambitions” (TSS, 2002:6).182 Most of these meas-
ures involved increasing the powers of public authorities involved with security 
issues (TSS, 2002:6-7, 36-37; SSP, 2007:8): 
- Creating ‘urgency areas’ in which public authorities were granted addi-
tional competences to stop degradation and restore authority; 
- Creating new detention methods for habitual offenders and adolescents; 
- Strengthening and increasing the possibilities for effective control and 
surveillance in the public domain; 
- Expanding the competences of the public prosecutor to conclude cases 
more efficiently; 
- Increasing the number of police hours spent in the streets; 
- Introducing the legal possibility for an administrative fine for nuisances 
and disturbances in the public domain; 
- Introducing compulsory general identification; 
- Developing a legal framework for the use of CCTV-surveillance by local 
authorities. 
 
In many cases, this increase in powers and in law enforcement efforts was tightly 
related to prevention. Risks often form the selection mechanism for objects of 
intervention. Increased efforts in law enforcement were usually directed at places 
posing a heightened risk for crime and annoyance. And the expansion in formal 
powers was based on the same logic: ‘urgency areas’ were risky places, new de-
tention methods were developed for risk citizens, and CCTV-surveillance served 
the preventive objective of deterrence in risky places and at risky times. In short, 
both law enforcement and the development of new formal competences became 
infused by the prevention perspective. 
 
3.2.3. Risks and the sources of insecurity 
Prevention was a core element in government’s security policy, as expressed in 
the emphasis on ‘risk’ for the identification of objects of intervention from 2002 
                                                   
182 The various measures discussed here not only aimed to directly reduce crime and nuisance, 
but also to decrease the overburdening of the judicial apparatus, whose capacity was dispropor-
tionally absorbed by dealing with habitual offenders, leaving little time for tackling other forms 
of crime (TSS, 2002:16). 
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onwards.183 Risk, commonly defined as ‘the chance of future damage’, served as 
the explicit mechanism by which the government identified potential sources of 
crime and insecurity. In the period between 1982 and 1992, preventive activities 
were based on the construction of a causal scheme between the individualisation 
of society and the increase in petty crime. In the period between 1993 and 2001, a 
causal scheme was constructed between certain target groups and the high levels 
of petty and violent crime. And in the period from 2002 onwards, risk citizens,184 
risk factors, risky times and risky places were identified as “notorious sources of 
annoyance and crime” (TSS, 2002:11).185 
The approach to risk citizens involved “[...] the specific groups which 
cause crime and annoyance in the public domain: habitual offenders and risk ado-
lescents. The cabinet’s line of reasoning was to get crime off the streets by ap-
proaching these groups, which should lead to a decrease of insecurity, (drug) an-
noyance and degradation of the public domain” (TSS, 2002:11). Especially illustra-
tive of the government’s preventive ambitions was the approach to at-risk adoles-
cents. Ideally, criminal or otherwise problematic behaviour should be pre-
vented.186 To make this possible, screening programmes to identify at-risk adoles-
cents were essential: “Early detection of problematic behaviour […] is of great 
importance. Many scientific studies show that early-stage interventions offer the 
greatest chance of behavioural change” (SSP, 2007:12). A second requirement was 
the development of early and personalised interventions. Behavioural interven-
                                                   
183 To illustrate, in the 61 pages of the 2001 Crime Control memorandum the word ‘risk’ (or 
variations of it) is used only seven times, compared to 35 times in the 108 pages of Towards a 
Safer Society in 2002. 
184 The term ‘risk citizens’ is not found in the analysed policy memoranda, but is used here to 
describe the various ‘risk groups’, to which the government does refer: habitual offenders, risk 
adolescents, risk adolescents under the age of twelve, citizens who loiter at certain places and 
hours of the day, and citizens who are susceptible to risk factors of violent behaviour. 
185 Besides approaches to the causes of crime and annoyance, strategies to influence the oppor-
tunities for criminal behaviour continued to be pursued. The issue of technical prevention           
– brought up for the first time in 1985 – is still a relevant strategy for crime prevention in 2007. 
For instance, in order to do something about the “unacceptably high level of 750.000 stolen 
bicycles per year”, more and secure bike parks, new technological methods such as ‘tagging’ of 
bicycles and registration in a national database of stolen properties were proposed (SSP, 
2007:6). Just as new technology can spark new types of crime – such as ‘cybercrime’ (SSP, 
2007:7) – new technologies can also be used to prevent crime. 
186 Government repeats the adage first stated in 1985’s Crime and Society that the administra-
tion of justice should be the last resort in crime policy, only to be employed if prevention should 
fail: “The first correction of delinquent behaviour is often a judicial one. Criminal law is not the 
last but the first chain in law enforcement” (TSS, 2002:4-5).  
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tions were to be tailored to every identified adolescent’s “risk profile” (SSP, 
2007:12).187  
Complementary to the personalised approach to risk citizens, surveillance 
systems could be used to monitor the public domain, putting specific emphasis on 
risky times and places: “Surveillance and law enforcement will be executed at 
places and times which have an increased risk of crime, violence and annoyance. 
These are places like train stations, bar districts, shopping centres, areas around 
coffee shops, places where adolescents loiter, et cetera. Rules will be strictly en-
forced. Police and municipalities will have more authorities. The efforts of super-
vising officers, enforcement authorities and private security organisations will be 
expanded” (TSS, 2002:34). For instance, to increase the security in public trans-
port for both staff and passengers, more entrance gates were installed to keep 
“nuisance individuals” out, more security personnel was introduced on trams and 
subways, and more CCTV-surveillance devices were installed at stations (TSS, 
2002:35).  
The final strategy concerned the approach to ‘risk factors’ for violent be-
haviour. In Security Starts with Prevention, the government stated that alcohol, 
drugs, weapons, and violent images in the media could “function as a catalyst for 
aggressive behaviour” (SSP, 2007:5; 8-9). In other words: certain factors in every-
day life could increase the risk of citizens behaving violently. This led the govern-
ment to develop disincentives and barriers, discouraging people from coming into 
contact with these risk factors. For instance, government proposed a stricter ap-
proach to soft drugs, consisting of a required minimum distance between ‘coffee 
shops’ and schools, immediate closure of coffee shops after any violation of the 
regulations, and the discouragement of coffee shops in the border regions (SSP, 
2007:9). Several similar measures were taken against alcohol abuse.188  
 
3.2.4. A shared responsibility 
In the 1985 memorandum Society and Crime and the 1990 memorandum Evolving 
Law, the government developed a division of responsibilities between state and 
society in the prevention of crime. Citizens were called upon to take responsibility 
for technical prevention and norm enforcement. Failure to do so meant that the 
state would be unable to compensate for the decay in social norms. At the same 
time, this served as an argument for the government to limit the state’s responsi-
bilities. In the period between 1993 and 2001, both the idea of citizen responsibil-
                                                   
187 Government introduced a special Committee for the Approval of Behavioural Interventions 
in the judicial apparatus (in Dutch: Erkenningscommissie Gedragsinterventies Justitie). This 
committee is responsible for the development of quality marks for behavioural interventions 
which are proven to be effective (SSP, 2007:13). 
188 These are further discussed in the chapter on public health policy. 
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ity and the limitation of state responsibilities had largely disappeared from policy 
considerations, even though the problem-oriented approach to crime implied 
further expansion of state interventions in society. 
However, especially after the appearance in 2007 of Security Starts with 
Prevention, a new explicit understanding of state and citizen responsibility devel-
oped. Next to a strict approach to offending citizens – “[t]hose who cross limits, 
will be firmly dealt with” (GD, 2007:2632) – society as a whole was object of a re-
emerging norm-oriented approach. The main concern was the lack of social cohe-
sion, especially in problematic neighbourhoods: “Personal freedom and develop-
ment can only exist if the things which tie people together […] are stronger than 
the things which distinguish them from each other” (CA, 2002:6). “Security, stabil-
ity and respect characterise the society this cabinet has in mind. A society in 
which people feel secure, familiar and connected to each other” (SSP, 2007:1). 
 
This time, the government developed an understanding of shared, rather than 
divided, responsibilities. This subtle, but highly significant difference lay in the 
transformation of the government’s understanding of ‘responsibility’. In Society 
and Crime and Evolving Law, ‘individual responsibility’ was understood to refer to 
accountability. Every citizen was, to some extent, perceived as being responsible 
for the protection of his own property by means of technical prevention. More-
over, the citizens themselves were primarily responsible for norm enforcement. 
The state had a limited and complementary responsibility. 
This more or less principle division of responsibilities was gradually 
abandoned from 1993 onwards – first implicitly, as a result of the emphasis on 
problem-oriented approaches in crime prevention, and later explicitly as part of a 
more decisive attitude with regard to public order issues.189 The explicit trans-
formation of both citizen and state responsibility rested on two arguments. First, 
citizen responsibility was no longer defined in terms of accountability for per-
sonal actions, but in terms of a specific form of active engagement for the public 
cause: “Citizens should act in accordance with the behavioural norms they also 
apply in the private domain. […] Indifference and keeping aloof from the public 
domain eventually lead, or at least contribute, to insecurity” (ISP, 1999:12). Gov-
ernment aimed “to restore the balance between rights and duties” (GD, 2010:3). 
And second, government constructed an interdependence between state 
and citizen responsibility: a “shared responsibility for security in the public do-
main is a precondition for a successful security policy […]” (ISP, 1999:12). And 
elsewhere: “The public domain belongs to the state and citizens together” (ISP, 
1999:12). Furthermore, an imaginary alliance was constructed between govern-
                                                   
189 The telltale title of the 2010 coalition agreement is Freedom and Responsibility (CA, 2010). 
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ment and society: government aimed to “become an ally of citizens” (CA, 2010:3; 
cf. CA, 2007:3). As a result, there was – in the eyes of government – no contradic-
tion between increased state efforts and the interests of citizens: “Participation 
[...] means that people are responsible together for the quality of their living envi-
ronment, means that people see norms and rules not as an obligation to the state, 
but as something we all want, and it means that people are supported in this cause 
by the government” (GD, 2003:4284).  
Whereas the division of responsibilities between 1982 and 1992 was a 
mechanism to limit state responsibility, the construction of a shared responsibility 
became a mechanism or justification for a further expansion of state responsibil-
ity. Moreover, the expansion of state responsibilities was justified as serving the 
interests of citizens. On the one hand, the state “[…] cannot handle security issues 
without the support of others” (TSS, 2002:10), on the other hand, society required 
protection and support by the state to realise a more secure public domain.  
 
Besides justifying an expansion of state interventions (which is discussed in the 
following section on intervention power), the idea of a shared responsibility also 
implied a justification of the efforts to activate citizens. The “joint effort” (TSS, 
2002:4) by state and society required at the very least law-abidance by citizens: 
“The state cannot uphold laws and rules when citizens and companies themselves 
do not feel responsible for abiding by them” (CA, 2003:9). But more is required. 
The government appealed directly to citizens to actively contribute to improving 
security: “Everyone must participate” (CA, 2003:4), since “a society cannot be 
changed by mere decree or by the grace of money” (CA, 2002:6). In practice, this 
led, for example, to police officers directly calling citizens and companies to ac-
count, for instance in cases of nuisance or littering (TS, 2002:36-37).  
Especially on the municipal and neighbourhood level, the contribution of 
citizens was seen as indispensable: “Government needs to address citizens, ado-
lescents, schools, companies, public services and societal organisations on their 
contribution [to crime prevention]. Neighbourhood initiatives to control crime 
and decrease annoyance will be supported” (CA, 2007:27). An example of coop-
eration between police and citizens was the introduction of the so-called ‘civil 
network’:190 “Through ‘civil networks’, the emergency room involves citizens to 
look out for persons or vehicles that have been involved in, for instance, burglary. 
Citizens who have joined the network can distribute ‘real time’ information on 
escape paths to the emergency room. This way, the police can track down sus-
pects more efficiently and, as a result, the chances of apprehension are increased” 
(TSS, 2002:23). Furthermore, ‘the civil network’ can be used to inform citizens 
                                                   
190 In Dutch: Burgernet. 
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about security aspects and liveability aspects of their neighbourhood, which could 
have a positive effect on their perception of nuisance and insecurity (SSP, 
2007:10).  
Other relevant forms of cooperation with citizens and businesses191 in-
cluded covenants between the municipal authorities and local bars and clubs on 
the prevention of dangerous situations, the introduction of Safe Night Out warran-
ties, Safe Business warranties, and Safe Homes warranties, and the stimulation of 
insurance companies to take up preventive measures in their policies and to util-
ise differentiation in insurance premiums (TSS, 2002:43). Furthermore, the gov-
ernment adopted a positive stance towards private security companies as a com-
plementary support to police control and surveillance (TSS, 2002:38). 
 
3.3. Intervention power 
 
3.3.1. Proximity: in the neighbourhood  
In the period between 1993 and 2001, the government’s problem-oriented ap-
proach to crime issues was characterised by three strategies. The strategy of prox-
imity referred to the emphasis on local administration to take preventive action. 
The strategy of coordination referred to the organisation of a broad set of activi-
ties around a shared preventive problem definition. And the strategy of personal-
isation referred to the identification of risk citizens as objects of intervention. 
From 2002 onwards, the specific focus on public order led to a further expansion 
of these three strategies. 
 
The strategy of proximity fits both the security paradigm and the perspective of 
prevention. Security refers to a certain quality of the public domain, more specifi-
cally of citizens’ direct living environments. And prevention implies a focus on the 
societal causes and breeding grounds of crime, annoyance and other sources of 
insecurity. A further emphasis on organising interventions in close proximity to 
citizens can therefore be understood as a logical consequence of the affinity be-
tween security and prevention. 
The government’s problem definition stressed everyday living environ-
ments, in which problems such as crime, annoyance, violence and degradation 
occur. While the previously held paradigm of ‘crime’ can be seen as an individual 
                                                   
191 Businesses were also made aware that it was in their self-interest to cooperate with the state 
to prevent crime against their property. The 1992 established National Platform Crime Control 
(in Dutch: Nationaal Platform Criminaliteitsbeheersing), public-private cooperation led to the 
development of various measures and projects such as Safe Businesses Warranties, approaches 
against identity fraud, handling stolen goods, and measures to secure property and business 
premises (SSP, 2007:7). 
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incident, the notion of ‘security’ relates to a more structural characteristic of spe-
cific areas in the public domain. Security is a ‘status’, crime is an individual act. 
This explains why ‘neighbourhoods’ (a policy category often based on postal 
codes) were the focal point of security policy: “The street, the neighbourhood, the 
district are, beside the direct environments of home and work, the social envi-
ronments in which we live every day” (CA, 2007:24).  
An example of the government’s strategy of proximity was the expansion 
of the number of ‘Justice in the neighbourhood’-offices,192 especially in “high-
crime areas” (APJD, 2002:15). These offices were originally platforms of coopera-
tion between public prosecutor, police and municipality that were set up to inter-
vene in crime and security issues at neighbourhood-level (TSS, 2002:35). The 
successors of these offices, called Security Houses,193 formed a broader platform 
for cooperation between municipality, the police, public prosecutor and welfare 
organisations to organise “an adequate connection between a punitive approach 
of adolescents and underlying family problems” (SSP, 2007:2-3).  
Another example was the option available to municipalities to designate 
certain areas with a high risk of annoyance or criminal activities as “urgency ar-
eas” (usually neighbourhoods or several blocks of streets). In these areas, public 
authorities temporarily had more powers to fight crime, for instance through pre-
ventive frisking or searching vehicles for weapons on suspicion (TSS, 2002:35-
36). Also, ‘neighbourhood mediation’ was introduced to prevent an escalation of 
aggression and violence between residents (SSP, 2007:5). 
Furthermore, the state needed to be visibly present at the places where 
crime and annoyance tended to take place: “Neighbourhoods must become more 
secure. Citizens should feel secure and at home in their neighbourhood. The use of 
‘neighbourhood police officers’ is crucial to prevent nuisance and degradation. A 
‘neighbourhood police officer’ has the proper information position, actively con-
tributes to social cohesion and to an integrated approach of local problems con-
cerning annoyance and degradation. With their knowledge of the neighbourhood 
and their residents, they can prevent a lot of trouble or control it in an early stage” 
(SSP, 2007:9-10).  
 
Local authorities were seen as best equipped to implement a neighbourhood-
based approach. However, this did not imply that national government had a dis-
tant role only. The government provided financial means and instrumental pre-
conditions and called on municipalities to deliver specific performances and re-
sults (TSS, 2002:7-8). With regard to instrumental preconditions, providing statis-
                                                   
192 In Dutch: Justitie in de buurt. 
193 In Dutch: Veiligheidshuizen. 
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tical data was an important requirement for effective interventions. Municipalities 
bore a responsibility in this respect, but national government developed a com-
plementary national ‘security index’ to monitor changes in local security statistics. 
This information could be used for local security plans and for prioritising the 
efforts of police and judiciary (TSS, 2002:8): “Without proper insight into pressing 
problems and bottlenecks, it is impossible to effectively determine the most im-
portant security issues, allocate priorities and take measures” (TSS, 2002:38). 
 
A final expression of the government’s strategy of proximity moved beyond the 
concern for the quality of the public domain. It was thought that control and pre-
vention of crime should not necessarily stop at the citizens’ front door, particu-
larly in the case of domestic violence, the most common type of violence in the 
Netherlands: “An important reason to treat domestic violence as a public concern 
is the fact that the state has the responsibility to ensure every citizens’ security” 
(PVPC, 2002:6).  
Early detection of domestic violence required raising awareness among 
health care professionals, teachers, employers, police, victim service employees, 
as well as among the victims themselves, by means of mass and target-group ori-
ented campaigns. Early interventions were enabled by the introduction of a spe-
cial telephone number, which citizens could dial to report suspicions of domestic 
violence and child abuse. Furthermore, the government urged professionals to 
report presumed violence or child abuse, even if this should breach their profes-
sional confidentiality. Self-defence courses for children were subsidised. The 
availability of restraining orders was expanded, as were therapeutic programmes 
and treatment in detention. Also, care services for the victims of domestic violence 
were improved (PVPC, 2002:15-38; SSP, 2007:5). 
 
3.3.2. Coordination: blurred boundaries 
The strategy of coordination followed from the many possible faces of prevention. 
From a preventive point of view, organisational boundaries between the police, 
public prosecutor and welfare organisations often formed a barrier for effective 
interventions: “We cannot stress enough the essential relation in social reality 
between such areas as wellbeing, education, youth- and health care and care of 
drug addicts” (TSS, 2002:10). The development of integrated approaches crossing 
the traditional boundaries between domains such as youth care, law enforcement 
and urban renewal was a logical consequence of this philosophy.  
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The prevention perspective served to catalyse the crossing of organisa-
tional boundaries.194 The approach developed for at-risk adolescents may be seen 
as an illustration par excellence: immediately after being identified as important 
sources of crime and annoyance, the most effective interventions to influence 
their behaviour were subsequently assessed. Often, these interventions consisted 
of a combination of care and discipline, tailored to every child’s specific needs, 
character and interests. In terms of a policy approach towards juvenile delin-
quents, this became a “combination of prevention, administrative and law en-
forcement, and after care” (SSP, 2007:1). 
No single measure was deemed effective enough for the prevention of 
crime and nuisance. Merely trusting in criminal law to influence undesirable be-
haviour was not enough, but the same held for trusting to surveillance in the pub-
lic domain or for providing support to risk adolescents without any ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’. For instance, the objective of improving security in public transport 
was pursued by installing entrance gates and electronic means of payment to en-
sure that only revenue passengers are able to board, by increasing (camera) sur-
veillance in vehicles and stations, by keeping vehicles and stations clean and well 
maintained, by banning repeat offenders from vehicles and stations, and by train-
ing public transport staff to deal with aggression and violence (PAPTS, 2002:6).195 
 
These considerations imply the necessity for coordination and cooperation be-
tween organisations which, from a traditional or task-oriented point of view, 
could be seen as opposite sides of the spectrum of state activities: “Prevention, 
social work and repression should take combined action to improve the situation 
of [at-risk adolescents] in sometimes very vulnerable families” (SSP, 2007:10). For 
                                                   
194 An example of this comprehensive strategy is the fact that the memorandum Security Starts 
with Prevention was coproduced by two Ministers of Justice, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the 
Minister for Youth and Family, the Minister for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, the 
State Secretary of Justice, and the State Secretary of Education. 
195 Another example is the set of measures proposed to reduce violence in the public domain: a 
registration of all alcohol-related violence or accidents, preventive frisking to control illegal 
possession of weapons (in the public domain, but also at schools and in bars), a recommenda-
tion system to prevent children from watching violent TV-images, neighbourhood mediation to 
solve conflicts between citizens, Safer Bar Programmes, measures to improve public transport 
security (see PAPTS, 2005), and measures to control violence against civil servants (including 
ambulance staff) (APAV, 2005:5-26).  
The approach to annoyance in the public domain showed the same pattern: a strict po-
licing of annoying behaviour and vandalism by adolescents in the public domain and shopping 
centers was combined with increased mayoral powers, making it possible to insist that problem 
families accept support, in addition to expanded competences for municipalities and housing 
corporations to deal with problematic tenants, through the introduction of compulsory routings 
for juvenile delinquents and the development of programmes for neighbourhood counseling 
and mediation (APAD, 2008). 
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instance, traditional organisational boundaries “[…] between the social field (edu-
cation, welfare work and youth care) and the activities of the police and judiciary” 
(TSS, 2002:40) were transcended in local platforms of cooperation such as Secu-
rity Houses. Also, domestic violence was tackled by strengthening the cooperation 
between the police, prosecutor and rescue services (TSS, 2002:41), and public 
transport security was improved by cooperation between municipality, public 
prosecutor, railway-police and public transport companies (TSS, 2002:35). 
Besides cooperation between repression-oriented and care-oriented or-
ganisations, personalised prevention also required cooperation between the vari-
ous parts of the judicial system. The police, public prosecutor, courts, detention 
centres and probation office were portrayed by government as a ‘chain’ with sev-
eral ‘links’. This metaphor expressed the desire for a tight coupling between or-
ganisations to make “seamless transfers” of suspects, delinquents, risk adoles-
cents and ex-convicts from one link to the other possible (SSP, 2007:16).196 Fol-
lowing this metaphor, citizens who entered the judicial system moved through the 
various organisations as if part of an assembly line: they were kept permanently 
in sight, while each organisation performed its own specific, but well-coordinated 
task. 
Developing coordinated approaches posed several organisational dilem-
mas. Cooperation between formally separated organisations required the estab-
lishment of a platform for cooperation (such as Security Houses or ‘chains’ in the 
judicial system), the development of a shared problem definition, and the imple-
mentation of integrated activities. Blueprint approaches were deemed ineffective 
for personalised approaches to habitual offenders or at-risk adolescents (TSS, 
2002:16). Instead, “sharing best practices” (e.g. APAV, 2005:14) and developing 
new science-based best practices in the expertise Centre for Crime Prevention and 
Security197 (APJD, 2002:9) were two important means to improve the effective-
ness of personalised interventions.198 
 
The coordination of activities often meant that data-sharing between organisa-
tions was required. For instance, the early detection of crime threats – from juve-
                                                   
196 This metaphor was also discussed in Crime Control. Here, government’s concern was an 
overburdening of organisations further down the judicial chain as a result of an increased police 
capacity (CC, 2001:13). This issue was still relevant a year later: “It is out of the question that 
the work done by one link be rendered futile because of a lack of capacity or cooperation with 
another link in the chain. Of prime importance is an integrated approach” (TSS, 2002:7). 
197 In Dutch: Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid. 
198 Knowledge of the causes of criminal behaviour is an important contribution to the realisa-
tion of preventive ambitions: “Our increased knowledge of the risk factors which cause adoles-
cents to fall into delinquency makes it possible to intervene at an earlier stage” (PE, 2002:5).  
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nile delinquency to terrorism199 – was often enabled by organisational or techno-
logical innovations. In the case of at-risk adolescents, this led to the introduction 
of the ‘Electronic Child Dossier’,200 an electronic file kept on every Dutch child, 
able to be consulted by various organisations such as general practitioners and 
youth welfare workers (OY, 2004; ECEC, 2007),201 and allowing all relevant or-
ganisations access to the same information. This organising philosophy was also 
applied in the judicial chain, where all organisations were linked to a registration 
system comprising every person in the judicial system, including his or her cur-
rent status and currently responsible organisation (TSS, 2002:31).  
Collecting and sharing data through this type of innovation enabled a 
permanent and closed network of monitoring to be established. At the same time, 
it also raised questions about the balance between privacy and security. However, 
the often-portrayed contradiction between ‘privacy’ and ‘security’ should, accord-
ing to the government, be perceived with more nuance: “The protection of the 
private sphere is often seen as indispensable to the protection of security. Guaran-
teeing security enables citizens to move freely and protects them against external 
threats and illegal or disproportional violations of their person or property. In 
public opinion, the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘protection of privacy’ are also often 
presented as opposites. Law enforcers and welfare workers often feel limited by 
norms and practices designed to protect the private sphere, especially the ex-
change of personal data” (SSP, 2007:5-6). Government aimed to clarify the privacy 
norms to professionals and, if necessary, remove unnecessary privacy restrictions 
(SSP, 2007:5-6).202  
 
3.3.3. Personalisation: realising behavioural change 
The strategy of personalisation, developed from 1993 onwards, was a conse-
quence of the shift in attention from petty crime to the people behind petty crime 
– from offences to offenders. From 2002 onwards, these “personalised approaches 
                                                   
199 “The cabinet wants to become aware of signs of derailment in an early stage, in cases of 
domestic violence as much as in cases of violence originating from terrorist motives” (GD, 
2007:2632). 
200 In Dutch: Elektronisch Kinddossier. Of course, more traditional surveillance and monitoring 
by the police are used as well. For instance, a police contact can lead to further investigation of 
possible problems in an adolescent’s family situation: “[…] this contact can be used to analyse or 
detect problems of adolescents and their family situation. If necessary, more thorough screen-
ing can be employed” (PE, 2002:11). 
201 These two memoranda are further discussed in the chapter on public health policy. 
202 The analysed memoranda provided no further information on the balance between privacy 
and security. Furthermore, the objective of this study was not to analyse the exact shifts in this 
balance. However, what the above-cited passage demonstrates is that security policies deliber-
ately explored the boundaries of what was legally allowed – otherwise the issue would not have 
been brought up and professionals would not feel limited in their activities.  
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that stress prevention” (SSP, 2007:2) were further developed and expanded to 
include risk citizens posing a threat to public order. Again, habitual offenders and 
problem adolescents were targeted as the two most important groups. 
 
The type of perpetrator that “persists in criminal behaviour” (TSS, 2002:14) was 
“[…] responsible for exactly those types of crime and annoyance with which citi-
zens had been more and more confronted over the past years” (TSS, 2002:16). 
The government defined a habitual offender as any person charged more than 
once during his criminal career (TSS, 2002:14) – admittedly, a broad definition. 
To protect society against this type of perpetrator, the government ap-
proach included “[…] arresting this group earlier, detaining them longer and cre-
ating services to decrease recidivism” (TSS, 2002:5). Specifically for the preven-
tion of recidivism, special penitentiary institutions for very active habitual offend-
ers were established.203 By means of a special detention and treatment order, 
habitual offenders could now be placed in this type of institution for a maximum 
of two years. By taking “a suspect’s total criminal past into account and not just 
separate offences” (IAHO, 2003:2), habitual offenders could be detained for a 
longer period of time. During their detention, customised treatment programmes 
could then be developed to break the vicious cycle of criminal behaviour. This 
might include programmes to kick alcohol- or drug addictions (IAHO, 2003:3; TSS, 
2002:8; 20). Tailor-made interventions for every individual detainee were pre-
sumed to increase the effectiveness of recidivism prevention. For some, a prose-
cutor’s offer of penal labour or another alternative sanction might be effective, 
while others were more receptive to penitentiary treatment programmes (TSS, 
2002:25-26).204 
More in general, the problem of recidivism (both habitual and non-
habitual offenders) was characterised by a systematic screening and analysis of 
convicts, an expansion of the available methods for behavioural interventions 
(according to a scientific accreditation system), an improved cooperation between 
probation offices and prison administration, and increased efforts to detect early 
signs of possible recidivism: “Ex-convicts who require strict control, will be fol-
lowed intensively to detect signs of relapse or recidivism at an early stage and to 
intervene if necessary” (SSP, 2007:16).  
 
The second important target group for behavioural interventions was formed by 
“adolescents who threaten to slide off into a criminal career” (TSS, 2002:14). Even 
                                                   
203 In Dutch: Inrichting voor Stelselmatige Daders. 
204 There is also a category of habitual offenders, which is not susceptible to any form of treat-
ment (TSS, 2002:26). 
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though the levels of crime and annoyance caused by adolescents had seemed to 
stabilise from the late 1990s onward (albeit at a substantially higher level than 
before), juvenile delinquency appeared to be growing more violent and aggres-
sive. Furthermore, adolescents running into trouble with the police seemed to be 
getting younger: whereas 16 and above used to be the most common age, serious 
crimes were now being committed more and more by 14- and 15-year olds. Even 
very young children (between 8 and 12) were having more frequent run-ins with 
the police (TSS, 2002:15). Special attention was directed at adolescents from cer-
tain cultural minorities.205 
The basic government strategy was:206 “adolescents who fall into delin-
quency must be guided back on track at an early stage and with great persistence. 
This is in the interest of society, their social environment and eventually also in 
their own interest” (PE, 2002:2). The government’s “new offensive” (SSP, 
2007:11) aimed to intervene in the lives of adolescents “at an early stage as possi-
ble” (SSP, 2007:2). These interventions were not only repressive in nature, but 
also covered areas such as employment, education, child protection and public 
health. The idea was that interventions in these areas could help to reduce risks in 
the physical, mental, social and cognitive development of children (OY, 2004:9).207  
An extensive quote sums up the government’s preventive reasoning un-
derlying the approach to risk adolescents at this time: “Early interventions, at the 
moment when [adolescents] are still susceptible, are important from a pedagogi-
cal point of view. This concerns the broad target group of adolescents, both Dutch 
native and cultural minorities, as well as those adolescents who have just begun to 
commit criminal offences such as vandalism, scooter-, bicycle- and cell phone 
theft, intimidation, annoyance, et cetera. […] But this also concerns adolescents 
who are driven towards crime and are in need of help. In all these cases, we are 
dealing with adolescents who are probably at the start of a criminal career if we 
do not intervene. Absenteeism (and, as a consequence, a low level of educational 
attainment) is an important risk factor. An accumulation of risk factors, such as a 
                                                   
205 Of all adolescent Antilleans and Arubans, 10.6% was suspected of delinquency, among Mo-
roccan adolescents, this figure was 8.3%, and among former-Yugoslavs and Somalis 7.7%; by 
contrast, the percentage for native Dutch adolescents was 1.8%. Moreover, since police data 
only registered country of birth, which excluded second-generation migrants, “[t]he overrepre-
sentation of adolescents of foreign descent is [...] probably underestimated” (TSS, 2002:15). 
206 The answer to the problem of juvenile delinquency is thought to lie in behavioural change, 
even though the structural causes for the high level of this type of delinquency may be broader: 
“The causes of juvenile delinquency are numerous and complex. Individualisation, migration 
and socio-economic factors play a role. These are causes that are difficult to influence. But much 
can be done about juvenile delinquency by putting [these offenders] under pressure” (PE, 
2002:4). 




poor family situation and a lagging emotional development, increases the chance 
of an adolescent running into trouble, or sliding downhill even further. This way, 
they can become the habitual offenders of the future” (TSS, 2002:15). In short: 
“Youth policy is based on the notion that prevention pays off” (QS, 2010). 
Comprehensive and personalised approaches incorporating elements of 
care, support and sanctioning were deemed best suited to realise a behavioural 
change (TSS, 2002:16; 21): “For every specific situation, the most appropriate 
strategy is determined. Examples are family support for parents, mentor pro-
grammes on a voluntary basis in secondary education, preventing language ar-
rears, preventing early school leaving, supporting adolescents to earn a relevant 
diploma for the labour market, labour market mediation, living under supervision 
for adolescents living alone, and boarding school-like services which offer correc-
tive programmes” (TSS, 2002:42). The range of available interventions also in-
cluded (PE, 2002:3; TSS, 2002:21-22; SSP, 2007:2): 
- Insisting, or even compelling parents to accept family support;  
- Strict enforcement of the Compulsory Education Act;  
- Developing screening instruments to determine the best approach for 
every individual adolescent;  
- National implementation of ‘case consultations’ between police and other 
relevant organisations; 
- More attention for reintegration in detention through ‘intensive routing 
support’;208 
- Compulsory aftercare following detention by probation services and 
youth care to prevent relapse into previous criminal habits; 
- Using legal means for administrative confinement and intensified after-
care.  
 
Schools play an important role in government strategy in this area. Since adoles-
cents without a starting qualification for the labour market have a four times 
greater chance of becoming involved in criminal activities, the government aimed 
to tackle absenteeism and the problem of early school leavers (SSP, 2007:2; ODO, 
2007:2). Measures included an improved system of absenteeism monitoring, of-
fering career orientation, improved transfers from primary to secondary educa-
tion, case consultations by so-called ‘care advisory teams’, and support to enrol 
unemployed adolescents without a qualification in an educational programme 
(ODO, 2007; SSP, 2007:11). At the same time, authorities introduced a tit-for-tat 
policy if “obstinate adolescents” dropped out of school anyway (SSP, 2007:11; 
                                                   
208 In Dutch: Intensieve Trajectbegeleiding. 
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TSS, 2002:5). Furthermore, a compulsory starting qualification for the labour 
market was introduced (ODO, 2007). 
 
In Security Starts with Prevention, the rising number of crimes committed by 
young children led to an expansion of the government’s approach to at-risk ado-
lescents to include children under the age of 12. These children were not liable to 
legal prosecution, but could be approached in various other ways, for example, by 
police officers calling them to account for their behaviour on the street. If police 
officers should come across children under the age of 12 in risky circumstances, 
they would bring them home to their parents and a note would be made in the 
national ‘referral index risk adolescents’.  
Youth care might then take further action. For instance, parents could be 
proactively contacted through house calls. Youth care could insist on parents ac-
cepting parenting and family support (ACA, 2008): “If parents are not capable of 
fulfilling their role as educators, a Centre for Youth and Family209 can offer them 
family support on a voluntary basis. If parents are not motivated, social workers 
should not let go of the family but further urge them to accept family support. In 
the end, compulsory family support in the form of a Family Supervision Order is 
an option” (SSP, 2007:12). 
 
3.4. Synopsis 
There are two striking differences between the 2001 memorandum Crime Control 
and that of 2002, Towards a Safer Society. Whereas the former took ‘crime’ as the 
dominant notion, the latter incorporated crime into a broader notion of ‘security’. 
And whereas the former was almost technocratic in nature, the latter expressed 
an attitude of decisiveness in the face of societal problems. However, both differ-
ences are, upon closer inspection, also a progression of earlier developments. 
‘Security’ had been slowly gaining importance in policymaking since 1993. And, 
besides viewing this as an expression of a change in the Dutch political landscape 
since the 2002 parliamentary elections, the decisive attitude could also be under-
stood as a continuation of the problem-oriented approach inherent to a strategy 
of prevention.  
 
The security paradigm broadened the range of relevant phenomena for policy-
making. While ‘crime’ refers to legally defined acts, ‘security’ refers to a certain 
status or quality of the public domain. Crime is but one of the relevant factors for a 
state of security – others include nuisance, degradation and subjective feelings of 
                                                   
209 In Dutch: Centrum voor Jeugd en Gezin. These are municipality-based services with a national 
coverage for parenting advice and support. 
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security among the general public. Furthermore, the security paradigm takes the 
public domain as the object of interventions. Hence, concerns for the public order 
rather than the legal order became the justification for state interventions. 
Security and prevention have a strong conceptual affinity. Besides the fact 
that both can be applied to a potentially limitless range of social phenomena, they 
can in many cases be understood as forming two sides of the same coin: whereas 
security refers to a certain status or quality of the public domain, prevention is the 
aversion of threats to this status or quality.  
Characteristic of this emphasis on prevention was the identification of 
‘risks’ for the selection of objects of intervention. The notion of ‘risk’ is typical for a 
preventive vocabulary: objects of policy intervention are identified on the basis of 
their potential for harm. Four types of risks for public order were identified by the 
government. Risk citizens, most importantly habitual offenders and problem ado-
lescents, were the designated objects of personalised approaches to prevent fu-
ture deviant behaviour. Risky places, such as train stations or problematic 
neighbourhoods, and risky times, such as nights out, were the focal point for in-
creased surveillance and law enforcement efforts. And risk factors, such as drugs, 
alcohol and other catalysts for aggressive behaviour, were the object of disincen-
tive policies. 
The expansion of the state’s intervention repertoire – following the gov-
ernment’s decisive attitude towards security issues – was to a large extent infused 
with a preventive perspective, as well. The creation of ‘urgency areas’, in which 
public authorities acquired additional competences to stop degradation and re-
store authority, the creation of a new detention order for the long term treatment 
of habitual offenders, and the creation of a legal framework for the use of CCTV-
surveillance were examples of newly developed competences with obvious pre-
ventive objectives. 
 
Crime policy from 2002 onwards saw the return of norm-oriented crime preven-
tion and explicit attention for citizen responsibility, which was first introduced in 
Society and Crime (1985) and the 1990 memorandum Evolving Law. However, 
upon closer inspection, an important difference is discernible between the two. In 
the 1980s, government equated ‘individual responsibility’ with accountability. 
Every citizen was, to a large extent, perceived as being responsible for norm en-
forcement in his own living environment and for the protection of his own prop-
erty by means of technical prevention. If citizens failed to take responsibility, gov-
ernment was unable and unwilling to compensate for this lack of societal effort.  
However, by 2007, government had developed an understanding of citi-
zen responsibility which was based, not on a division of responsibilities, but on 
the construction of a shared responsibility between state and society. The differ-
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ence between the two is that the former was a mechanism for the limitation of 
state responsibility, whereas the latter is a mechanism or justification for a further 
expansion of state responsibility. In the preventive gaze, the ‘ex post’ responsibil-
ity of the constitutional state – i.e. accountability for one’s own actions – was 
transformed into an ‘ex ante’ responsibility: the capability of citizens to assess the 
consequences of their actions beforehand is appealed to. If citizens failed to do 
this, government perceived itself as justified to intervene in a preventive way: 
habitual offenders were subjected to recidivism prevention programmes, risk 
families to family support, and at-risk adolescents to personal coaching.  
A further justification of these interventions was constructed in the form 
of a metaphorical alliance between state and society: state and society needed each 
other to realise a secure society, and the state was justified in protecting and sup-
porting a vulnerable society. Instead of staying aloof in the face of society’s failure 
to take responsibility for technical prevention and norm enforcement, the gov-
ernment set out to “become an ally of citizens” (CA, 2010:3; cf. CA, 2007:3). Like-
wise, law-abiding citizens were called upon to actively participate in achieving a 
more secure society. 
 
The three organising strategies of proximity, coordination and personalisation, 
which were first developed between 1993 and 2001, were further refined and 
expanded upon from 2002 onwards. In the first place, the strategy of proximity 
served the purpose to approach the causes and breeding grounds of crime and 
insecurity in citizens’ direct living environments. Situation-specific approaches at 
neighbourhood level characterised the government’s preventive and law enforc-
ing activities. Interventions ranged from visible surveillance and law enforcement 
activities at risky times and places, to the structural improvement of living condi-
tions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and cooperation between local network 
partners in Security Houses. 
Second, the strategy of coordination referred to an effective organisation 
of a broad range of preventive interventions. There is no single measure effective 
enough to tackle the causes of crime and insecurity. Organisational boundaries 
between the police, public prosecutor and welfare organisations may well have 
been logical from a task-oriented perspective, but often formed a barrier to the 
implementation of effective interventions from a preventive perspective. Organis-
ing cooperation around individual cases in Security Houses, aligning actors in the 
judicial system in a ‘chain’ to make seamless transfers of delinquents from one 
link to the other possible, and sharing ‘best practices’ and data on individual risk 




And third, the strategy of personalisation was a consequence of the shift in 
intervention target from petty crime to the people behind petty crime. From 2002 
on, this strategy was broadened to include citizens posing the greatest risk to pub-
lic order – most importantly, habitual offenders and risk adolescents. Citizens who 
had been identified as risk citizens served as the metaphorical enemy in the 
aforementioned alliance between state and society. The approach adopted to op-
pose this ‘enemy’ sought to realise a structural behavioural change. A specialised 
detention order to enable the long-term treatment of habitual offenders, reinte-
gration programmes for juvenile delinquents and parenting support for risk ado-
lescents were developed to prevent recidivism of offenders and prevent risk ado-
lescents from sliding off into a criminal career. These activities were characterised 
by a mixed pedagogical strategy, in which elements of discipline and care were 
combined to integrate deviant citizens into society. 
 
Dutch crime policy has thus seen several fundamental changes since the introduc-
tion of prevention in 1985. Complementary to a judicial response to crime, a 
strategy was developed to intervene on the risk factors of crime. At first, adminis-
trative prevention stressed the importance of increased surveillance and technical 
prevention. Since the 1990s, this approach has been steadily expanded. Twenty-
five years after the publication of the Society and Crime memorandum, a preven-
tive intervention repertoire is in place for risk citizens, risk factors, risky times 
and risky places, which includes a broad range of both repressive and supportive 
strategies. 
In the following sections, two contemporary Dutch policy practices are 
analysed to support the findings in the previous policy genealogy. The selection of 
both practices follows from the current state of affairs in policymaking. First, the 
preventive focus on the public domain and public (instead of legal) order is fur-
ther analysed in the situation-specific approach to crime issues in the district of 
Rotterdam-South. Technical prevention, surveillance, interventions in the oppor-
tunity structure and increased administrative authorities are among the activities 
that may be expected to be employed there.  
And second, the preventive focus on personalised interventions is further ana-
lysed in the approach to habitual offenders, risk adolescents, juvenile delinquents 
and ‘care avoiders’ in the Care and Security House in the city of Tilburg. Here, we 
expect to gain more insight into the strategies of early detection, prevention of 
recidivism and behavioural interventions towards individual citizens. 
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3. Crime prevention in Rotterdam 
 
3.1. Rotterdam-South 
In 2007, the Dutch government published a list of the 40 most problematic Dutch 
neighbourhoods suffering from the accumulated problems of social, housing, pov-
erty and security issues. The majority of neighbourhoods situated in Rotterdam-
South, the part of the city located south of the Meuse River, were included on this 
list. One of the districts in this part of Rotterdam, called Charlois, is home to five of 
these neighbourhoods, of which one, Pendrecht, ranked second on the abovemen-
tioned list of problematic neighbourhoods. Even though its origins date from the 
Middle Ages, present-day Charlois is characterised by early 20th century urban 
expansion in the northern neighbourhoods, and mostly 1950s urban development 
in the southern neighbourhoods.  
In the south, Charlois comprises two neighbourhoods (Pendrecht and 
Zuidwijk). These are separated by an overground tube line, but share the same 
architectural characteristics. Both neighbourhoods were built according to the 
post World War II modernist principles of urban planning: straight sight lines, 
separated apartment blocks with stretches of green in between (so called ‘com-
munal gardens’), a grid structure of main and side streets, a clear separation of 
functions (such as a centrally located shopping centre), functionally designed 
apartments with little variation, and a total plan for the neighbourhood as a cohe-
sive whole. Underlying these modernist principles was an optimistic belief in the 
possibilities to improve living standards through urban planning. Pendrecht and 
Zuidwijk were built as ‘garden cities’, which reflected an ideal of how people 
should live: light and space instead of the cramped, dark and unhygienic housing 
of the old cities. According to the original architect of both neighbourhoods, urban 
planning was to support the coexistence of “the harmony and privacy of the family 
in its own home, and the harmony and communality of a group”.210 
                                                   
210 “De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:9; my translation, RP. The aforementioned ideals of the original 
architect of Rotterdam’s ‘garden cities’ to create a harmonious social and family life by means of 
urban planning may come across as naive nowadays. However, the objective to create an attrac-
tive environment in which people can live securely and pleasantly is by no means a thing of the 
past. Consider, for instance, the following vision presented in a municipal policy memorandum 
on the long term developments in Pendrecht: “Children play outside and neighbours have a chat 
while they are tending their garden. All inhabitants take care of their direct living environment 
and their houses. They are interested in each other, without suffering from small-town meddle-
someness” (“De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:22; my translation, RP).  
The neighbourhood is still (or: again?) a core notion in municipal policy. However, 
what has changed is the idea that proper urban planning is sufficient to create a pleasant living 
environment. Instead, ‘the social’ and the way people act in these neighbourhoods have become 
a focal point of efforts to prevent undesirable behaviour and improve living conditions.  
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From the 1980s onwards, the population composition changed, a devel-
opment accompanied by an accumulation of crime, housing and poverty issues. 
People from the lower socio-economic strata were now the main inhabitants of 
the apartment blocks, which were once built for the middle class. Among the 
roughly 25,000 inhabitants of Pendrecht and Zuidwijk are many immigrants, re-
cipients of social security (14% for Pendrecht), and poorly educated people (75% 
for Pendrecht).211 In other words, this part of the city “[...] with its many cheap 
rented houses is a sanctuary for people whose lives have not been smooth sailing 
– to say the least”:212 people from broken homes, single and teenage mothers, 
youth gang members, drop-outs, victims of domestic violence, alcohol and drug 
addicts, former psychiatric patients, the lonely and the homeless. Even if their 
number is relatively small, these socio-economically deprived citizens cause a 
great deal of crime, annoyance and physical degradation. 
 
3.2. Political context: a ‘regime change’ 
The sudden rise of ‘Liveable Rotterdam’,213 the political party of populist leader 
Pim Fortuyn, is a crucial contextual factor for understanding the emphasis in mu-
nicipal policymaking on the quality of social life.214 In the municipal elections of 
March 2002, newcomer ‘Liveable Rotterdam’ won 17 of the 45 seats on Rotter-
dam’s city council, which was previously governed by Labour led majorities. Two 
months later, Fortuyn was assassinated on the eve of the national Parliamentary 
elections. Nonetheless, the participation of ‘Liveable Rotterdam’ proved a turning 
point in municipal politics, and especially in the approach to issues of liveability, 
security and integration. The party’s political agenda played an important role in 
the newly formed Municipal Executive. Moreover, ‘Liveable Rotterdam’ had a ma-
jor impact on the general political spectrum in Rotterdam and influenced the po-
litical agendas of established parties (Van Ostaaijen, 2010).  
                                                   
211 http://www.rotterdam.nl/DSV/Document/Bestemmingsplannen%20in%20procedure/ 
 Charlois/Pendrecht/12.%20Masterplan%20Pendrecht%202004.pdf; consulted d.d. 21-9-2011. 
212 Quote from a journalist’s eyewitness account in Pendrecht, http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1038/ 
Rotterdam/article/detail/2224897/2007/09/28/Beste-wensen-voor-mijn-buurman.dhtml; 
consulted d.d. 27-10-2011.  
213 In Dutch: ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’. 
214 Even though the living conditions in Rotterdam-South have been a concern for the munici-
pality since the mid-1990s, the current policy approach was only developed when the notions of 
security and liveability entered the policy discourse. Before 2002, housing development was the 
dominant strategy to improve living conditions. After 2002, this strategy was complemented by 
person-oriented approaches and by a broader concern for the quality of the public domain. 
Tackling the causes of insecurity contributes to a structural improvement of liveability and fits 
the municipal strategy of “social reconquest” (See http://www.kei-cetrum.nl/websites/kei/ 
files/KEI2003/Projecten/GemeenteRotterdam_Sociale%20herovering.pdf; consulted d.d. 29-
10-2011 (my translation, RP). 
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In the first years after the 2002 elections, the new Municipal Executive or-
ganised a new approach to issues of security and liveability (Tops, 2007). First of 
all, it took the perspective of the citizens as a starting point: if citizens perceive 
something as a problem, it is a problem. For instance, subjective feelings of inse-
curity and perceptions of the quality of the built-up environment formed impor-
tant considerations for the selection of priorities in municipal policy.  
Second, security policy was placed at the heart of the municipal organisa-
tion, in close proximity to the Municipal Executive. A programme bureau for secu-
rity policy was positioned directly under the mayor. Furthermore, a steering 
committee was installed, in which the mayor, the alderman responsible for secu-
rity policy, the chief commissioner of police and the public prosecutor could di-
rectly coordinate their efforts and determine priorities. 
In the third and final place, the new Municipal Executive emphasised pol-
icy implementation and ‘front-line action’ over policymaking. To this end, several 
instruments and organisational novelties were introduced.215 For instance, the 
municipal Security Index – in which the objective and subjective security figures 
of each neighbourhood are monitored – was used as an important instrument of 
communication and control: priorities and performances were explicitly made 
public. Furthermore, very specific ‘targets’ were determined to measure the per-
formance of both the Municipal Executive and the various municipal organisations 
responsible for policy implementation. Another organisational novelty was the 
introduction of several so-called ‘city marines’:216 project leaders assigned to 
break through existing organisational boundaries and organise coordinated ef-
forts between actors involved in policy implementation around concrete prob-
lems, such as the approach to slum landlords and their tenants. 
 
3.3. Policy context: a preventive and area-oriented approach 
Despite the rhetoric of “tough action”217 – exemplified by the frequent use of mili-
tary metaphors (such as ‘city marines’ and ‘front-line action’) and the “deliberate 
strategy to occasionally push the legal boundaries”218 – the municipal policy ap-
proach to security following the 2002 ‘regime change’ was certainly not solely 
about repression. From the outset, prevention and care played a crucial role in the 
strategy to structurally improve the security situation and liveability in Rotter-
dam’s disadvantaged neighbourhoods (e.g. Tops, 2007).  
                                                   
215 An example of the municipal focus on implementation and front-line action is the explicit 
description of a municipal security policy memorandum as “[a]n action programme, not a policy 
document”. See: Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:6. 
216 In Dutch: ‘stadsmarinier’. 
217 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:1. 
218 In the words of an interviewee. 
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In the most recent policy memoranda, prevention and repression were 
presented as two complementary characteristics of the municipal security policy: 
“No matter how different Rotterdammers may be, they all agree on one issue: the 
city should be secure. We use a preventive approach, complemented by robust 
repressive actions if necessary”.219 On the one hand, enforcement is crucial since 
“[f]reedom only exists when boundaries are set”.220 Specific issues include a strict 
approach to every-day annoyances in the public domain and to violent crimes. On 
the other hand, “[s]ecurity starts […] with the prevention of insecurity”.221 Per-
sonal approaches for risk or criminal adolescents, but also the design and mainte-
nance of the public domain fit in this preventive approach. 
Repression and prevention are interrelated strategies. For instance, police 
and non-police surveillance can serve both objectives simultaneously: law en-
forcement, detection, deterrence and discipline are all intended purposes of sur-
veillance (as we shall discuss further below). Furthermore, a tough approach can 
also have a preventive effect by itself. In the words of one of the interviewees: 
“Sometimes, if you bite instead of bark, this can have a large preventive effect on 
residents. They know you are not afraid to act”. And finally, a basic level of order 
is necessary to deploy a strategy of structural prevention.  
Roughly five years ago, hardly a day went by in Pendrecht without a vio-
lent crime. For this reason, the first action taken in Pendrecht and Zuidwijk fol-
lowing the ‘regime change’ in Rotterdam was “a large cleanup” – in the words of 
an interviewee – of people who, usually in groups or gangs, persisted in criminal 
or annoying behaviour in the public domain. Members of gangs were identified, 
special ‘intervention teams’ were formed to individually approach residents at 
home, parents of minor gang members were approached, and instigators of crime 
and annoyance in the public domain were closely followed by the police. Only 
after the most troublesome individuals had been removed from the neighbour-
hood or placed in an individual support programme were the conditions right for 
structural strategies of prevention. 
 
Another characteristic of Rotterdam’s security policy is the distinction between 
phenomenon-oriented approaches, person-oriented approaches and area-
oriented approaches. The first concerns issues such as nightlife violence and do-
mestic violence. The second strategy “combines care and punishment”222 in the 
                                                   
219 Ruimte voor talent en ondernemen, 2010:16; my translation, RP. 
220 Ruimte voor talent en ondernemen, 2010:5; my translation, RP. 
221 Ruimte voor talent en ondernemen, 2010:5; my translation, RP. 
222 Werken aan talent en ondernemen, 2010:24; my translation, RP. The attitude of the involved 
citizens is crucial for determining which course of action is chosen. A distinction is made be-
tween the able, the willing and the unwilling: “We give every opportunity to Rotterdammers 
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approach to individual citizens, such as risk adolescents, habitual offenders and 
drug addicts. However, the third strategy is of special interest here.223 Rotter-
dam’s security policy is very much a neighbourhood-oriented policy. Neighbour-
hoods are perceived as the geographical entities, which are important for citizens’ 
every-day wellbeing: “[...] a ‘reasonable’ living environment is not good enough, 
one should feel at home in the direct living environment”.224 Furthermore, 
neighbourhoods are perceived as a logical object of interventions to tackle the 
causes of crime and insecurity. Interventions are organised in citizens’ direct liv-
ing environment “to prevent a neighbourhood from deteriorating”.225 
For every neighbourhood, a “Comprehensive Neighbourhood Action Pro-
gramme” has been developed by an area manager in cooperation with relevant 
partners, such as police and housing corporations.226 Furthermore, data on objec-
tive and subjective security are monitored yearly for every neighbourhood in the 
municipal Security Index, which was published for the ninth time in 2010.227 
Based on these data, priorities for the police and municipality can be determined, 
and early warnings of decline can be identified to enable a quick response and to 
forestall a further worsening of problems.228 And finally, the investment pro-
gramme ‘Rotterdam South Pact’229 was specifically developed “to call a halt to 
selective migration by 2015 (in order to retain residents from middle or higher 
income groups) and to increase residents’ satisfaction with their living condi-
tions” in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods on the south bank of the Meuse.230 
 
                                                                                                                                 
who are ‘willing and able’, we help the group that is ‘willing but unable’, and at the same time 
we are strict towards people who are ‘unwilling’ (Werken aan talent en ondernemen, 2010:3; my 
translation, RP). 
223 Person-oriented approaches are the subject of the description of the activities in and around 
the Care and Security House in Tilburg. 
224 Pact op Zuid: vier jaar investeren in Rotterdam Zuid 2006-2010, 2010:59; my translation, RP. 
225 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:2. 
226 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:1. 
227 The Security Index 2010 is based on objective crime figures (for instance of theft, violence, 
burglary, annoyance, vandalism and maintenance of the public domain) and on the input of 
16.000 inhabitants of Rotterdam, who were asked about their perception of security, liveability, 
and the municipal and police response to these problems. Every neighbourhood was classified 
into one of the following categories: ‘insecure neighbourhood’, ‘problem neighbourhood’, 
‘threatened neighbourhood’, ‘attention neighbourhood’, and ‘(reasonably) secure neighbour-
hood’. For instance, Pendrecht scored a 5,4 out of a possible 10 points in 2010, and has seen a 
rise in the last five years in status from ‘problem neighbourhood’ to ‘threatened neighbourhood’ 
(http://www.rotterdam.nl/Directie%20Veilig/PDF/Nieuwsflits/Veiligheidsindex2010LR.pdf; 
consulted d.d. 27-10-2011). 
228 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:2. 
229 In Dutch: Pact op Zuid. 
230 http://www.pactopzuid.info/index.php?pageID=22; consulted d.d. 29-10-2011.  
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Using this combination of repression and prevention on a neighbourhood level, 
the municipality aims to achieve more than the absence of crime. Concerns for 
security and the quality of citizens’ direct living environment have been brought 
together under the moniker ‘liveability’.231 The eventual objective for Pendrecht is 
a neighbourhood with a varied housing stock, more middle class families,232 green 
and communal gardens, “involved, positive and active residents”,233 and a “natural 
and cosy atmosphere”.234 A preventive approach to the structural causes of crime 
and insecurity on neighbourhood level is a core element in the efforts to realise a 
liveable neighbourhood.  
In the following, three different types of preventive activities in the 
neighbourhoods Pendrecht and Zuidwijk are described.235 First, increased surveil-
lance activities are motivated by the preventive objectives of deterrence and early 
detection. Second, the design of the public domain and the population composi-
tion are transformed into relevant objects of preventive interventions. And third, 
local authorities tend to err on the side of caution: presumptions of problems 
serve as a justification for several preventive interventions. 
 
3.4. Visible presence 
Surveillance and monitoring can be understood as simultaneously serving preven-
tion and repression. Surveillance, especially police surveillance, is a repressive 
strategy in terms of law enforcement. Police patrol and CCTV-surveillance are 
important means to detect criminal behaviour. At the same time, surveillance 
techniques also aim to prevent crimes from being committed: people behave in a 
more disciplined fashion when they know they are, can or may be observed (Fou-
cault, 1975). Surveillance also enables early detection of crime and security risks. 
And visible surveillance in the public domain can have a positive impact on sub-
                                                   
231 Social and security issues are highly interrelated from the viewpoints of prevention and 
liveability. It is therefore not surprising that the municipality of Rotterdam has introduced a 
Social Index complementary to the Security Index. Since 2008, the social quality of all neigh-
bourhoods has been monitored. Indicators include pollution and annoyance, level of neigh-
bourhood services, housing quality, command of the Dutch language, level of public health, level 
of education, social cohesion, social participation, and social and cultural activities. In the 2010 
Social Index, Pendrecht scores a 5,1 out of a maximum 10 points, which places the neighbour-
hood in the category ‘socially vulnerable’. See: http://www.rotterdam.nl/COS/publicaties/ 
Vanaf%202005/09-3100.Sociale%20Index%202010.pdf; consulted d.d. 27-10-2011. In its most 
recent work programme, the Municipal Executive states the ambition to integrate the Security 
Index and the Social Index into a “neighbourhood profile” (Werken aan talent en ondernemen, 
2010:5; my translation, RP). 
232 “De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:49; my translation, RP. 
233 “De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:6; my translation, RP. 
234 “De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:21; my translation, RP. 
235 At the time this study was being researched (Fall 2011), the area-oriented approach to secu-
rity in Pendrecht and Zuidwijk had already been underway for a decade. 
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jective feelings of security. Several surveillance techniques – both police and non-
police – are deployed in Rotterdam-South with these preventive objectives in 
mind. 
 
3.4.1. Being there 
A first surveillance strategy is to establish a “visible presence” of the police and 
the City Management Department236 in the public domain to prevent crime and 
annoyance. ‘Being there’ not only serves to increase residents’ subjective feelings 
of security, but also aims to deter criminal behaviour. Locations for surveillance 
are not selected ‘at random’, but according to a preventive reasoning. So called 
‘hot spots’ – places and times posing the highest risk of criminal or annoying be-
haviour such as robberies, burglaries, vandalism, drug-related problems and 
youth group annoyance – are specifically selected for intensified surveillance. A 
‘hot spot’ is identified by the municipality as “an area consisting of one or more 
streets where degeneration, crime and pollution set the scene”.237 An example of 
surveillance at ‘hot spots’ is the so-called “anti-raid patrol”: regular and clearly 
visible police patrol in shopping streets to deter potential raiders.  
In principle, there is at least one police officer permanently present in the 
neighbourhood – but certainly more during the evening and at night. There are 
also complementary non-police surveillance activities. For instance, the ‘youth 
service team’, consisting of twelve adolescents under the supervision of a welfare 
worker, patrols twice a week during busy hours at a large shopping centre in Rot-
terdam-South. Besides providing a job to adolescents who were on the verge of 
going off the rails, the ‘youth service team’ is a means to prevent police action and 
“have a better atmosphere instead of more police on the streets” (in the words of 
an interviewee). In their clearly recognisable red shirts, the team members patrol 
in pairs and call adolescents in and around the shopping centre to account for 
their behaviour. Unlike the police, the ‘youth service team’ can talk to annoying 
adolescents on their own level and in a non-threatening way. They start by simply 
striking up a conversation (‘How are you?’, ‘Do you live around here?’) and then 
explain that certain behaviour is annoying to customers and shop-owners, or 
warn that they can be fined if the police catches them smoking or drinking in the 
shopping centre. 
 
Another complementary method of surveillance is the use of CCTV. Even though 
this does not contribute to a ‘visible presence’, it can have important preventive 
effects. CCTV-surveillance has been deployed in Rotterdam since 2000 and there 
                                                   
236 In Dutch: ‘Stadstoezicht’. 
237 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:15. 
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are currently roughly 325 cameras spread across the entire city, mainly at shop-
ping centres, bar districts, train stations, tube stations and problematic 
neighbourhoods. The cameras are watched 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Images 
are stored for seven days.  
CCTV-surveillance serves three purposes: criminal investigation, quick re-
sponse to ongoing crime or disturbances of the public order, and prevention by 
means of deterrence.238 Besides police CCTV-surveillance, private actors also use 
this means of surveillance. For instance, a large housing corporation in Pendrecht 
has installed close to 100 cameras in entrance halls and arcades of their buildings 
to prevent burglary and vandalism and increase tenants’ feelings of security. Many 
shop-owners have also installed their own camera surveillance systems to pre-
vent burglary and facilitate criminal investigations. 
 
Furthermore, besides intensified surveillance on ‘hot spots’, the police have also 
intensified surveillance specifically directed at notorious troublesome individual 
residents in the neighbourhood. These might include ex-offenders, problem ado-
lescents, known alcoholics, khat users, causers of noise pollution, former psychiat-
ric patients, et cetera. The main message towards these residents is a preventive 
one: “we are keeping a close eye on you” – as an interviewee put it. For instance, 
every adolescent (up to 23 years) who has served time in prison and returns to 
Pendrecht is invited for a “welcome talk” with police, municipality and probation 
office. These authorities explain “the rules of the game” and make it clear that the 
adolescent will be closely followed.  
Also, every adolescent in Pendrecht with a prison record or who has 
“caught the police’s attention” on New Year’s Eve receives a “warning letter” the 
next year: the police will be watching him during that year’s celebration. Another 
example is the “Very Irritating Police” (VIP) approach towards known trouble-
makers and instigators of annoyance and criminal behaviour in the neighbour-
hood. The VIP-approach basically means constantly and annoyingly following, 
stopping and checking notorious residents to show them that the police know 
who they are and is keeping a close eye on them. 
 
3.4.2. Eyes and ears on the streets 
A second preventive ambition of surveillance is that of having “eyes and ears” on 
the streets for the early detection of problems. Besides being useful for law en-
forcement, deterrence and criminal investigations, surveillance also increases the 
chance that the police and other organisations will “come across” citizens who 
                                                   
238 http://www.rotterdam.nl/Directie%20Veilig/PDF/Overige%20publicaties/Brochure%20  
Cameratoezicht.pdf; consulted d.d. 27-10-2011. 
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require a personalised preventive approach. This objective transforms the role of 
police officers from one that involves “merely writing fines” for individual in-
fringements into enabling a more structural approach to the causes of these in-
fringements if possible. For instance, “if you repeatedly catch a junkie illegally 
selling newspapers or urinating in public, you could give him a ticket every time, 
but it is more important to register him every time. This way, you build up a dos-
sier and a profile, which can become a reason for welfare work to select him for an 
intervention”.239 Police officers can also report their concerns about the wellbeing 
of individual residents to welfare organisations and housing corporations. 
 
Non-police surveillance can strengthen the authorities’ information position in the 
neighbourhood. For instance, a major housing corporation in Pendrecht has em-
ployed a ‘neighbourhood caretaker’, who is not only responsible for maintenance, 
but also for answering residents’ complaints and for identifying residents who 
either have or cause problems. Tenants who cause noise pollution, who always 
leave the curtains down during the day, who have many guests coming and going 
late at night, whose son has dropped out of school, or whose children are out on 
the streets late at night causing annoyance: these might all be indications of viola-
tions of their rent contract or criminal behaviour, but could also point to underly-
ing personal problems. These indications might be reason for further interven-
tions, such as house calls to find out more about a potential problem. In the words 
of a housing corporation employee: “We act upon presumptions”. 
Citizens themselves can also play an important role as the ‘eyes and ears’ 
in the neighbourhood. In every neighbourhood, there are always concerned and 
committed residents who devote some of their time to creating a better living 
environment. These citizens organise cultural activities, do volunteer work, or-
ganise sports activities, maintain public gardens, write for the neighbourhood 
newspaper, and inform police and housing corporation of annoyance and suspi-
cions of criminal activities.240 Neighbourhood police officers, neighbourhood care-
takers employed by the housing corporation and neighbourhood-based welfare 
workers try to build up a relation with these people to improve their own infor-
mation position and detect liveability problems at an early stage. In the words of a 
housing corporation employee: “These people are my informants”.  
                                                   
239 Example given by an interviewee. 
240 In general, active citizenship is stimulated. For instance, the housing corporation cooperated 
with several residents to paint ‘house rules’ on four garage doors in a square in Pendrecht. 
These rules, visible to everyone, express the social norms that both housing corporations and 
these residents strive for: ‘we say hello to each other’, ‘we are friendly to each other’, ‘the square 
is for everybody, old and young’, ‘playing football is OK, but be careful of cars and windows’, ‘we 
don’t vandalise or make a mess of our neighbourhood’. 
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3.5. The legible neighbourhood 
The structural characteristics of a neighbourhood are important contributors to 
crime and annoyance. First, the physical layout of the built-up environment can 
offer an opportunity structure for criminal behaviour: dark street corners, stair-
case entrances, escape routes and poor locks do not cause criminal behaviour, but 
they do create a context in which criminal behaviour can thrive. And second, the 
population composition of a neighbourhood also correlates with criminal behav-
iour: an overrepresentation of people from the lower socio-economic strata usu-
ally has a negative effect on crime levels and on other aspects of neighbourhood 
liveability.  
Both these structural characteristics are subject to municipal interven-
tions: “[…] there is a link between the physical layout of a neighbourhood 
(squares, entrance halls, garages, alleyways, concentration of care facilities) and 
the safety in the neighbourhood. The quality of the housing (many cheap rented 
dwellings, quickly changing subletting, properties in which drug dealing takes 
place) and inadequate amenities in certain neighbourhoods also have a negative 
effect on safety and the quality of life”.241 The underlying logic or rationale of both 
types of interventions can be described as creating a ‘legible neighbourhood’ – 
that is, a neighbourhood without dirt or degradation, with clear sight lines and 
technical barriers to deter deviant behaviour, good quality housing, and a law-
abiding and responsible middle class population. 
 
3.5.1. Interventions in the opportunity structure 
The lay-out and design of certain streets or squares increase the opportunities for 
individuals to exhibit criminal or annoying behaviour. Interventions in this ‘op-
portunity structure’ are usually of a very subtle nature. They are hardly noticeable 
if they have not been pointed out explicitly. In Pendrecht and Zuidwijk, one hous-
ing corporation owns a large part of the housing stock and is therefore able to 
intervene in the built-up environment on a substantial scale. Three types of inter-
ventions can be discerned in making the built-up environment less vulnerable to 
crime.  
 
A first type of intervention emphasises ‘light’ and ‘sight’. Unobstructed sight lines 
and proper street lighting decrease the possibilities for criminals to escape or to 
remain unnoticed. Small fences are placed in walking paths to block escape routes 
for scooters or bicycles. Hedges are trimmed to create clear sight lines behind 
apartment blocks: hedges have a maximum height of one meter in the front yard 
and a maximum of 1.80 meters in the backyard. Publically accessible arcades are 
                                                   
241 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:12. 
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closed off as much as possible, since these are common places for adolescents or 
drug dealers and addicts to hang around. Well-lit entrance halls help to create a 
feeling of security. The same goes for transparent glass in entrance halls of apart-
ment blocks. Street lighting can improve feelings of security and expose hiding 
places – however, poorly placed lighting can also create attractive places for ado-
lescents to hang around and cause annoyance. Placing curtains in the windows of 
an abandoned and soon to be demolished apartment block creates the impression 
that the residence is occupied and deters copper thieves or homeless people look-
ing for a place to spend the night. 
In short, every element of the built-up environment can be analysed in 
terms of possible criminal behaviour. In the words of a housing corporation’s 
neighbourhood manager: “When I look at this neighbourhood, I look through the 
eyes of a criminal. Where can I hide? Where can I get access to houses or shops? 
Where are the best places to deal drugs? Where are the comfortable places to 
hang around with friends? What can I steal of value from an abandoned apart-
ment block?” This perspective produces certain logical outcomes in terms of ap-
propriate interventions to make life less easy for potential criminals in Pendrecht 
and Zuidwijk. 
 
The second type of intervention in the opportunity structure is the “Clean, Whole 
and Safe Approach”.242 A clean and whole neighbourhood “determines to a large 
extent the residents’ perception” of security.243 The public cleansing department 
prioritises the maintenance of the public domain in the disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods.244 The police strictly enforce rules with regard to outside display areas of 
shops (usually a maximum of one meter). Graffiti is removed within 24 hours. The 
housing corporation responds quickly to residents’ complaints about broken 
lighting or fences. And agreements are made between the municipality and hous-
ing corporation with regard to their mutual responsibility for the maintenance of 
the public domain (roads and pavements, mowing of lawns, maintenance of public 
gardens, safe demolition locations, et cetera).245 
Besides the objective to improve subjective feelings of security among 
residents, these interventions are infused with the preventive argument that a 
clean and intact public domain will make people less inclined to show deviant 
behaviour.246 Again, these interventions do not directly tackle the causes of crime, 
                                                   
242 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:12. 
243 Five-Year Action Programme Security, 2010:12. 
244 See for instance the “Comprehensive Neighbourhood Action Programme of Pendrecht”, 
2011:24. 
245 “Afspraken tijdelijk beheer Pendrecht-Zuid”, 2008. 
246 Cf. the ‘broken window theory’ (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). 
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but they aim to create an environment in which criminal or otherwise undesirable 
behaviour is deterred. 
 
The third type of intervention in the opportunity structure aims to use technical 
measures to reduce opportunities for criminal behaviour. Improved locks in en-
trance halls of apartment blocks are the most obvious example of this type of 
crime prevention. Another example is the boarding up of the ground floor of soon 
to be demolished apartment blocks with large metal sheets to deter copper 
thieves and homeless people from breaking in. Another measure is, for example, 
the installation of turnstiles in tube stations to prevent fare dodging. 
An archetypal technical intervention was made at a large shopping centre 
in Rotterdam-South. The large staircases there were a ‘favourite’ spot for robber-
ies. The escalator going up to the entrance was located next to the staircase going 
down. There was no barrier in between, which made it relatively easy for thieves 
to snatch a bag from a person going up and to make a quick escape by jumping on 
the staircase going down. A technical barrier was created between the two stair-
cases to make this spot a less ‘attractive’ place for robbers. 
 
3.5.2. Interventions in the population composition 
The second set of structural characteristics of a neighbourhood does not concern 
the opportunity structure, but the population composition. Contrary to the sub-
tleness of the interventions described above, interventions in population compo-
sition are very explicit and radical: the ambition is to replace a substantial part of 
the inhabitants from the lower socio-economic strata with new middle-class in-
habitants.247 Moreover, instead of merely deterring crime (as in the case of inter-
ventions in the opportunity structure), these interventions aim to tackle the 
causes of crime on a collective level. 
The Pendrecht and Zuidwijk neighbourhoods have been subject to large-
scale demolition, renovation and new housing development since the mid-1990s. 
This process, commonly referred to as “restructuring” literally aims to create a 
(new) physical and social structure in a neighbourhood: creating more socio-
economic diversity in the population composition by reducing the percentage of 
social housing (from 95% to 54% for Pendrecht)248 and subsequently increasing 
the percentage of private housing (to 35% for Zuidwijk, against 65% tenement 
housing).249 To this end, roughly 50% of the existing housing stock in Pendrecht 
                                                   
247 Werken aan talent en ondernemen, 2010:27. 
248 http://www.kei-centrum.nl/view.cfm?page_id=1897&item_type=project&item_id=215; 
 consulted d.d. 21-9-2011. 
249 http://www.kei-centrum.nl/view.cfm?page_id=1897&item_type=project&item_id=229; 
 consulted d.d. 26-10-2011. 
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and Zuidwijk has been renovated or rebuilt. The underlying theory is that more 
middle class families will lead to fewer liveability problems, including crime and 
annoyance. Middle-class inhabitants reduce unemployment figures, are financially 
more well off and tend to take better care of their own property and direct living 
environment.  
A large housing corporation in Pendrecht summarises its efforts to change 
the population composition – or composition of different “customer groups” – in 
the following figure:250 
 
Customer group Current composition Ambition Pendrecht 2020 
   
Survivors251 15% 10% 
Discoverers252 10% 5% 
Neighbourhood-oriented one- 











Modal income elderly 15% 15% 
Well-off elderly 5% 5% 
Dynamic individualists253 10% 5% 
Well-off families 5% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Completely new blocks of apartments or family houses have been built, existing 
apartments have been combined and renovated to meet contemporary demands 
of size and comfort, and tenants have been offered the opportunity to purchase 
their rented apartment from the housing corporation. Other measures by housing 
corporations to change the population composition are not aimed at attracting the 
middle class by renovation and housing development, but at “stopping the con-
centration of citizens with multiple problems”.254 For instance, new potential ten-
ants in apartments owned by the housing corporation are screened and may even 
be refused on the grounds of insufficient income, a history of previous annoyance 
or large family size.  
Also, current residents who cause severe and repeated annoyance can be 
removed from the neighbourhood: tenancy agreements can be terminated if ten-
                                                   
250 “De Nieuwe Tuinstad”, 2009:49; my translation, RP. 
251 People from lower socio-economic strata, who struggle to make ends meet each day. 
252 People who are still finding their way in life and have a strong urban culture, such as stu-
dents, immigrants and young working people. 
253 Well-educated people with a relatively high income and a dynamic social life. 
254 “Comprehensive Neighbourhood Action Programme of Pendrecht”, 2011:21. 
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ants fail to change their behaviour after repeated warnings. They will be offered 
another house in a different neighbourhood as a “last chance” – in the words of a 
housing corporation employee. If this change of context also fails to yield the de-
sired change in behaviour, they are placed on a list of people to whom Rotterdam-
based housing corporations do not rent apartments. 
 
3.6. Intervening on presumptions 
 
3.6.1. Proactive policing 
Complementary to changing the population composition are efforts to change and 
control the behaviour of the current population. To this end, several preventive 
powers have been introduced in the municipal intervention repertoire. These 
powers follow from a mayor’s formal responsibility for public order in his mu-
nicipality according to article 172 of the Dutch Municipalities Act. Infringements 
of the public order are usually so-called ‘victimless offences’, such as noise pollu-
tion, annoyance and begging. In the vocabulary of ‘public order’, there are no indi-
vidual victims, but society in general is perceived to be the victim of disturbances 
in normal social relations in the public domain. 
The broad notion of ‘responsibility for the public order’ is an administra-
tive competence, which exceeds the boundaries of criminal law. It is therefore 
extremely receptive to preventive ambitions: in principle, the competence to up-
hold the public order is not a punitive competence, but a preventive or restorative 
competence (NGB, 2010:9). From this perspective it is not surprising that the 
mayor’s formal intervention repertoire has been expanded over the last few years 
to include several explicitly preventive competences, all of which feature the pos-
sibility of ‘proactive policing’ or the legal opportunity to intervene before a pre-
sumed infringement of the public order has occurred. These formal preventive 
competences include: 
- Stop and search/‘preventive frisking’ (article 151b Municipalities Act): 
since 2002, the mayor can designate so-called ‘security risk areas’,255 pub-
lically accessible areas with a high risk of violent offences and threat of 
firearms, such as bar districts, areas with drug nuisance or festival ter-
rains (NGB, 2010:23). Both Pendrecht and Zuidwijk are designated ‘secu-
rity risk areas’.256 In these areas, the police may carry out searches of per-
sons and vehicles for weapons (guns, pepper spray, knuckledusters) or il-
legal substances (drugs) without a specific cause or suspicion.  
                                                   
255 In Dutch: ‘veiligheidsrisicogebied’. 
256 http://www.rotterdam.nl/smartsite.dws?id=1046197; consulted d.d. 3-11-2011.  
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In practice, small police teams of ten to fifteen officers may close 
off a street or tube station, stop all cars passing a specific street, or walk 
into a bar to frisk all customers. This so-called ‘preventive frisking’ in 
Pendrecht and Zuidwijk takes place on a daily basis, but only during the 
period between November and April. Preventive frisking aims to prevent 
violence by confiscating weapons, improve citizens’ feelings of security 
and trust in police, and deter people from carrying weapons.257 
- CCTV-surveillance (article 151c Municipalities Act): a legal basis for 
CCTV-surveillance has been in place since 2006, even though many mu-
nicipalities, including Rotterdam, had  already been using this preventive 
measure for some years. As described above, this type of surveillance can 
have various functions, but in principle “installing cameras is always in-
tended as a preventive measure and not as a tool for criminal investiga-
tion” (NGB, 2010:27). 
- Administrative confinement258 (articles 154a and 176a Municipalities 
Act): since 2000, mayors have been able to – under strict legal conditions 
– order the preventive custody of persons for a maximum of 12 hours. 
This competence is aimed at keeping (groups of) troublemakers away 
from large manifestations (such as demonstrations) or events (such as 
football matches).259 
- Preventing hooliganism and severe annoyance (articles 172a and 172b 
Municipalities Act): since 2010, mayors have acquired additional powers 
to deal with known troublemakers (such as football hooligans, drug ad-
dicts and problem adolescents). To prevent expected new violence or an-
noyance, the mayor can introduce temporary bans barring individuals 
from certain places (such as bar districts, tube stations or football stadi-
ums on match days), prohibitions of public gatherings for specific indi-
viduals, and bans barring children under the age of 12 from certain areas 
without parental guidance (NGB, 2010:32-34). 
The municipality of Rotterdam uses the instrument of the ‘area 
ban’ in problematic neighbourhoods to control annoyance, such as public 
gatherings, intimidating group behaviour, drug nuisance, prostitution and 
harassment of citizens. In practice, the police issue a warning after the 
first offence and impose an area ban after a repeated offence (for a mini-
mum of 24 hours and a maximum of nine months).260 
                                                   
257 Yearly Report Preventive Frisking, 2008:6. 
258 In Dutch: ‘bestuurlijke ophouding’. 
259 Veiligheid voor dummies, 2010:4. 
260 http://www.rotterdam.nl/Directie%20Veilig/PDF/Overige%20publicaties/beleidsregel% 
20gebiedsontzegging.pdf; consulted d.d. 27-10-2011. 
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- Temporary restraining order: since 2008, Dutch law has allowed mayors 
to deny a person access to his own home for a maximum of four weeks in 
case of a clear and serious risk of repeated domestic violence. The period 
of the restraining order can be used to arrange for proper support and 
care (NGB, 2010:45). 
- Involuntary psychiatric hospital admission (article 20 BOPZ Act): since 
1994, mayors may order the involuntary admission in a psychiatric hospi-
tal of persons who, as a result of a presumed psychiatric disorder, pose an 
acute and severe danger for their own security or for the security of oth-
ers (NGB, 2010:53). 
 
3.6.2. Interventions behind the front door 
In addition to the aforementioned formal competences to control and prevent 
certain behaviour, the city of Rotterdam has also developed measures to influence 
the behaviour of individual citizens. These measures aim to prevent further prob-
lems in the future by tackling the perceived causes of undesirable behaviour. The 
identification and selection of individual citizens from the general population in 
Rotterdam is described in the following. The actual nature of personalised ap-
proaches in crime prevention is discussed in the following section of this chapter 
on the Care and Security House in the city of Tilburg. 
In the area-oriented approach of crime and annoyance in Pendrecht and 
Zuidwijk, the selection of and approach to individual citizens largely takes place 
on the basis of presumptions. The aforementioned practices of police and non-
police surveillance create opportunities for establishing contact with individuals 
and provide the authorities with valuable information on residents. It takes a spe-
cific kind of perspective to select individuals for personalised approaches: a per-
spective which looks beyond the situation at hand for possible underlying prob-
lems and for opportunities to proactively approach these problems. In the words 
of a neighbourhood police officer: “I always look for the irregular, for what isn’t 
normal in the neighbourhood. This can be an abandoned car, but also an eleven-
year old child hanging around late at night. I report everything which strikes me 
as irregular”. 
 
This type of perspective is clearly evident in the practice of ‘house calls’, also 
called the ‘behind the front door approach’. Small ‘intervention teams’, consisting 
of two or three persons (usually representatives of the police and of the city dis-
trict, sometimes complemented by a representative of a housing corporation or a 
municipal policy department) visit private residences to check for any irregulari-
ties, such as drug use, cannabis nurseries, illegal habitation, filth, poverty, arrears 
of maintenance, social security fraud, child neglect, teenage mothers and other 
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personal or family issues. Houses are selected on the basis of neighbourhood 
complaints or presumptions of illegal activities by the police, municipality and the 
housing corporation. At the time of this study (fall 2011), the intervention team in 
Pendrecht was visiting around four or five houses per month. 
In practice, an intervention team is usually allowed in by the tenants 
(even though they can legally refuse entrance).261 The team works according to a 
strict protocol.262 The home situation is assessed on the basis of a quick search 
through the house, a talk with the residents and further available information on 
the residents. A standard checklist is used to evaluate six ‘life areas’ (housing, 
employment and income, health, education, welfare support, and fire safety). This 
can be the starting point for further personalised interventions263 – in terms of 
repression (such as home eviction or cuts in social security) or care (such as fam-
ily support). Inspections by intervention teams may be announced or unan-
nounced – the latter in the case of irregularities in the population register, previ-
ous problems with a specific house (such as cannabis nurseries), and in the case of 
nuisance, signs of illegal habitation or severe personal problems of the tenants. 
Even though the ‘behind the front door approach’ is not limited to crime 
policy, but aims to detect various types of problems, this proactive outreach inter-
vention is typical of a policy aimed at preventing crime and nuisance. An impor-
tant objective of house calls is law enforcement, but this is complemented by an 
additional goal of identifying the causes of undesirable behaviour. Again, as with 




The objective of the inquiry into the crime control activities in Rotterdam-South 
was to gain insight in the role of prevention in these activities, and thereby to 
support the findings in the previously discussed policy genealogy. An analysis of 
the intervention repertoire in Rotterdam-South reveals three distinct ways in 
which the perspective of prevention infuses situation-specific crime policy. Even 
                                                   
261 This is not the case for recipients of social security. They are obliged to cooperate. Further-
more, if tenants refuse entrance to the intervention team, this is not entirely without conse-
quences: an annotation of the refusal is made in their dossier. 
262 http://www.rotterdam.nl/Directie%20Veilig/PDF/Overige%20publicaties/protocol%20 
huisbezoeken%20interventieteams%202010.pdf; consulted d.d. 27-10-2011. 
263 The intervention teams also reveal the importance of coordinated activities for an effective 
proactive outreach approach. The police, municipality and housing corporation work closely 
together in the teams themselves, but also coordinate their activities in the follow-up actions 
after an intervention. For instance, if an irregularity has been identified, the police write a tick-
et, the housing corporation sends a letter warning of the violation of the rent contract, and the 
municipality invites the residents for a talk to discuss various scenarios. 
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though the boundaries between repression and prevention are often thin or even 
impossible to draw there where both ambitions are simultaneously served, the 
ambition to prevent crime, annoyance and liveability problems is at the core of 
the municipal approach. Prevention, construed as a ‘way of seeing’, produces spe-
cific problem definitions, specific policy ambitions and specific types of interven-
tions. 
 
First, the prevention perspective changes the way the physical layout of the city, the 
population composition and citizen behaviour are perceived. The physical layout of 
the public domain is no longer seen through functional or emancipatory eyes, but 
as an opportunity structure for criminal behaviour. The population composition is 
not a neutral given, but a determinant of crime, annoyance and liveability prob-
lems. And citizen behaviour is not merely a matter of individual responsibility, but 
also a source of risks. The police, housing corporations and municipality see dif-
ferent aspects of social reality and perceive different problems when they look 
through a preventive gaze. What may have been neutral elements in the public 
domain have now been transformed into the focal points of preventive interven-
tions.  
The archetypal expression of this transformation in problem perception is 
the way the built-up environment in Rotterdam-South is perceived. In the words 
of one interviewee, the neighbourhood is “seen through the eyes of a criminal”. An 
analysis of how criminals (or other troublemakers) would make use of the physi-
cal layout has become the starting point for interventions in the opportunity 
structure. Take, for instance, the design and placement of public benches. Next to 
providing recreational services to the public, careful consideration of the distribu-
tion of these benches also offer possibilities to reduce crime and nuisance in the 
public domain. Since some benches tend to attract annoying adolescents and drug 
dealers, removing these is a means to prevent annoyance and crime. In much the 
same way, escape routes, arcades, entrance halls, clear sightlines, the height of 
hedges and street lighting become the object of a preventive crime policy. 
 
Second, surveillance and monitoring are preconditions for prevention. The public 
domain and citizen behaviour are carefully monitored to identify risks and select 
objects for preventive interventions. Risks need to be identified before they can be 
tackled. Prevention depends on a panoptic capability – the extent to which au-
thorities are able to identify the places, times and citizens posing an increased risk 
to security. CCTV-surveillance enables 24/7 monitoring. Police surveillance is 
focused on ‘hot spots’. Intervention teams look behind the front door. Priorities 
are based on the results of a Security Index. And profiles are made of ex-offenders 
and risk adolescents.  
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These and other forms of surveillance and monitoring can be used for 
purposes of deterrence (such as police surveillance at ‘hot spots’), but they also 
are the selection mechanism for personalised interventions. The mechanism at 
play is a specific way of looking at what goes on in the streets, at citizen behaviour 
in the public domain, at increasing crime figures in a certain neighbourhood, and 
at indications of criminal behaviour or personal problems behind the front door. 
In the words of an interviewee, surveillance and monitoring are deployed to “look 
for the irregular”, to look for what deviates from normality. This implies a broad-
ening of the professional scope of, among others, police officers and housing cor-
poration employees. Police officers no longer merely write tickets for infringe-
ments, but also look for means to enable a more structural approach to the per-
ceived causes of these infringements (such as personal or family issues of problem 
adolescents). Housing corporations no longer merely take care of maintenance 
and repair, but will also approach individual tenants if their behaviour causes 
problems. 
 
In the third and final place, the municipality’s preventive ambitions are supported 
and made possible by innovations in the formal-legal intervention repertoire of 
public authorities. The mayor’s responsibility for upholding public order is in 
many ways a preventive responsibility. Whereas the administration of justice 
requires concrete suspicions of criminal offences, upholding the public order has 
either a restorative or a preventive nature. Put differently, the notion of public 
order is highly receptive to the perspective of prevention. The expansion of the 
mayor’s formal competences is a logical consequence of adopting a prevention per-
spective. 
Even though the responsibility for the public order is a longstanding mu-
nicipal task, the intervention repertoire has been considerably expanded during 
the last few years to facilitate proactive policing and prevention of disturbances in 
the public order. New formal competences of the mayor include the ordering of 
‘preventive frisking’ (stop and search of citizens without reasonable suspicion), 
CCTV-surveillance, restraint orders, area bans and administrative confinement. 
What characterises these new preventive instruments is that they enable inter-
ventions before an actual infringement of the law has occurred. In other words, 
interventions are justified on the basis of presumptions. 
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4. Care and Security House Tilburg 
 
4.1. Tilburg, Spoorlaan 448 
To describe the second and third floor of an office block on a busy street in the 
centre of town264 as a ‘house’265 may seem somewhat farfetched. The elevator 
taking visitors to the reception on the second floor has a small sign indicating that 
the offices and meeting rooms on the third floor can only be accessed with an en-
trance card. They have had a few incidents involving ex-offenders who came to 
‘claim’ their welfare support. The reception itself looks like a general practitio-
ner’s waiting room. Small seats are attached to the wall. A local radio station is 
playing. A flat screen on the wall offers visitors some general information on the 
Care and Security House. A news bar at the bottom of the screen shows local po-
lice messages and news items. A few people are waiting to be collected for their 
appointment. A few gossip magazines lie scattered on side tables. There is a lively 
reception and front office where the local dialect prevails. 
In short, the Care and Security House has an open and friendly character. 
The atmosphere is very informal. Most staff members – or employees of the vari-
ous partner organisations working part-time at the Care and Security House – 
work in open-space offices or at least leave the door to their office open.266 Police 
officers visiting the Care and Security House leave their uniform at the police sta-
tion. The open-space plan is designed to promote cooperation between employ-
ees. There also is a conference room for case consultations, as well as several 
meeting rooms where citizens – ‘clients’ as they are called – can be received to 
discuss offers for community service or educational support. All these meeting 
rooms have CCTV – just in case something happens. 
 
In total, 20 organisations and just under 200 employees work together in the Care 
and Security House (both permanent staff and part time employees of the partner 
organisations). Youth care services, public prosecutor, the police, municipality, 
housing corporations, custodial institutions, welfare work, community service 
bureau, a drugs and alcohol clinic, probation office, child protection council, sup-
                                                   
264 Tilburg, a former industrial town, is a city with just over 200,000 inhabitants in the south of 
the Netherlands. According to one of the interviewed managers of the Care and Security House, 
there are roughly 200 habitual offenders and 20 so called ‘systematic offenders’ (very active 
habitual offenders) within the city. These are important target groups for the activities of the 
Care and Security House. 
265 The word ‘house’ should not be taken to literally, even though the essence of the approach is 
that network partners come together in one location to coordinate their efforts. One can better 
think of a Security ‘House’ as an office or meeting-place, where representatives of various or-
ganisations can come together for meetings or can spend a part of their time working. 
266 Some 80 workstations are available for just under 200 mostly part-time employees. 
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port point domestic violence, psychiatric clinic and mental institution267 – repre-
sentatives of these organisations and professions have all been brought together 
under one roof. The ‘raison d’être’ of the Care and Security House was “[…] the 
necessity to overcome organisational divides between administration, justice and 
welfare, and thereby create conditions for a more adequate approach of security 
issues” (Fijnaut, in Franken c.s., 2008:96; my translation, RP). The Care and Secu-
rity House can be seen as an ‘information hub’ designed to facilitate integrated 
efforts for individual cases and problems. 
Although the Security House in Tilburg was established in 2002,268 the in-
tegration of welfare organisations was only realised in 2008.269 The main argu-
ment for integration was the overlap in client needs with regard to security and 
health care approaches. This ‘overlap’ could lead to situations in which various 
organisations failed to coordinate their efforts around one single case. Another 
incentive for cooperation was the (partial) financial compensation for activities in 
the context of the Care and Security House, as network partners are sometimes 
obliged to contribute to security issues under the terms of their subsidy contract 
with the municipality of Tilburg.270 Even though the municipality has little formal 
say on many of the welfare organisations involved in the Care and Security 
House,271 it does try to persuade them to take their role in crime prevention seri-
ously – if necessary, by altering subsidy contracts. 
                                                   
267 In Dutch, the network partners are: gemeente Tilburg, OM, Amarant, Bureau Jeugdzorg, DJI, 
GGD, GGz, Halt, Instituut Maatschappelijk Werk, Juvans, Kompaan en De Bocht, Novadic-
Kentron, politie, Raad voor de Kinderbescherming, Reclassering Nederland, RIBW, Slachtoffer-
hulp, Steunpunt Huiselijk Geweld, Stichting MEE and Traverse. 
268 This made the Security House in Tilburg the first of its kind in the Netherlands. The Security 
House focused on first offenders and ex-offenders. It is noteworthy to mention that this was a 
local initiative, which was later picked up by national government, for instance in the Security 
Starts with Prevention memorandum which proposes a national coverage of Security Houses for 
“an adequate connection between a punitive approach of adolescents and underlying family 
problems” (SSP, 2007:2-3). At the time of writing (early 2011), there were a total of 45 Security 
Houses in The Netherlands. 
269 At the time of research, this was the only Dutch Security House to have fully integrated the 
welfare domain into its working method. 
270 Care for security, local policy memorandum on security policy 2008-2010, municipality of 
Tilburg, 2008:1. 
271 Of course, the mere existence of a Security House does not necessarily mean it is effective. 
The effectiveness and robustness of a Security House depends to a large extent on the local 
institutional settings and the commitment of the network partners. A common organisational 
dilemma here is that financial circuits of the network partners are usually based on segmented 
tasks and not on integrated efforts. Also, employees of the network partners have to be compe-
tent to develop integrated approaches, which sometimes requires neglecting formal goals or 
organisational boundaries for the sake of individual cases. According to one of the interviewed 




The basic assumption underlying the integration of the care and security 
domains is that criminal behaviour usually coincides with complex personal and 
social issues.272 Based on this assumption, it is logical – from a preventive point of 
view, at least – to integrate the existing approaches to these social issues. In the 
words of one of the employees: “every euro well spent in the social domain is ef-
fectively a euro well spent in the security domain”. This theory is constitutive for 
the Care and Security House: if there were no (perceived or imaginable) relations 
between criminal acts and underlying socio-economic, mental or personal living 
circumstances,  personalised and integrated interventions would be redundant. A 
preventive strategy needs a prior causal scheme to identify the possible objects of 
intervention. 
Interestingly enough, the first name suggestion – ‘Prevention House’273 – 
was declined by the welfare organisations, since they felt this would make them 
instrumental in promoting crime prevention only. The basic idea behind the co-
operation between the 20 organisations involved is to determine the most appro-
priate and effective approach possible for individual cases – whether this is a judi-
cial (repressive) measure or an offer of support to change a criminal lifestyle, or a 
combination of the two.  
 
The main purpose of the Care and Security House is to provide a setting for these 
organisations to coordinate their efforts around several categories of citizens who 
either have or cause problems. The most important categories are problem chil-
dren and adolescents, habitual offenders, victims and perpetrators of domestic 
violence, and persons with multiple and complex problems (a group often re-
ferred to as ‘worrisome care avoiders’).274 For some specific target groups, several 
teams are based within the Care and Security House itself – including the ‘care 
interference’ team, that deals with the above mentioned ‘care avoiders’, a team for 
the municipal (non-judicial) approach to ex offenders, and a team tasked with 
                                                   
272 This assumption can sometimes confront the network partners with interesting questions. 
The approach behind many interventions is based on the idea that so called ‘life areas’ are im-
portant indicators for criminal behaviour: unemployment, a poor family situation and financial 
problems are correlated with criminal behaviour (such as ex-offenders falling back into their 
criminal habits). But the network partners are also confronted with cases of criminal behaviour 
in which there are no evident underlying social or personal problems. It is difficult to find an 
object for preventive interventions in these cases, since they do not fit the underlying assump-
tion of a relation between criminal behaviour and personal or family issues. 
273 The term is also used in the local security memorandum Care for security, 2008:13. In this 
memorandum, the establishment of the eventual Care and Security House is announced. 
274 In Dutch: ‘zorgwekkende zorgmijders’. These are people who do not ask for care, but are in 
need of care (according to the assessment of welfare workers), are unaware of the care availa-
ble, or have refused earlier help efforts – for instance drug or alcohol addicts who do not recog-
nise the severity of their problems. 
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handling cases of domestic and sexual violence. In its mission statement, the Care 
and Security House states the following objectives: 
- Reducing domestic violence; 
- Developing approaches for people with multiple problems; 
- Preventing first offences by adolescents; 
- Preventing recidivism; 
- Offering support for victims; 
- Offering appropriate (after) care; 
- Offering a reliable information node.275 
 
The establishment of the Care and Security House was a local initiative (started in 
2002 in Tilburg) and still is a local affair: the regionally organised network part-
ners are called upon to create the necessary facilities for their specific region 
(usually a city and its neighbouring towns). No blueprint is provided by the na-
tional government, but it does stimulate the sharing of ‘best practices’ and ‘proven 
effective behavioural interventions’ – for instance, through databases and web-
sites offering information for local organisations276 or providing privacy protocols 
for data sharing between network partners on individual citizens. Furthermore, 
national government offers information and advice on effective means to organise 
cooperation between network partners and helps to develop information systems 
to integrate available data on individual cases and ‘follow’ the progress in these 
cases. The national government merely facilitates – local network partners carry 
out the actual implementation. 
The Care and Security House plays a central role in the municipal security 
policy. The local policy context in which the Care and Security House was estab-
lished is of an explicitly preventive nature: “Repression will certainly not be aban-
doned, but more attention will be paid to prevention. You can keep fighting symp-
toms, but you only need to take away the cause once”.277 According to the local 
policy memoranda, the assumption underlying the establishment of the Care and 
                                                   
275 http://tilburg.veiligheidshuis.org/site/?page=1; consulted d.d. 18-3-2011. 
276 For instance the website of the national Centre for Crime Prevention and Security 
(http://www.hetccv.nl/), which offers information on effective administrative instruments in 
crime control and their legal constraints and conditions. Other relevant initiatives to facilitate 
local crime control are the Committee on Behavioural Interventions (http://www. 
rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/recidive/erkenningscommissie-gedragsinterventies), a commit-
tee under responsibility of the Minister of Justice which examines and assesses the effectiveness 
of behavioural interventions to reduce recidivism; and the website of the Guidebook Youth and 
Security, an information database on available instruments and legal competences on juvenile 
delinquency developed by the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, the aforementioned 
Centre for Crime Prevention and Security, and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities 
(http://www.wegwijzerjeugdenveiligheid.nl/ index). All websites consulted d.d. 25-4-2011. 
277 “Tilburg maakt werk van integraal veiligheidsbeleid”, 2008:1 (my translation, RP). 
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Security House was that a mere punitive approach lacks the behavioural compo-
nent necessary for prevention. Especially adolescents – both delinquent and risk 
adolescents – are an important focal point, since this is a group perceived to be 
receptive to preventive measures.278  
 
4.2. Assessment, coordination and intervention 
 
4.2.1. Case consultations 
The working process in the Care and Security House is organised around ‘case 
consultations’, in which the approach to individual cases is discussed with a num-
ber of relevant network partners. The following consultations are organised on 
behalf of the various different target groups:279 
- Judicial Case Consultation Youth: minors who have committed a criminal 
offence or have infringed upon the Compulsory Education Act. Network 
partners present at this consultation are the police, public prosecutor, 
child welfare council, youth care, the community service bureau and the 
compulsory education bureau. 
- Scenario Consultation Youth: monitoring of juvenile habitual offenders 
and risk adolescents, as well as after-care programmes for ex-offenders. 
Network partners present at this consultation are the police, public 
prosecutor, child welfare council, youth care, Judicial Custodial Institu-
tion, compulsory education bureau and the municipality of Tilburg. 
- Scenario Consultation Habitual Offenders: judicial approach to habitual 
offenders and after-care for those leaving detention. Network partners 
present at this consultation are the police, public prosecutor, probation 
service, addiction clinic, municipal health service, community shelters, 
psychiatric care services, Judicial Custodial Institution, social work and 
the municipality of Tilburg. 
- Social Work Case Consultation Youth: risk adolescents and problematic 
youth groups (non-judicial). Network partners present at this consulta-
tion are the police, child welfare council, youth care, social work, compul-
sory education bureau and youth work. 
- Social Work Case Consultation Adults: adults with multiple complex prob-
lems (non-judicial). Network partners present at this consultation are the 
police, municipal health service, housing corporation, social work, com-
                                                   
278 Care for security, 2008:1. 
279 http://tilburg.veiligheidshuis.org/site/?page=1; consulted d.d. 18-3-2011. The names of the 
consultations are translated from Dutch. 
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munity shelters, psychiatric services, addiction clinic and the municipality 
of Tilburg. 
- Domestic Violence: personal or family-centred approaches to cases of 
domestic violence. Network partners present at this consultation are the 
police, public prosecutor, probation service, addiction clinic, municipal 
health service, social work, community shelters, victim service and the 
support unit domestic violence. 
- Scenario Team Sexual Violence: approaches to cases of (presumed) sexual 
violence. Network partners present at this consultation are the police, 
municipal health service, social work, community shelters, child welfare 
council, youth care and the support unit domestic violence. 
- Routing Consultation: after care for underaged ex-offenders. Network 
partners present at this consultation are the child welfare council, youth 
care, judicial custodial institution and the municipality of Tilburg. 
 
The first objective of these consultations is to assess individual cases. In most 
consultations, the chairman briefly introduces an individual case, followed by an 
invitation to the representatives of the network partners to provide more infor-
mation on the individual involved (if available). For instance, a juvenile first of-
fender may also turn up in the files of the compulsory education bureau or may 
have had previous contacts with child care services. Also, any available informa-
tion on a person’s social environment is discussed to gain insight into the back-
ground of an individual case – which could range from a first offender whose par-
ents have a criminal record to the characteristics of a youth group with which an 
adolescent hangs out on the streets.  
Previous contacts of an individual with the police are also deemed rele-
vant – whether or not these led to charges (instead of actual convictions) or 
merely concerned involvement in other cases (such as being present when a 
friend or relative committed an offence). In general, case assessment implies look-
ing beyond the initial (police) report at the underlying personal and social context 
of an individual. If this context is “cause for concern” – as the representatives of 
the network partners call it – further interventions might be justified.  
The second objective of these consultations is to determine a course of ac-
tion and to coordinate the efforts of the network partners: “nobody walks out the 
door without a swift and clear response”.280 Under the motto “one family, one 
plan”,281 the network partners develop an approach that operates on the assump-
tion that an individual’s personal and family situation is a crucial explanatory 
                                                   
280 http://tilburg.veiligheidshuis.org/site/?page=1; consulted d.d. 18-3-2011; my transl., RP. 
281 http://tilburg.veiligheidshuis.org/site/?page=1; consulted d.d. 18-3-2011; my transl., RP. 
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factor for criminal behaviour and personal problems. The eventual approach aims 
to intervene in this specific situation with the purpose of preventing further prob-
lems or the worsening of problems in the future. In practice, this can lead to inter-
ventions to prevent first offenders from committing any further offences, prevent 
worsening of situations of domestic violence, or reintegrate an ex-offender.  
The strategies developed during the case consultations are usually called 
‘scenarios’. A ‘scenario’ expresses the idea that interventions are made on the 
basis of, on the one hand, expectations with regard to the development and behav-
iour of an individual if no intervention takes place, and, on the other hand, expec-
tations with regard to the most effective object and intervention strategy to struc-
turally avert this future. In practice, this usually means that the prime responsibil-
ity for an intervention is assigned to one of the network partners during the case 
consultation. Depending on the case and the nature of the consultation, a follow-
up on an individual case is put on the agenda for next week’s consultation.282 
These follow-up consultations are usually of an informative nature: no new inter-
ventions are planned, but the progress of current cases and interventions con-
tinue to be monitored.283 
 
Practical matters are the main concern during most case consultations. Consider, 
for instance, the case of 17-year old Peter,284 who was convicted of molestation 
and has dropped out of school. He now lives with his grandfather. A strict pro-
gramme to get his life straightened out is part of his probation process. According 
to his probation officer, the Crossroads-project, a full-day programme of educa-
tion, work, social skills classes, cooking, and strict control on use of drugs in which 
adolescents participate for a minimum of six months and a maximum of two 
years, would be ideal for Peter. However, Peter and his parents or caretakers must 
                                                   
282 Some consultations are held once every two weeks. 
283 Virtually all case consultations are structured the same way. The agenda consists of a list of 
cases to be discussed in (usually) one and a half hour – ranging anywhere from 6 to 20 cases. 
Each case is introduced briefly by the chairman or the representative of the police. Next, every 
representative of the network partners is asked whether he or she has any information based 
on prior contacts with the individual (or his family) in question. Each case consultation ends 
with a clear decision, supported by all representatives present, on which network partner will 
take what kind of action.  
For every case, notes are taken by a staff member of the Care and Security House – and 
sometimes placed in an electronic file or regional database which can be accessed by all rele-
vant network partners. These notes, which are added to a case file, are projected during the 
consultation on a large screen for all participants to see. And if a representative of the public 
prosecutor is present, he or she can log into the court system to check on charges, previous 
sentences, court session days, dates of discharge from prison, and so on. 
284 This case, as well as the cases mentioned below, are based on real cases, but have been ad-
justed and made anonymous for privacy reasons. The cases are, however, representative of the 
ones discussed during the consultations. 
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sign a contract to commit to this project. In Peter’s case, his grandfather will not 
allow the probation officer to talk to Peter. If he persists in his refusal, the only 
alternative remaining is court custody. 
The practical matter discussed here – and in most other case consulta-
tions – is twofold: how to approach citizens in the most appropriate way, and how 
to make these citizens cooperate. These questions are tackled pragmatically by 
the representatives of the various network partners. The network partners are 
familiar with each other’s roles and responsibilities.285 Case consultations are a 
matter of deciding how to ‘get through’ to citizens. This implies deciding what sort 
of action should be taken (coercion or care?), who should take action (social 
workers or youth care?), and what strategies should be deployed (merely offering 
care to clients, persuading clients to accept care, or warning clients that refusing 
care might lead to more coercive measures?). In the words of one of the employ-
ees: “you only have one chance to make the first contact”. 
 
A typical case consultation on a first time report may take the following form: 
 
Chairman: “[…] Ok, then. On to the next case”. 
 
Police officer:  “[…] This is another one of those affairs… 16-year old 
Kimberley was reported missing by her mother. Turned 
out she was staying at a girlfriend’s place. Kimberley has 
been arrested twice in the past year for shoplifting. And 
we are also familiar with some of her relatives – a brother 
and her father have been suspected of felonies. For us, this 
was cause for concern about Kimberley’s wellbeing”. 
 
Chairman: “Thank you. Does anyone have more information about 
Kimberley or her family situation?” 
 
Child protection: “No, we’re not familiar with her”. 
 
Social work: “Yes, we’re familiar with this family. The mother followed 
an anger management course with us two years ago”. 
 
Compulsory education: “And we are familiar with Kimberley as well. She has 
problems at school: gets in fights with fellow students and 
                                                   
285 Even though the consultations are well structured (and often having a routine-like nature), 
the atmosphere is relaxed and informal. 
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has played truant twice this year. Her school says she is a 
ticking time bomb”. 
 
Youth worker: “No. No information”. 
 
Youth care: “It is also good to know that there are three other children 
in this family. Apparently the police are familiar with one 
of them, but we know nothing about the other two. I’d like 
to know more, considering the trouble the other two are 
causing”. 
 
Chairman: “Well, this is indeed cause for concern. I think it might be 
best if outreach social work and youth care cooperate on 
this one to find out more about the issues in this family”. 
 
Social work:  “Alright, we’ll pay them a visit and take a look”. 
 
Chairman: “And I’ll put this case on the agenda for our next consulta-
tion two weeks from now”. 
 
And a typical case consultation to monitor the progress of an individual case may 
take the following form: 
 
Chairman: “Well, our friend was released from prison two weeks ago. 
Do we know what he has been up to lately?” 
 
Police officer: “Yes, we have been extra vigilant since he was released 
from prison. He has been spotted with his drinking pals at 
central station again”. 
 
Chairman: “That doesn’t come as a surprise”. 
 
Public prosecutor: “I have been counting. If he commits one more crime he 
will have committed enough in the last five years for a ju-




Chairman: “Ok, let’s put him on our list as ‘potential ISD’286 and keep 
a close watch on him. Next case concerns our acquaint-
ance Smith”. 
 
Probation officer: “I’m very concerned about him. He recently threatened 
two employees of the Custodial Institution where he is 
resident with a knife. I think we should really advise the 
court to prolong his detention and treatment order”. 
 
Chairman: “When is that decision due?” 
 
Public prosecutor: “In two months”. 
 
Chairman: “Do we have any back-up plan in case the court should 
decide not to prolong his detention and treatment order?” 
 
Probation officer: “We can only keep an eye out for him and try to persuade 
him to follow a municipal resocialisation programme”. 
 
Social work: “But isn’t this a guy with a very low IQ? Bear in mind that 
the open municipal reintegration facility uses a minimum 
cut-off IQ score of 75”. 
 
Probation officer: “That might indeed be a problem. I’ll check it out. The only 
other alternative we have is to try to place him in a facility 
for the intellectually impaired”. 
 
Chairman: “Ok. But make sure you can act quickly should the court go 
against our advice. Smith could then be back on the streets 
within a week”. 
 
Another relevant issue is how individual cases actually ‘enter’ the Care and Secu-
rity House. In most instances, the cases are introduced in the various case consul-
tations by the police. For instance, all police reports of domestic violence, all re-
ports of juvenile delinquency and all new incidents involving habitual offenders 
are by definition discussed in the relevant case consultations. Besides formal re-
ports of criminal offences, the police can also draw up so-called ‘concern re-
                                                   
286 Institution for Habitual Offenders: specialised detention and treatment order for habitual 
offenders. In Dutch: Inrichting voor Stelselmatige Daders (ISD). 
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ports’.287 These are cases in which there is no direct criminal offence, but there 
are serious concerns about the personal or social problems an individual citizen 
(and especially children or adolescents) might have. Examples include children 
who have run away from home, a child living with two criminal parents,  a child 
living in a house where a cannabis nursery was dismantled,  a person arrested for 
drug dealing with apparent medical and personal problems, and so on. If a report-
ing officer assesses such a case as being a serious ‘cause for concern’, it will also 
be discussed in the Care and Security House.288 
Cases can also be introduced by the other network partners. These cases 
generally concern individuals with multiple and complex social issues, who are 
therefore in need of an integrated approach. In the Routing Consultation, the pub-
lic prosecutor introduces all cases of ex-offenders about to leave detention and 
start their probation. And finally, the staff of the Care and Security House itself 
regularly draws up updated lists of habitual offenders to be discussed and moni-
tored in the Scenario Consultations Youth and Habitual Offenders. Individual citi-
zens cannot report cases to the Care and Security House. The consultations be-
tween the network partners in the Care and Security House are based on previous 
reports of criminal offences or specific ‘concerns’ for the wellbeing or behaviour 
of individual citizens.289 
 
In the following, we take a closer look at the working practices of the profession-
als associated with the Care and Security House. The descriptions given below of 
‘client contacts’ (as the interventions in individual cases are called) are not meant 
to be exhaustive, but to provide a representative impression of the working prac-
tices in and around the Care and Security House. Five target groups have been 
selected; three of the five belong on the ‘security side’ of the spectrum: juvenile 
offenders, habitual offenders and ex-offenders. The two other target groups are on 
the ‘care side’ of the spectrum: care avoiders and risk adolescents (taken together 
as one target group) and domestic violence. It is important to keep in mind, how-
ever, that all of these target groups can overlap: a juvenile offender can also be a 
                                                   
287 In Dutch: ‘zorgmelding’. 
288 Five phases can be distinguished in the working process of the Care and Security House: 1) 
input (reports of individual cases), 2) case consultation, 3) implementation of developed ap-
proach, 4) monitoring of the progress of the intervention, and 5) termination of the case after 
completion of the intervention (Jaarplan 2009 Veiligheidshuis Tilburg, 2009:10). 
289 In this respect, the working process is of a reactive rather than a preventive nature. How-
ever, upon closer inspection, the objectives of the consultations reveal a definite preventive 
ambition. In the words of one of the interviewed managers of the Care and Security House: “Our 
objective is not to prevent people from being reported. Our objective is to prevent people – once 
they are reported – from ever being reported a second time” (see also: Jaarplan 2010 Zorg- en 
Veiligheidshuis Tilburg, 2010:11). 
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habitual offender or an at-risk adolescent in need of care, and an ex-offender 
working on his rehabilitation can also be a (former) habitual offender. 
 
4.2.2. Juvenile offenders 
Mary, who just turned 16 last month, was caught at school in possession of two XTC-
pills. When confronted by one of her teachers, she threatened him and became vio-
lent. She has had no prior contacts with the police, but the compulsory education 
bureau has her on record for playing truant twice during the past year. Also, the 
youth care systems show that she was diagnosed with ADHD a few years ago. She 
hangs out with a group of youths at the station square. Furthermore, a teacher told 
the police that Mary’s mother passed away a few months ago. Even though the of-
fence Mary has committed is not that serious, the circumstances are serious cause 
for concern about her wellbeing and future development. A punitive approach might 
therefore worsen her situation. Instead, she will receive an alternative sanction and 
social workers will visit her at home to talk with her and see if she wants to accept 
help. 
 
All declarations of offences by minors (between the age of 12 and 17) are dis-
cussed in the Judicial Case Consultation Youth. The public prosecutor presents the 
cases and discusses what the most appropriate action is. For instance, a boy sus-
pected of stealing bikes might be brought before juvenile court, whereas a young 
hooligan who offended a group of policemen might receive an offer to carry out 
community service. The judicial response to each offence should be proportional, 
but also effective in terms of preventing recidivism. A first offence, in particular, 
might therefore be followed by an intervention by social work to talk with parents 
to assess the family situation. In the case of underlying family issues, cases can 
also be transferred to the Social Work Case Consultation Youth, in which an ap-
propriate intervention will be developed by youth care or social work. 
The specific approach adopted towards a juvenile offender is based first 
on the severity of the offence, second on the offender’s personal circumstances, 
and third on the cooperative attitude of the offender’s parents. Serious offences 
are always followed by a judicial approach; minor offences (such as shoplifting or 
vandalism) may be followed by an alternative approach: especially in cases of 
young first offenders without further behavioural or school problems, a settle-
ment is usually offered by the public prosecutor to the parents in the form of an 
alternative, non-judicial, sanction,290 on condition that a (formal) confession and 
parental consent is obtained to organise an alternative sanction for their son or 
                                                   
290 However, if an adolescent does not follow the alternative programme, the community ser-
vice bureau may advise the public prosecutor to start a judicial approach after all. 
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daughter. This criterion filters out the uncooperative cases. The alternative sanc-
tion has an explicit pedagogical objective and has the advantage that juvenile of-
fenders avoid being saddled with a criminal record. 
 
The alternative sanctions are carried out by community service bureau ‘Halt’ – 
which is short for ‘the alternative’ in Dutch and (as in English) means ‘stop’. The 
approach is based on the idea that adolescents should set right as far as possible 
what they have done wrong, and that adolescents have to learn what the conse-
quences of their acts were or might have been. Depending on the length of the 
alternative programme and on the motivation of the adolescent to cooperate, a 
stint of community service might also be a part of the sanction.291 
The core of the programme consists of three talks between the adolescent 
in question, the parents and a ‘Halt’-employee, a learning assignment to be com-
pleted by the adolescent (which might take the form of writing an essay on what 
he or she has done wrong),292 apologies to the victim of their offence, and some-
times a (financial) compensation for the damage done. This entire programme 
takes about four weeks. The basic assumption behind this programme is that ju-
venile offenders learn by being confronted with the (possible) consequences of 
their acts. ‘Learning’ has a preventive objective: the alternative sanction is de-
signed to keep adolescents from committing another offence in the future. 
 
Consider, for instance, the case of Mike, Vincent and Patrick – three 13-year old 
‘typical Halt-youngsters’.293 They were caught starting a small fire in a forest out-
side of Tilburg during a period of extreme drought. Although it was not necessary 
to alarm the fire brigade – the small fire was put out by a passer-by – the three 
youngsters were requested to appear at a local fire station for an ‘apology’ as part 
of their alternative sanction. At this meeting, Joan, the ‘Halt’-employee opened the 
conversation, after which the three boys timidly addressed the fireman: 
 
                                                   
291 ‘Halt’ sanctions longer than eight hours always have an element of community service. Fur-
thermore, if adolescents are unmotivated or uninterested in learning about what they have 
done, ‘Halt’ usually decides not to waste any time on talks with victims, but instead makes 
community service a larger part of their programme. In the words of one of the ‘Halt’-
employees: “maybe these unmotivated youngsters will learn something through this more 
repressive approach”. 
292 If adolescents have committed an offence under the influence of drugs or alcohol, their learn-
ing assignment includes a course at a local clinic to hear and talk about the negative effects of 
alcohol and drug use. 
293 In the words of the ‘Halt’-employee dealing with their case. Mike, Vincent and Patrick come 
across as the typical ‘boys next door’. During the observation of their ‘apology’, they appeared to 
be slightly intimidated by the circumstances. It was fairly obvious which of them was the insti-
gator and which the followers. 
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Joan:  “We are here because you have started a fire. We have prepared 
some questions for the fireman present here. But perhaps you’d 
first want to tell him what you have done?” 
 
Mike:  “Well, we were playing in the forest near our scouting club. And 
then we thought about making a fire in a hole with some leaves…” 
 
Vincent: “…It was just a small fire. But I saw a man was watching us and we 
ran away. He came after us and he told us we had to wait for the 
police…” 
 
Patrick: “…Yes, I think that’s about what happened. I don’t know really. We 
also had to write an essay about what we did”. 
 
Joan:  “But you also want to tell the fireman something, don’t you? And 
you have some questions to ask, because we talked about what 
could have happened”. 
 
Vincent: “Yes. We would like to know what a ‘code red’ means…” 
 
Following this introduction, the fireman gave a short improvised lecture on the 
dangers of forest fires. He stressed what might have happened. Especially the 
number of firemen and the amount of water required to fight a forest fire seemed 
to impress the three youngsters. During the meeting, the ‘Halt’-employee repeat-
edly had to remind the three boys about the questions they had prepared, since 
they mostly remained quiet – probably as a result of nervousness and a short at-
tention span. After 45 minutes the meeting, which was largely of an informative 
nature, came to an end. 
 
Fireman: “What do you think about what I told you?” 
 
Patrick:  “That what we did was pretty stupid” [Vincent and Mike nod in 
agreement]. 
 
Joan:  [Addressing the fireman] “Well thank you very much for your 
time. I hope it was useful for you as well. Hopefully you won’t see 
these boys again here. [Turning attention to the boys] And I’d like 
you to think about today. About what you heard. I will call your 
parents to make another appointment. I’m curious as to what you 
will tell them about today. You can go now”. 
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A meeting like this is preventive in the sense that talking about the consequences 
of certain behaviour aims to establish a ‘learning effect’. In other words, while 
‘Halt’-interventions are first and foremost sanctions for minor offences, the con-
tacts with juvenile offenders are taken as an opportunity to have an effect on the 
way these youngsters think about certain behaviour. 
 
4.2.3. Habitual offenders 
John has a long criminal record and is well known by police, public prosecutor and 
probation office. He spent a few weeks in prison after his most recent conviction for 
burglary. At the moment, he is back home in a squat. However, neighbours have 
recently complained about noise pollution in the middle of the night. They suspect 
that drug dealing takes place in the squat, but there are not enough leads for the 
police to take action. Furthermore, they do not know if John himself is directly in-
volved. However, the police will keep a close watch on the premises and on John’s 
behaviour. Should there be evidence of criminal offences being committed, this could 
lead to John’s tenth conviction in the last five years. This is enough for a judge to 
send him to an Institution for Habitual Offenders (‘ISD’) for a maximum of two years. 
There, he will follow a strict programme to break through the vicious cycle of com-
mitting crimes, getting arrested, spending a few weeks in prison and relapsing into 
old habits again. For now, John will be classified as ‘potential ISD’. 
 
At the Care and Security House, four different categories of habitual offenders are 
distinguished. First, there are offenders within the ‘focus group’: these habitual 
offenders are motivated to accept care and work on kicking their old habits, 
whether or not as a part of a court ruling.  
Second, there is the ‘potential ISD’ category, which includes habitual of-
fenders on the brink of committing ‘enough’ offences to receive a detention and 
treatment order developed specifically for this target group (‘ISD’). A list is kept of 
these habitual offenders in the Care and Security House. All habitual offenders on 
the ‘potential ISD’-list are sent a letter from the public prosecutor, in which they 
are warned that one more offence could lead to an ISD-order in court. Further-
more, the police actively “stalk”294 offenders on the ‘potential ISD’-list to increase 
the chances of arrest.295  
                                                   
294 These are the words of a manager at the ISD-unit at the Vught penitentiary. In Dutch, the 
term used is ‘ambtelijk stalken’. 
295 If habitual offenders on the ‘potential ISD’ list are arrested, the probation office makes an 
assessment of factors conducive to crime in the offender’s personal characteristics or social 
context. This assessment will be part of a court advice on the most suitable treatment (with 
‘ISD’ as a possibility). 
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Third, there is a group of offenders already inside an Institution for Habit-
ual Offenders (‘ISD’). These are habitual offenders who received a detention and 
treatment order following their latest offence.  
And finally, there is a group of habitual offenders who have been assessed as be-
ing unfit for treatment – they will simply receive a punitive response after com-
mitting a crime.  
The first three categories receive special attention from the network part-
ners at the Care and Security House, since these habitual offenders are susceptible 
to behavioural change. They are all monitored during the meetings of the Scenario 
Consultation Habitual Offenders: have they committed any new offences? Are they 
motivated to work on rehabilitation? How is their rehabilitation programme pro-
gressing? When do they leave prison or the ISD? What are the risks of relapse if 
they return to society? What action should the municipality take to make sure 
someone leaving the ISD has a place to stay and an income in the form of social 
security? 
 
Since 2004, the courts have had the legal possibility to impose a detention and 
treatment order of a maximum of 24 months for very active habitual offenders 
(ten offences in the last five years). Of the 5000 to 6000 registered very active 
habitual offenders in The Netherlands, some 300 are annually placed in an Institu-
tion for Habitual Offenders (‘ISD’). “The primary goal of the ISD-order is long-term 
detention, in order to make it practically impossible for adult, very active habitual 
offenders to continue their criminal behaviour. The second goal is to reduce re-
cidivism through behavioural change and reintegration into society”.296 For a 
maximum of 24 months,297 habitual offenders in the ISD follow a treatment pro-
gramme “[…] aimed at motivating the habitual offender for a life without crime, at 
learning new behaviour and at preparing a return into society”.298 
One of the Dutch ISD-units is located in the penitentiary in the southern 
Dutch town of Vught.299 Some 48 ISD-detainees are held in one of the buildings of 
the penitentiary complex.300 They live in four groups (or ‘communities’) of twelve 
                                                   
296 “Informatieblad Maatregel Inrichting Stelselmatige Daders (ISD)”; my translation, RP. 
297 In most cases, the courts impose the maximum number of months. 
298 “Informatieblad Maatregel Inrichting Stelselmatige Daders (ISD)”; my translation, RP. 
299 This penitentiary is nowadays home to various groups of offenders – ranging from units for 
psychiatric offenders and for habitual offenders to units for sex offenders and some of the Neth-
erlands’ most dangerous criminals. The history of the penitentiary goes back to 1942, when an 
SS-led concentration camp was built at this site. One barracks of this camp is still in use by the 
current penitentiary – the other barracks and surroundings are a national museum. 
300 A few others are held at the unit for psychiatric offenders and a number of ‘ISD-ers’ follow an 
extramural programme outside the prison walls. In total, there were 76 ‘ISD-ers’ at the Vught 
penitentiary at the time of this study (d.d. 20-6-2011). 
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people each. Each group has its own living area, furnished with a dining table, a 
kitchen, two sets of sofas, a television set and a pool table. These living areas are 
connected directly to a central office for the penitentiary staff. The staff do not 
wear uniforms, but are casually dressed to stress their role of practitioner, rather 
than guard. The doors between the living areas and their office are open. A sharp 
contrast with the relatively open and friendly atmosphere and architecture of the 
living area is the block of cells along a hallway connected to the living area. In 
general, the object is to “create a motivating and supportive detention climate”,301 
which includes a positive treatment, rewarding good behaviour and personal 
counselling by a mentor. 
 
The habitual offenders at the ISD-unit in Vught follow an intensive programme 
designed to “break the vicious cycle of crime and conviction” (in the words of the 
ISD-manager at the Vught penitentiary). Many of the residents at the ISD-unit are 
addicted to drugs or alcohol302 (over 90%) and many have severe personality 
disorders or psychiatric disorders. Some (roughly 20%) also have low IQs or are 
educationally subnormal. They are often caught in a life of crime to sustain their 
own addiction.303 Many offenders in the ISD-unit are of foreign descent who em-
barked at an early age on a criminal lifestyle, come from broken homes, and have 
failed previous care programmes. Moreover, social isolation is another common 
problem: according to the ISD-manager in Vught, hardly any of the offenders in 
the ISD-unit receive visits. Their social context ‘outside’ usually consists of fellow-
criminals and addicts. 
Once inside, the first responsibility of the ISD-staff is to “stabilise” an of-
fender. Since many ‘ISD-ers’ suffer from drug addiction, psychiatric and other 
health issues, the stabilisation period consists of kicking their drug habits (often 
with the help of methadone) and taking care of mental and physical health issues. 
Furthermore, this is also a period of habituation: getting used to a daily rhythm 
(such as getting up in the morning and eating regular meals at set times), learning 
personal hygiene and self-care, and becoming tranquil, approachable and recep-
tive to a reintegration programme. Even though this first period may take up to 
several months, within seven days a personal coach (“routing supervisor”) is ap-
pointed to every ISD-er for the duration of the detention order and a provisional 
plan for his stay is drawn up. This provisional plan is the basis for the eventual 
                                                   
301 “Productbeschrijving herziene versie oktober 2010. Inrichtingen voor Stelselmatige Daders 
(ISD)”, 2010:14; my translation, RP. 
302 They can, therefore, also be described as ‘care avoiders’ (in the words of a manager of the 
ISD-unit in Vught). 
303 There is also a group of habitual offenders acting from financial motives. 
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reintegration plan. For every cooperative304 ISD-er, a personalised reintegration 
plan is developed during the first eight weeks of detention. A ‘successful’ reinte-
gration into society basically means a life without crime. 
A reintegration plan is based on a ‘what works’-method, and on the back-
ground and ambitions of an ISD-er: psychological tests are performed and infor-
mation concerning an individual’s former lifestyle and history of (failed) care pro-
grammes305 is collected by the ISD-staff. Also, talks are held with the ISD-er to find 
out where his ambitions and interests lie (in terms of a life ‘outside’ without 
crime, such as a specific education and job field).306 The eventual treatment pro-
gramme is directed at “[…] activating detainees to take their own responsibility 
for behavioural change and a new lifestyle”.307  
 
Every programme has an intramural and an extramural phase: 
- During the first, intramural phase, “behavioural interventions” have a cen-
tral role in the treatment. These interventions can take the form of cogni-
tive skills and lifestyle training for a period of 16 to 20 weeks, designed to 
prepare detainees to deal with freedom, responsibility and temptations in 
the outside world. Other activities during this phase can include debt re-
lief, trying to establish or restore a non-criminal social network in the 
outside world, and following education relevant for a job or internship 
during the extramural phase (and the period after the detention order has 
ended). 
- The intramural phase usually (depending on an individual’s motivation 
and progress) ends with an ‘in between’ phase, during which a detainee 
lives inside, but has a daytime job or internship ‘outside’. This work may 
consist of cleaning the premises of the nearby national museum, doing 
odd jobs at a local elderly home, or helping out in a charity shop. The idea 
                                                   
304 In principle, treatment within the ISD-unit is of a voluntary nature. If an ISD-er refuses coop-
eration, his stay will consist merely of detention and of following the regular day programme 
without any treatment or reintegration plan. However, over 90% is cooperative. It often takes 
some time to get an ISD-er to become cooperative: even if he is reluctant or even hostile to-
wards treatment, he will be constantly motivated to work on his reintegration during his stay. 
Cooperation also means that an ISD-er will have a chance to earn privileges and eventually start 
a probationary release programme. 
305 This also contains information available at the network partners in the Care and Security 
House. 
306 According to a manager at the ISD-unit, these ambitions should be modest: “We are already 
very happy if someone has a place to stay and does part-time volunteer work at a nursing home, 
at a sheltered workshop or at a shop specialised in recycling goods after his ISD-period has 
ended”. 
307 “Productbeschrijving herziene versie oktober 2010. Inrichtingen voor Stelselmatige Daders 
(ISD)”, 2010:4; my translation, RP. 
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is to “slowly accustom the detainees to responsibilities”, according to an 
ISD-manager in Vught. The personal routing supervisor usually arranges 
these jobs, sometimes in cooperation with a nearby municipality. During 
the ‘in between’ phase, detainees report back to the entrance gate at strict 
times.  
Detainees live outside the penitentiary walls during the following extra-
mural phase (but are still the responsibility of the penitentiary). In most 
cases, the detainee is still subject to some sort of control, which may take 
the form of ‘living under supervision’ in a specialised municipal facility, or 
electronic tagging: the ISD-er has a strict daily schedule to keep to (work, 
shopping, appointments with the probation officer, et cetera), including 
strict curfews to prevent an alarm from going off at the ISD-unit. 
 
The weekly programme of an ISD-er commonly includes various other activities 
as well, such as economic labour in detention (for instance, welding or packing 
work), sports and recreation. It is important to point out, however, that many 
persons in the ISD are unfit for work because of physical or mental problems or 
because they are unable to function in a group. The standard compulsory weekly 
programme in an ISD-unit is as follows – excluding meal times, judicial activities 
and random urine control for contraband substances:308 
 
Activities Hours (percentage of participants) 
  
Economic labour 16 (35%) 
Domestic and therapeutical labour 16 (65%) 
Airing 7 
Visitors 1 
Visit by children 1 (25%) 
Sport 2,5 
Library 0,75 
Education 2 (50%) 
Group talks 1 
Art education 1,5 (30%) 
Church 1 
Recreation 10 
Other activities 2,5 
Individual care 1 
Individual activities as part of reactivation 2 
Medical care 0,5 
                                                   
308 “Productbeschrijving herziene versie oktober 2010. Inrichtingen voor Stelselmatige Daders 
(ISD)”, 2010:12; my translation, RP. 
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Throughout the duration of the detention and treatment order, cooperation be-
tween the penitentiary, public prosecutor, psychiatric and addiction care, and 
probation office is crucial to implement a reintegration plan. During the extramu-
ral phase, the police and municipality also become more important – the latter, for 
instance, to arrange a house and a (volunteer) job. As an ISD-er is prepared for his 
release back into society, both the municipality and individual routing supervisor 
strive to make the transition as frictionless as possible. The first 72 hours after 
release from prison are the most vulnerable. Instead of simply putting a detainee 
outside the prison gates after his detention order has ended, he is provided with a 
place to stay, a daytime occupation, an ID card and social security, in an effort to 
prevent a quick relapse into crime. 
 
4.2.4. Ex-offenders 
18-year old Michael is serving time in an Institution for Juvenile Delinquents,309 
where he has followed correctional education for the past two years. Michael is 
about to be released and is motivated to work on his resocialisation. He now wants 
to do something for society in return. After his release, he can probably get a job in 
the kitchen of a senior citizen’s home, but must first convince the kitchen chef of the 
home to take him on. This chef, however, happens to have had bad experiences with 
ex-convicts. Another point of concern is that Michael can only claim social security 
and health care insurance after his release from the institution. As Michael’s supervi-
sor knows from experience, these are the ‘little things’ that can make the difference 
between relapse and resocialisation. 
 
The category of ‘ex-offenders’ consists – within the context of the Care and Secu-
rity House – of juvenile offenders who are working on their reintegration into 
society. A ‘scenario’ is developed for every juvenile delinquent, in terms of ex-
pected future behaviour. This scenario is the basis for the advice given to the pub-
lic prosecutor prior to a juvenile delinquent’s trial, as well as for the rehabilitation 
programme after detention. The adolescent’s social environment plays a central 
role in determining adequate interventions for the prevention of recidivism: the 
status of so-called ‘life areas’ (does he or she have an ID, a job or schooling, finan-
cial means, a house and non-delinquent friends?) is an important guideline to 
assess an adolescent’s personal situation and his or her chances of successful rein-
tegration into society. 
                                                   
309 Specialised detention and treatment order for juvenile delinquents who were convicted of a 
serious felony and are in need of resocialisation to prevent recidivism. In Dutch: PIJ-maatregel 
(‘plaatsing in een inrichting voor jeugdigen’). In popular language, this detention and treatment 
order is described as a youth hospital order (in Dutch: ‘Jeugd-TBS’). 
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In almost every case of juvenile delinquency, a compulsory resocialisation 
programme is integrated into a judicial verdict. The broad range of options in-
cludes (combinations of)310 a specialised juvenile detention and treatment order 
for severe cases (with a duration of two years and a possible maximum four year 
prolongation), a strict programme of house arrest and possible restraining orders 
with a gradual expansion of freedom, a programme within a municipal open rein-
tegration institution to help motivated juvenile delinquents get their lives back on 
track, or a schooling programme at a daytime municipal reintegration facility. At 
the end of a judicial reintegration programme, a case is transferred from the de-
tention centre to the municipality, which may decide to offer additional reintegra-
tion programmes or further assistance in helping a juvenile delinquent to find a 
house, a job or proper schooling. 
 
For the adolescents imprisoned in ‘Den Hey-Acker’, a Judicial Custodial Institution 
for Juveniles located in a forest just outside the southern Dutch city of Breda, their 
reintegration programme starts at the time of their arraignment (hence before 
their actual trial) and continues after their detention period has ended. For many 
adolescents, a specific reintegration programme is part of the sentencing re-
quirements, whether or not in the form of a detention and treatment order. In 
total, roughly 100 adolescents are held in detention and follow a reintegration 
programme at ‘Den Hey-Acker’. These adolescents are divided into several groups 
of roughly 12 individuals each – based on the severity of their case (for instance, if 
they have a specific detention and treatment order)311 and on the type of crime of 
which they were convicted.312 Each group has its own designated area within the 
institution: a large room with a shared kitchen, lounge area, pool table, dart board, 
table tennis table and small outside court, behind which twelve cells are located 
(two stories of six cells each). Besides this group area, there are several indoor 
and outdoor facilities to keep the adolescents busy, such as classrooms for day-
time education (including many facilities for manual work), a gym, football fields, 
a tool shed where youngsters can learn to lay bricks, a kitchen garden to grow 
vegetables and a few animals to take care of under supervision of a mentor. None-
theless, ‘Den Hey-Acker’ is still very much a detention centre with all the neces-
                                                   
310 A court judgment may include a conditional detention and treatment order if a juvenile de-
linquent is motivated to work on his reintegration in an open facility (as a sort of ‘last chance’). 
A stay in open facilities or following a schooling programme can also be part of a probation 
leave. 
311 At the time of this study, there were two groups of adolescents in ‘Den Hey-Acker’ with so-
called ‘PIJ’ detention and treatment orders. These adolescents were convicted of serious felo-
nies and follow a long-term compulsory reintegration programme with a minimum duration of 
two years and a possible maximum of six years. 
312 Especially sexual offenders are kept in a separate group. 
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sary features to keep the adolescents inside – although designed in a somewhat 
camouflaged and ‘friendly’ way: high electronic fences surround the institution 
instead of walls; there are no bars, but the windows are too small for people to 
squeeze through; and no patrolling guards, but constant visible staff surveillance, 
locked doors and separated hallways between the various areas of the institution. 
The ‘Work-Wise routing model’ is an important and often-used method 
for reintegration purposes. This model was developed for adolescents remaining 
at a Judicial Custodial Institution for longer than three weeks,313 and especially for 
adolescents with an average or high risk of recidivism. The basic assumption un-
derlying this reintegration routing is that adolescents and youngsters “show high-
risk behaviour if they do not connect well enough with their social environment. If 
they are insufficiently connected to important social institutions such as family, 
school and work, they have little to lose when they take a wrong turn in life”.314 
The routing focuses on individual support to improve an adolescent’s social skills, 
and on an individual’s intrinsic motivation to get an education and/or a job, i.e., on 
“finding and keeping a job, following and completing a training course, finding and 
keeping a safe place to live, and building and maintaining a positive social net-
work the youngsters can fall back on”.315 
 
The actual ‘routing model’ consists of four phases, through which an adolescent 
progresses before the end of his or her time in the judicial system (both in deten-
tion and during probation). The first of these phases is ‘intake and planning’: a 
risk assessment and prognosis, which is made at the time of arraignment: what is 
necessary for a proper reintegration and what is necessary to organise this (for 
instance, in terms of housing, schooling and work)? From provisional custody 
onwards, every juvenile delinquent is assigned an Individual Routing Counsel-
lor316 by the Judicial Custodial Institution who provides counselling about future 
prospects, schooling, work, family situation, undesirable friends, and so on. The 
Individual Routing Counsellor remains the adolescent’s personal coach, both in-
side and outside the institution. 
The second phase of the routing is called ‘inside’ (since all activities are 
carried out strictly within the walls of the institution) and focuses on education 
and personal development. This is also the period in which adolescents learn to 
                                                   
313 For adolescents with a short detention period (less than three weeks), a variant of this rout-
ing model is used. Since there is only a limited period of time to work with these adolescents 
during their detention period, their routing starts immediately with focusing on the return into 
society. This correlates with the third phase of the entire routing model. 
314 “The Routing”, 2007:10; my translation, RP. 
315 “The Routing”, 2007:15; my translation, RP. 
316 In Dutch: Individuele Trajectbegeleider (‘ITB’er’). 
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adapt to life inside, and to living in a group with fellow convicts.317 This includes 
devoting attention to personal hygiene, daily rhythm, cooking and eating together. 
Every adolescent has his or her own personal learning objectives. These consist 
of, first, dealing with personal issues such as aggression, telling lies, accepting ‘no’ 
for an answer, negative self-image or being too gullible,318 and second, of follow-
ing an educational programme (which takes up most of the daytime) based on 
personal capabilities and interests. Gaining some kind of education should even-
tually help in finding a job ‘outside’. Coaches, teachers and mentors keep a daily 
‘score card’ on an adolescent’s attitude, motivation and development.319 Based on 
an adolescent’s progress, the decision is made as to whether or not he or she can 
move to the next phase of the routing. 
This next phase is called the ‘transition’ and is spent partly inside and 
partly outside the institution. The adolescent still lives inside, but follows an edu-
cation or has an internship ‘outside’ during the daytime. To qualify for this period 
and for conditional leave, an adolescent must have at least 26 hours of work or 
schooling a week. The Individual Routing Counsellor plays a mediating role be-
tween adolescent, schools, trainee posts and municipality. Municipalities have a 
legal obligation to make every attempt to find these adolescents a job or intern-
ship and (as part of the fourth phase of the routing) a place to stay.320  
The fourth and final phase of the routing (‘outside’) starts when the deten-
tion period ends and the probation period begins. The adolescent is no longer 
living inside the institution, but has moved back to his parents or to a place of his 
own. Even though probation has now taken over formal responsibility for the 
adolescent from the custodial institution, the Individual Routing Counsellor con-
tinues to visit the adolescents assigned to him to check on their development. 
During this period, the municipality also has a more prominent role: besides the 
                                                   
317 Adapting to life within a group can be difficult for some adolescents and can also lead to 
conflicts. There is, in fact, a special group within ‘Den Hey-Acker’ for adolescents who are inca-
pable of integrating into ‘normal’ groups. 
318 An important method used inside ‘Den Hey-Acker’ is ‘You Turn’: a group discussion held 
twice a week in which the adolescents address a personal issue which they have come across in 
the previous days. For instance, an adolescent discusses with his group members the fact that 
he had an argument with one of his teachers. Using role play methods, the adolescents can try to 
find out how to prevent this from happening again. Furthermore, the ‘Your Turn method’ is 
used to integrate new detainees into the group by asking them to tell the group the story of 
their life up to then. On the one hand, this makes them vulnerable, but on the other hand, it can 
also help them to feel secure and trusted within their group. 
319 Good results may be rewarded with certain privileges (such as use of a game computer in 
one’s cell). 
320 Besides, from a preventive point of view it is also in the own best interest of municipalities to 
organise a proper ‘aftercare’ for an adolescent, who will probably return to the municipality 
after the judicial routing ends. 
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legal obligation to make all effort to find a place for the adolescent to stay,321 the 
municipality may also decide to offer further aftercare when the formal judicial 
probation period ends.  
 
The activities in the ‘Work-Wise routing model’ are designed to accomplish a suc-
cessful return of a juvenile delinquent to society. Besides helping adolescents to 
find their way in society, this approach also aims to protect society by preventing 
further criminal behaviour by these adolescents. The dominant strategy to realise 
these two objectives is resocialisation through work, schooling, proper housing 
and personal development. 
In the implementation of this objective, the Individual Routing Counsellor 
plays a crucial role. The routing model is not only a ‘closed system’ in itself – guid-
ing adolescents from arraignment to aftercare – but also a model characterised by 
permanent and personalised attention and supervision. A counsellor supports the 
adolescent through every phase of their routing, maintains contact with his par-
ents, and discusses his case in the Care and Security House. In the words of one of 
these counsellors: “I’m more or less the personal assistant of my boys. They can 
call me 24 hours a day. But I’m also always there to make sure the boys don’t take 
a wrong turn again”. 
 
There are, however, some limitations to these preventive ambitions and strategies 
of personal support.322 First of all, if an adolescent is not cooperative, the risk of 
recidivism remains high. For instance, the temptation of the profitable drug trade 
may be too high for an adolescent to resist. In these cases, there is little more the 
staff of ‘Den Hey-Acker’ can do than to keep this type of adolescent busy during 
detention and just hope for the best.  
And second, every judicial sentence or detention and treatment order is 
temporary: even the longest routings end with an adolescent being released back 
into society. Even if the risk of recidivism is still high, this fixed end may force the 
custodial institution to allow an adolescent conditional leave. In the words of one 
of the staff member of ‘Den Hey-Acker’: “you have to try something”.  
 
4.2.5. Risk families and care avoiders 
The police report the case of a 10-year old boy, who threw a brick from a fly-over at 
a passing car below. His mother, standing close by, was unable to stop him. The po-
lice describe the mother as ‘very cooperative’. However, the mother proved to be on 
                                                   
321 A municipality may formulate the condition that an adolescent has to accept living under 
supervision if he wants to move into a house provided by the municipality. 
322 Budgetary constraints left aside. 
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record in the files of both the police and the youth care service. Five years ago, she 
was convicted of shoplifting: she had tried to steal baby food. After the divorce from 
her husband, things appeared to improve for her and her child. The past few years 
her family coach – appointed by youth care services – has been positive about her 
development. She tries her best, but apparently does not have enough control over 
her child. This worrisome situation is reason for child care to follow this family more 
closely. 
 
In the Social Work Case Consultations on Youth and Adults, network partners 
discuss the serious concerns they have about the wellbeing of individuals. In the 
case of minors, these are referred to as ‘risk children’ (or ‘risk families’ to include 
the parents), in the case of adults as ‘worrisome care avoiders’. In both instances, 
the perspective is more on care than on judicial aspects (such as preventing re-
cidivism). The basis for network partners to take action is not (necessarily) a 
criminal offence, but concern about a person’s wellbeing or possible future delin-
quent behaviour.  
Typical cases of risk children include a father who reports concerns about 
his son’s drug use and possible drug dealing, a daughter who keeps running away 
from home, or a mother who is incapable of controlling her rebellious adolescent 
son. Typical cases of worrisome care avoiders include a street person with obvi-
ous health problems, a drug addict living in a slum dwelling, or a single unem-
ployed man who (according to his neighbours) keeps the curtains of his apart-
ment closed all day and is often seen carrying in large quantities of alcoholic bev-
erages every few days. 
Interventions in these cases consist in the first place of “care interfer-
ence”, which can be described as “an active and outreaching form of help for per-
sons and risk groups which are urgently in need of help, but do not ask for help 
themselves”.323 This can take the form of merely informing persons about existing 
support facilities, but can also imply persuading them to accept care in their own 
best interests or in the interest of their child. The latter can take the form of sup-
porting people step by step to enter rehab, getting the proper health or psycho-
logical care, applying for social security, or getting parenting support, but also       
– especially when children are involved – the form of more coercive measures by 
youth care or, in severe cases, the child protection council.  
‘Care interference’ and ‘outreach work’ are strategies to guide people 
through to welfare services. The first thing to be done in all cases, however, is to 
“simply have a look” and try to establish contact with the persons involved to as-
sess their situation and motivation. Here, the goal is not to stop certain behaviour 
                                                   
323 Jaarplan 2010 Zorg- en Veiligheidshuis Tilburg, 2010:24; my translation, RP. 
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from occurring again (as is the case with preventing recidivism), but instead to 
“proactively324 seek out risk cases”325 and, if possible, help them get the care and 
support necessary to get their life back on track.  
In the following paragraphs, two examples of these practices are de-
scribed: first, an activity by outreach social work working with a problematic fam-
ily, and second, an intervention by the Care Interference Team directed at a wor-
risome care avoider. The former is concerned with the wellbeing of children, the 
latter with the wellbeing of adolescents – however, the procedure is very similar 
in both practices. 
 
An example of outreach social work is the case of the Edwards family. The mother, 
aged 20, was caught stealing baby milk in the pushcart of her one-year-old daugh-
ter. She did, however, pay for eight cans of beer, which were allegedly for the fa-
ther of her child. This, combined with the general impression the mother made, 
led to a ‘concern report’ being filed by the police officers dealing with the case. 
This two-page report contained the personal data of the family members and de-
scribed the situation, which raised concerns about the daughter’s wellbeing. The 
report also included available information on previous or existing welfare activi-
ties. And finally, a list of ‘risk factors’, including presumptions of child abuse, drug 
use, domestic violence, psychological problems or child neglect, was filled out by 
the police, who checked each factor ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘unknown’.  
Based on this concern report, two outreach social workers paid this family 
a visit. In this case, a prior notice was sent by mail326 with the message that “we 
would like to meet you and see what sort of help you might need”. During the first 
visit, both parents seemed willing to accept support in the upbringing of their 
daughter. However, several problems were noticed: both father and mother had 
sizeable debts and they regularly had fights – probably in the presence of their 
daughter. Moreover, according to the father, the mother had borderline disorder, 
which made her difficult to deal with. Given these circumstances, the outreach 
                                                   
324 The Care Interference Team tries to activate a broad network of police officers, care provid-
ers, social workers, housing corporation employees, and so on for this ‘proactive search for risk 
cases’. The nine members of the team regularly give presentations to groups of professionals in 
the region to promote their work. They are largely dependent on reports by others about possi-
ble care avoiders, so making as many people as possible aware of the Care Interference Team 
increases the chance that care avoiders will be reported to the team. The team has also made a 
short introductory film, in which the viewer is introduced to three people whom the team has 
helped to get their life back on track. 
325 “Tilburg maakt werk van integraal veiligheidsbeleid”, 2008:12; my translation, RP. 
326 This is not always usual. In many cases outreach social work visits families without prior 
notice, if they think a notice might alert the family or make them less inclined to allow them to 
enter the house. 
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social service was determined “to make sure these parents got the care and sup-
port they need”. However, their second visit, during which further arrangements 
for parenting support were to be made, did not go as planned: the father was not 
present and the mother was suddenly very unwilling to accept any form of sup-
port. 
A third visit was scheduled. The outreach social workers dealing with the 
Edwards case planned to gather enough information on the family situation to 
draw up a report for the youth care child abuse office.327 Since the mother proved 
uncooperative, they felt they had no other option than to call in the youth care 
service,328 which has the legal authority to impose compulsory parenting support 
in cases of presumed child abuse.329  
This third visit also did not go according to plan. At 11 AM, father opened 
the door. He looked tired and claimed he had been working until 6 AM in the 
morning. When the two outreach social workers asked whether they could come 
in for a talk, he refused. He ‘did not feel like it’. He would rather discuss matters 
with his friends if he felt like talking about it at all: “they know me better than you 
do”. Moreover, his wife had left him, taking their daughter with her. Where she 
was right now, he could or would not tell.330 Before closing the door, he gave the 
two employees his wife’s mobile phone number. 
They decide to send her a text message to ask her where she was and 
whether they could come over to have a talk with her. An hour later, they received 
a reply: “I’m looking for a place to stay right now. You are no use to me and don’t 
care about me. You only care about having a nice place to live for yourself”. Fol-
lowing this uncooperative response, the outreach social service decided to file a 
report with the child abuse office at the local youth care services. 
 
Outreach social work is preventive in terms of its ‘risk-based’ interventions and in 
terms of its ‘early detection’ ambitions. Following a concern report by the police, 
outreach social workers ‘reach out’ to families to assess their situation. Based on 
                                                   
327 In Dutch: ‘Advies- en Meldpunt Kindermishandeling’ (AMK). 
328 However, as one outreach social work employee said, “for our own safety we do not want to 
tell the parents this at home. If we do decide to hand over the case to youth care, we will invite 
mom and dad to the Care and Security House to inform them. Or, if they don’t show up, we will 
inform them by mail”. 
329 If necessary, cases can be transferred even further to the child protection council, which may 
start a procedure to remove the child from parental custody. 
330 The outreach social work employees expressed their doubts on the father’s claim that his 
wife had left him for good: “according to the previous talks we had with them, she has a long 
history of running away and coming back home again in a few weeks time. I do believe she ran 
away and isn’t at home right now. But for all we know, he might be lying about the fact that he 
doesn’t know where she is right now”. 
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this assessment, the outreach social workers can decide to alert other welfare 
organisations such as the youth care service or the child protection council to take 
further action. This logic of intervention is, in the first instance, based on per-
ceived risk factors and presumptions of family problems, and secondly, on the 
assumption that proactively reaching out enables support and care at a stage 
when problems are still “reparable”. The notion of ‘risk children’ and ‘risk fami-
lies’ refer to this logic of intervention. 
There are, however, several limitations to outreach social work. Most im-
portantly, outreach work depends on the cooperation of the citizens and families 
involved. If they do not allow outreach social workers inside their house to talk, 
assessment of the situation is severely hampered. Their problems remain ‘hidden’ 
if there are no valid reasons for compulsory child protection interventions. Fur-
thermore, cooperation also implies that citizens tell the truth – which they do not 
always do for a variety of reasons (such as suspicions of youth care workers, 
stubbornness, claims to privacy, shame or psychological problems).331 At the same 
time, lack of cooperation by parents can also be assessed by welfare professionals 
as a risk factor in itself, which for instance justifies scaling up interventions from 
outreach support to youth care. Here, uncertainty about what is going on in a fam-
ily forms the trigger for more intervention. 
 
An example of the activities of the Care Interference Team, directed at adult ‘wor-
risome care avoiders’, is the case of Tom. Tom, 36 years old, lives in a shabby 
apartment above a garage. For the better part of the past eleven years, he has 
been making ends meet with illegal odd jobs at this garage. Recently, his alcohol 
addiction had worsened up to the point that he was unable to work. Having no 
income whatsoever, he finally applied for social security. The welfare service em-
ployee who interviewed Tom was concerned about his physical health and made a 
call to the Care Interference Team, which decided to pay Tom a visit. The first 
three times, they found the door locked. The fourth time, they found Tom at home. 
Tom then told Frank, the Care Interference Team employee, he could not go on 
living like this and accepted the offer to spend two weeks in ‘detox’. Before doing 
so, he had the names of his son and daughter tattooed on his forearms – building 
up a relation with them was his main motivation to kick his alcohol addiction. 
Tom, however, declined the offer to spend three months in rehab after his 
detox. He said he felt strong enough to fight the addiction alone, even without the 
use of medication to suppress his dipsorexia. Frank did not want to let go of Tom 
                                                   
331 However, according to the outreach social workers at the Care and Security House, most 




and continued to visit him once a week to check on his situation. He hoped to be 
able to persuade him to accept some sort of support. One of these visits took place 
two weeks after Tom left ‘detox’. Tom received Frank at his modest apartment – a 
bed, a couch, a sink, a coffee table, a television and a small cabinet with pictures of 
what seem to be his mother and two children. As he lit a cigarette and offered 
Frank one, he calmly talked of the difficult moments he had had just the day be-
fore. Two of his friends, who also live above the garage and also have alcohol 
problems, came over. And even though they did not push him to drink, they did so 
themselves. Tom managed to resist the temptation. “But I really thought: shall I 
just have one beer?”332 
 
Frank:   “You knew this was always going to happen as long as you live 
here. This place is filled with triggers. You were strong yesterday, 
but will you be the next time? Once you succumb, you will be lost”. 
 
Tom:  “I know, I know. But I want to stop and I will stop drinking. You 
don’t have to doubt that. Besides with this nice weather and all, I 
hardly spend any time here in my apartment”. 
 
Frank:  “I know you’re strong. But you don’t have a job yet and in the eve-
nings you will be here and your friends will be, too. In rehab they 
can help you deal with difficult moments like the one you experi-
enced yesterday”. 
 
Tom: “Yes, I know. But I also know I’m strong enough to do this without 
rehab”. 
 
Frank: “I just want you to realise how real the danger of relapsing into 
old habits is. Even if you are strong. Have you considered any of 
the other options I told you about last week?” 
 
Tom: “About that discussion group?” 
 
Frank: “Yes, the relapse prevention group. But also the medication that is 
available to suppress your craving for alcohol”. 
 
                                                   
332 The following is not a literal transcript of the dialogue between ‘Tom’ and ‘Frank’, but is 
representative of their actual discussion. 
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Tom: “Well, I’ll think about that discussion group. Won’t do me any 
harm, at least. And I also thought about those medicines. If I still 
have difficult moments in a week from now, maybe you should 
provide me with some”. 
 
Frank:  “Why not take the medication now? Why wait for difficult mo-
ments? Please consider this seriously. I mean it. And the discus-
sion group will definitely do you good: the members are all people 
with the same problem. For once, you can talk about your feelings 
instead of suppressing them with alcohol”. 
 
Tom:  “Ok. Ok. I will”. 
 
Frank:  “And you have my cell phone number. As soon as you have a tough 
moment, call me”.333 
 
‘Being there’ is the implicit motto underlying the interventions of the Care Inter-
ference Team: proactively searching for worrisome care avoiders, making home 
visits, not letting go and supporting clients through every step of the process 
(from helping them to apply for social security to making sure they are admitted 
to rehab). The members of the team have, by and large, two objectives: making 
sure someone gets the care he or she ‘deserves’, and making sure he or she does 
not relapse into old habits. Two preventive elements characterise ‘care interfer-
ence’: intervening on the basis of presumptions or causes of concern (that is, be-
fore actual problems are assessed during a first house visit) and intervening be-
fore problems worsen or become ‘irreparable’. 
But this approach also has its limitations: “if someone does not want to 
cooperate, there is often little you can do if there is no acute danger to their own 
health or to the people around them”. Care interference tries to hold on to their 
clients if they are not sure of a good result, but have, in the end, no means to en-
force their will. Moreover, people have to make the change themselves for an in-
tervention to work: “even if you know there is a real chance of someone relapsing, 
you have to give them the benefit of the doubt if they say they can make the 
                                                   
333 The observation of this visit took place in April 2011. In June 2011, during a brief conversa-
tion Frank provided an update on the developments in Tom’s case. A week after the visit de-
scribed here, Tom had had six beers during an evening of cards with his friends. Disappointed in 
himself, he decided to ask for medication to help him through his difficult moments. Since then, 
he has been doing reasonably well: despite having had a few beers, he has managed to prevent 
relapse and since late May has taken up some of his previous ‘work’ at the garage. Frank is posi-
tive about Tom’s future. 
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change by themselves”. Prevention plays a crucial role in their profession, but at 
the same time the members of the Care Interference Team accept the practical 
limitations to this ambition. 
 
4.2.6. Domestic violence 
In the Johnson family, a seven-year-old child appears to be present during the fights 
between his mom and dad. The parents deny having problems, but there have so far 
been six reports of presumed domestic violence by the neighbours. Adding to this 
suspicion is the fact that both parents were convicted some years ago for running a 
cannabis nursery in their attic. Furthermore, a couple of years ago the initial report 
of domestic violence indicated that the father might have an alcohol problem. At the 
time, there was not enough evidence to make a case. The father refused help for his 
alleged alcohol problem. He “seems to be avoiding care”. Since then, it has been quiet 
and the family dropped out of sight. None of the network partners report any exist-
ing contacts with any members of the family. But given the recent concerns, “some-
thing must be done to get through to this family”. If they slam the door in the face of 
the employees of the support unit domestic violence, we will have to take firmer 
action and put the youth care services on this case”. 
 
Police reports on suspicions of domestic violence are discussed in the Intake Do-
mestic Violence consultation – especially if there are children involved and there 
are multiple reports of violence.334 Typical cases include reports of fights between 
a father and mother while young children are present, of arguments between a 
mother and daughter, or of abusive boyfriends. This case consultation is held to 
decide what action can be taken if there are insufficient leads (yet) for a judicial 
intervention. As with the approach to risk adolescents and care avoiders, “doing 
nothing is not an option” in the face of serious concerns: “something must be done 
to prevent escalation” – in the words of several participants in the case consulta-
tion. A typical first intervention in this type of case is trying to find out more about 
a family and establishing some form of contact through outreach social work. Only 
then can a proper assessment of the seriousness of the initial report be made. 
 
An example of an intervention by the Support Unit Domestic Violence is the con-
sultation with Ahmed and Fouzia. They are the parents of four children and have a 
history of domestic violence. The father was issued a restraining order for 10 days 
                                                   
334 Suspicions of sexual violence are discussed in a separate case consultation (Scenario Team 
Sexual Violence). These suspicions are not necessarily confined to the domestic sphere (but 
may, for instance, also involve suspicions against school teachers). Even more so than in the 




after reports of domestic violence against his wife and oldest daughter (aged 14) 
had been received. Since children are involved in this case, the police made a ‘con-
cern report’ to discuss this case in the Care and Security House.  
Following the case consultation, the youth care service and the Support 
Unit Domestic Violence took several measures. Among other things, the youth 
care workers assessed the family situation. And the Support Unit has urged the 
public prosecutor to issue a contact ban for Ahmed following his ten-day restrain-
ing order, since there were serious concerns for recidivism. Ahmed has not seen 
his children since. He has, however, followed a probation course on ‘aggression 
regulation’, and found a temporary job at a sheltered workshop for four days a 
week. 
Now, several months later, Fouzia has asked for a consultation with Ah-
med under the supervision of an employee of the Support Unit Domestic Violence, 
an employee from the youth care service and a social worker. She wants her hus-
band’s contact ban to be lifted. Before the consultation, the youth care and social 
workers arranged separate meetings with Ahmed and Fouzia. They especially 
urged Fouzia to formulate strict conditions before asking the court to lift Ahmed’s 
contact ban. However, they have no choice but to respect Fouzia’s decision, de-
spite fears that Ahmed will become violent again. 
Fouzia was late for the meeting in one of the CCTV-controlled rooms of the 
Care and Security House. This gave the representative of the Support Unit Domes-
tic Violence the chance to ask Ahmed about his probation training on aggression 
regulation. When Fouzia entered, about fifteen minutes late, the atmosphere grew 
slightly uncomfortable, although everybody tried to act as naturally and relaxed as 
possible. An interpreter was present during the consultation, since the mother, in 
particular, barely speaks Dutch, which did nothing to improve the situation.335  
 
Fouzia:   “My youngest son sleeps very badly at night. And one of my 
daughters keeps asking for her father. But most of all, I have 
talked with Ahmed’s brothers and they tell me he has really 
changed. He has a job now. I want him to come back home to see 
for myself if he really has changed”.  
 
Fouzia’s arguments did not immediately please the representatives of youth care, 
social work and the support unit domestic violence. Underlying their questions 
was a distinct concern for the security of her children and herself. Although they 
                                                   
335 Throughout the entire conversation, Fouzia talked via her interpreter, who was seated be-
tween her and Ahmed. Ahmed in return tended to speak Dutch and (thereby) seemed to avoid 
direct interaction with his wife. 
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have no formal means to enforce their will, they did try to convince Fouzia, in 
particular, to take the matter seriously:  
 
SUDV336:  “Once the contact ban is lifted, there is almost no way back. If he 
does become violent again, there is little we can do, except call in 
the child protection authorities, who will decide if the children can 
stay at home”.  
 
Social worker: “I have already discussed this with the mother yesterday, and we 
think it’s best to enter into a kind of ‘contract’ to effect a stepwise 
return, based on mutually agreed conditions. The mother has dis-
cussed her conditions with me, which include the liberty to follow 
Dutch language courses, to get her driving license and to visit fam-
ily in Belgium by herself. Also, she wants Ahmed to work, to take 
responsibility for the children when she is at school, to follow the 
probation training on aggression regulation and to have more con-
fidence in her capabilities as a parent. And finally, Fouzia wants to 
discuss a visiting arrangement for a stepwise return of Ahmed”. 
 
Fouzia: “The last condition is no longer necessary.  I have heard from his 
family that he has changed. He can simply come home”. 
 
SUDV: “Well, I don’t know if we can agree with that…” 
 
Ahmed:  “Do these conditions come from you or from Fouzia?” 
 
Social worker: “From Fouzia. We have discussed them yesterday and I put them 
on paper”. 
 
Ahmed:  “Well, I don’t see many problems. Most of the things you mention, 
we have already been doing in the past. We talk about things, I re-
spect her and do take responsibility for my children”. 
 
SUDV:  “And what about the other things? Fouzia wants to learn Dutch 
and get a driver’s license. She wants to go out alone. She wants an 
equal say in the way you raise your children”. 
 
                                                   
336 SUDV stands for the representative of the Support Unit Domestic Violence. 
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Ahmed:  “I don’t object to her going to school. No problem. But the other 
things are not a matter of yes or no. We have to talk about this. For 
instance, it is not a problem if she visits the neighbours, but if she 
wants to visit family in Belgium I think I should know that she is 
going away. This is natural. If I work, someone must be at home to 
take care of the children. We have to talk about these things at 
home. Listen to each other and make arrangements for the situa-
tion at hand”. 
 
Fouzia:  “We can discuss this when he is home again. If I go out to do the 
shopping, I don’t need to ask. But if I want to visit a friend, it is 
normal to talk about this. But he should not forbid me to visit a 
friend during the weekend when I spend the entire week at home 
watching over the children. I want more freedom, but not to do 
bad things”. 
 
Youth care: “To talk is really important. If you do decide to proceed, we should 
discuss a stepwise return and talk about the kind of support you 
need from social work. For your sake, but also for the sake of your 
children”. 
 
Ahmed and Fouzia seemed to be avoiding the difficult issues that lie between 
them, stating that they should talk about these things at home and work on them 
together. This left the social worker, the youth care representative and the Sup-
port Unit Domestic Violence workers with little other choice than to talk more or 
less ‘on behalf’ of Fouzia and try to break through the apparently frictionless sur-
face of Ahmed’s and Fouzia’s statements. In their assessment, Ahmed was “still 
very touchy” and they feared for the security of Fouzia and the children. 
 
SUDV:  “Ok. So we can conclude that you, Fouzia, want Ahmed to come 
home again under certain conditions. But we also have some con-
ditions. First, you both have to accept support by welfare work on 
how to discuss family issues, on how to raise your children to-
gether and how to deal with past experiences of domestic vio-
lence. This is especially important for your children. And second, 
we want you, Fouzia, to think all this over once more and to think 
about the conditions under which you accept Ahmed’s return”. 
 
Ahmed:  “No. What is this? We have already discussed this. Why should she 
go back on her intention to accept me back immediately?” 
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The meeting ended in a rather disorderly fashion. Fouzia left. Because of the con-
tact ban, Ahmed was asked to stay for a few minutes to allow Fouzia to leave the 
premises. After Ahmed had also left, the representatives of youth care, social work 
and the Support Unit Domestic Violence discussed the situation. Even though 
there was little they could do to enforce their terms, they discussed various 
strategies to minimise the risk of Ahmed becoming violent again. In the words of 
one of representatives: “My only concern is the security of this family. And I’m 
really afraid Ahmed will become violent again. He says he’s fine with all of 
Fouzia’s conditions, but I don’t believe him”. 
The network partners involved in this case used three strategies. First, the 
strategy of persuasion: during the meeting, Fouzia repeatedly was strongly urged 
to think things over. The welfare workers more or less tried to hide the fact that 
they have little formal say in the proceedings by using phrases such as “we insist 
that…”, “our condition is that…” and “we want you to…”. Moreover, they made the 
possible consequences of recidivism explicit: child protection may step in and 
remove the children from home.  
The second strategy involved trying to formalise Ahmed’s return: during 
the meeting, there were talks of effecting a ‘contract’ between Fouzia and Ahmed 
in which they would express their conditions. Also, after Ahmed and Fouzia had 
left, a ‘return plan’ was discussed, including specific blocks of hours during the 
next couple of weeks, in which Ahmed would be allowed to visit his family (should 
his restraining order be lifted).  
And third, the strategy of continued supervision was employed: several 
support activities were discussed to keep an eye on Ahmed, Fouzia and their chil-
dren. The reintegration of Ahmed into the family was perceived as being fraught 
with dangers, and having social workers around might help Ahmed and Fouzia to 
deal with the situation and to detect early warnings of possible tensions between 
them. 
Even though the word ‘prevention’ itself was not mentioned during the 
talks, the words and actions of the representatives of social work, youth care and 
the Support Unit Domestic Violence nevertheless reflected a definite preventive 
ambition: what drives their actions is the combination of a dominant concern for 
the security of the family and their assessment that Ahmed might relapse into old 
habits. However, the consultation between Fouzia and Ahmed also revealed that 
they are dependent on the cooperation of the parents,337 that they have little for-
                                                   
337 The representative of the Support Unit Domestic Violence mentioned the possibility that 
Fouzia and Ahmed were already seeing each other again behind the backs of the network part-
ners: “they might be putting up a show here”. 
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mal say in their decisions and that, in the end, they have to accept the fact that 




4.3.1. A cause for concern 
In studying the crime control activities in and around the Care and Security 
House, the objective was to gain insight into the role of prevention in these activi-
ties, and thereby to support the findings in the previously discussed policy gene-
alogy. An analysis of the intervention repertoire in Tilburg reveals three different 
levels on which the perspective of prevention infuses person-oriented crime pol-
icy. 
The first level concerns the objective of the Care and Security House. Al-
though reactive in the sense that actions are only taken after a case has been dis-
cussed in one of the various case consultations, the objective of the Care and Secu-
rity House is preventive in the sense that its aim is to treat every individual case in 
such a way that a structural solution or improvement is realised to avert an ex-
pected undesirable future of criminal or otherwise problematic behaviour. In the 
words of one of the managers of the Care and Security House: “Our objective is not 
to prevent people from being reported. Our objective is to prevent people – once 
they are reported – from ever being reported a second time”. 
 
The second level of prevention follows from this objective. The prevention per-
spective is most clearly visible in the way cases are introduced, in the problem 
analyses, and in the nature of the subsequent interventions. Individual cases are 
introduced and assessed on the basis of causes for concern. A telling practice in 
this respect are the ‘concern reports’, which are made by police officers following 
police notifications or other contacts with citizens. These ‘concern reports’ do not 
deal with criminal offences, but with a police officer’s fear of future problems if no 
action is taken by one of the network partners in the Care and Security House to 
intervene in an individual’s personal or family situation. Concerns are the justifica-
tion mechanism for interventions: presumptions and risk factors ought to be inves-
tigated, and early interventions are a means to prevent problems from worsening 
and becoming irreparable.  
During case consultations, information is gathered and shared to make an 
assessment of an individual’s personal situation. The underlying question in these 
consultations is: do we have reason to believe that this person has problems, 
which might lead to behaviour that poses a risk for others or for himself? Seen 
from this perspective, it is understandable that the police are interested in an 
individual’s prior involvements in a criminal case (even without an actual convic-
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tion). It is also logical for network partners to share data on school absenteeism 
and previous contacts with the social services, and it is essential that a proper 
assessment should include information on an individual’s relatives or friends: all 
this information is instrumental in assessing whether the cause for concern is 
valid. 
Typical for the assessment of causes for concern is the practice of devel-
oping ‘scenarios’. Based on the expectation of undesirable behaviour if no meas-
ures are taken, the network partners seek to replace this by a new ‘scenario’ in 
which certain behaviour or certain elements in an individual’s personal life are 
corrected. Expectations are the modus vivendi of the Care and Security House. 
Based on expectations of future developments, reintegration programmes for 
offenders, support programmes for people in danger of relapsing in undesirable 
behaviour and proactive approaches to people who are believed to have personal 
or family problems are developed. 
Moreover, in some cases the adage even is: ‘when in doubt, act’. In the as-
sessments by police or welfare professionals, uncertainty can be the justification 
for further intervention. The line between prevention (based on risk factors) and 
precaution (based on a fundamental uncertainty with regard to the future) is very 
difficult to draw in professional assessments, but the case description shows sev-
eral examples which tend towards the latter. For instance, if parents prove unco-
operative with outreach support to talk about their children, this might be used as 
a reason to scale the case up to youth care. And if case consultations do not make a 
proper assessment possible, this might be the argument for a first intervention. 
 
The third level at which prevention structures the work of the Care and Security 
House is the way professionals define and limit their responsibility. Especially 
interesting is the role of police officers and representatives of the public prosecu-
tor: while, on the one hand, they represent institutions in the repressive-judicial 
sphere, they actively participate in the preventive ambitions of the Care and Secu-
rity House on the other. Police officers draw up ‘concern reports’ and representa-
tives of the public prosecutor attend case consultations to discuss effective ap-
proaches to habitual offenders. As a result, their scope is broadened from the con-
fines of law enforcement, to include the prevention of crime. 
A similar broadening in professional scope occurs in the work of welfare 
organisations, social work, corrective facilities and the probation office, which are 
usually tasked with carrying out the actual interventions. Prevention is an impor-
tant element in their daily work – either because they have the explicit task of 
preventing future problems (such as individual supervisors for offenders in a re-
integration programme), or because prevention has broadened their initial re-
sponsibility to offer care and support. Professionals working in the field of domes-
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tic violence, or with risk adolescents and worrisome care avoiders do not merely 
provide care: they also explicitly see it as their responsibility to prevent future 
problems (such as backsliding in the case of an alcohol addict) or to prevent the 
further worsening of problems (such as early and outreach interventions in cases 
of presumed domestic violence or parenting problems).  
Prevention depends to a large extent on the way the various network 
partners incorporate this perspective into their daily work. For instance, deten-
tion centres are tasked with preventing recidivism, police officers with reporting 
causes for concern, while social workers strive for an early and proactive detec-
tion of possible risk families. In short, prevention broadens the professional scope 
of both repressive-judicial and welfare professionals. 
Furthermore, prevention produces a transformation in professional prac-
tices. Preventive interventions tend be outreaching and persistent. Outreach inter-
ventions enable the early detection of problems. Ideally, at least, the network 
partners do not wait for ‘care avoiders’ to report themselves or for at-risk adoles-
cents to slip into criminal behaviour. Instead, interventions take place as soon as 
possible. Moreover, interventions, and the organisation behind these, are as per-
sistent as possible. Professionals do not take ‘no’ for an answer at the first at-
tempt, but try to ‘hold on’ and ‘get through’ to people by making home calls, by 
following the progress of individual cases in case consultations, by using persua-
sion and even strongly insisting that people accept care and support. 
 
4.3.2. Care and discipline 
The Care and Security House was established with a very specific objective in 
mind. “To organise around the problem” or “to reason from the problem” are 
commonly used phrases by professionals to explain why the Care and Security 
House has been designed to overcome organisational boundaries between the 
various network partners. These boundaries may find their justification in bu-
reaucratic or task-oriented considerations, but hamper the effective approach to 
“actual” problems.338 The network partners in the Care and Security House stress 
the importance of cooperation and coordination for the organisation of activities 
around a shared assumption and problem definition.  
                                                   
338 This does not imply that bureaucratic elements are eliminated from the Care and Security 
House. First, the network partners remain separate organisations and only cooperate on certain 
areas of their work field. Second, and more important, the activities in the Care and Security 
House itself have a bureaucratic element: case consultations do not break through the dilemma 
of the division of labour and coordination, but are a means to determine new forms of dealing 
with this dilemma. A case consultation is, in other words, itself a bureaucratic device: it involves 
deciding which organisation is responsible for further actions. 
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The adage “to organise around the problem” and the institutional design 
of the Care and Security House is only ‘logical’ or ‘rational’ from a very specific 
perspective – a prevention perspective. A solely punitive and judicial approach to 
crime is perceived as being insufficient from a preventive point of view, but would 
be perfectly logical from a legalistic perspective. Consider, for instance, the fact 
that police officers are interested in prior involvement or accusations of individu-
als in criminal cases (instead of prior convictions only): while this may seem ir-
relevant from a legal point of view, it makes perfect sense in the context of assess-
ing the need for preventive interventions towards individuals. 
 
Moreover, the shared preventive problem definition rests on a very specific as-
sumption with regard to the causes of crime and other issues. The assumption 
underlying the existence of the Care and Security House is that criminal or other 
undesirable behaviour stems from the social contexts in which people live and 
from personal or behavioural characteristics. Prevention, therefore, within this 
context, always refers to personalised and behavioural prevention. The activities 
carried out by the various network partners depend on the construction of a pre-
ventive theory or scenario, which links risky behaviour to possible explanations 
based on an individual’s personal characteristics or social context.  
This theory enables and justifies interventions, but also limits the scope of 
preventive activities to individual circumstances and, as a consequence, does not 
offer a logical course of action if these circumstances fail to provide an explana-
tion for certain behaviour. Without police antecedents, without information on 
family members, without problems at school and without indications of family 
issues following a house visit and talks with parents of delinquent adolescents, the 
network partners are left without clues as to where to direct their preventive 
interventions at. Without the establishment of risk factors, repressive-judicial 
approaches serve as the ‘last resort’.  
There are several other limitations to the objective of prevention. Most 
importantly, behavioural change cannot be enforced – professionals always de-
pend to a certain extent on the cooperation of their ‘clients’. People ‘need to be 
motivated’. If an adolescent in detention says he believes dealing drugs to be fi-
nancially more attractive than having a legal job, this effectively means the end of 
the preventive ambitions of his supervisor. And if a former alcohol addict says he 
can fight his addiction without the use of medication or professional help, there is 
little more a care interference unit can do than keep in touch and hope for the 
best. Moreover, all interventions are temporary: after a certain period interven-
tions end and individual cases drop out of the picture. Perhaps they will never be 
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seen again, or perhaps they will pop up years later in a criminal case, a concern 
report or the social work database.339 
 
The preventive objective of behavioural change produces an affinity between care 
and discipline. The cooperation between repressive-judicial organisations and 
welfare organisations can only be explained by referring to the aforementioned 
shared problem definition and shared assumption for interventions. To prevent a 
first offender or ex-offender from committing further crimes in the future, or to 
prevent risk adolescents from developing criminal behaviour in the future re-
quires activities to transform a (potentially) deviant individual into a well-
functioning member of society. 
Effective preventive interventions transcend the boundaries between the 
domains of welfare and law enforcement: prevention produces a permeability be-
tween previously separate policy domains. Crime prevention is often a matter of 
outreach social work or a matter of personal reintegration programmes for de-
tainees. Elements of care and welfare permeate crime policy. And conversely, 
elements of crime policy permeate care and welfare: punishment is transformed 
into an ‘ultimum remedium’, a last resort if crime prevention through care should 
fail.340 
The archetypal example of blurred boundaries between care and disci-
pline is the legal possibility to impose a treatment and detention order on habitual 
offenders. Since 2004, very active habitual offenders (ten offences in the last five 
years) can be placed in an Institution for Habitual Offenders (‘ISD’) for a maxi-
mum of 24 months. The justification for this detention order is not an individual 
crime, but the aim to protect society against these very active offenders for a 
longer period of time and to change an offender’s life of crime by means of treat-
ment and support. An instrument of punishment (detention) enables crime pre-
vention through individual care and support. 
 
A precondition for behavioural crime prevention is the identification of various 
target groups. These target groups refer to citizens with an increased risk of 
criminal behaviour or behaviour that impairs their own or their family’s wellbe-
ing. Cases introduced in the Care and Security House are categorised according to 
one of the following ‘labels’: juvenile offenders, habitual offenders, ex offenders, 
                                                   
339 Other limitations to prevention mentioned by professionals in the Care and Security House 
are financial limitations (especially in the case of cutbacks) and the possibility of organisations 
passing the buck for budgetary or capacity reasons. 
340 However, care is not simply instrumental to crime prevention, but has an objective of its 
own: the prevention of future problems in terms of unhealthy behaviour, child rearing, unem-
ployment, housing or financial issues requires a tenacious and outreaching care approach.  
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risk adolescents or families, worrisome care avoiders, and offenders and victims 
of domestic violence.341 This categorisation enables the development of interven-
tions that are customised to fit individual cases. 
Within this categorisation, there is a special concern for adolescents. They 
are especially vulnerable to negative influences (such as domestic violence), and 
make up an important part of the total number of criminals. However, children 
and adolescents are also more susceptible to behavioural change than adults. As a 
consequence, adolescents are a logical target group for preventive interventions. 
                                                   
341 There is a strict definition or little room for discussion on some categories, such as habitual 
offenders or ex offenders. For others, the boundaries between the categories are more blurred: 
for instance, a juvenile offender might simultaneously be a habitual offender, and a risk adoles-





5. PREVENTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY 
 
 
“City life [...] generated uncertainties of its own: crime, 
mob violence, rebellion, the unpredictable cycles of the 
urban-industrial labor market, and mass epidemics. [...] 
Lengthening and tightening chains of interdependence 
bound together the urban population, increasing exter-
nalities among them. And although the awareness of 
these externalities was often only patchy at best, the fact 
that mutual dependency tied together the rich and the 
poor, the established and the outsiders, in one figuration, 
escaped no one.” 
 





1.1. Disease, health and collective action 
There are several ways of understanding phenomena of ‘disease’ and ‘health’. 
Seen from a medical-biological paradigm, diseases pose a threat to individual 
wellbeing and to general societal health as a result of natural and epidemiological 
factors.342 By contrast, a social perspective on disease and health stresses several 
other, less external or biological sources of potential harm: “where and how peo-
ple live are […] just as important to health as biological factors. [...] In this social 
model, people are not passive victims of disease, but are actively engaged in the 
realisation and maintenance of health” (Boot & Knapen, 2005:6; my translation, 
RP). Poor social hygiene or poor self-care are contributing factors to disease, in 
the same way epidemiological factors are. 
In the medical-biological paradigm, health is determined by characteris-
tics of the living environment such as decent housing, proper sewerage systems 
and clean drinking water. Under the social paradigm, aspects of individual behav-
iour determine health: personal hygiene, proper nourishment and physical exer-
cise. The latter paradigm also introduces an element of social and individual re-
sponsibility for health. Individuals are more than the passive victims of disease. 
                                                   
342 Contrary to crime (which was discussed in the previous chapter), threats to an individual’s 
health generally derive, not from the deliberate actions of another individual, but from natural 
and epidemiological sources or from a person’s own behaviour. Even though transmission of 
infections is a result of human interaction, the actual cause of the infection does not directly 
stem from any individual decision or act. 
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Both paradigms offer possibilities for prevention. In the following policy geneal-
ogy, however, especially the social paradigm on health takes centre stage. 
 
The history of western medicine can be traced back to prehistoric shamans or, for 
a more structured approach to diagnostics, to Hippocrates of Kos (ca. 460 BC – ca. 
370 BC). However, modern medicine originated from the Enlightenment’s interest 
in the biology of the human body and as a result of the striving to liberate man 
from external influences. New insights into the causes of, and cures for, diseases 
eventually opened the door for health care improvements. By the mid-19th cen-
tury, most European countries had several privately (often religious-based) or 
publically funded hospitals, providing a rudimentary form of general health 
care.343 However, it was not until after the Second World War that widespread 
health care facilities and health care insurance came into being (e.g. Van der 
Woud, 2006). The late-20th century welfare state transformed health care from a 
matter of (religious) ‘caritas’ to a matter of individual rights.344 
Besides an interest in human biology, the Enlightenment also sparked an 
interest in the social determinants of health. Instead of a focus on the human body 
as the locus of disease, poor living conditions and lack of hygiene came to be un-
derstood as important causes of epidemiological diseases. Especially in the second 
half of the 19th century, the idea took root in Western Europe that collective health 
problems could be controlled through advancements in public hygiene, such as 
                                                   
343 Early practices to influence determinants of health were already developed in the Middle 
Ages, such as quarantine of travellers from plague-infested regions and establishment of infir-
maries for the ill. However, these medieval infirmaries usually served the purpose of incapacita-
tion of dangerous or socially unwanted subjects more than they actually provided care and cure 
(e.g. De Swaan, 1988). 
344 The contemporary Dutch health care system is characterised by a semi-regulated, semi-
private interaction between care providers (health institutions and health care professionals), 
clients (insurance patients) and health insurance companies (Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 
2008:361; Boot & Knapen, 2005:182). Government determines the framework for this interac-
tion, and pays special attention to quality, affordability and accessibility of health care (Mack-
enbach & Van der Maas, 2008:434).  
Important characteristics of the Dutch system are a division between a first (general 
practitioners), second (specialised care, accessible through referral) and third echelon (highly 
specialised services), a division between extramural and intramural care, a compulsory general 
health care insurance (with compulsory acceptance of clients by insurance companies), and a 
national insurance for exceptional (individually uninsurable) medical expenses (‘AWBZ’) 
(Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:371, 390, 394). 
State regulation of the health care system was introduced relatively late in The Nether-
lands. For a long time, private (mainly religion-based) provisions and funds dominated health 
care services. A wartime decree (1941) regulated general accessibility to health care, only to be 
replaced in 1964 by a law to regulate compulsory health care insurance and complemented in 




sewerage, public housing and drinking water supplies (Mackenbach & Van der 
Maas, 2008:19-27; Van der Woud, 2006).345 The British Public Health Act of 1848, 
enacted in response to reports on sanitary conditions in urban areas in 1844 and 
on the cholera epidemic in 1847, was the first of its kind. This act took the view 
that the promotion of public health was the responsibility of the state. The Nether-
lands was relatively late in developing collective action: a housing act and a health 
act were passed in 1901, and a commodities act to regulate food hygiene followed 
in 1919 (Van der Woud, 2010:80).346 
 
This was the birth of the field of ‘public health’: “the science and the art of pre-
venting disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and efficiency 
through organized community efforts for the sanitation of the environment, the 
control of community infections, the education of the individual in principles of 
personal hygiene, the organization of medical and nursing service for the early 
diagnosis and preventive treatment of disease, and the development of the social 
machinery which will ensure to every individual in the community a standard of 
living adequate for the maintenance of health” (Winslow, 1920). 
While rooted in the ideals of the Enlightenment, the development of pub-
lic health was also very much a practical answer to the problems posed by the 
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of Western European societies in the 19th 
century. Even though the 19th century Sanitary Movement had promoted the sci-
entific knowledge of the consequences of poor nutrition and hygiene, a basic lack 
of financial means condemned the lower socio-economic classes to extremely 
                                                   
345 The early 20th century brought improvements in the form of antibiotics, vaccination pro-
grammes and food hygiene. More recent (post-1970) examples of public health interventions in 
The Netherlands are the screening of 99,5% of all new-borns on metabolic diseases through the 
Guthrie test and other forms of periodic health screening of children, advice on the sleeping 
position of new-borns to prevent sudden infant death syndrome, vaccination of children against 
common contagious diseases, and the introduction of childproof closures on dangerous sub-
stances.  
Furthermore, the number of traffic victims has been reduced as a result of infrastruc-
tural improvements, energy absorption zones and safety belts in cars, and regulation and in-
formation on drunk driving. Other examples include the reduction of trans fat in food, regula-
tions and information to reduce smoking and adolescent alcohol use, use of condoms to prevent 
sexually transmitted diseases, and the introduction of breast cancer screening. These measures 
have realised many “silent victories”. Diseases have been prevented and life expectancy has 
increased – hence, the success is that no harms occurred. Moreover, these measures intervene 
on a collective rather than individual level (Mackenbach, 2011). 
346 However, several municipalities, such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, had by the end of the 
19th century already developed sanitation departments for the cleansing of public streets and 
canals and the collection of garbage and feces. Furthermore, public utilities were established to 
build hospitals, schools and water supply systems, and to lay out new urban development areas, 
parks, paved streets and street lighting (Van der Woud, 2010:291-297). 
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unhealthy, slum-like living circumstances, insufficient food and nutritional value, 
and poor drinking water hygiene (e.g. Van der Woud, 2010).347  
Very gradually, the ‘social question’ broke through the ideological barriers 
of ‘laissez-faire’-politics. The interrelatedness between the upper and the lower 
classes, which shared the same urban environment and were part of the same 
economic (capitalist) system, implied that society as a whole was affected by poor 
health (De Swaan, 1988). Contagious diseases were not necessarily confined to 
the slums from whence they originated, nor were poor health and a short life ex-
pectancy without consequences for the labour productivity. Instead of a collection 
of individuals, united under some sort of autonomous natural law, society came to 
be perceived as an entity, as a collective organism that could and should be influ-
enced by collective action. 
 
Even though public health and health care348 both contribute to the health of a 
population, they are characterised by a different logic. Whereas public health 
measures are usually a form of ‘unsolicited collective action’ by the state (Macken-
bach & Van der Maas, 2008:271), health care activities stem from an individual 
‘request for care’ (Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:361). Health care is directed 
at individual treatment, public health at population-level health threats (e.g. WRR, 
1997:122-128). Curing disease characterises the practice of health care, whereas 
improvement of health is central to public health activities (cf. Pomerleau & 
McKee, 2005). And whereas disease is the focal point of health care, the notion of 
‘health’ is central to public health policy. Health is a broad notion and can refer to 
the mere absence of disease, but also to the image of a healthy life and the quality 
of life.  
These notions of ‘health’ and ‘quality of life’ imply a broader perspective 
than a mere medical paradigm. They transcend an important distinction in public 
health between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’: “Patients suffer from ‘illnesses’; doctors 
diagnose and treat ‘diseases’. Illnesses are experiences of discontinuities in states 
                                                   
347 Illustrative for the living conditions of the lower classes is the average life expectancy in The 
Netherlands in 1866: 33 years. Contagious diseases such as cholera, poor and small housing, 
insufficient, unhealthy and unhygienic nutrition, unsafe labour conditions, and lack of access to 
health care and medication were the most important threats to the health of especially the 
lower classes (Van der Woud, 2010:240). 
348 Welfare state institutions (including health care institutions) tend to take up a large part of 
public expenditures – more so than more ‘traditional’ policy areas such as crime policy. For 
instance, the total budget for 2011 for the Dutch Justice department was 4.8 billion (and anoth-
er 5 billion for the police), while the Ministry of Health had a total budget of 86.6 billion euro. 
Moreover, because of the nature of health care institutions, expenditures have been subject to a 
more or less ‘autonomous’ growth – most importantly because of demographic developments, 
which led to an increase of elderly people in need of care. See: http:// prinsjes-
dag2010.nl/miljoenennota/huishoudboekje_van_nederland; consulted d.d. 1-8-2011. 
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of being and perceived role performances. Diseases, in the scientific paradigm of 
modern medicine, are abnormalities in the function and/or structure of body or-
gans and systems” (Eisenberg, 1977:9).  
The quality of life not only depends on a medical diagnosis, but also on a 
personally experienced and, in part, culturally determined state of discomfort, 
which can also occur in daily life and without a specific medical diagnosis or bio-
logical basis (Kleinman c.s., 2006). Someone may feel ill, but not suffer from a 
clear biological disease. And conversely, someone may suffer from a disease, but 
not experience any clear signs of illness. The Cartesian dichotomy between body 
and soul is transcended in the notion of illness (Eisenberg, 1977:10). 
 
1.2. Prevention and Dutch public health policy 
The development of modern public health interventions predates the develop-
ment of the health care system. This also implies that prevention of diseases dates 
back to at least the late-19th century. However, the notion of ‘public health’ as a 
distinct policy concept is of relatively recent date. In its 1978 memorandum 
Health For All, the World Health Organisation (WHO) urged governments and 
international organisations to take measures to establish a level of health, which 
would permit all people to lead a socially and economically productive life.349 This 
memorandum focused on the determinants of health. Objects of intervention in 
public health, such as pollution, lack of public hygiene, unhealthy lifestyles, pov-
erty and genetic defects were considered the causes of disease, and hence a causal 
scheme – necessary for prevention – between disease and the objects of interven-
tion to avert disease was constructed. 
Prevention is “the totality of measures, both inside and outside the realm 
of health care, with the objective of protecting and improving health by prevent-
ing disease and health problems” (Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:190; my 
translation, RP). In general, three different preventive strategies can be discerned. 
Primary prevention deals with averting the development of a disease (for instance 
through vaccination programmes). Secondary prevention deals with the early 
detection of diseases to enable early interventions (for instance, through cancer 
screening programmes). Tertiary prevention deals with the reduction of the nega-
tive impacts of a disease which has already established itself (for instance, 
through medication to control high blood pressure) (e.g. Mackenbach & Van der 
Maas, 2008:192).  
Preventive measures can have several different objects of intervention, 
such as diseases (infections, cancer, diabetes), risk factors (smoking, nutrition), 
target groups (adolescents, the elderly) and settings (the workplace, schools) 
                                                   
349 Found at http://www.who.int/about/en/; consulted d.d. 3-10-2010.  
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(Boot & Knapen, 2005:78-84). Since risk factors can also be the object of preven-
tive activities, the aforementioned secondary and tertiary forms of prevention 
may not only apply to the early detection of diseases or the prevention of disease 
progression, but also to the early detection of risk factors for disease or the treat-
ment of people with an increased risk of developing diseases (such as obese peo-
ple or smokers). 
 
Since 1983, the Dutch constitution has required that the state take measures to 
promote public health.350 Many activities developed in later years can be traced 
back to this constitutional obligation, the specific interpretation of which is a mat-
ter of policymaking. The Dutch government’s 1986 Memorandum on the Develop-
ment of Public Health Policy351 is important in this respect, as it marks a shift in the 
object of preventive measures, as well as a structural incorporation of the preven-
tion perspective in national policymaking.  
To start with the shift in the object of intervention, it is interesting to note 
that, up until 1986, preventive measures were mostly directed at exogenous de-
terminants of health, such as the contamination of food, water and air, safety of 
the living and working environment, spreading of contagious diseases, and pov-
erty. From 1986 onwards, the focus was broadened to include endogenous deter-
minants of health, which – besides genetic factors – refer to the way individual 
human behaviour and lifestyle choices influence personal health. The choices 
people make in their behaviour correlate to the development of degenerative and 
non-communicable diseases such as (forms of) cancer, diabetes and cardiovascu-
lar diseases, which have risen to epidemic proportions in Western European wel-
                                                   
350 Public health activities are based on a legal framework, of which article 22 in the Dutch con-
stitution – introduced in the 1983 constitutional reform – forms the backbone:  
- “The authorities shall take steps to promote the health of the population. 
- It shall be the concern of the authorities to provide sufficient living accommodation. 
- The authorities shall promote social and cultural development and leisure activities.” 
(English version: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/nl00000_.html; consulted d.d. 17-11-2010). 
Further legal foundations for public health can be found in four laws. The Care Insur-
ance Act (‘Zvw’) and the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (‘AWBZ’) form the core of the Dutch 
health care system. Furthermore, the Social Support Act (‘Wmo’) regulates welfare activities 
such as social work, provisions for disabled persons, care for the homeless, and control of do-
mestic violence. And finally, the Public Health Act (‘Wet Publieke Gezondheid’) regulates the 
specific public health responsibilities of national and local authorities, such as epidemiological 
analyses, monitoring of the public health status, incorporation of health aspects in policymak-
ing, the implementation of prevention programmes, and the control of social hygiene 
(Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:438-439). 
351 In Dutch: Over de ontwikkeling van gezondheidsbeleid; TK 1985-1986, 19500/1-2. References 
to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘MDP, 1986’, followed by the page number. 
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fare states.352 Hence, lifestyle and individual choices with regard to smoking, alco-
hol use, nutritional habits and physical exercise became a focal point for policy-
making, next to the existing repertoire to improve living conditions, regulate food 
and water quality, and develop vaccination programmes. 
The 1986 Memorandum on the Development of Public Health Policy was the 
first proper policy memorandum on prevention. This memorandum marks the 
beginning of a structural incorporation of prevention in public health policy. Pre-
vious health memoranda mostly dealt with the structure and financial expendi-
tures of the health care system. The first health policy memorandum ever pub-
lished, the 1966 Public Health Memorandum,353 was largely an inventory of exist-
ing structures, institutions and practices in health care, as well as a report on the 
status of public health in The Netherlands. The 1986 memorandum did not imply 
the introduction of prevention (this dates back to the late-19th century), but in-
stead the rediscovery and reinterpretation of prevention as a means to structurally 
improve the status of public health.354 
 
In the implementation of Dutch public health policy, the Municipal Health Ser-
vices355 play a pivotal role. Even though national government determines the gen-
eral policy outline (this falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Health, 
Welfare and Sport), the implementation and the development of specific policies 
and activities are decentralised tasks. Since the end of the 1980s, a network of 
Municipal Health Services with national coverage has been responsible for a vari-
                                                   
352 Mackenbach & Van der Maas (2008:60-67) distinguish several ‘epidemiological transitions’. 
Until deep in the 19th century, contagious diseases and famines determined the status of public 
health in Western Europe. Between 1875 and 1920, these diseases and famines declined steeply 
as a result of preventive measures and increased wealth. And by the second half of the 20th 
century, almost all infectious diseases are under control as a result of increased wealth and the 
development of vaccines. However, especially since the Second World War, degenerative and 
non-communicable diseases have developed into a new epidemic. 
353 In Dutch: Volksgezondheidsnota 1966; TK 1965-1966, 8462/1. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘PHM, 1966’, followed by the page number. 
354 Improvement of the status of public health is infused with the ambition to reach a level of 
health that permits all people to lead a socially and economically productive life. Thus under-
stood, public health policies are closely related to welfare policies, of which the objectives are 
social integration and participation (Van Dam c.s., 2000:19). Unemployment, educational disad-
vantages, family problems, poverty and social support for adolescents, parents, homeless, ad-
dicts, elderly and minority groups are all related to public health policy. Especially with the 
introduction of the Social Support Act in 2006 (which stresses participation), the fields of health 
and welfare have become interrelated (e.g. Van Dam & Wiebes, 2005:96). Health and welfare 
policies share to a large extent the same underlying motives, such as quality of life, self-
development and emancipation of citizens, and the promotion of a general feeling of wellbeing 
for every individual (Hortulanus c.s., 1997:158; cf. WRR, 1982:15). 
355 In Dutch: ‘Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst’ or ‘GGD’. 
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ety of tasks, such as youth health care (including vaccination, monitoring and par-
ent advice at infant centres), control of infectious diseases, medical support in 
case of disasters, social hygiene, population screening, and the development of 
preventive programmes.  
Furthermore, public health policy is also implemented through the en-
forcement of the Working Conditions Act and through various government-
subsidised organisations for the promotion of health – such as institutes for men-
tal health and addiction (‘Trimbos’), for tobacco control (‘Stivoro’), for consumer 
safety (‘Consument en Veiligheid’) and healthy nutrition (‘Voedingscentrum’) 
(Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:270-315). 
 
1.3. Outline 
The following case study of public health policy in The Netherlands consists of 
two parts. The first part is a policy genealogy, which takes the aforementioned 
1986 Memorandum on the Development of Public Health Policy as starting point. 
However, the actual policy genealogy starts in 1966, the year in which the very 
first Dutch health policy memorandum was published. Several policy memoranda 
between 1966 and 1986 are analysed to describe the developments which even-
tually led to the (re)introduction (and reinterpretation) of prevention as a policy 
paradigm. In total, four time periods are distinguished: 1966-1982, 1983-1990, 
1991-2002 and 2003-2011. This has an analytical purpose: even though the actual 
policy development is more ambiguous and nuanced, the four periods aim to high-
light new elements and crucial developments amidst the continuities. 
The second part of this study is an analysis of local preventive practices in 
policy implementation. The selected practices are part of the “Healthy Together 
programme”,356 developed by the city of The Hague. This programme coordinates 
the various municipal efforts on public health and offers insight into both situa-
tion-specific and personalised forms of prevention. In an appendix to this study, 
an overview is presented of the observations, interviews and documentation un-
derlying the empirical findings. 
The description of local practices in the city of The Hague serves as an ex-
ample of the contemporary public health intervention repertoire in Dutch local 
government. As such, it does not propose to be representative of all local public 
health practices. Its methodological function is to support the validity of govern-
ment’s statements of intent on policy implementation: if the characteristics of the 
selected policy practices coincide with the characteristics of the statements of 
intent, this supports the status of the latter as a valid representation of the Dutch 
state’s intervention power.  
                                                   
356 In Dutch: Samen Gezond. 
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2. Policy genealogy: the rise of the behavioural policy paradigm 
 
PART 1: PREVENTION AS COLLECTIVE PROTECTION (1966-1982) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Prevention has long been a point of concern in health care and public health poli-
cies: in the approach to epidemic diseases since the late 19th century, and later 
through large vaccination programmes. Prevention has played a role in national 
policymaking from 1966 onwards. This was the year the first Dutch health policy 
memorandum was published, simply entitled Public Health Memorandum 1966.357 
The memorandum mainly served as a comprehensive overview or inventory of 
what was already ‘out there’ in terms of health care provisions, and as an analysis 
of the status of public health in The Netherlands, and only in the second instance 
as a means to structurally plan the development of these provisions in the future 
(Boot & Knapen, 2005:207). Before 1966, the Dutch health care system had grown 
expansively, but it was also fragmented, since many provisions were organised by 
private, mostly religious, organisations.  
On the topic of public health, the memorandum served as a description of 
the history of policies and activities since the Local Government Act of 1851. This 
act marked the first explicit, albeit modest, mention of state responsibility for 
public health in the form of a basic control of the problems caused by pauperism 
in expanding cities. From the late-19th century onwards, a more structural im-
provement of living conditions was pursued through the introduction of sewerage 
systems, drinking water supply and state inspectorates on nutrition.358 After the 
Second World War, the social security system also had positive effects on the state 
of public health: poverty was no longer an important cause of health problems. 
Furthermore, health care services became widespread from the 1940s onwards 
and were codified in 1960s legislation: the National Health Insurance Act359 be-
came effective in 1966 and compulsory collective insurance was introduced in 
                                                   
357 In Dutch: Volksgezondheidsnota 1966; TK 1965-1966, 8462/1. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘PHM, 1966’, followed by the page number. 
358 A public health measure worthy of mention here is the longstanding concern for alcohol use 
and abuse. Since the 1881 Licensing Act (in Dutch: Drankwet), the Dutch state has regulated the 
sale and use of alcoholic substances in order to prevent public drunkenness, alcoholism and 
threats to public order. Through legal regulation, governments have over the years aimed to 
drive back the harmful effects of alcohol abuse. Prohibiting public drunkenness, regulating the 
maximum number of selling points within a municipality, prohibiting the sale of alcohol to 
children, and the introduction of a license system for alcohol sale have been a matter of con-
stant regulation ever since (PHM, 1966:23, 29-30). 
359 In Dutch: Ziekenfondswet. The National Health Insurance covered among other things medi-




1968 to compensate for exceptional (individually uninsurable) medical ex-
penses.360 This legislation was a sign of the gradual move away from privately 
organised health care, toward state-controlled health care services. 
 
The 1966 Public Health Memorandum should be understood against this historical 
background. It explicitly introduced two different government strategies in the 
approach to health issues: ‘health care’361 and ‘health protection’.362 Policies with 
regard to ‘care’ were concerned with the organisation and financing of curative 
provisions; policies with regard to ‘protection’ dealt with preventive policies, such 
as vaccination programmes and regulations on public hygiene.  
The strategy of ‘health protection’ was a more goal-oriented approach to-
wards public health threats: “Only national government is capable of surveying 
[the entire terrain of health protection] and of permanent preparedness to pre-
vent threats to public health. In the past, policing activities against those whose 
wrongful behaviour posed a threat to public health took centre stage.363 Nowa-
days, it is clear that health protection should be approached through more opera-
tional methods. Since it has become more difficult, or even impossible, for indi-
vidual citizens to recognise sources of disease in food or the environment, clearly 
the government has a duty to take action on behalf of citizens in terms of research 
and regulation. To that end, legislation is not enough. Government should also 
give advice and maintain close and constant consultation with experts. As a result, 
regulatory activities will be pushed to the background” (PHM, 1966:31).364 
In the following, the first steps in the government’s new approach to pub-
lic health threats are analysed. Besides the aforementioned Public Health Memo-
randum, the 1974 Memorandum on the Structure of Health Care365 and the 1979 
memorandum Health Care Policy and its Budgetary Consequences366 are discussed. 
 
 
                                                   
360 In Dutch: Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten. 
361 In Dutch: ‘gezondheidszorg’ (PHM, 1966:100). 
362 In Dutch: ‘gezondheidsbescherming’ (PHM, 1966:170). 
363 Up to 1966, legislation served as the main trigger for preventive state activities – for instance 
in the form of prohibition and policing of behaviour which posed a danger for public health 
(such as the sale of contaminated food), or in the form of providing proper housing and devel-
oping vaccination programmes.  
364 However, the above-cited statement received little follow-up in various policy memoranda in 
the period up to 1983. 
365 In Dutch: Structuurnota Gezondheidszorg; TK 1973-1974, 13012/1-2. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘MSH, 1974’, followed by the page number. 
366 In Dutch: Het beleid ter zake van de gezondheidszorg met het oog op de kostenontwikkeling; 
TK 1978-1979, 15540/1-2. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘HBC, 1979’, 
followed by the page number. 
255 
 
1.2. Definition power 
 
1.2.1. The dominance of the medical paradigm 
Even though the 1966 Public Health Memorandum introduced ‘health care’ and 
‘health protection’ as two distinct strategies, the dominant focus was on the im-
provement of public health by professionalising and structuring the existing 
health care services (PHM, 1966:166). In the years following 1966, government 
continued to focus on the health care system as a means to improve the status of 
public health. However, concerns about the efficiency367 and financial viability368 
of the health care system dominated the 1974 Memorandum on the Structure of 
Health Care and 1979 memorandum Health Care Policy and its Budgetary Conse-
quences (e.g. MSH, 1974:7; HBC, 1979:5).  
In this context, prevention of disease was seen as one of the possible 
means to cut back expenditures and relieve the overburdened health care system: 
“Government aims to reduce the growth of demands on health care services by 
improving information to the public, promoting budgetary awareness on both the 
supply and the demand side of health care, and stimulating preventive measures” 
(HBC, 1979:6; cf. MSH, 1974:6).  
However, government added to this the bitter realisation that “as the na-
tional health care service reaches its goal of improving the standard of public 
health, it tends to become more costly since people in general live longer, disabled 
people have more opportunities in life, and the number of people relying on 
health care [at an elderly age] increases; this development, combined with grow-
ing medical and technical possibilities, can lead to a structure which makes itself 
unviable” (HBC, 1979:10). 
 
1.2.2. Prevention as protection 
In the 1966 memorandum, prevention took the form of health protection. As soci-
ety became increasingly more complex, the number of external factors that 
threatened public health also grew. Population growth, expansion of traffic, indus-
try and environmental pollution, the increase of mental stress in the daily working 
and living environment, the development of new medicines and medical stand-
ards, and the emergence of new threats to the quality of nutrition and drinking 
                                                   
367 For instance, the government proposed to organise health care services according to a ‘fac-
tory line logic’. Different ‘echelons’ were distinguished to structure the way citizens were to 
enter and move through the health care system. General practitioners, who even now make up 
the bulk of all non-specialised services of the ‘first echelon’, were by and large the only ‘en-
trance’ for citizens into the health care system. From there on, patients could be referred to the 
specialised somatic services of the ‘second echelon’ (hospitals et cetera) (MSH, 1974:13-16). 
368 The total expenditures for the national health care service had risen from five billion guild-
ers in 1968 to ten billion guilders in 1972 (MSH, 1974:7). 
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water all called for more state interventions (e.g. PHM, 1966:188). This more 
complex society required a more active state: “The considerable influence on the 
living environment of intensified traffic, of expanding trade and industry, and, not 
in the last place, of housing for the fast growing population requires an increased 
level of regulatory activities by the state” (PHM, 1966:173).369  
Prevention of disease implied protecting the population against the exter-
nal health threats typical of a complex society. ‘Health protection’ is “the entire 
repertoire of measures against exogenous influences in order to maintain, pro-
mote and protect an optimal public health status […]” (PHM, 1966:170). Tangible 
sources of disease, according to the memorandum, included bacteria and other 
harmful organisms, food, drinking water, air quality, living environment (noise, 
stench, loss of privacy, offensive behaviour, vandalism, crime, etc.), and the avail-
ability of food and water (PHM, 1966:171-172).370 Consequently, the government 
proposed measures for “the preservation of hygienic food, drinking water, con-
sumption goods and medicines”, for “the preservation of an environment in which 
man can safely live, reside, work and recreate” and for “the prevention of severe 
mental disorders” (PHM, 1966:173). 
 
Government’s dominant preventive focus during this period was on external or 
exogenous health threats. However, ‘health promotion’ was mentioned as another 
possible preventive strategy (PHM, 1966:170). Even though there was no system-
atic approach to endogenous health threats371 in the policy memoranda published 
between 1966 and 1982, the government did express an ambition to strengthen 
and expand the advice and information provided to citizens with regard to healthy 
living habits, healthy choice of food, physical exercise, regular recreation (PHM, 
1966:173), family planning and use of contraceptives (PHM, 1966:192).  
This implied a broadening of the preventive scope: “Stimulating a hygienic 
lifestyle, an adequate food pattern and the systematic promotion of interpersonal 
relations, in which carefulness towards others is taken into consideration, and in 
which disruptive and harmful influences on the environment are avoided, are 
considered very important for public health and the protection of the environ-
                                                   
369 Furthermore, the growth of wealth was mentioned as a possible negative factor for public 
health: on the one hand, living standards and public hygiene had increased, but on the other 
hand, diseases of civilisation were also likely to increase (PHM, 1966:13). This line of thought 
was not further pursued in the 1966 memorandum, but would become the core of the public 
health policy from 1983 onwards. 
370 More broadly, government distinguishes the following causes of illness: 1) causes which 
stem from man’s environment or living conditions; 2) causes which are biologically determined 
and can be already present at birth; and 3) causes which determine individual resistance 
against diseases” (PHM, 1966:33). 
371 Health threats following from individual human behaviour. 
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ment by government. This is especially relevant if health threats can still be pre-
vented. If anywhere, here prevention is better than the cure” (PHM, 1966:15). 
Generally speaking, government saw prevention of disease as “[...] of great 
importance to society. Not only because the functioning of society as a whole is 
only possible if citizens are physically and mentally suited for their task in society, 
but above all because the physical and mental wellbeing of individual persons 
determines their happiness to a very large extent […]” (PHM, 1966:9). Govern-
ment saw its task as one that had developed “from controlling epidemics and ob-
vious abuses in public hygiene a hundred years ago, and the protection of the 
workplace conditions over the last 75 years, towards a more general protection 
and promotion of public health, both in physical and mental terms” (PHM, 
1966:187). 
In this, the government foreshadowed public health policy from 1983 on-
ward. Not until that time did individual human behaviour and lifestyle choices 
become a focal point of preventive policies. This development coincided with – 
and was to a large extent made possible by – a paradigm shift from ‘disease’ to 
‘health’: “[it] has become more and more obvious that health is not merely the 
absence of disease […], but a state of socially determined physical and mental 
wellbeing” (PHM, 1966:10). 
 
1.2.3. A complementary responsibility 
The improvement of public health followed from a specific sense of governmental 
responsibility: “If one perceives public health issues from the perspective of re-
sponsibilities, it seems appropriate to place public health in the realm of rights. 
[…] The right to health is not an individual or absolute right. It may be compared 
to the right to labour. It demands the creation of state provisions that enable citi-
zens to live under optimal health conditions, just as the state has the responsibil-
ity to create optimal conditions for employment. The creation, maintenance and 
possible improvement of these conditions is the task of public health policy, and 
this implies the creation of safeguards for each individual to share in the health 
care services as a complement to his own responsibility and obligation of self-
care” (PHM, 1966:10).  
This description of state responsibility not only included the creation of 
proper health care services, but also the protection of citizens against external 
health threats. This preventive responsibility implied a very broad range of activi-
ties, such as vaccination programmes (PHM, 1966:198), traffic safety, environ-
mental pollution, industrial and spatial planning, environmental and technical 
hygiene, disposal of waste materials, alcohol abuse, promoting recreational activi-




Although the scope of activities was broad, its underlying sense of responsibility 
was limited and, moreover, complementary to citizens’ own responsibility for 
their health and wellbeing: “An individual is primarily responsible for his own and 
his family’s health and safety, in so far as this can be influenced by himself. […] An 
individual is responsible for following elementary hygienic and safety practices, 
for taking no more health risks than what is commonly understood as normal, and 
for using well-known, scientifically approved and accepted means to improve 
health” (PHM, 1966:10).  
The complementary state responsibility was directed at the sources of 
disease outside the sphere of influence of individual citizens, such as the control of 
epidemic diseases and the consequences of structural social transformations (in-
cluding population growth, technological developments, urbanisation, industriali-
sation and high living standards) (PHM, 1966:13): “Besides the [...] measures of 
self-protection to be taken by each citizen, there still remains an area for state 
intervention, in which individual citizens are no longer able to protect themselves 
or make a responsible choice. This principle is applicable to national defence, wa-
ter works, public order and security, and also to public health” (PHM, 1966:14). 
The line between the primacy of citizen responsibility on the one hand, 
and overestimation of the citizen’s capability to take this responsibility on the 
other hand was a thin one (PHM, 1966:100). The government offers a specific 
example to illustrate where the line should be drawn: “it is not a task of govern-
ment to ban the smoking of cigarettes. It is, however, a responsibility of govern-
ment to prudently inform the users of these products of the dangerous relation 
between smoking and lung cancer. It should be stressed, however, that every 
adult is free to continue smoking and increase the risk of lung cancer” (PHM, 
1966:170).372 
 
1.3. Intervention power 
 
1.3.1. Decentralisation 
The organisation of health protection is, to a large extent, a task for local public 
authorities. This is the level at which authorities can gather detailed information 
on the status of public health and can develop activities targeted at the specific 
nature of local problems. This realisation led government during this period to 
propose setting up a national network of Municipal Health Services.  
                                                   
372 At the same time, government also stressed that the state of public health could only be 
improved if people took government’s advice to heart: “Efficient public health care can only be 
achieved when all citizens actually accept this care. […] Especially here, the responsibility of the 
individual for his personal health, and the health of the people close to him, can be realised by 
embracing  government recommendations concerning public health” (MSH, 1974:16). 
259 
 
These services were appointed several preventive tasks, including the 
control of epidemic diseases and quarantine, the collection and analysis of re-
gional epidemiological data, the establishment of school health services and am-
bulance services, sanitary regulation and other technical hygienic services, decon-
tamination services in harbour cities, and dissemination of public health informa-
tion and advice to the general public (MSH, 1974:17). National government was 
responsible for the coordination between these services, for long term planning, 
and for the broad outlines of public health policy (MSH, 1974:19-20). 
 
1.3.2. Research, regulation and service delivery 
The government’s objective to protect citizens against exogenous health threats 
beyond the sphere of influence of individuals, required a specific organisation and 
an array of instruments. Three distinct implementation strategies followed from 
the government’s protective ambitions and complementary responsibility. 
First of all, proper protection against external threats in a dynamic and 
complex societal context required knowledge of the sources of disease and an 
effective means to tackle these: “Future policy will aim for a systematic collection 
and evaluation of data to be applied for science-based activities in health services. 
[Government] not only implies the use of knowledge in hospitals or institutions of 
care, but specifically in neighbourhood-based services as well, where the influ-
ence of the living environment is felt most directly” (PHM, 1966:163-164). 
Secondly, protection required elaborate regulation. Exogenous health 
threats beyond the sphere of influence of individual citizens could be found in 
industry, waste material, water supply, nutrition, medicines, traffic, and public 
hygiene. All these domains of social life, therefore, became subject to government 
regulation (PHM, 1966:189-190; 193-194). Criteria for the quality of water, air, 
food and medicines were defined and subsequently enforced (PHM, 1966:69-99). 
And third, the protection of society against health threats was realised 
through concrete interventions by the public authorities: “Preventing air pollu-
tion, removal of waste materials, creating recreational services […] and improving 
traffic safety are just a few examples of the expansive and varied domain of tech-
nical-hygienic services which will be given priority” (PHM, 1966:40). Further-
more, health service delivery was a condition to achieve improvement in the 
status of public health: local child care services, population screening and infor-
mation on health risks are a few examples of preventive activities that were un-
dertaken (PHM, 1966:103; 259). 
 
1.3.3. Rational persuasion 
Even though this was, at the time, little more than agenda-setting, the govern-
ment’s aforementioned attention to endogenous health threats also touched on 
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the need for instrumentation. Whereas the response to exogenous threats beyond 
the control of individual citizens was characterised by research, regulation and 
service delivery, health threats within the control of individual citizens called for a 
different approach. Here, government aimed to ‘empower’ citizens to take respon-
sibility for themselves with regard to avoidable health threats: “Promoting a bal-
anced development process through all life phases by means of adequate advice 
and information becomes of more importance than could have been foreseen in 
earlier times” (PHM, 1966:33).  
Health education and advice had a voluntary character, although govern-
ment did stress the importance of citizen compliance for the success of its policy 
(PHM, 1966:170). Mass-media campaigns and personalised advice by, for in-
stance, general practitioners (PHM, 1966:136) or schools (PHM, 1966:173) aimed 
to provide objective information: “Public information campaigns will raise the 
awareness of everybody’s responsibility for one’s own health and that of fellow 
citizens, as well as the awareness of the consequences of certain risky lifestyles” 
(GD, 1971:144). There was a sense of optimism that citizens would incorporate 
this information into their daily lives and follow the most rational course of action 
in terms of health. 
 
1.4. Synopsis 
In terms of definition power, the dominant focus of government policy memo-
randa between 1966 and 1982 was on the proper organisation of the health care 
system. This had to do with concerns about the effectiveness and financial viabil-
ity of the health care system, but also with the fact that further improvement of 
public health was primarily viewed as a medical matter. Prevention of disease was 
still mainly understood to comprise health protection against exogenous health 
threats, which were beyond the control of individual citizens. This strategy holds 
something of a middle ground between prevention and a classic welfare state 
apparatus: on the one hand, it explicitly aims to prevent undesirable phenomena, 
on the other hand, it is rooted in the idea that the state is only justified to inter-
vene beyond the realm of individual responsibility. 
Every citizen was considered to be primarily responsible for his own 
health. State intervention was required only when health threats were perceived 
as being beyond the control of individual citizens: health protection was a com-
plementary responsibility. In the end, every citizen was free to decide for himself 
whether he wanted to live a healthy life. Government’s responsibility was limited 
to providing the opportunities for citizens to do so – in terms of protection against 
exogenous threats and in terms of objective information on the risks of certain 




The trigger for state interventions in the realm of health protection lay in 
the increased numbers of health threats produced by modern society: urbanisation, 
industrialisation, population growth, traffic increase, and the circulation of dan-
gerous goods and substances. The justification for these interventions was the 
objective to maintain a properly functioning and economically productive society. 
 
In terms of intervention power, the government’s protective ambitions required 
research, regulation and service delivery. In the face of a dynamic and complex 
societal context, a permanent monitoring of the nature and causes of external 
health threats was a necessity. The ambition to intervene on these causes implied 
a need to develop effective, knowledge-based interventions. Furthermore, protec-
tion required elaborate regulation. Quality standards and health standards for 
nutrition, drinking water, air, public hygiene, medicines and working conditions 
needed to be defined and subsequently enforced by state authorities. And finally, 
concrete interventions were necessary to realise healthy living environments, a 




PART 2: THE RISE OF THE HEALTH PARADIGM (1983-1990) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Even though health policy between 1966 and 1982 hinted at future developments, 
the medical paradigm remained at the heart of efforts to improve public health. 
The modest attention to prevention of disease in the various relevant policy 
memoranda was, by and large, a continuation of early preventive measures 
against epidemic diseases. Exogenous threats to public health were controlled 
through regulation to protect citizens from harm due to circumstances beyond 
their control. The increasing complexity of society may have created new exoge-
nous threats to the quality of food, drinking water, housing and medicines, but the 
basic strategy of protection of the population followed directly from earlier activi-
ties in the realm of public hygiene and vaccination programmes. The govern-
ment’s “entire repertoire of measures against exogenous influences in order to 
maintain, promote and protect the optimal public health status […]” (PHM, 
1966:170) rested on the assumption that individuals were in the first place re-
sponsible for their own health and that the state’s responsibility was limited to 
controlling those sources of disease that were beyond the sphere of influence of 
individual citizens. 
Two important discontinuities in public health policy would expand the 
government’s scope of interest from the mid-1980s onwards. In 1966, govern-
ment hinted at the first of these when it stated “health is not merely the absence of 
disease […], but a state of socially determined physical and mental wellbeing” 
(PHM, 1966:10). The introduction of the notion of ‘health’ already implied a 
broader focus than mere protection against sources of disease; one in which fac-
tors contributing to the quality of life in general, too, were relevant. Moreover, the 
idea of health as the absence of disease expressed an explicit preventive perspec-
tive, dedicated to averting future developments that might harm a person’s physi-
cal and mental wellbeing. In the period following 1983, government made the 
explicit paradigm shift from ‘disease’ to ‘health’. 
A second discontinuity concerns the object of preventive interventions. 
Government stated in 1966 that “a hygienic lifestyle, an adequate food pattern and 
[...] interpersonal relations” (PHM, 1966:15) were important focal points for the 
prevention of disease. However, from 1983 onwards, health promotion would 
take its place next to health protection as an important preventive strategy. In 
health promotion, individual behaviour and the choices people make in their daily 
lives take central stage. Thus endogenous health threats joined exogenous health 




The rise of the health paradigm coincided with the waning of the medical para-
digm as a strategy to further improve the status of public health. The 1979 Health 
Care Policy and its Budgetary Consequences memorandum foreshadowed this de-
velopment, stating: “[Research shows us that] changes in the status of public 
health, for better or for worse, can largely be attributed to environmental factors 
and to lifestyle or behavioural patterns, which consist of an aggregate of decisions 
relevant to an individual’s health. These decisions are more or less within the 
sphere of influence of an individual. The status of public health cannot be im-
proved much further through the development of curative services. Instead, more 
attention, money and energy should be paid to public health policies which influ-
ence environmental factors and promote healthy behaviour. […] This requires a 
fundamental approach to health information and education” (HBC, 1979:17). 
From 1983 onwards, disease prevention became a separate and distinct 
element in policymaking: policy memoranda appeared on a regular basis and dis-
cussions about preventive policies were largely divorced from the discussion on 
the organisation and management of health care services. In the core memoran-
dum of the 1983-1990 period, the lengthy Memorandum on the Development of 
Public Health Policy,373 government set out its paradigm shift from disease to 
health, which was based on the analysis of both exogenous and endogenous ‘de-
terminants of health’. Other memoranda discussed in the following are Public 
Health Policy with Limited Means374 (1983) and Nutrition Policy375 (1983), Safety 
in the Private Sphere,376 Accents in Sports Policy,377 Youth Policy378 and Public Men-
tal Health,379 all published in 1984, Alcohol and Society380 (1985), Prevention of 
Cardiovascular Diseases381 (1987) and Working on Health Care Renewal382 (1990).  
                                                   
373 In Dutch: Over de ontwikkeling van gezondheidsbeleid; TK 1985-1986, 19500/1-2. References 
to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘MDP, 1986’, followed by the page number. This 
memorandum is also known as the Memorandum 2000 because government hoped to have 
realised its long-term ambitions to improve public health by the year 2000. 
374 In Dutch: Volksgezondheidsbeleid bij beperkte middelen; TK 1983-1984, 18108/1-2. Refer-
ences to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘PLM, 1983’, followed by the page number. 
The 1983 and 1986 memoranda form a pair, the latter dealing with long-term policy ambitions, 
the former with midterm ambitions (PLM, 1983:5). 
375 In Dutch: Voedingsbeleid; TK 1983-1984, 18156/1-2. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘NP, 1983’, followed by the page number. 
376 In Dutch: Veiligheid in de Privésfeer; TK 1983-1984, 18453/1-2. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘SPS, 1984’, followed by the page number. 
377 In Dutch: Accenten Sportbeleid; TK 1983-1984, 18039/2-3. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘ASP, 1984’, followed by the page number. 
378 In Dutch: Jeugdbeleid; TK 1983-1984, 18545/1-2. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘YP, 1984’, followed by the page number. 
379 In Dutch: Geestelijke Volksgezondheid; TK 1983-1984, 18463/1-2. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘PMH, 1984’, followed by the page number. 
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Also worthy of mention here is the fact that since the 1983 revision of the 
Dutch Constitution, the state has been required to take measures to promote the 
health of the population. In the memorandum Public Health Policy with Limited 
Means, the broad constitutional obligation was further specified as follows: “[gov-
ernment policy] should be directly or indirectly focused on the promotion, main-
tenance or restoration of public health, as well as on the maintenance and in-
crease, if possible, of the independence of the individual in case of chronic disease 
or handicap, and finally on the relief of pain” (PLM, 1983:5). 
 
2.2. Definition power 
 
2.2.1. The waning of the medical paradigm 
Until 1983, the dominant strategy to improve the status of public health was the 
organisation of an effective and financially viable health care system. The domi-
nance of this medical paradigm on public health was abandoned in the 1983 Pub-
lic Health Policy with Limited Means memorandum and 1986 Development of Pub-
lic Health Policy memorandum. Even though health care remained an important 
element in the entire repertoire of health interventions, the curative ideal became 
less attractive as a strategy to further improve the status of public health.  
Structural societal developments had led to the development of a new 
type of disease, for which a curative approach alone had proven ineffective: “The 
development into an industrialised society has had far-reaching consequences for 
the nature of the problems which confront public health policy. The economic 
transformation from physical to non-physical labour and the increased possibili-
ties for consumption has stimulated lifestyles which bear obvious health risks. 
The effects of these lifestyles, such as overconsumption and lack of physical exer-
cise, are manifest in important categories of disease. The relation between these 
risks and human behaviour serves as a point of departure for a preventive policy 
aimed at promoting and preserving health” (PLM, 1983:9; cf. MDP, 1986:13-16).  
 
With the emergence of lifestyle diseases, illness was no longer merely perceived 
as a medical issue, but also as a social and behavioural issue. For example, while 
people had far more leisure time now than ever before, they failed to use this to 
compensate for the lack of physical exercise caused by the increase of non-
                                                                                                                                 
380 In Dutch: Alcohol en Samenleving; TK 1985-1986, 19243/1-3. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘AS, 1985’, followed by the page number. 
381 In Dutch: Preventie Hart- en Vaatziekten; TK 1987-1988, 20259/1-2. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘PCD, 1987’, followed by the page number. 
382 In Dutch: Werken aan zorgvernieuwing; TK 1989-1990, 21545/1-2. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘WHR, 1990’, followed by the page number. 
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physical labour (MDP, 1986:38). Lifestyle diseases are a product of prosperous 
societies, whereas previous threats to public health were to a large extent related 
to poverty. During this period, cardiovascular diseases emerged as the most im-
portant cause of death, followed by cancer (MDP, 1986:78).  
These diseases do not lend themselves easily to cure. According to the 
government, this was why the status of public health showed very little improve-
ment, and differences in health status among groups and geographical areas per-
sisted: “In the previous period, a situation of decreasing added value of the health 
care system for the status of public health took place almost unnoticed. An ex-
panding supply [of health care], unhealthy environmental factors and unhealthy 
lifestyles have had a direct effect on the demand for health care. We now have to 
realise that investing more financial means in health care will no longer increase 
the status of public health” (MDP, 1986:225).383  
 
2.2.2. The paradigm shift from disease to health 
The notion of disease is by definition central to the curative ideal. The aversion of 
disease was also emphasised in existing preventive policies in the form of health 
protection. However, the government’s aforementioned analysis of lifestyle dis-
eases led to a shift beyond the notion of disease, as the notion of ‘health’ took cen-
tre stage in the Development of Public Health Policy memorandum (MDP, 
1986:21).  
The health paradigm implied more than the absence of disease. It also 
contributed to the ambition “to attain a level of health for all citizens [...] by the 
year 2000 which will enable them to lead a socially and economically productive 
life” (MDP, 1986:17). What may at first have seem a semantic distinction is, upon 
closer inspection, a broadening of the government’s scope: a general concern for 
the “quality of life” emerged as a result of the aim for full participation of all citi-
zens in society, unhindered by physical or mental health problems (MDP, 
1986:47).384  
                                                   
383 Other more traditional state tasks in health protection were reassessed in the light of socie-
tal developments as well. For instance, the rise of sexually transmitted diseases required an 
adequate response in the realm of infectious diseases (MDP, 1986:119), the growth of global 
airline traffic increased the chances of ‘foreign’ contagious diseases entering The Netherlands 
(MDP, 1986:123), the widespread and socially accepted use of cannabis in The Netherlands 
required attention from a medical point of view (MDP, 1986:167), and newly developed vac-
cines provided new opportunities for health protection (MDP, 1986:123). 
384 Government outlined the paradigm shift along four arguments in its Memorandum on the 
Development of Public Health Policy: 1) improving the health status of the population and sev-
eral population groups in particular, 2) the practical necessity to anticipate on future develop-
ments, 3) the shift in focus from ‘life expectancy’ to ‘quality of life’, and 4) meeting the demands 
of the World Health Organisation to develop public health policy (MDP, 1986:5-6).  
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Contrary to disease, which is a certain abnormal physical or mental state 
more or less clearly defined by medical profession and by government in the con-
ditions for claims to health care insurance,385 health, when understood as a state 
of full physical, mental and societal wellbeing, is by definition an unbounded con-
cept. Hence, the Dutch government called the focus on health an “all-embracing 
way of thinking” (MDP, 1986:307). 
The health paradigm and the prevention perspective are tightly related. 
First of all, both aim to avert disease. Also, prevention is not necessarily limited to 
disease. Instead, prevention can be applied to the notion of health as well: if health 
refers to a certain quality of life, then prevention focuses on averting threats to 
this quality. Therefore not only was averting disease the core of the new preven-
tion perspective, but also averting threats to a healthy life in general.  
 
2.2.3. The determinants of health 
The second important transformation in public health policy, besides the para-
digm shift from disease to health, was the surge of interest in endogenous health 
threats. Whereas previous preventive policies – under the name of ‘health protec-
tion’ – had been limited to exogenous threats beyond the control of individual 
citizens, the expansion of the preventive scope to include endogenous threats 
gave rise to policy attention for citizen behaviour and lifestyles.  
The 1986 Memorandum on the Development of Public Health Policy pre-
sented a general framework for analysing the various factors that determine the 
status of public health. Five “determinants of health” (MDP, 1986:17-18)386 were 
distinguished: 
- Exogenous societal factors, such as cultural, economic and social devel-
opments. Interventions in this realm included the prevention of industrial 
accidents, improvement of working conditions, policies with regard to un-
employment and disability, and the stimulation of a good social network 
and family life (MDP, 1986:30-40; 132). 
                                                   
385 This definition of disease is, however, arbitrary. First, there is the unsolvable question of 
what exactly makes a mental or physical condition ‘normal’. And furthermore, new medical or 
societal developments can lead to the development and discovery of new diseases (such as 
cardiovascular diseases in affluent societies or the rise of repetitive strain injuries (RSI) as a 
result of contemporary working conditions). For the purpose of this research, however, it is 
sufficient to state that diseases can be more or less specifically described and officially acknowl-
edged. This applies to a far lesser extent to health status. 
386 Besides these determinants of health, the general status of public health also depends on 
demographical developments such as ageing and population growth (MDP, 1986:21). Further-
more, not every citizen is affected by these determinants in the same way. In fact, government 
observed a persistent difference in the status of health among various socio-economic groups 
(MDP, 1986:199).  
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- Exogenous natural-physical factors, such as living environment and natu-
ral-physical environment. Interventions in this realm included regulations 
on soil and air pollution, protection of the biological balance in nature, pu-
rification of drinking water, and the protection of food safety (MDP, 
1986:26-28). 
- The aggregate of activities in the health care system. While a properly 
functioning health care system contributed to the status of public health, 
this was understood by the government as being merely one of the five 
determinants of health (MDP, 1986:17-18). 
- Endogenous biological and genetic factors. Interventions in this realm in-
cluded early detection of diseases and (congenital or hereditary) physical 
defects, as well as early interventions following detection – especially to-
wards population groups with an increased risk (MDP, 1986:23-24; 55). 
- Endogenous lifestyle factors, such as nutritional, drinking and smoking 
habits, as well as ways in which individuals deal with mental stress. Inter-
ventions in this realm dealt with “[…] decisions which influence an indi-
vidual’s health and are more or less within the control of an individual” 
(MDP, 1986:44). More specific, possible interventions aim to reduce 
“[r]isky habits such as smoking, excessive drinking, unhealthy eating hab-
its and unsafe behaviour [...]” (MDP, 1986:62). 
 
The attention to determinants of health flowed from of several developments. 
First, it followed from government’s ambition to structurally develop preventive 
policies. Four of the five determinants identified called for proactive rather than 
reactive state action – only the existence of a health care system referred to the 
curative ideal. And second, the determinants expressed the broad focus of gov-
ernment’s newly developed health paradigm. A commitment to improve the qual-
ity of life implied more than protection against external health threats alone. 
Within these five different determinants, strong emphasis was placed on 
endogenous lifestyle factors, since these were the main determinants of non-
communicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases and cancer. The focal 
point of public health policy became “the relation between behaviour (lifestyle) 
and disease” (PLM, 1983:6). The basic policy assumption was that improvement 
of public health could be achieved through the promotion of healthy living habits 
and the prevention of avoidable health risks (PLM, 1983:8).  
 
2.2.4. From protection to emancipation 
A logical result of the focus on endogenous determinants of health was the gov-
ernment emphasis on what individual citizens themselves could do to improve 
their health. Previously, in the period between 1966 and 1982, government em-
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phasis on individual responsibility related to self-care and bearing the conse-
quences of behaviour choices. Now, in the light of the explosive rise in lifestyle 
diseases, this shifted to an emphasis on the relation between individual behaviour 
and collective problems. The focus on health protection against external threats 
was complemented by a preoccupation with everyday decisions concerning nutri-
tion, drinking, smoking and physical exercise, which are “within the control of 
individuals” (MDP, 1986:356). Citizens were no longer merely passive victims of 
disease, but could also take active part in the prevention of health threats. 
In this light, government reassessed its responsibility with regard to 
health promotion. To some extent, this newly developed responsibility still pre-
sumed some form of victimhood of individual citizens – this time, not in the form 
of external threats, but in the form of economical and social contexts and circum-
stances. Government did “[…] not want to suggest that the responsibility for 
health risks following from risky behaviour can be automatically attributed to the 
individuals involved. Opting for healthy or risky behaviour is often not a free 
choice. High standards are set for our functioning in a complex society: in the 
workplace, in family contexts, at school, in social life et cetera. How we spend our 
available time is to a large extent preconditioned. […] Often, there is only a very 
limited possibility to change an individual’s living environment. […] Behaviour, 
including healthy behaviour, cannot be seen apart from its societal context. For 
instance, smoking, the use of alcohol or physical exercise are part of and an ex-
pression of a way of life, which is to a considerable degree determined by social 
contacts […]” (PLM, 1983:9). In short: “[…] health is determined by life circum-
stances and the individual’s available possibilities to improve health. The respon-
sibility for health cannot be automatically individualised” (PLM, 1983:9). 
 
Endogenous lifestyle factors are in principle within the control of individual citi-
zens, but the social context acts to limit the opportunities for an actual behaviour 
change. The recognition of these limitations was also the justification for the ex-
pansion of state activities. As individual behaviour had been found to cause health 
threats, and had, moreover, proven hard to change, the logical conclusion was that 
government could not leave citizens to their own fate: “[Public health policy] does 
not affect an individual’s responsibility for his own health or the mutual support 
among citizens, but should on the contrary make an appeal to enlarging individual 
responsibility” (MDP, 1986:309).  
Government responsibility must walk a thin line between creating de-
pendency of citizens on the state and shifting all responsibility to society (MDP, 
1986:310). This thin line is called emancipation: “The lifestyle approach not only 
uses an epidemiological model, in which the nature and severity of health-
threatening behaviour determines the reaction by public services, but [...] an 
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emancipatory model, in which people are stimulated to make conscious decisions 
with regard to their health […]” (MDP, 1986:46-47). A more conscious and well-
informed citizen is presumed to make different lifestyle decisions and to resist or 
compensate societal tendencies towards unhealthy behaviour. 
Since vulnerability was an important argument for the expansion of state 
activities, special attention went out to the protection of vulnerable population 
groups. For instance, the protection of non-smokers justified a ban on smoking in 
public buildings (MDP, 1986:173). Another example was the increased effort to 
reduce alcohol use among adolescents: “The primacy of personal responsibility 
[for one’s health] cannot be absolute. There are vulnerable groups and risky situa-
tions in our society. Especially amongst adolescents, the strong increase in alcohol 
consumption is cause for concern: not just because of the immediate risks and 
problems, but also because of long-term negative consequences for public health” 
(AS, 1985:19). 
 
2.2.5. The politicisation of lifestyle 
As a consequence of the focus on the endogenous determinants of health, lifestyle 
decisions were no longer a private matter, but a political one: “The success in the 
control of infectious diseases and the rapid technological developments in medical 
science have led many to the conviction that a cure can be found for every disease. 
Partly because of these high expectations with regard to health care, the impor-
tance of individual responsibility for health has met with little response among 
the population” (MDP, 1986:63).  
As a result of this ‘politicisation of lifestyle’, government proposed to ex-
pand the range of its activities:387 “Up to now, government policy in the realm of 
public health has had the following accents: the financing system […], granting 
subsidies and setting quality standards, especially for professions and education. 
Although several initiatives arose during the past decade, the purely content-
                                                   
387 Whereas the state expanded its activities in prevention, it simultaneously moved away from 
central planning in the realm of health care. Government anticipated the introduction of market 
mechanisms in health care during the 1990s: “State planning activities are directed too much at 
control, standardisation and procedures and too little at solving concrete problems. They are 
too administration-centred” (MDP, 1986:308). 
Interestingly enough, government framed cutbacks in health care services partly as a 
move towards prevention. The health care system was based on a curative ideal, but should also 
be understood as a means to make people less dependent on the state: “Health care should not 
lead to a state of unnecessary dependency. Nor should the promotion of independency result in 
leaving people in need to their own fate” (PLM, 1983:6). More specifically, government strove 
for “a shift from curative to preventive services, from clinical to polyclinic care, from hospitals 
and institutions to general practitioners” (PLM, 1983:6). This shift was to a large extent inspired 
by the necessity to cut back on welfare state expenditures – as the title of the 1983 Public Health 
Policy with Limited Means memorandum already more or less gave away.  
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related objectives fell outside the scope of government. […] This trend [of more 
specific public health objectives] in policy making needs to be strengthened” 
(MDP, 1986:309).  
While public authorities were responsible for informing citizens about the 
possible consequences of their behaviour, citizens and private organisations were 
also called upon to act in accordance to government’s policy ambitions: “Not just 
the authorities, but also – and sometimes, mainly – citizens, health care organisa-
tions and insurance companies need to make public health ambitions their own” 
(WHR, 1990:5). Instead of management (of the health care system) or regulation 
(in terms of health protection), the government aimed to intervene more actively 
in society to improve the status of public health.388 
 
2.3. Intervention power 
 
2.3.1. Anticipation, intervention, coordination 
The paradigm shift from disease to health, together with the focus on both en-
dogenous and exogenous sources of disease, led to transformations in the organi-
sation of state interventions. The implementation of preventive ambitions re-
quired a different strategy than the organisation of health care services or the 
protection against exogenous health threats. Three organisational principles 
stood out in public health policy from 1983 onwards: a strengthening of the 
state’s anticipatory capacities, a strengthening of the state’s interventionist ca-
pacities, and a strengthening of the state’s coordinative capacities. 
 
First, preventive policies are by definition future-oriented – they deal with phe-
nomena that are not (yet) present. Moreover, a specific characteristic of public 
health is that interventions only tend to have an effect in the long run. A memo-
randum published in 1986 noted that even if everyone were to quit smoking to-
day, the effect on the status of public health would only be visible years many 
years hence (MDP, 1986:101). Furthermore, the longer interventions on future 
health threats are postponed, the more difficult and costly measures to avert or 
alter these threats become. 
Hence, a logical consequence of preventive ambitions was “the strength-
ening of the anticipatory capacity” (MDP, 1986: 314). Early indications of societal 
trends in citizen behaviour or in development of diseases were recognised as im-
portant preconditions for a preventive approach: “As soon as risks are known and 
                                                   
388 However, government made it clear that there were limits to the range of state interven-
tions: “It would be erroneous to think that an all-embracing way of thinking, which is a charac-




traceable, they are in principle open to intervention” (PMH, 1984:20). The gov-
ernment aimed to increase the state’s anticipatory capacity by means of “a) more 
specific collection of data on mortality indicators and the size of certain patterns 
of disease, on the status of public health in specific geographical regions and on 
specific societal groups; b) research on long term developments in health care; 
and c) drawing up regional and local ‘health plans’” (MDP, 1986:315). Specific 
activities included research on risk factors for cardiovascular diseases, the evalua-
tion of preventive measures, the detailed registration of patient data (for instance 
on relevant risk factors), and population screening for cardiovascular diseases, 
nutritional habits and the identification of risk groups (PCD, 1987:36-47). 
 
Prevention of disease and health threats also required an interventionist capacity. 
A characteristic of the health care and health protection strategies previously 
employed was that state activities remained at a certain distance from actual so-
cietal processes. After all, a health care system is a compensation mechanism for 
disease, but does not, as a rule, intervene in the causes of disease. By contrast, the 
envisioned prevention of endogenous health threats necessarily implied influenc-
ing societal processes. Prevention is explicitly goal-oriented and action-oriented: 
it is not the execution of a certain ‘task’, but the realisation of societal effects 
through concrete interventions.  
Characteristic of such an approach is a pragmatic attitude. Interventions 
were to have realistic goals and obvious effects. In other words, “[…] there should 
be no long and difficult chains of causality between the causes and the relevant 
situation or behaviour. The statement that ‘everything is interconnected’ may be 
correct from a certain philosophical viewpoint, but is irrelevant for a practical 
health policy” (MDP, 1986:309). This goal-oriented policy was interested in ‘what 
works’, which, in practice, could take different forms, such as research to develop 
new interventions that could have a “substantial effect” (MDP, 1986:90) or evalua-
tion of interventions to analyse their effect on lifestyles: “did an anti-smoking 
campaign have any effect?” (WHR, 1990:9). 
An example of the efforts to strengthen the state’s interventionist capacity 
and to intervene in societal processes was the government’s ambition to organise 
interventions “nearby” citizens (WHR, 1990:11). An important role in the imple-
mentation of prevention was assigned to the local authorities. At the local level, 
low-threshold activities and services could be organised and coordination be-
tween various activities realised (WHR, 1990:8). More specifically, Municipal 
Health Services were seen as crucial in the organisation of prevention: “An impor-
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tant ambition is the realisation of a networked system389 of municipal health ser-
vices” (MDP, 1986:300).  
 
A third organisational principle underlying the government’s preventive ambi-
tions was the strengthening of the state’s coordinative capacities. Underlying the 
health paradigm and the five determinants of health was a form of “all-embracing 
thinking” (MDP, 1986:307). From a preventive perspective, it is logical to develop 
an approach that covered as many health risks as possible. Consequently, the gov-
ernment’s approach to endogenous lifestyle factors consisted of “a combination of 
measures such as health information and education, measures directed at societal 
relations (such as an advertisement ban on certain goods), reducing the availabil-
ity of certain goods, control of food, price policy, et cetera, et cetera” (MDP, 
1986:46). No single measure was presumed to be effective enough to influence 
societal processes. Instead, a comprehensive set of measures was deployed, rang-
ing from financial incentives and information campaigns to legislation and regula-
tion.  
Only in a coordinated constellation was it possible for multiple instru-
ments and interventions to help government realise its policy objectives. Health 
‘facets’ in other, adjacent policy fields were identified as a means to elucidate the 
comprehensive scope and the coordination between measures: “Facet policy is 
policy dealing with the health components or dimensions in the policies of other 
policy terrains than that of the Ministry of Health” (MDP, 1986:216). This organ-
isational strategy implied cooperation between policy departments, both on a 
national and on a local level (MDP, 1986:12): “Possible issues are environmental 
policy, security policy (on various areas: urban planning, traffic, housing, labour), 
measures which influence the lifestyle of citizens (limiting drinking milieus, limit-
ing advertisements, positive recreational policy, promoting sports activities) and 
very general policy terrains: general economic policy, employment policy and 
labour conditions policy” (MDP, 1986:218). 
 
2.3.2. Education, regulation, detection 
The paradigm shift from disease to health and the accompanying emphasis on 
prevention also led to the development of a specific intervention repertoire. Three 
instruments or techniques are discussed in the following. First, the emancipation 
of citizens was promoted by means of health information and education about 
healthy lifestyles. Second, regulatory techniques were deployed to complement 
the efforts of rational persuasion. And third, early detection of health risks 
                                                   
389 The literal translation of ‘networked system’ is ‘closed net’ (in Dutch: ‘sluitend net’). 
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through monitoring and screening of the population enabled early intervention in 
both individual cases and societal developments. 
 
Of these three techniques, “health information and education” was the most 
prominent (PLM, 1983:11) and a direct consequence of the aforementioned ‘poli-
ticisation of lifestyle’: “In times when society was predominantly confronted with 
diseases which made little individual prevention possible (contagious diseases, 
lack of proper nutrition or diseases following from poverty), the emphasis on 
[health information and education] was less important than in the case of diseases 
of affluence. The development of this type of disease is to a large extent deter-
mined by individual behaviour. The necessary influence on behaviour is pursued 
through health information, with an emphasis on training and education of the 
individual and special attention for the relation between (physical and mental) 
health and social context and living environment” (MDP, 1986:37). 
The main objective was to inform the public about the health conse-
quences of lifestyles and modern life in general: “The objective of health informa-
tion and education is to make visible the negative influences of [industrialisation, 
automated production processes, urbanisation and an increased number of con-
sumptive possibilities] on a person’s lifestyle, and to motivate people to con-
sciously change their behaviour, with as goal to counteract or ease the harmful 
effects on health” (PLM, 1983:11). Underlying this objective was a specific image 
of rational choice. The government presumed that citizens would change their 
behaviour if made aware of the negative consequences of unhealthy lifestyles – as 
if it were a utilitarian trade-off between pain and pleasure. Moreover, the gov-
ernment presumed a very specific conception of rational behaviour: healthy be-
haviour was perceived as the rational mode of action for individual citizens. 
Concrete activities included anti-smoking campaigns (MDP, 1986:101) 
and alcohol information (MDP, 1986:152). In both cases, campaigns were devel-
oped for the general public and for specific target groups, such as adolescents and 
pregnant women. The educational system and the mass media were the two most 
important channels of communication for the government (PLM, 1983:12). Pri-
mary schools were obliged by law to provide health education (MDP, 1986:171), 
and health care and public health professionals, in particular general practitio-
ners, were also assigned an important role in providing health information (PLM, 
1983:12). 
 
As a complement to the efforts of rational persuasion, the government introduced 
several regulatory techniques. Unlike health information, regulation did not pre-
sume rational choice. Instead, regulation served as a “supportive” technique (PLM, 
1983:13), which acted as a safety net in case education failed to achieve the de-
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sired effect. As citizens were perceived to be vulnerable and susceptible to health 
threats in their social environment (such as non-physical labour and deeply so-
cially engrained habits of smoking), regulatory disincentives390 were deemed a 
necessary element in preventive policies. For government, “[…] regulation and 
education are in line with each other” (PLM, 1983:12). Both formed part of a 
“mixed approach” to endogenous health threats (MDP, 1986:46). 
Specific regulatory interventions included limitations on the sale of alco-
hol to adolescents or the use of tobacco. In the case of alcohol, government pro-
posed to change the then current Licensing and Catering Act to make it possible to 
put in place a more stringent approach to alcohol use, including “[…] a more effi-
cient licensing system, a legal framework for municipal bylaws, house rules for the 
sale and use of alcohol in the sports and cultural sector, a ban on radio and televi-
sion commercials for alcohol […], a ban on the sale of alcohol in football stadiums 
and petrol stations, [and] earlier closing times for pubs, sport canteens and cul-
tural organisations […]. Furthermore, the instrument of raising alcohol excises can 
play a role in the alcohol moderation policy” (MDP, 1986:153). Although citizens 
were, to a large extent, still left free to continue smoking or drinking, a combina-
tion of education and regulation was used to convince, or at least urge, them not 
to do so. 
 
A third technique was tightly related to the aforementioned strengthening of the 
anticipatory capacities of the state. After all, the early detection of risks is an ex-
pression of the prevention perspective par excellence, as well as of the relation 
between prevention and the curative ideal. Risk detection through population 
screening makes medical intervention possible in a stage when a disease is still 
treatable and, consequently, severe disease or even death is still preventable.  
The focal point was, in this case, risk groups, such as citizens with an in-
creased chance of cardiovascular diseases or cancer (MDP, 1986:83), or pregnant 
women, in order to identify hereditary or birth defects in a prenatal stage (MDP, 
1986:183). Besides early detection of individual cases, screening also served as a 
means to gather information on more general developments in public health and 
on the identification of risk groups (MDP, 1986:315; 331). 
 
                                                   
390 Government did not consider imposing a general ban on unhealthy products such as tobacco 
or alcohol. Government opted to persuade citizens to voluntarily give up unhealthy life styles 
through a set of disincentives. A probable explanation was the likely lack of support or compli-
ance from the general public for a general ban on products, the use of which was widespread 
throughout society. Crucial to the choice of intervention was the notion that “there should be a 




2.3.3. Lifestyle interventions: eating, smoking and drinking 
Three important risk factors for lifestyles diseases were identified: high blood 
pressure, tobacco use and high cholesterol (PCD, 1987:5). As a logical conse-
quence of government emphasis on endogenous determinants of health, the 
causes of these risks were taken as the object of preventive interventions: eating, 
smoking and drinking – activities which constitute to a large extent the daily lives 
and habits of the population (PCD, 1987:6).391 
Nutritional habits were important, as a normal body weight was known to 
be important to personal health (NP, 1983:58). The number of smokers was also 
to be further392 reduced since “smoking is the most avoidable cause of disease and 
mortality in western societies” (WHR, 1990:10). And alcohol abuse was associated 
with a broad range of societal issues, such as psychological problems, family is-
sues, absenteeism, pregnancy complications, early mortality, drunk driving (de-
spite legal regulations since 1974), and issues of crime and public order such as 
aggression and vandalism, which had increased considerably in number since the 
1960’s (MDP, 1986:152; AS, 1985:5; 13-18). 
 
With regard to nutrition, the government proposed several interventions to alter 
eating habits: “The two core elements of nutrition policy are the promotion of a 
sensible diet, and measures to secure a proper food supply and safe food prod-
ucts” (NP, 1983:5). This ‘sensible choice’ was, however, to remain a free choice for 
every citizen. The government was reluctant to introduce financial measures or 
forms of regulation to influence food choice and nutritional habits (NP, 1983:7-8; 
66-68).393 Instead, the promotion of healthy nutritional habits was pursued 
through a “transfer of knowledge” (NP, 1983:7). The government relied (to a large 
extent) on the persuasiveness of scientific arguments and the rational choice of 
citizens. 
                                                   
391 Beside these ‘new’ spearheads of public health policy, government remained responsible for 
a broad domain of health protection, including vaccination programmes and public hygiene, and 
regulation of the quality of medicines, food, drinking water and the living environment: “This is 
realised through a set of regulations on safety prescriptions for food and consumer goods. Fur-
thermore, the protection of the consumer against external harmful influences such as radiation 
or toxic substances is part of the domain of health protection” (WHR, 1990:12; cf. SPS, 1984). 
These health protection measures were by and large directed at the physical-natural (such as 
environmental pollution and dangerous substances) and the societal determinants of health 
(such as work place and consumer product safety) (MDP, 1986:26-28; 30-39; SPS, 1984:10). 
392 Even though the percentage of male smokers of 15 years and older had decreased from 90% 
in 1958 to 43% in 1985 (PCD, 1987:12). 
393 For instance, labelling of products by food producers to inform the public about a product’s 
ingredients and nutritional value was promoted, but not made mandatory (NP, 1983:69-70). 
And in the realm of advertising, only a very moderate regulation was proposed for commercial 
activities regarding alcohol and tobacco (NP, 1983:70).  
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Education and information activities included “[…] consumer information 
in general, education in schools, as well as stimulating companies to include nutri-
tional aspects in their production, advertising and labelling of products” (NP, 
1983:7). Citizens were approached through mass-information campaigns (NP, 
1983:73) and campaigns aimed at specific ‘risk groups’, such as the elderly, mini-
mum wage earners, ethnic minorities (NP, 1983:11-12) and adolescents, whose 
“poor nutritional habits need to be corrected as early as possible to prevent prob-
lems at a later age” (NP, 1983:64). Furthermore, the number of dieticians at mu-
nicipal health services was to be increased (NP, 1983:73), and the government 
examined possibilities for establishing a national centre for nutrition to realise a 
coordinated effort towards nutritional habits (WHR, 1990:10). 
 
Information and education was also the dominant strategy with regard to tobacco 
use.  Information campaigns and warning signs on the packaging of tobacco prod-
ucts formed the core of the government’s preventive strategy. Regulation served 
as a complementary strategy, for instance by limiting the number of selling points 
for tobacco products and limiting the number of tobacco commercials aimed at 
adolescents (PLM, 1983:16; MDP, 1986:170; PCD, 1987:36-47). 
What distinguishes tobacco use from poor nutritional habits is the effect 
smoking has on other people (non-smokers). Similar to alcohol abuse, smoking is 
not merely an individual matter; it also directly affects the lives of other citizens. 
Hence, it was “electoral pressure by non-smokers objecting to the damaging ef-
fects of second-hand smoking” (MDP, 1986:173) that led government to introduce 
more regulation against smoking than with regard to nutrition. An example was 
the proposed ban on smoking in public buildings (PLM, 1983:16). 
 
The approach to alcohol abuse largely followed a similar strategy as the tobacco 
disincentives policy: “the more alcohol consumption among a population, the 
more problems occur, while a lower consumption decreases problems. […] [This] 
indicates the necessity of a broad preventive approach in alcohol policy. A mod-
eration of alcohol consumption is a must” (AS, 1985:13). Adolescents, in particu-
lar, a population group more susceptible to the negative health influences of alco-
hol, showed worrying numbers of excessive alcohol consumption (AS, 1985:10). 
In terms of actual interventions, “a comprehensive set of four different policy in-
struments” was proposed (AS, 1985:19):394 
                                                   
394 Another possible strategy is influencing the price of alcohol through excises and taxation. 
However, government chooses not to use this instrument (yet) and relies to a large extent on 
strategies of information and persuasion (AS, 1985:60).  
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- Interventions on the demand-side of the market, such as information 
campaigns on the dangers of drunk driving, educational programmes 
on healthy lifestyles at schools, and the promotion of healthy behav-
iour by youth care workers, general practitioners, teachers, street 
workers and other professionals: “by pointing out the consequences 
of excessive alcohol use and the benefits of moderate alcohol use, the 
citizen will be motivated to drink less and drink differently. Responsi-
ble drinking should have a positive image. The eventual objective is a 
behavioural change: promoting moderate alcohol consumption” (AS, 
1985:27-28). 
- Prevention through health care services, which included proper 
health care for alcohol addicts, plus a broader awareness and early de-
tection by welfare workers and general practitioners. Early interven-
tions were deemed necessary to prevent further damage or addiction 
(AS, 1985:30; 36). 
- Strict regulation for the distribution of beer, wine and spirits, specifi-
cally aimed at preventing excessive alcohol use among adolescents. 
Government proposed a strict enforcement of the Licensing and Ca-
tering Act, as well as amendments to the then current legislation to 
further restrict the distribution of alcohol (including a ban on the sale 
of alcohol at petrol stations, regulation of opening times of bars, a 
stricter licensing system, and limitations on alcohol commercials on 
television, on aggressive sales methods and on free samples) (AS, 
1985:41-58). 
- Increased research on alcohol problems, in order to gain insight into 
the nature and size of alcohol problems, risk factors and risk groups, 
as well as on the effectiveness of policy measures. Research can “[…] 
contribute to the development of preventive policies” (AS, 1985:68). 
 
Besides these three preventive policy spearheads, government also drew atten-
tion to the importance of physical exercise and (organised) sporting activities in 
preventing health problems (PLM, 1983:13-14), pointing out that physical exer-
cise was part of a healthy lifestyle, just as proper nutrition, a moderate use of al-
cohol and non-smoking were. Lack of exercise was a “risk factor” for cardiovascu-
lar diseases (ASP, 1984:10). Government applied a provision-oriented strategy, 
directed at increasing the number and the accessibility of sports facilities (e.g. 
ASP, 1984:11). Furthermore, information campaigns were to be specifically de-
signed for relatively inactive population groups, such as women, minority groups 




2.3.4. The healthy citizen as object of interventions 
A core characteristic of every preventive policy, then, as now, is an interest in 
people who have not (yet) shown problematic behaviour – whether in the field of 
crime policy, where early detection of family problems enables the identification 
of adolescents at risk, or in the field of public health, where a focus on healthy 
instead of sick people enables interventions in a stage when irreparable damage 
can still be prevented. While health care is concerned with the ill, public health 
policy is concerned with the healthy. Hence, not the hospital population, but the 
entire population became relevant for health policy: “The realisation that health is 
more than the mere absence of disease has led to a shift in public health policy to 
the healthy individual, and the possibilities to promote health as much as possi-
ble” (PLM, 1983:8).  
Citizens with an increased chance of becoming ill as a result of their un-
healthy behaviour were especially of interest. Socio-economic status was identi-
fied as an important indicator for health differences between men and women, 
between people living in cities and in the countryside, between single and married 
people, between immigrants and natives (MDP, 1986:199): “It is well known that 
people from the lower social classes on average live more unhealthily (specifically 
with regard to diet and smoking)” (MDP, 1986:48). Cultural minorities were espe-
cially overrepresented in the lower social-economic strata, where unemployment, 
poor housing conditions and discrimination impact on health (MDP, 1986:197). 
Therefore, specific health information programmes for cultural minorities were 
developed (MDP, 1986:198). 
For reasons other than socio-economic status, children and adolescents 
formed another target group. They were, by definition, an important focal point of 
preventive strategies: “A preventive policy aimed at lifestyle change is most effec-
tive when it can be started at an early age” (MDP, 1986:57). Specific interventions 
were required and effective, especially since adolescence “[...] is the age at which 
people take independent decisions for the first time in their life, also with regard 
to such lifestyle activities as smoking, traffic behaviour, use of contraceptives, et 
cetera” (MDP, 1986:61). 
 
2.4. Synopsis 
Until 1983, protection of citizens against exogenous health threats formed the 
core of government’s preventive policy. Even though this task was expanded as a 
result of new threats in a rapidly modernising society – characterised by an in-
crease of traffic, industry, population, air and soil pollution, food products and 
medicines – the scope was explicitly limited to phenomena outside the sphere of 
influence of individual citizens. Moreover, the dominant strategy to further im-
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prove the status of public health was the organisation of a proper health care sys-
tem. 
Between 1983 and 1990, two important discontinuities in comparison to 
the previous period could be discerned in government’s definition power: the rise 
of the health paradigm and the emphasis on endogenous lifestyle factors. Both 
were triggered by the emergence of diseases of affluence, such as cardiovascular 
diseases and several forms of cancer. Whereas public health problems in the past 
were (partly) correlated with poverty, contemporary problems were correlated 
with an increase in wealth – such as the dominance of non-physical labour and the 
availability of unhealthy (amounts of) nutrition.  
 
In the face of diseases of affluence, little improvement in the status of public 
health could be expected from further investments in the health care system. In-
stead of a focus on disease and cure, therefore, the focus shifted to health and 
prevention. The health paradigm broadened the range of state interventions to 
every possible positive or negative influence on a person’s quality of life: “health 
is not merely the absence of disease […], but a state of socially determined physi-
cal and mental wellbeing” (PHM, 1966:10). This paradigmatic transformation 
implied the introduction of an “all-embracing way of thinking” (MDP, 1986:307) 
to realise the objective of full participation of all citizens in society, unhindered by 
physical or mental health problems (MDP, 1986:47). 
The health paradigm and the prevention perspective were closely related. 
Besides the shared ambition to avert disease, prevention could also be applied to 
the notion of health. As such, prevention was not merely concerned with averting 
disease, but more broadly with averting threats to the quality of life in general. 
Health was defined as a state of full physical, mental and societal wellbeing. Pre-
vention, then, could be understood as the aversion of all identified threats to a 
healthy life. 
Exemplary of this conceptual affinity between health and prevention was 
the government’s introduction of five determinants of health as an analytical 
framework for public health policy. Next to the familiar exogenous factors and the 
influence of a proper health care system, endogenous health threats were also 
identified. More specifically, endogenous lifestyle factors, such as habits concern-
ing nutrition, drinking and smoking, were recognised as contributing, to a large 
extent, to the development of lifestyle diseases. Unlike prevention in the form of 
protection against exogenous threats, a focus on endogenous health threats re-
quired prevention in the form of health promotion. 
In the case of health protection, the role of the state was limited to health 
threats beyond the control of individual citizens, while a focus on endogenous 
health factors which lie within the sphere of influence of citizens required a new 
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demarcation between citizen and state responsibility. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment still held citizens primarily responsible for their own health. On the other 
hand, the societal context often limited the practical opportunities for citizens to 
lead a healthy lifestyle. For example, in an economy largely characterised by non-
physical labour, and with deeply engrained social habits of smoking and drinking, 
individual citizens could find it extremely difficult to change their behaviour.  
Following this argument, government proposed an emancipatory ap-
proach to health promotion: using health information and education to support 
citizens in making the rational, healthy choice. Even though this emancipatory 
approach was characterised by a sense of restraint with regard to actively influ-
encing lifestyle choices, it implied a distinct expansion of the range of state activi-
ties. Henceforth, lifestyle decisions were no longer a private, but a political matter, 
as well. In other words, health promotion marked the politicisation of lifestyle. 
 
The paradigm shift from disease to health and the focus on endogenous instead of 
merely exogenous sources of disease also ‘produced’ several significant transfor-
mations in the state’s intervention power. First of all, the change and expansion of 
the preventive ambitions led to the introduction of three organisational principles 
in the implementation of these ambitions. A strengthening of the state’s anticipa-
tory capacities served the preventive objective of identifying risks and detecting 
undesirable developments in the status of public health. A strengthening of the 
state’s interventionist capacities served the preventive objective of actively influ-
encing societal processes, instead of merely organising health care services or 
regulating exogenous threats. And a strengthening of the state’s coordinative ca-
pacities served the preventive objective of covering a broad range of potential 
risks and organising comprehensive sets of measures. 
Second, three strategies or techniques were specifically introduced to re-
alise the prevention of disease and health threats. The heart of health promotion 
was formed by health education – the strategy of rational persuasion of citizens by 
means of information campaigns, health education at schools and advice by gen-
eral practitioners. However, regulation, such as limitations on the sale and use of 
tobacco, was adopted as a complementary strategy, intended to provide support 
to citizens and especially adolescents in making the rational choice with regard to 
health. Citizens were left free to continue their unhealthy lifestyles, but the com-
bination of education and regulation aimed either to convince or urge them not to 
do so. Finally, the strategy of early detection of health risks through monitoring 
and screening of the population enabled early intervention in both individual 
cases and societal developments. 
In the third and final place, the focus on endogenous determinants of 
health led to a focus on the most important risk factors for lifestyle diseases: high 
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blood pressure, smoking and high cholesterol. Eating, smoking and drinking habits 
– important causes of these factors – were activities which were deeply engrained 
in the daily lives of citizens and were now identified as important objects of inter-
vention. Moreover, the paradigm shift from disease to health also turned the 
healthy citizen into an object of intervention: “The realisation that health is more 
than the mere absence of disease has led to a shift in public health policy to the 
healthy individual, and the possibilities to promote health as much as possible” 
(PLM, 1983:8). Specific interest was directed at citizens at a heightened risk of 
developing lifestyle diseases, such as those in the lower socio-economic strata, as 
well as adolescents, who are especially susceptible to the temptations of un-




PART 3: IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1991-2002) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Whereas the period between 1983 and 1990 was marked by several discontinui-
ties in public health policy, such as the paradigm shift from disease to health and 
the emphasis on endogenous determinants of health, the following period, from 
1991 to 2002, was characterised by the continuation of policy objectives and ap-
proaches. There was no ‘frame setting’ memorandum in this period, the way the 
1966 Public Health Memorandum and the 1986 Memorandum on the Development 
of Public Health Policy had presented the general outlines of government policy 
for years to come.  
The period between 1991 and 2002 saw the development of structural at-
tention to prevention: “In practice, the emphasis on the determinants of health 
implies strengthening prevention (including facet policy), since this makes it pos-
sible to influence the natural-physical environment, the social environment and 
lifestyles” (HP, 1991:10). The 1992 memorandum Prevention for Public Health395 
marked the start of a series of letters to Parliament, reports and evaluations, as 
well as more substantial outlines for expanding and refining the preventive ap-
proach to health threats. New parliamentary papers have been added to this dos-
sier396 ever since. 
 
Two characteristics stood out during this period in the development of preventive 
health policy. First, the health paradigm was further conceptualised and, as a re-
sult, the scope of preventive policies was expanded. A more explicit focus to the 
broad notion of ‘health’ was introduced from 1991 onwards: improving the qual-
ity of life. An important incentive for this was the emergence of chronic diseases – 
or more precise: non-communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases. 
Next to averting disease (primary prevention) and the early detection of disease 
(secondary prevention), the health paradigm also implied the prevention of dis-
ease progression (tertiary prevention). If no cure was possible and full prevention 
had proved unsuccessful, attention was directed at reducing the negative impact 
of the established disease, and of disease-related complications, on an individual’s 
wellbeing. This represented “a shift in emphasis from ‘cure’ to ‘care’” (PHP, 
1991:2).  
                                                   
395 In Dutch: Preventie voor de volksgezondheid; TK 1992-1993, 22894/1. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘PPH, 1992’, followed by the page number. 
396 At the time of writing (late December 2011), the last entry was on 30-12-2011 under num-
ber 22894/308. A 1997 letter to Parliament in this dossier is discussed in the following as well: 
TK 1996-1997, 22894/13. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘PPH, 1997’, 
followed by the page number. 
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A second characteristic of the development in preventive policies was the 
government focus on concrete interventions and implementation. The policy 
memoranda published between 1991 and 2002 contained no extensive analyses 
of the current status of public health. Instead, an orientation on action and effec-
tiveness prevailed. By 1990, the government had included an ‘action programme’ 
in its memorandum Working on Health Care Renewal to sum up the various inter-
ventions, plans, taskforces and programmes to be introduced over the following 
years (WHR, 1990:5). From 1991 onward, Dutch public health policy showed “[…] 
a strong increase in the interest in prevention and in practical activities” (PPH, 
1992:3). As a consequence of this interventionist attitude, more detailed interven-
tions were developed (for instance towards risk groups) and a concern for di-
lemmas in the organisation and implementation of prevention emerged. 
 
Besides the memorandum mentioned above, the present discussion of Dutch pub-
lic health policy in the period between 1991 and 2002 is based on the following 
memoranda: Health Policy 1992397 published in 1991, Public Health Policy 1995-
1998398 (1995), Tobacco Disincentives Policy399 (1996), Action Programme Preven-
tion Policy400 (1997), Education Support and Development Stimulation401 and Nu-
trition and Health,402 both of which appeared in 1998, Public Health Care403 (1999) 
and its short 2000 follow-up,404 Alcohol Policy405 (2000), and  Sports, Exercise and 
Health (2001).406 
 
                                                   
397 In Dutch: Gezondheidsbeleid 1992; TK 1991-1992, 22459/1-2. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘HP, 1991’, followed by the page number. 
398 In Dutch: Volksgezondheidsbeleid 1995-1998; TK 1994-1995, 24126/1-2. References to quo-
tations in the text are abbreviated as ‘PHP, 1995’, followed by the page number. 
399 In Dutch: Tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid; TK 1995-1996, 24743/1. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘TDP, 1996’, followed by the page number. 
400 In Dutch: Actieprogramma Preventiebeleid; TK 1996-1997, 22894/14. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘APPP, 1997’, followed by the page number. 
401 In Dutch: Opvoedingsondersteuning en Ontwikkelingsstimulering; TK 1997-1998, 25980/1. 
References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘ESDS, 1998’, followed by the page num-
ber. 
402 In Dutch: Relatie Voeding en Gezondheid; TK 1998-1999, 26229/1-2. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘NH, 1998’, followed by the page number. 
403 In Dutch: Openbare Gezondheidszorg; TK 1998-1999, 26598/1. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘PHC, 1999’, followed by the page number. 
404 TK 1999-2000, 26598/2. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘PHC, 2000’, 
followed by the page number. 
405 In Dutch: Alcoholbeleid; TK 2000-2001, 27565/1-2. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘AP, 2000’, followed by the page number. 
406 In Dutch: Sport, Bewegen en Gezondheid; TK 2000-2001, 27841/1-2. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘SEH, 2001’, followed by the page number. 
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3.2. Definition power 
 
3.2.1. Prevention and the quality of life 
From 1991 onwards, the ‘quality of life’ became the central theme in public health 
policy (HP, 1991:12; 15-16). This implied “[…] an effort to enable as many people 
as possible to remain in good health and participate in society as long as possible” 
(PHP, 1995:5). Thus understood, ‘quality of life’ became a logical element of the 
health paradigm. From the outset, therefore, health was viewed during this period 
as “more than the mere absence of disease”, and was the focus on “the healthy 
individual and the possibilities to promote this health as much as possible” (PLM, 
1983:8). Health and disease were no longer mutually exclusive categories in the 
face of non-communicable diseases: instead of a black-and-white perspective, 
government applied the notion of health as a dynamic status of physical and men-
tal wellbeing that could improve or decline. 
A focus on the ‘quality of life’ also implied a further refinement of the pre-
ventive approach to public health: “A good preventive policy can improve the 
quality of life” (PPH, 1992:3). Whereas primary and secondary prevention deal 
with interventions to prevent disease and to detect early signs of disease, tertiary 
prevention aimed to prevent further health loss when a disease has already been 
established. Prevention comes in many forms: “Improvement in public health is 
the result of deliberate interventions of preventive or curative nature aimed at: 
avoiding premature disease or death, improvement of the individually experi-
enced quality of life, or the prevention, reduction or postponement of a depend-
ency of care” (PPH, 1992:5). In terms of a focus on ‘the quality of life’, prevention 
at this time was focused on ‘avoidable health loss’ (HP, 1991:2).407 
 
The active promotion of the quality of life implied some sort of understanding of 
what ‘quality’ was taken to comprise. Even though the definitions in the various 
policy memoranda remained vague at best, the government described the value of 
a socially and economically productive life: “Prevention, care and cure not only 
contribute to more independence, a longer life and increased vitality; they also 
reduce absenteeism as a result of disease and stimulate economic activity, em-
ployment and social cohesion” (PHP, 1995:6).  
                                                   
407 However, the health paradigm has the potential for an even broader approach to health and 
related issues. According to government, health is tightly related to social and economic partici-
pation, a broad social network, and a proper education (PHP, 1995:7-8). There is a “[…] direct 
relation – especially in the realm of prevention – between social cohesion, safety and security, 
social participation and health” (PHP, 1995:19). As a result of this broadened perspective, pre-
viously separate policy fields are now perceived as highly interrelated: “Cabinet policy for the 
improvement of social cohesion and security may also have a positive effect on the reduction of 
the threat [of alcohol related delinquency] for health and wellbeing” (PHP, 1995:13). 
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The justification for this specific notion of ‘quality of life’ was based on the 
construction of a convergence between individual and collective interests. Accord-
ing to government, a healthy population “[…] serves the individual and the collec-
tive cause. Improving health and preventing disease are investments in ‘human 
capital’; they enhance a socially and economically productive life” (PPH, 1992:5). 
In line with the aforementioned ‘politicisation of lifestyle’, a more specific under-
standing of ‘quality of life’ led to a more specific understanding of appropriate 
citizen behaviour, which subsequently found expression in the political definition 
of collective and individual interests. 
 
The notion of ‘quality of life’ covered three distinct government ambitions. First, it 
alluded to the idea of ‘lifestyle’ as the most important determinant of health for 
contemporary public health policy. Again, as in the previous period, individual 
habits such as smoking, drinking, eating and (lack of) physical exercise were taken 
as objects of intervention. The government set out “[…] a number of priorities in 
the realm of prevention: discouraging tobacco use, improving nutrition, stimulat-
ing healthy physical exercise, increasing safety in the private domain, at work and 
on the streets” (PHP, 1995:4). Alcohol moderation, tobacco regulation, informa-
tion on healthy nutrition and promotion of physical exercise were among gov-
ernment’s priorities (HP, 1991:30-34; PHP, 1995:23-24). 
Second, the notion of ‘quality of life’ covered the approach to differences 
in health and health risks between various population groups: “The improvement 
in the status of public health is not evenly spread over the population” (HP, 
1991:2). In general, people in the lower socio-economic strata (and especially 
migrant groups) and people with a lower level of educational attainment were 
found to have an increased risk of developing health problems (PHP, 1995:12): “A 
large number of health problems (long term disease, severe physical restrictions, 
health complaints) occurs roughly twice as much in groups with a lower level of 
education compared to more highly educated groups” (PHP, 1995:11). The focus 
on specific target groups was a logical consequence of the striving to prevent 
avoidable health loss, since it implied a focus on citizens who were most at risk. 
The focus on health differences in the population was also an expression of the 
value of equality: all citizens should be equally able to participate in society and 
lead healthy lives. 
And third, the focus on ‘the quality of life’ was especially relevant for those 
suffering from non-communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, res-
piratory afflictions, rheumatism and diabetes. Given the twin challenges of an 
ageing population and of the rise in lifestyle diseases, both cure and prevention of 
disease had their limitations: “In health policy, the emphasis will be placed on 
non-communicable diseases and diseases which are common in the elderly. As a 
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consequence, a gradual shift in policy and care towards preservation and im-
provement of the quality of life is desirable for this category of patients” (HP, 
1991:2). Preserving a certain quality of life and preventing the progression of 
disease in those already affected came to be seen as the highest attainable goal 
(MDP, 1986:125-128). The permanent use of medication and screening were cru-
cial elements in this approach (MDP, 1986:130; cf. WHR, 1990:14). 
 
3.2.2. Purposeful and prudent 
The emphasis on ‘quality of life’ was not only an extension and refinement of the 
health paradigm, it also signalled a new, action-oriented approach to health is-
sues. As outlined above, health promotion aimed to intervene in societal proc-
esses instead of merely providing a form of protection against external threats or 
care as a reaction to disease. Prevention in terms of health promotion implied 
purposeful action. However, a new repertoire of organisations and interventions 
dedicated to the prevention of avoidable health loss could not be built overnight. 
Hence, strong emphasis was placed on “[...] concrete implementation and realisa-
tion” (PPH, 1992:9) from 1991 onward. 
Since the Memorandum on the Development of Public Health Policy ap-
peared in 1986, various new activities had been developed to promote public 
health, such as screening programmes for several forms of cancer (including 
breast cancer and cervical cancer), an expanded range of preventive activities in 
the care for addicts, a national vaccination programme, new and stricter legisla-
tion on tobacco products, an alcohol moderation policy, several large national 
information campaigns on AIDS and alcohol abuse, and the establishment of The 
Netherlands School of Public Health (PPH, 1992:8).408  
 
                                                   
408 The implementation of these and other activities was to a large extent a task for the munici-
pal authorities. Since 1989, the Collective Prevention Public Health Act (in Dutch: ‘Wet 
Collectieve Preventie Volksgezondheid’) has determined the responsibilities of local authorities 
for the promotion of public health, which are mainly carried out by a national network of mu-
nicipal health services. 
However, “[t]he fact that preventive policies call for more consistency and coherence, 
and that preventive practices do not fit the scheme of individually insurable risks, justifies a 
permanent and monitoring function for national government” (PPH, 1992:16). This included 
setting priorities for preventive policies, allocating adequate financial means, developing na-
tional research programmes, realising and maintaining an adequate organisation of preventive 
services, formulating legislation as an ethical and legal basis for prevention, promoting the 
effectiveness and quality of preventive measures, protecting the population against health 
threats, stimulating interdepartmental and international co-operation, and establishing regula-
tory authorities (PPH, 1997:3-4; cf. PHC, 1999:11-15; HP, 1991:7). Furthermore, four-yearly 




Effectiveness was the most important criterion in the development of this new 
intervention repertoire. This expansion of state responsibilities was carried out 
with judicious care. Even though no strict demarcations between state and citizen 
responsibility were mentioned, the government combined the expansion of its 
activities with a sense of caution: there were several “considerations which re-
mind us to be prudent” (PPH, 1992:5).  
There was a certain limit to state responsibility: “[…] there should be a 
proper balance between the things a citizen can do with regard to his responsibil-
ity for his own health, and the things which belong to the responsibility of societal 
organisations, health care professionals and public authorities” (PPH, 1992:3). 
Although the government refrained from elaborating on this principle, it was well 
aware that at the very least a certain restraint was required: “Since the personal 
freedom of the citizen with regard to his own lifestyle represents an important 
value in modern society, preventive measures related to lifestyles should be dealt 
with very cautiously” (PPH, 1992:6). Since prevention was often a form of ‘unso-
licited care’, implementation of preventive measures needed to be held against 
high standards of legality, ethics, societal acceptance and efficiency (PPH, 1992:5; 
cf. PHP, 1995:21). 
Furthermore, prevention was not a panacea for all problems related to 
public health, and in fact, could even create new ones. For instance, in some cases, 
prevention could prove cost-ineffective in the long run: “improved living condi-
tions and health care services have prevented disease and death at an early age, 
but [have also] led to prolonged diseases and physical limitations at an elderly 
age” (PHP, 1995:20). In other words: “prevention will only occasionally make 
health care services cheaper, certainly not in the long run” (PHP, 1995:20). Hence, 
“[…] prevention is justified not by possible savings, but by the improvement in 
health and wellbeing” (PHP, 1995:20). 
 
3.3. Intervention power 
 
3.3.1. Three organisational principles for a new intervention repertoire 
As a result of the focus on the “[...] concrete implementation and realisation” (PPH, 
1992:9) of preventive interventions, policy memoranda from 1991 onward dealt 
extensively with the organisational principles and organisational dilemmas of 
prevention. In the following, three strategies for the organisational design of the 
new intervention repertoire are discussed. The first was the strategy of decentral-
ised implementation, which enabled interventions in citizens’ behaviour and so-
cial context. The second, cooperation and coordination, enabled the development 
of the mixed approaches necessary for realising behavioural change. And the 
third, intervening at an early phase and a persistent manner, characterised the 
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approach towards risk groups. While these three principles echo the aforemen-
tioned discussion of the strengthening of interventionist, coordinative and antici-
patory state capacities in the period between 1983 and 1990, they are representa-
tive of a far more purposeful preventive approach. 
 
The first organising principle used for the construction of a preventive interven-
tion repertoire is the principle of proximity. The establishment of public health 
services, the monitoring of the population and the implementation of preventive 
programmes was presumed to be the most effective when organised in the direct 
living environment of those concerned: “The local authorities are the authorities 
nearest to many people. Problems are also felt most directly at this level, and, 
moreover, local authorities are able to relate with other policy areas relevant for 
the general wellbeing of citizens in specific local circumstances” (PPH, 1997:3). 
As discussed earlier, the Collective Prevention Public Health Act of 1989 
explicitly formulated the tasks of the municipal health services. These included 
vaccination programmes, development of preventive programmes tailored to 
local problems, promotion of public hygiene, organisation of the care for youth, 
elderly, disabled people, addicts or other people in need of support (PPH, 1997:2; 
4; cf. PHC, 1999:8), and were carried out via the national network of municipal 
health organisations that had been put in place (PHC, 2000:2).  
 
The second organising principle of prevention that can be distinguished is the 
principle of coordination. Improvements in public health can be achieved through 
interventions in many other policy domains besides that of health: “when the lim-
its of health care are in sight, it becomes obvious that much improvement of pub-
lic health can be achieved outside the realm of health care. Therefore, […] we aim 
to give a new impulse to facet or inter-sectoral policy” (HP, 1991:3). A preventive 
approach towards avoidable health loss expands government’s scope to health 
aspects in all domains of policymaking.  
For instance, health risks in the workplace, such as stress and physical 
load, were tackled by both the State Secretary of Health and the Minister of Social 
Affairs in the form of (among other things) model projects for stress prevention, a 
national ‘stress monitor’, prevention of burnouts, prevention of aggression and 
violence, and stricter enforcement of the Working Conditions Act (PPH, 1992:18). 
Another example of inter-sectoral policymaking was the cooperation between the 
Ministries of Health and Transport to reduce noise and air pollution (PPH, 
1992:19-20). 
The principle of coordination was also evident at the level of policy im-
plementation. During this period, health promotion was increasingly organised 
through comprehensive and mixed approaches. Different strategies and tech-
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niques were combined for an optimum effect on citizen behaviour. For instance, 
the efforts to reduce the number of adolescent smokers included information 
campaigns, strict enforcement of the smoking ban in public buildings, self-
regulation of advertising activities by the tobacco industry, a ban on the sale of 
tobacco to children under the age of 18, support for people who want to quit 
smoking, and a tobacco excise increase (TDP, 1996:2-9). 
 
The third identifiable organising principle of prevention is the principle of timeli-
ness or the ambition to intervene before unavoidable harm has occurred. Clearly, 
it was not enough merely to create equal access to health care services and mu-
nicipal health services. The groups at risk, such as adolescents, homeless people 
and cultural minorities, tended not to ask for care or support, even though they 
might be the ones who need it the most: “In principle, health care facilities are 
equally accessible for cultural minorities as they are for native Dutchmen. […] 
However, judged by the need for care, the active use tends to lag behind” (HP, 
1991:24).  
Merely creating proper care services and offering health information will 
not suffice to reach the most vulnerable groups in society: “The people who stand 
most in need of education and stimulation in their development, where the risks 
for the children and society are the biggest, appear to be the most difficult to 
reach by care services” (ESDS, 1998:9). Not everybody in need of help will seek 
help. Some could even be described as “care avoiders”409 (ISP, 1999:38).  
Given these considerations, the government aimed to improve the identi-
fication of risk groups (ESDS, 1998:13) and develop “outreach methods” to proac-
tively offer support to citizens at risk (ESDS, 1998:16). Early detection would en-
able early intervention. Hence the need for a “[…] proper system of early detec-
tion, referral and coordination to prevent children and their parents from ending 
up between a rock and a hard place” (ESDS, 1998:6). Schools, well baby clinics and 
nurseries were considered to be best equipped to detect problems in an early 
stage, since they operated in close proximity to children and provided services to 
the vast majority of all Dutch parents (ESDS, 1998:8). 
 
3.3.2. The repertoire of lifestyle interventions 
Under the motto “avoidable health loss” (e.g. WHR, 1990:10; HP, 1991:2) the gov-
ernment focused on the habits and lifestyles that were open for improvement. 
Eating, smoking, drinking and physical exercise became the spearheads of gov-
ernment’s behavioural approach (APPP, 1997). The causal scheme between en-
dogenous lifestyle factors and public health problems, developed in 1986, still 
                                                   
409 In Dutch: ‘zorgmijders’. 
290 
 
served as the basis for preventive policies at this time. However, while rational 
persuasion was the dominant strategy between 1983 and 1990, a distinct increase 
in regulatory strategies was seen from 1991 onward.  
Explicit financial and regulatory disincentives were developed, especially 
in the realm of smoking and drinking. These included the introduction of age lim-
its, a stricter enforcement of existing regulations and increase of excises. By con-
trast, the approach to nutrition and physical exercise was characterised by the use 
of positive incentives as a complementary technique to information and educa-
tion. In general, lifestyle interventions were justified by government as means to 
improve “the match between the importance people attach to their health and 
their actual individual [...] behaviour” (NH, 1998:20). 
 
The government proposed an intensification of the alcohol moderation policy, 
since “[…] alcohol related problems have become a social phenomenon which 
threatens public health and calls for a broad range of measures” (HP, 1991:30). 
After a slight decrease in the 1980s, the consumption of alcohol began to climb 
again during the 1990s. Several measures were developed to control the negative 
influences of alcohol abuse in family life (violent behaviour, divorce), at work (ab-
senteeism), in traffic (drunk driving) and during nights out (aggressive behav-
iour). Two target groups – adolescents and “(former) problem drinkers” – were 
especially relevant in this respect (AP, 2000:2; 8-10). 
Measures and interventions included centrally coordinated alcohol infor-
mation activities and campaigns, education through school television and teaching 
material, and specific regional and local prevention projects (HP, 1991:33). Also, 
government convinced the alcohol industry to agree to self-imposed restrictions 
on their advertising activities and, in some cases, to use educational slogans in 
their advertising (HP, 1991:34). Government further proposed to raise the beer 
excise tax, to lower the maximum alcohol level for motorists, and a stricter en-
forcement of the Licensing and Catering Act (such as the obligation for vendors to 
verify the age limit of 16, more severe and effective sanctioning, increased police 
surveillance on nights out, and expanded authority for mayors to close down bars 
that violate the Licensing and Catering Act) (AP, 2000:14-57). 
 
Targeting tobacco use, government proposed the implementation of a set of disin-
centives (e.g. HP, 1991:50) to prevent adolescents from smoking, to stimulate 
more people to quit smoking, and to protect non-smokers against passive smok-
ing (TDP, 1996:2). In particular, prevention directed at adolescents had top prior-
ity (TDP, 1996:2). Like in the case of alcohol, government opted for a long term 
strategy of disincentives and prevention, instead of a complete legal ban: both 
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smoking and drinking were (still) widely socially accepted activities and many 
people earned their living in the tobacco industry or in catering (AS, 1985).  
Policy instruments included mass information campaigns directed at ado-
lescents, self-regulation by the tobacco industry to limit the advertising activities 
directed at adolescents, stricter enforcement of the legal smoking ban in public 
buildings, introduction of an age limit of 18 for the sale of tobacco, and a tobacco 
excise increase. Furthermore, government planned further regulation if self-
regulation by the tobacco industry proved ineffective, such as stricter advertising 
limitations and a ban on smoking in trains, post offices, banks, et cetera (TDP, 
1996:2-9). 
 
The approach to unhealthy eating habits was characterised by ‘positive’ incen-
tives, in contrast to the disincentive-dominated approaches to smoking and drink-
ing. However, the problem of unhealthy eating was not taken lightly, as the in-
crease in cardiovascular disease is strongly related to the rise in overweight and 
obesity: “Obesity is a clear risk factor for a number of life-threatening diseases” 
(NH, 1998:11). Obesity was especially a growing concern among target groups 
such as adolescents, elderly, and people in the lower socio-economic strata and 
ethnic minorities. On average, people ate too much: too much fat, too much salt, 
and not enough vegetables and fruit (PHP, 1995:23-24). 
Government continued its efforts to stimulate a healthy lifestyle and a 
food pattern along the lines of a science-based ‘guideline on proper nutrition’. A 
varied set of measures was proposed, which included the labelling of food prod-
ucts which fit within a healthy lifestyle (PHP, 1995:23-24), information campaigns 
on healthy food, the promotion of healthy food in school canteens, research into 
nutritional habits and effective measures to influence behaviour, and consulta-
tions with food producers and vendors to adapt their supply to societal demand 
for healthy products (NH, 1998:5).  
 
Finally, government aimed to promote physical exercise to counteract the “exer-
cise failure” in all segments of society (SEH, 2001:2). Lack of physical exercise was 
second only to smoking as the largest risk factor for premature death and the de-
velopment of various diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, depres-
sion, osteoporosis and several forms of cancer, leading to considerable health care 
costs and lack of economical activity (SEH, 2001:2). Structural societal and eco-
nomical changes in modes of transportation, in non-physical labour and automa-
tion largely banished physical exercise from daily activities: “For many people, 
physical exercise no longer appears to be a necessity, but has become a voluntary 
and deliberate choice” (SEH, 2001:2). And it is exactly this choice which govern-
ment aimed to influence: “Sufficient exercise is in principle a citizen’s free choice; 
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nobody can coerce him. But government can support and stimulate citizens to 
make the choice for an active lifestyle” (SEH, 2001:4). 
In general, government aimed to once again make physical exercise an in-
tegrated part of daily life. The proposed set of interventions included information 
campaigns and the organisation of a national ‘action week’ (including free health 
tests and exercise advice) to increase the awareness of the public of the impor-
tance of physical exercise. Sporting activities at schools and the use of bicycles for 
daily transport were promoted, ‘community based interventions’ to stimulate 
sports at the neighbourhood level were introduced, built-up environments were 
to be designed to make physical exercise more attractive (such as creating safe 
cycle paths and more sports facilities in parks), and experiments were developed 
to integrate sports into after-school care (such as creating after-school or home-
work facilities at sports clubs, or stimulating sports clubs and neighbourhood 
organisations to use a school’s sports facilities) (SEH, 2001:25-26; 29-34).410  
 
3.3.3. The identification of risk groups 
As in the years before, the entire (healthy) population is the object of interven-
tions – after all, everybody is subject to the determinants of health (although not 
everybody to the same extent or in the same way). Measures such as the reduction 
of the availability of tobacco products (PHP, 1995:23), the introduction of labels 
on food products to inform the public (PHP, 1995:24), and information on the 
dangers of drunk driving (PHP, 1995:24-25) are examples of interventions which 
are directed at the entire population. 
However, many of the interventions proposed from 1991 onwards were 
targeted at specific risk groups – citizens, who for some reason were more suscep-
tible to the negative determinants of health or who had already been more highly 
affected. As mentioned in the above, the identification of target groups was a logi-
cal consequence of the objective to prevent avoidable health loss, since it implied 
a focus on the citizens most at risk. Especially “[w]orrying is the increasing num-
ber of adolescents with an unhealthy lifestyle” (QS, 1997) and the fact that “[t]he 
improvement of the status of public health is not evenly spread over the popula-
tion” (HP, 1991:2). Aside from adolescents in general, the lifestyles of population 
groups in the lower socio-economic strata were also cause for concern (PHP, 
1995:12). 
In terms of specific interventions, differentiated information campaigns 
for specific groups (HP, 1991:21) were launched, as were population screening 
                                                   
410 Monitoring of the population to gain insight in local exercise patterns and societal trends to 
develop specific interventions or campaigns was complementary to these and other measures. 
Therefore, government invested in an “exercise monitor” (SEH, 2001:26; 34-35) and in further 
research to understand why people do or do not exercise (SEH, 2001:18). 
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programmes, such as for cervical cancer, in which hard-to-reach groups received 
extra attention (HP, 1991:21). Lastly, several groups of adolescents – especially 
cultural minorities (HP, 1991:26) – who were beyond the reach of youth care fa-
cilities were identified, for whom additional “outreach” activities by municipal 
health services were required (HP, 1991:13).411  
 
3.4. Synopsis 
The period between 1991 and 2002 largely constituted the consolidation and re-
finement of the analyses and ambitions sketched out between 1983 and 1990. 
Prevention became a structural element of public health policy: policy memo-
randa on prevention were published on a regular basis from 1992 onwards, the 
health paradigm was further specified in the notion of ‘quality of life’, and gov-
ernment invested in the construction of a new preventive intervention repertoire. 
In line with the aforementioned ‘politicisation of lifestyle’, government 
viewed the refinement of its preventive activities as both in the public interest 
and in the individual interests of citizens. The justification for increased lifestyle 
interventions lay in the construction of a convergence between individual and col-
lective interests: “[...] a socially and economically productive life” (PPH, 1992:5). 
However, even though no strict demarcations between state and citizen responsi-
bility were formulated, government combined its expansion of purposeful action 
with an explicit sense of caution and prudence when it came to intervening in citi-
zen behaviour. 
 
In terms of definition power, the notion of the quality of life was introduced as the 
missing link between the absence of disease and the possibility of cure. In a per-
fect world, diseases could either be fully prevented or be fully cured. In the reality 
of modern society, non-communicable lifestyle diseases are in most instances not 
fully preventable or curable. However, a policy aimed at enabling full social and 
economical participation of citizens had also to take into account the quality of life 
                                                   
411 The actual approach to health differences was explicitly broader than a mere prevention of 
illnesses and a typical example of inter-sectoral policymaking: “People without a job often have 
a lower socio-economic status and, associated with this, more unhealthy living habits and cir-
cumstances, more health complaints, more demand for health care provisions and a shorter life 
expectancy. Increasing economic participation can therefore have a positive effect to break the 
vicious circle of being unemployed and having health problems” (PHP, 1995:8).  
As a result of the interrelatedness between health, living conditions, unemployment, 
educational level and insecurity, a preventive policy should include the efforts of a broad range 
of fields, such as public health policy, education policy, welfare policy and labour market policy. 
Specific target groups included cultural minorities, but also several groups of adolescents that 
face multiple problems, such as “[…] learning and behavioural problems, school arrears, drop-
ping out of school, unemployment and crime. We especially have parents and children from 
certain ethnic minorities in mind” (ESDS, 1998:3). 
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of citizens suffering from non-communicable diseases or at risk of developing 
such a disease in the future.  
In this context, the distinction between ‘health’ and ‘disease’ became 
blurred; instead of being viewed as mutually exclusive categories, the government 
now referred to health loss. Between full prevention and cure of disease, care 
emerged as an expansion of the preventive approach to health. Tertiary preven-
tion, aimed at preventing disease progression, took its place next to primary and 
secondary prevention (that dealt with interventions to prevent disease and detect 
early signs of disease).  
 
The further conceptual refinement of prevention was complemented by an em-
phasis on the construction of an intervention repertoire. Government set out to 
convert the ambitions from the mid-1980s into actual measures and interven-
tions. The pragmatic and action-oriented nature of many policy memoranda be-
tween 1991 and 2002 corresponded with the idea that health promotion required 
purposeful action in actual societal processes, in contrast to the earlier view that 
public health policy consisted of providing a form of protection against external 
threats or care in case of disease.  
A new repertoire of organisations and interventions dedicated to the pre-
vention of avoidable health loss was not built overnight. The construction of this 
intervention repertoire was the focal point of public health policy between 1991 
and 2002. Three organisational principles can be distinguished, that echoed the 
strengthening of interventionist, coordinative and anticipatory state capacities in 
the period between 1983 and 1990. Now, however, a more purposeful preventive 
approach was shaped. 
First, the principle of proximity can be distinguished, which principally 
aimed to organise interventions in citizens’ direct living environments. This 
serves prevention, not only because low-threshold neighbourhood services make 
an effective approach to local health issues possible, but also because lifestyle 
interventions benefit from direct interactions between citizens and public profes-
sionals. Personalised advice and support, population screening and monitoring of 
developments in the status of public health were therefore organised at the mu-
nicipal level. 
Second, a principle of coordination can be mentioned, which followed from 
the broad range of health aspects in other policy domains and from the objective 
to intervene in actual societal processes. The health paradigm implied a form of 
all-embracing thinking: all relevant facets for prevention were to be taken into 
account. Prevention transcended the boundaries of health policy: the relations 
between, for instance, health policy and crime policies (alcohol abuse), labour 
policies (workplace safety), welfare policies (youth care) and spatial planning 
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(design of the built-up environment) were the objects of ‘facet policy’. Further-
more, coordination was also necessary in the implementation of lifestyle interven-
tions: behavioural change was pursued by means of mixed approaches of health 
information, regulation, law enforcement, personal support and financial disin-
centives. No single measure was deemed effective enough to realise behavioural 
change. 
The third principle, the principle of timeliness, dealt with the early detec-
tion of problems and subsequent early interventions – before unavoidable harm 
has occurred. The principle was specifically used for the approach towards risk 
groups, such as adolescents, people in the lower socio-economic strata and cul-
tural minorities. Risk groups were often difficult to reach through normal health 
services: many were reluctant to ask for care and made no use of regular munici-
pal services. Therefore, government emphasised the need for identification of risk 
citizens, reaching out to ‘care avoiders’, and monitoring developments in the 
status of public health.  
 
The actual intervention repertoire was based on the outline developed in the 
years between 1983 and 1990. The causal scheme between endogenous lifestyle 
factors and public health problems still served as the basis for preventive policies, 
but now, next to the strategy of rational persuasion, regulatory strategies were 
developed to realise behavioural change. In particular, the approaches to smoking 
and alcohol abuse were characterised by disincentives: age limits, strict enforce-
ment of legislation and excise increases served as complementary instruments to 
mass campaigns and target group information.  
By contrast, the approach to the problems of unhealthy eating habits and 
lack of physical exercise was characterised by positive incentives, such as the la-
belling of food products which fit within a healthy lifestyle, promoting healthy 
food at school canteens, developing information campaigns on healthy food and 
proper physical exercise, promoting sports activities at schools, creating safe cycle 
paths, and expanding sports facilities. 
In more general terms, this development marks a transition from an 
emancipatory to an interventionist strategy. In the former strategy, government 
relied on providing rational information and left the actual decisions to citizens 
themselves. In the latter strategy, government extends its role to incentivising 
citizens to make a specific type of decision. Whereas emancipation aims to pro-
vide citizens with tools to make conscious decisions, an interventionist strategy 
implicitly decides for citizens what the most favourable course of action is. 
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PART 4: A HEALTHY LIFE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHOICE (2003-2011) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The period between 1991 and 2002 saw the refinement of the health paradigm 
and the subsequent expansion of preventive health policy. Next to primary pre-
vention to stimulate a healthy lifestyle of the entire population, and secondary 
prevention targeted at specific at-risk groups, the government increasingly fo-
cused on tertiary prevention for people already affected by a non-communicable 
disease. 
Implicit in the development of preventive activities focused on endoge-
nous health threats, such as tobacco use, alcohol abuse, an unhealthy diet and lack 
of physical exercise, was the blurring of the boundaries between state responsibil-
ity on the one hand, and citizens’ responsibility for their own health, on the other. 
Prevention efforts directed at endogenous health threats called for purposeful 
action to alter citizen behaviour. Unlike the government’s former policy of provid-
ing health protection against exogenous health threats beyond the control of indi-
vidual citizens – which was the nature of preventive policies up to 1983 – the fo-
cus on lifestyle and behaviour lacked clearly defined boundaries to mark where 
exactly this own responsibility began and ended. 
Between 1983 and 1990, government strategy consisted by and large of 
providing the appropriate health information to enable citizens to make a rational 
choice with regard to their lifestyle. Between 1991 and 2002, more regulatory 
measures were introduced as a complementary strategy to health information. 
The government was aware that this directly affected citizens’ lifestyle choices, 
but, other than calling for prudence and caution to be applied, it took no further 
steps to define the bounds of health promotion by the state.  
From 2003 onwards, citizen responsibility became the focal point of all 
preventive health policy. Citizens were no longer viewed as passive victims of 
disease, but as active contributors to their own health and thereby to the status of 
public health. However, they failed to ‘automatically’ behave according to health 
norms. Until 1983, this choice had been explicitly left to the individual citizen. 
From 1983 onwards, however, the ‘ignorant citizen’ became the focal point of 
health promotion until around 1990: unhealthy behaviour was held to be the re-
sult of the dearth of proper information on the consequences of unhealthy behav-
iour. Based on the model of the rational citizen and on the idea that healthy be-
haviour equals rational behaviour, the emphasis of the government was placed on 
health education and information. 
However, citizens may be well informed and still behave in an unhealthy 
way. Rational persuasion can fail on two accounts: either people lack the will-
power to change their behaviour, even though they know it is unhealthy, or they 
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do not share government’s conception of rational behaviour. In other words: citi-
zens may be either ‘incapable’ or ‘unwilling’ to change their behaviour. Both types 
were the focus of public health policy from 2003 onwards. The government’s jus-
tification for interventions no longer relied only on the model of the ‘ignorant but 
rational citizen’, but was also derived from the idea that many citizens require 
behavioural incentives and disincentives to change their unhealthy lifestyle.  
Citizens were to be made responsible for their own health – not in the 
sense that they were expected to bear the negative consequences of their un-
healthy lifestyle decisions, but in the sense that they were to be made aware that 
they were responsible for choosing to live a healthy life. If they failed to ‘take’ this 
responsibility automatically, state incentives and disincentives would be em-
ployed to persuade them to. The responsibility for the promotion of health was 
presented as a form of benevolence: citizens required support in making healthy 
decisions in a society where non-physical labour had become the norm, fast food 
was available on every street corner, and motorised traffic had banished physical 
exercise from daily life. What the government had noted earlier, in 1986, became 
the basic justification for state interventions from 2003 onwards: “it often seems 
that society makes unhealthy behaviour easy and healthy behaviour difficult” 
(MDP, 1986:208). 
 
In the analysis of Dutch public health policy in the period from 2003 onward, the 
following memoranda are discussed: Living Longer in Good Health: Also a Question 
of Healthy Behaviour,412 published in 2003, Operation Young413 (2004) and two 
accompanying letters on implementation issues,414 Alcohol Policy415 (2005) and its 
follow-up in 2007,416 the 2005 Covenant on Obesity417 as well as the accompanying 
action plan, Balanced Energy418 and its follow-up in 2009 Healthy Weight Covenant 
                                                   
412 In Dutch: Langer Gezond Leven: Ook een Kwestie van Gezond Gedrag; TK 2003-2004, 
22894/20. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘LLGH, 2003’, followed by the 
page number. 
413 In Dutch: Operatie Jong; TK 2003-2004, 29284/1. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘OY, 2004’, followed by the page number. 
414 TK 2004-2005, 29284/5 and TK 2005-2006, 29284/16. 
415 In Dutch: Voortgang Alcoholbeleid; TK 2004-2005, 27565/29. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘AP, 2005’, followed by the page number. 
416 TK 2007-2008, 27565/35. References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘AP, 2007’, 
followed by the page number. 
417 In Dutch: Convenant Overgewicht; TK 2004-2005, 22894/51. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘CO, 2005’, followed by the page number. 
418 In Dutch: Energie in Balans; TK 2005-2006, 22894/70. References to quotations in the text 
are abbreviated as ‘BE, 2005’, followed by the page number. 
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2010-2014,419 National Programme Tobacco Disincentives 2006-2010420 (2006), 
2006’s Choosing a Healthy Life,421 Every Chance for Every Child422 (2007), Being 
Healthy, Staying Healthy423 (2007), Healthy Nutrition424 and Socio-Economic 
Health Differences,425 both from 2008, Obesity Memorandum426 (2009), and, pub-
lished in 2011, Health Nearby.427 
 
4.2. Definition power 
 
4.2.1. Preventing decline 
During this period, endogenous determinants of health still formed the core of 
government’s problem definition: “In the past, health risks were external, nowa-
days there are also many risks which people, mostly unintentionally, create them-
selves” (BHSH, 2007b:10). Despite previous policy efforts, lifestyle factors contin-
ued to be responsible for an increase in non-communicable diseases, such as dia-
betes and depression (LLGH, 2003:16-17). Furthermore, the status of public 
                                                   
419 In Dutch: Convenant Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014; TK 2009-2010, 31899/15. References to 
quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘CHW, 2009’, followed by the page number. 
420 In Dutch: Nationaal Programma Tabaksontmoediging 2006-2010; TK 2005-2006, 22894/78. 
References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘NPTD, 2006’, followed by the page 
number. 
421 In Dutch: Kiezen voor een Gezond Leven; TK 2006-2007, 22894/110. References to quota-
tions in the text are abbreviated as ‘CHL, 2006a’, followed by the page number. The memoran-
dum is sent to Parliament as a letter from the Minister of Health, with a supplementary memo-
randum, downloadable from the Ministry’s website. The memorandum Choosing for a Healthy 
Life was found at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties-pb51/ 
preventienota-kiezen-voor-gezond-leven.html (consulted d.d. 21-10-2010). References to quo-
tations in the text are abbreviated as ‘CHL, 2006b’, followed by the page number. 
422 In Dutch: Alle Kansen voor Alle Kinderen; TK 2006-2007, 31001/5. References to quotations 
in the text are abbreviated as ‘ECEC, 2007’, followed by the page number. 
423 In Dutch: Gezond zijn, gezond blijven; TK 2007-2008, 22894/134. References to quotations in 
the text are abbreviated as ‘BHSH, 2007a’, followed by the page number. The memorandum is 
sent to Parliament as a letter from the Minister of Health, with a supplementary memorandum, 
downloadable from the Ministry’s website. The memorandum Being Healthy, Staying Healthy 
was found at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties-pb51/ 
gezond-zijn-gezond-blijven.html (consulted d.d. 21-10-2010). References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘BHSH, 2007b’, followed by the page number. 
424 In Dutch: Gezonde Voeding; TK 2007-2008, 31532/1. References to quotations in the text are 
abbreviated as ‘HN, 2008’, followed by the page number. 
425 In Dutch: Aanpak sociaaleconomische gezondheidsverschillen; TK 2008-2009, 22894/209. 
References to quotations in the text are abbreviated as ‘SEHD, 2008’, followed by the page num-
ber. 
426 In Dutch: Nota Overgewicht; TK 2008-2009, 31899/1. References to quotations in the text 
are abbreviated as ‘OM, 2009’, followed by the page number. 
427 In Dutch: Gezondheid Dichtbij; TK 2010-2011, 32793/1-2. References to quotations in the 
text are abbreviated as ‘HNB, 2011’, followed by the page number. 
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health in general was waning as a result of unhealthy habits: “A strong effort to 
realise healthy behaviour is necessary because the status of Dutch public health is 
worsening as a result of smoking, alcohol abuse and obesity” (CHL, 2006a:1). Im-
proving public health had become “a matter of healthy behaviour” (LLGH, 
2003:2). 
The standard of public health in The Netherlands was by no means poor. 
There was simply a lot of room for improvement: “Life expectancy continues to 
rise in The Netherlands. […] However, The Netherlands does not live healthily 
enough. People do not live as long as they could and are sick more often than nec-
essary” (LLGH, 2003:1). The following findings topped the list of unhealthy behav-
iours (LLGH, 2003:2): 
- “One in three people smokes 
- Nine out of ten people eat too much saturated fat 
- Three quarters of the population do not eat enough fruit and vegetables 
- More than half the population does not get enough not exercise 
- Half of all men and a third of all women is overweight 
- The number of sexually transmitted diseases is rising, as is the number of 
abortions among teenagers”  
 
Moreover, government concern was focussed less on the current public health 
status, and more on certain trends in citizen behaviour that could cause serious 
problems in the future. Already, the status of Dutch public health was merely av-
erage, as compared to other European countries (LLGH, 2003:1). And further de-
cline looked to be in store, especially in view of the unhealthy behaviour engaged 
in by Dutch adolescents (LLGH, 2003:14-15): 
- “Nearly half of all adolescents between 15 and 19 smokes 
- Nine out of ten adolescents do not eat enough fruit and vegetables 
- Half of the adolescents between 13 and 17 […] does not get enough exer-
cise 
- Fourteen percent of the boys and seven percent of the girls drinks too 
much”  
 
In short, the government aimed to prevent a decline in the status of public health. 
In more quantifiable terms, the government’s main objectives were 1) to increase 
disability-free life expectancy, and 2) to reduce the number of avoidable health 
deficits (LLGH, 2003:10). It was not that the current situation was giving cause for 
concern; the aim was to avert an undesirable scenario through a strategy directed 
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at the structural causes:428 “Only a focused approach to the most important 
sources of disease can turn this development around” (LLGH, 2003:1). A scenario 
(or ‘trend’) is the basis for government’s problem definition. To take a not (yet) 
present reality as a problem definition is an expression of a preventive perspec-
tive par excellence: act now to prevent future problems. 
 
4.2.2. The convergence of individual and collective interests  
According to the government, there were two reasons for the state to intervene in 
improving the status of public health. First of all, financial and economical inter-
ests were at stake: “Unhealthiness costs society a great deal of money: costs for 
health care, disease-related absenteeism, disability” (LLGH, 2003:1). The govern-
ment estimated the costs of disease at roughly between 2,5 and 4 billion euros 
(LLGH, 2003:2). A healthy population was essential to the economical vitality, and 
hence to the material welfare, of The Netherlands: “Public health is of great impor-
tance for the vitality and resilience of our society. The more people are healthy, 
the higher the labour productivity and the lower the costs of disease-related ab-
senteeism and disability will be. Therefore, public health is an important resource 
for our prosperity” (LLGH, 2003:9).  
Second, there were reasons of solidarity at stake – albeit in a very specific 
sense. Not only did unhealthiness harm labour productivity, it also affected the 
legitimacy of welfare state services provided: “Avoidable costs caused by un-
healthy behaviour may jeopardise solidarity” (BHSH, 2007a:7). In other words, 
engaging in unnecessarily unhealthy behaviour could be seen as anti-social behav-
iour: “Everybody needs to realise that the way they deal with health, has direct 
influences on others and appeals directly to their solidarity” (BHSH, 2007b:13).  
From a collective perspective, unhealthy behaviour was problematic be-
cause it affected labour productivity and undermined the solidarity and legitimacy 
of the welfare state services. Moreover, government constructed a convergence 
between these collective interests and the personal interests of citizens: “People 
themselves profit the most from a longer healthy life” (CHL, 2006a:4). Collective 
and personal interests coalesced: “Healthy citizens often feel better, are less often 
                                                   
428 It should be noted that, perhaps paradoxically, government also identified another trend – 
one that was more hopeful in terms of public health. While on the one hand addressing behav-
iour as a problem, it also signalled an important change of attitude towards health in Dutch 
society: “Large groups of people already deal very consciously with their health, and the societal 
interest in health issues and health products is growing […]” (BHSH, 2007b:22). This positive 
trend was also picked up in 2011’s Health Nearby: “The lifestyle of the average Dutchman 
seems to move in the right direction: the number of people with (severe) overweight and the 
number of smokers, drug users and problematic drinkers seems to stabilise, albeit at a high 
level. Sports have increased during the previous years. There is, of course, room for improve-
ment: healthy living can use an incentive” (HNB, 2011:4). 
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sick, work more and longer; in short, they can participate better. Therefore, health 
improvement and reducing the burden of disease and premature death benefits 
both the citizen and society” (LLGH, 2003:6; cf. CHL, 2006a:4).429 This constructed 
convergence between collective and individual interests served as an important 
argument to justify state interventions aimed at stimulating a healthy lifestyle. 
The government actively looked “for shared interests” (BHSH, 2007b:15) as 
points of application for state interventions. 
 
4.2.3. Choosing a healthy life 
Government’s construction of shared interests formed the justification for the 
concept of shared responsibility between citizens and state for the improvement 
of public health. On the one hand, citizens were responsible since they were con-
sciously able to choose in favour of a healthy lifestyle. On the other hand, the state 
was responsible, since it could incentivise citizens and encourage them to make 
healthy choices in a society which often ‘promotes’ unhealthy behaviour. Accord-
ing to this perspective, the role of the state was to make people behave the way 
they actually wanted to behave. 
According to government, citizens could also simply choose not to engage 
in needless and avoidable unhealthy behaviour: “People do not have to smoke or 
drink too much, but many of them do. People can get enough physical exercise, 
but (only) less than half the population wants to exercise half an hour a day. 
Physical exercise can prolong your life by three years. Healthy food, such as vege-
tables and fruit, is on sale in abundance, but many people prefer fat, sweet or salty 
products. In short, citizens can choose a healthy lifestyle. Adults should realise 
this. And they should be aware of the choices they can make for themselves and in 
their role as an example to adolescents” (CHL, 2006a:4). Hence the title of the 
memorandum Choosing a Healthy Life “deliberately emphasises the possibility of 
choice” (CHL, 2006b:3).  
Government summarises the state’s responsibility as “supporting citizens 
in choosing healthier lifestyles” (LLGH, 2003:5) or “persuading people to make 
healthier choices” (CHL, 2006a:4). More specifically: “Citizens are responsible for 
their behaviour with regard to their health. The role of government is to create 
the right preconditions for citizens to take their responsibility. Where necessary, 
the cabinet takes its responsibility by amending regulations (such as the smoking 
ban in bars)430 or by subsidising certain activities (such as pilot projects with re-
gard to physical exercise on a doctor’s prescription)” (BHSH, 2007a:2).  
                                                   
429 Furthermore, participation and health were said to be mutually reinforcing: “If one is not 
healthy, it is harder to participate; and one feels better if one participates” (BHSH, 2007b:35). 
430 However, enforcement problems led government to propose a liberalisation of the smoking 
ban for smaller bars in 2010 (CA, 2010:20). 
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On the one hand, this strategy left it up to the citizens to take responsibility for 
their own health, operating on the assumption that people would rather behave in 
a healthy way out of personal interest. On the other hand, this strategy implied 
that healthy behaviour was considered to be the social norm: “Improving public 
health begins with changing one’s attitude in a rapidly developing society, in 
which inactivity more and more threatens to become the norm as a consequence 
of technological developments, organisation of work and patterns of leisure and 
transport. Preventive policies only succeed if citizens are held directly to account 
for their own behaviour. The changing attitude towards smoking is a good exam-
ple in this respect. Most people fully realise the fact that non-smoking should be 
the social norm, at work and in public buildings; therefore, healthy behaviour 
should become the norm for citizens” (LLGH, 2003:2).  
However, individual responsibility was not the same thing as bearing the 
consequences of the choices made. Instead, responsibility was understood as the 
ability to choose a lifestyle according to a social norm. This subtle but significant 
alteration of the meaning of ‘responsibility’ changed the perspective from individ-
ual responsibility to a collective or “shared responsibility” (LLGH, 2003:10). Con-
sider, for instance, the government’s attitude towards non-communicable dis-
eases such as diabetes: “The citizen/patient is responsible for his own behaviour. 
By taking responsibility for behaviour and lifestyle, a citizen can reduce the 
chance of developing a chronic disease or postpone the moment he becomes ill. 
Moreover, through healthy behaviour and by strictly following therapies, he can 
prevent and postpone complications” (LLGH, 2003:30). 
According to government, an improvement in public health “will only suc-
ceed when we all participate, starting with the citizen, but also: national govern-
ment, local authorities, health insurance companies, the business world, societal 
organisations and research institutions” (LLGH, 2003:1). More specifically, 
schools were required to make room for health education in their programmes 
(LLGH, 2003:38), food producers encouraged to produce healthier food (LLGH, 
2003:27), health care professionals were expected to talk to patients about their 
lifestyle if necessary (LLGH, 2003:39), insurance companies could offer such ser-
vices as fitness club subscriptions, courses to quit smoking and health tests as part 
of their supplementary packages (LLGH, 2003:39), and so forth. 
 
4.2.4. A farewell to the rational citizen 
Underlying the ambition “to persuade people to make healthier choices” was a 
specific image of the citizen forming the target of health promotion (CHL, 
2006a:4). Even though self-interest and collective interest can converge, citizens, 
as the government well knew, did not automatically act according to their own 
best interest. The ‘shared interests’ required state intervention to be effectuated. 
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From 2003 onwards, the use of information campaigns alone to make citizens 
aware of these shared interests was explicitly acknowledged to be insufficient to 
generate actual behavioural change. Instead, government also proposed “[…] to 
make visible the consequences of choices and to offer alternatives where neces-
sary” (LLGH, 2003:12-13).  
More specifically: “Government supports the citizen by arranging society 
in such a way that ‘making the healthy choice’ becomes the easy choice. Healthy 
products should be easily available (outlets, pricing, promotion) and the living 
environment should be supportive of physical exercise (for instance, in the layout 
of residential areas)” (CHL, 2006a:4). More so than before,431 government pro-
poses to shake off its reluctance to intervene in citizens’ behaviour – which can in 
some cases imply a move towards ‘paternalism’:432 “government may hold the 
opinion that people’s behaviour is not according to their own best interest (pater-
nalism) or that [the state] has a special responsibility towards people with arrears 
(solidarity)” (BHSH, 2007b:15).433 
 
The reason behind this more meddlesome approach was an explicit shift in the 
way government perceived the citizen.434 According to the government, it was 
unrealistic to expect citizens to automatically choose a healthy lifestyle in a socie-
                                                   
431 According to government, previous policy initiatives in the realm of public health “have been 
too informal” (BHSH, 2007a:14). 
432 Here understood by government as deliberate meddlesome state interventions. 
433 The Health Nearby memorandum (2011) seems, at first sight, to have a less interventionist 
character: “regarding lifestyle, people make their own choices” (HNB, 2011:2). However, gov-
ernment still emphasises the objective to create a “[...] an environment which makes the healthy 
choice easy” (HNB, 2011:2). Instead of explicitly influencing citizens’ ‘choice architecture’ or 
developing mass information campaigns, government stressed the importance of low-threshold 
and neighbourhood-based sports facilities (HNB, 2011:2; 5). Personalised information, self-help 
and advice through social media, peer-to-peer education and the internet (‘EHealth’) was seen 
as an important part of preventive health care, for instance in the field of mental health and 
depression (HNB, 2011:15; 23).  
Another example of an individualised form of health information was the voluntary 
prevention test, which “[…] enables people to monitor their own health and helps as a motiva-
tion to make healthy choices” (HNB, 2011:16). And finally, education at schools, through the 
internet and in the general practitioner’s consulting room can play a crucial role in improving 
citizens’ health skills, for instance with regard to a healthy diet and proper physical exercise 
(HNB, 2011:22-23). 
As a result, the 2011 memorandum is not necessarily a break with previous policy 
memoranda: it leaves the general objective to make the healthy choice the easy choice intact. It 
does, however, also show the politically contested nature of specific techniques to influence 
citizen behaviour. Furthermore, the Health Nearby memorandum also sticks to more or less the 
same notion of ‘responsibility’ as developed in other post-2003 memoranda: “We want to equip 
adolescents to take responsibility for themselves, especially at a later age” (HNB, 2011:23). 
434 Government outlined this perspective in memoranda on obesity. However, the line of argu-
ment is applicable to other risk factors as well, such as alcohol and smoking. 
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tal context in which unhealthy behaviour was by far the easier choice. Structural 
societal developments, or “factors which are an inherent part of the way our mod-
ern society is structured” (CO, 2005:2) should be taken into account: “The cause of 
obesity seems simple on an individual level […]: too much food and too little exer-
cise. Following this argument, the solution is also ‘easy’. If people eat less and ex-
ercise more, they will stop gaining weight. However, the temptation to eat too 
much and exercise too little is a constant one, 24 hours a day. Food is offered in 
abundance, while times of shortage no longer occur. It is becoming increasingly 
easy to eat more and to exercise less. The various environmental and lifestyle 
factors have a fattening effect, which create the conditions for the current strong 
increase in obesity. […] Obesity can be seen as the ‘modern equivalent’ of the ma-
jor health issues of the late 19th century” (OM, 2009:7). 
As a consequence, providing health information as the sole means to affect 
behaviour was deemed to be insufficient. Government no longer saw the citizen as 
a rational being, who could be persuaded to change his behaviour by giving out 
objective information: “People make their own decisions with regard to food, 
drink and exercise. In government policy, respect for this freedom is key. But it is 
important to inform people to enable them to choose sensibly. […] However, the 
choices, behaviour and lifestyles of people are only partly determined by knowl-
edge and information. Psychological research shows that motives such as money, 
pleasure, comfort and habits are strong incentives. Psychosocial incentives (iden-
tity, appearances, peer pressure) and emotions play an important role, as well. […] 
Therefore, it is important for children and their parents to learn to keep an eye on 
their energy balance early on. It should be made easier for adults to choose a 
healthy lifestyle” (OM, 2009:9).  
 
4.3. Intervention power 
 
4.3.1. Proximity: activating the social context 
Moving beyond the health protection focus of the period between 1966-1982, 
beyond the model of the rational citizen during the period 1983-1990, and beyond 
the prudent interventions in lifestyles of the period 1991-2002, government now 
rated these previous policies as being “too informal” (BHSH, 2007a:14). From 
2003 onwards, increased interventions were deemed necessary to make the 
healthy choice the easy choice. Less reliance on health information and less reluc-
tance to intervene in societal processes characterised the government’s interven-
tion repertoire during this time. The government did not propose to enforce a 
healthy lifestyle, but aimed to influence the societal context in such a way that 




This intensified strategy also impacted on the organisation of the state’s 
intervention repertoire. The three previously distinguished interrelated organisa-
tional principles of prevention were further refined. First, the principle of prox-
imity was expanded to include not only the organisation of state services in local 
settings, but, more broadly, the entire social context in which citizens lived and 
worked. Secondly, the principle of coordination now emphasised the development 
of ‘integrated’ and personalised policy efforts towards children and adolescents. 
And third, the principle of timeliness took the form of ‘outreach work’ towards 
risk citizens.  
 
To start with the principle of proximity, the government’s ambition to hold people 
directly to account for their behaviour necessitated “[…] an approach which actu-
ally gets through to citizens: at home, at school, at work, at places where people 
spend their leisure time, in the neighbourhood, and in the general practitioner’s 
consulting room” (LLGH, 2003:3). In other words, prevention of unhealthy life-
styles and depression should “[…] take place where people live: at home, at school, 
at work and in neighbourhoods” (LLGH, 2003:35). Government explicitly named 
proximity as the guideline for the organisation of public health interventions and 
services: “The basic principle is that policymaking and implementation to pro-
mote and protect public health should take place in close proximity to the citizen 
[…]” (LLGH, 2003:37). 
A new element in this organisational principle was the activation of the 
citizens’ direct social context. Not only public authorities and state-subsidised 
organisations, but private organisations, too, needed to pay more attention to 
prevention – not in the least because this served their own interests, as well. 
Companies could benefit from prevention to reduce illness-related absenteeism 
among their employees. Food producers could benefit from a healthy image if they 
produced healthy food. And health care insurance companies could include fitness 
programmes, health tests and smoking cessation courses in their supplementary 
packages as means to prevent large health care costs by their policyholders in the 
future (BHSH, 2007a:3; LLGH, 2003:27; 39). 
A specific example of cooperation between private companies and the 
state is the Covenant on Obesity and its follow-up, the Healthy Weight Covenant 
2010-2014. This “broad societal movement” (BE, 2005:2) consisted of a covenant 
with ten societal partners (including food producers, the catering industry, the 
Dutch sports federation and insurance companies) with the objective of prevent-
ing obesity.435 All of these partners committed to investing in measures and activi-
                                                   
435 The Covenant Healthy Weight 2010-2014 includes even more partners (such as the major 
Dutch cities and representatives of educational institutes) and aims for a broader range of local 
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ties, which “stimulate the individual to make healthy choices with regard to diet 
and exercise by making the healthier choice as easy and attractive as possible” 
(CO, 2005:3). The implementation plan of the covenant listed a broad range of 
activities, such as information brochures for young parents, a broader assortment 
of healthy foods in stores, a stop to misleading information in food commercials, a 
reduction of the portion size of prepared meals as well as a healthier composition 
of these meals, promotion of healthy food at schools and in company canteens, 
development of educational programmes on healthy food, more sports activities 
in and around schools, and the organisation of sports camps for obese children 
(BE, 2005:10-17). 
The participation of health care professionals and schools was also part of 
government strategy to activate citizens’ social environment. Health care profes-
sionals, such as general practitioners, were expected to talk to patients about their 
lifestyle if necessary. This could form an important complementary responsibility, 
next to their primary curative task (LLGH, 2003:39). And schools were required to 
“pay attention to the importance of health in their educational programmes. Chil-
dren should learn how they can preserve and promote their own health and what 
they can do if they or others fall ill or suffer minor injuries. This includes attention 
to personal hygiene, the risks of addictive activities such as smoking and alcohol 
use, and responsible behaviour in the face of dangerous situations in and around 
school. Furthermore, schools provide a safe and healthy environment for educa-
tion” (LLGH, 2003:38). 
 
4.3.2. Coordination: an integrated approach to adolescents at risk 
The principle of coordination was seen in action in the longstanding practice of 
‘facet policy’, or the identification of health aspects in adjacent policy fields (MDP, 
1986:216), and in the assumption that behavioural change could only be realised 
through a comprehensive set of interventions (HP, 1991:3). From 2003 onwards, 
an additional element was introduced regarding the response to at-risk adoles-
cents: the individual adolescent became the starting point for a personalised ap-
proach, in which elements from all relevant policy domains, such as public health, 
welfare, education and crime policy were integrated. In this ‘child-centred per-
spective’ (OY, 2004:2), ‘health’ or ‘crime’ no longer constituted the problem defini-
tion; instead, this comprised the entire range of risks involved in growing up.436 
                                                                                                                                 
preventive projects and public-private partnerships: municipalities are approached and sup-
ported to make obesity one of the spearheads in their local public health policies. 
436 Another new element in the organisation of coordination is the emphasis on the relation 
between health care provisions and prevention: “The distinction between illness and health 
becomes less clear. For instance, health care is confronted more and more with an increase in 
chronic patients because of a lack of preventive policies” (BHSH, 2007a:14). Cure and preven-
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In the Operation Young memorandum, the State Secretary of Health, the 
Minister of Administrative Renewal, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Educa-
tion, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Housing and the Minister of 
Integration proposed several ‘integrated’ strategies to control and prevent prob-
lems particularly associated with children and adolescents, such as youth unem-
ployment, language arrears, early school leavers, integration and crime (OY, 
2004:3). Where crime policy ends and public health policy begins became impos-
sible to determine – which was, in fact, the basic objective: no longer was there a 
single crime, welfare, education or health policy; this had now all been integrated 
into an all-encompassing youth policy.437  
Abandoning the traditional sectoral structure of state administration to 
define prevention ambitions (CHL, 2006a:7) meant that crossing organisational 
boundaries became unavoidable. In addition, new organisational entities were 
developed to enable this integrated approach: a national network of neighbour-
hood-based Centres for Youth and Family438 formed the ‘front office’ of youth 
policy (OY, 2004). These low-threshold centres served to provide parenting ad-
vice and support, but also enabled the early detection of problems: “A compre-
hensive system of nursery and education offers every child better chances [...] and 
mitigates a number of risks. This is not enough for all children; sometimes extra 
care is necessary. Therefore, a comprehensive system of identification, analysis 
and interventions is of great importance” (OY, 2004:8).439  
                                                                                                                                 
tion should not be seen as two distinct domains, but require further coordination – for instance 
through an increased attention of general practitioners and insurance companies for unhealthy 
lifestyles of their patients and subsequent programmes to improve them (HNB, 2011:13). In 
short, “more prevention in the consulting room” (HNB, 2011:17). 
437 The basic philosophy underlying youth policy was the following. First of all, parents were 
“primarily responsible for the wellbeing of their children and for a healthy upbringing” (BHSH, 
2007b:13). However, parents often experience difficulties in raising their children, and adoles-
cents themselves “[…] are not always capable of making well considered choices” (BHSH, 
2007a:8). “Therefore, the state also has explicit tasks. For instance, the state should offer ade-
quate protection to children and adolescents if their development is severely threatened. Fur-
thermore, the state should provide family and education support if parents are overburdened 
by their task” (OY, 2004:2).  
438 In Dutch: ‘Centrum voor Jeugd en Gezin’. 
439 Elsewhere: “This cabinet emphasises early detection of risks, with the broadest reach possi-
ble. From (before) birth to adulthood” (OY, 2004:8). To realise this, government will develop 
standardised ‘risk profiles’ which can be used by professionals to detect risks and make a provi-
sional diagnoses of the physical, mental, social and cognitive development of children (OY, 
2004:9; 16). Furthermore, government proposed to develop a ‘referral index for at-risk adoles-
cents’ (an electronic application for a national registration of contacts between an organisation 
and an adolescent) and an ‘electronic youth dossier’ (an electronic application to make the 
youth care files of every Dutch child nation-wide available for all relevant organisations) (OY, 
2004; ECEC, 2007:10-11).  
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This shift in problem definition is related to the prevention perspective. 
Children and adolescents were the most logical objects of intervention for the 
prevention of behavioural problems such as crime and unhealthy lifestyle. Their 
higher susceptibility (more so than adults) to external influences meant that both 
the necessity and the possibility for intervention were greater: “The foundation 
for a bad lifestyle is often laid at an early age. An unhealthy lifestyle at an early 
age, such as lack of physical exercise and a poor diet, can lead to obesity […]. This, 
in turn, can result in an increased chance of being bullied at school, in poorer 
school results, in the development of emotional problems in growing up, in the 
development of diabetes (and accompanying complications) and the development 
of problems with the locomotor system at a later age” (BHSH, 2007a:6). In other 
words, “adolescents are often off to a bad start” (BHSH, 2007b:10). 
 
4.3.3. Timeliness: the outreaching state 
In the previous period (1991-2002), the organisational principle of timeliness was 
specifically used for the identification of citizens at risk. However, it was not 
enough simply to organise public health services in close proximity to citizens, as 
some population groups failed to make use of these facilities. From a preventive 
point of view, waiting for risk groups to report health problems was self-
defeating, as these groups benefited most from early interventions.440 From 2003 
onwards, the notion of ‘outreach work’ was introduced to intensify early detection 
and early intervention towards risk citizens (LLGH, 2003:41; ESDS, 1998). 
There was still “[...] cause for concern [since] unhealthiness, disease and 
premature death are more common among certain population groups than others. 
Especially the health status of people with a low educational level and a low in-
come, among whom many cultural minorities, is lagging behind” (LLGH, 2003:1; 
cf. LLGH, 2003:21). On average, the life expectancy of citizens in the lower socio-
economic strata was four years shorter, and 12 years less were spent in good 
health – largely a result of unhealthier behaviour and poorer living and labour 
conditions (CHL, 2006a:3). A focus on at-risk citizens offered many opportunities 
for health improvement and for increasing economic productivity (SEHD, 
2008:15). 
 
                                                   
440 Besides the focus on citizens at risk, early detection of already established diseases was and 
remains a crucial element in prevention: “Prevention starts with the early detection of – and 
early interference in – diseases” (LLGH, 2003:42). Monitoring and population screening, as well 
as standardised methods to analyse data are important means to assess the status of public 




Since mass media campaigns appear to be less and less effective, and low-
threshold health services often tended not to be used by those standing most in 
need of these (LLGH, 2003:13), public authorities started looking for ways to pro-
actively reach out to citizens. Minority groups and children were a particular con-
cern in this respect: “We cannot always wait for ‘a client’s demand’. In the interest 
of parents and children, help should more often be meddlesome (‘outreaching’)” 
(LLGH, 2003:41). Government deliberately moved beyond mere informal strate-
gies of information and service provision: “Undesirable situations should not per-
sist. Everybody should take responsibility if there are indications of a child run-
ning into trouble. Wait and see and muddling on or even looking away is out of the 
question. […] We have past the phase of permissiveness” (ECEC, 2007:11). 
Preventive paediatric health care came to include a broad early screening 
of all children, followed by personalised and assertive outreach interventions to 
prevent further damage: “Investing in the positive development of a child before 
its fourth birthday is the best form of prevention against many problems at a later 
age. Youth care services will carry out risk analyses of problems in upbringing and 
development for every child between the ages of 0 and 4, and where necessary, 
supportive interventions will be employed. Interventions can include family sup-
port for parents, participation in programmes of pre- and after-school education, 
activities in ‘community schools’,441 and youth care activities” (ECEC, 2007:11). 
Ideally, parents should set the right example to their children. They should be 
well-informed about the difficulties of parenthood: “A healthy life begins before 
conception” (HN, 2008:33). A prenatal approach may well be the logical conse-
quence of the prevention perspective: this is how far risk factors can be traced 
back. 
 
4.3.4. Lifestyle interventions and the behavioural paradigm 
Aiming to make the healthy choice the easy choice, government introduced five 
spearhead actions:442 smoking disincentives, tackling obesity, reducing diabetes, 
alcohol moderation, and prevention of depression. These actions were meant to 
reduce six types of diseases, namely cardiovascular diseases, cancer, asthma, dia-
betes, mental disorders and disorders in the locomotor system (LLGH, 
                                                   
441 In Dutch: ‘brede school’. 
442 The memorandum Living Longer in Good Health mentions three spearhead actions, namely 
‘smoking’, ‘obesity’ and ‘diabetes’ (LLGH, 2003:3), which are complemented by ‘alcohol abuse’ 
and ‘depression’ in the memorandum Choosing for a Healthy Life (CHL, 2006b:28). The memo-




2003:17).443 Many of the measures discussed in the following fall under the cate-
gory “lifestyle interventions” (CHL, 2006b:43).444 Prevention of avoidable health 
loss and the promotion of a healthy lifestyle were infused by a behavioural para-
digm: the measures aimed to realise behavioural change by making a healthy life-
style the social norm. 
The concrete interventions were characterised by a combination of tech-
niques, ranging from information to regulation and from service delivery to finan-
cial disincentives. For instance, in the case of smoking “a combination of various 
measures proves to be successful: both a ban on advertising, an age limit and 
health warnings on packaging, besides support to give up smoking, smoking bans 
and excises. In short, especially a broad and coherent set of measures has real 
effect in the fight against smoking” (LLGH, 2003:24).  
 
Smoking “[…] is still the most important avoidable cause of death in The Nether-
lands” (NPTD, 2006:10). Therefore, “[n]on-smoking should be the social norm” 
(LLGH, 2003:23), both to protect non-smokers and to prevent citizens from smok-
ing (CHL, 2006b:29). The government’s ambition was to reduce the percentage of 
smokers among the Dutch population from 28 percent in 2005 to 20 percent in 
2010 (CHL, 2006b:30). Health information, such as campaigns for target groups 
                                                   
443 A focus on the government approach to specific risk groups, such as adolescents, revealed an 
interrelation between the abovementioned strategies in their actual implementation. Govern-
ment expressed specific concern about the behaviour of adolescents: “Unhealthy behaviour 
among adolescents is becoming more and more common, and this does not sound promising for 
the future” (LLGH, 2003:1). This unhealthy behaviour covered many of the above-mentioned 
terrains, such as smoking, excessive drinking, unhealthy nutrition and lack of physical exercise.  
For instance, even though Dutch alcohol consumption could be characterised interna-
tionally speaking as modest, adolescents were found to be drinking more and more often, which 
can lead to health problems such as brain damage. Furthermore, obesity was becoming a prob-
lem among adolescents (CHL, 2006a:3). Schools could play an important role here, for instance 
by making health education a part of their programmes (such as teaching children how to deal 
with unhealthy temptations), by offering healthy products in canteens, by constructing secure 
sports facilities, and by striving for a smoke-free schoolyard (HNB, 2011:23-25). 
444 Besides the dominant focus on behaviour and lifestyle, more ‘traditional’ forms of prevention 
remained part of the state’s responsibility for public health, such as in the response to the ex-
ogenous health threats beyond the scope of influence of individual citizens. An example is the 
response to epidemic diseases: government aimed for a vaccination level above 95% (and 80% 
for the influenza vaccine) (LLGH, 2003:40).  
Furthermore, government regulates the safety of products and food, has a responsibil-
ity in the reduction of accidents in the private sphere, and prevents the pollution of the living 
environment by means of regulation and information (LLGH, 2003:43-46). After all, “[…] health 
is not only dependent on individual actions and choices. Good and equally accessible education, 
safe working conditions and a healthy and safe environment are essential for the preservation 
and promotion of good health. [Furthermore, to] ensure good health, citizens should be able to 
demand proper health care” (LLGH, 2003:10). 
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(adolescents) and health warnings on tobacco products (NPTD, 2006:22-27) were 
important. However, “[…] knowledge about the harmful effects of (passive) smok-
ing alone does not lead to the desired degree of behavioural change” (NPTD, 
2006:12). Therefore, legislation to raise excises, limit advertising for tobacco 
products and enacting a ban on smoking in public places were crucial as well 
(NPTD, 2006:14). Schools could also play an important role, for instance through 
education and promotion of smoke-free schoolyards (HNB, 2011:23-25).  
 
Obesity remained a growing problem during this period, especially among adoles-
cents. On average, 40% of the population was overweight and 10% obese – num-
bers which were projected to rise considerably over the coming years (CO, 
2005:2).445 Obesity leads to increased risks of diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, 
malfunctioning of the locomotor system, and chronic respiratory afflictions (OM, 
2009:16). Besides personal health loss, obesity leads to enormous costs for the 
health care system and to loss of labour productivity (OM, 2009:19-20).  
As with tobacco disincentives, the health information and education pro-
vided by, for example, the Dutch national Nutrition Centre446 (OM, 2009:28; 31), 
while important, were insufficient strategies to prevent obesity. Therefore, a var-
ied set of supporting measures was developed “[…] to promote rational lifestyle 
choices” (HDSB, 2008:4) and to “make the healthy choice the easy choice” (HN, 
2008:5). More specifically, government promoted “an improved availability of 
healthy products and improved composition of food products. Industry, retail, 
catering, attraction parks, sports club canteens, schools and private companies 
play a role here” (HN, 2008:11). Government aimed to persuade food companies, 
caterers, supermarkets and sports organisations to produce healthier food, reduce 
portion sizes, replace the supply of snacks and sodas in vending machines with 
healthier choices, cut back on commercial activities specifically aimed at younger 
children, and stock healthy products at eye level on supermarket shelves (CO, 
2005; CHW, 2009; LLGH, 2003:27-29; cf. CHL, 2006b:37; cf. BHSH, 2007a:16).  
Other measures included preventive strategies in the realm of health care, 
such as an ‘exercise cure’ for people with overweight, and possibilities for health 
insurance companies to financially compensate their customers if they follow 
preventive programmes (OM, 2009:10; 45). Furthermore, research447 by the new 
‘Knowledge Centre Obesity’448 (OM, 2009:13) as well as monitoring (for instance, 
                                                   
445 However, government states in 2011 that the number of people with overweight seems to 
stabilise (HNB, 2011:4). 
446 In Dutch: ‘Voedingscentrum’. 
447 For instance, a current lack of knowledge makes it impossible to use genetic information for 
the treatment or prevention of obesity (OM, 2009:23). 
448 In Dutch: ‘Kenniscentrum Overgewicht’. 
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through the ‘monitor health arrears’) were considered “essential to evaluate and if 
necessary adjust the approach to obesity” (OM, 2009:11).449  
 
Another concern was the increase of the number of (especially young) diabetics. 
This development threatened the vitality of Dutch society (CHL, 2006b:42). Gov-
ernment employed four strategies simultaneously: prevention of diabetes among 
the healthy population, early detection of people with an increased risk of devel-
oping diabetes, early detection of people with diabetes, and improving health care 
services for diabetics (LLGH, 2003:31).  
The prevention of diabetes and other non-communicable diseases was at 
the top of the list, as these are incurable and lead to numerous costs: “Non-
communicable diseases reduce the quality and length of life and lead to social 
costs because of health care demands and because of a decrease in labour produc-
tivity and labour participation” (BHSH, 2007a:6). The government aimed to re-
duce the number of diabetics under the age of 55 by promoting healthy food, 
physical exercise and moderate alcohol use, and by preventing a worsening of the 
affliction (LLGH, 2003:30). 
 
Alcohol abuse also remained an important issue. Even though overall alcohol con-
sumption in The Netherlands had declined, adolescents had become the most 
frequent drinkers in Europe – they drank too much and at an increasingly younger 
age (AP, 2005:1-2). There were two reasons for opting for a more assertive ap-
proach: the “paternalistic motive” that comes into play when the health and well-
being of adolescents is at stake; and a desire to “control nuisance and damage” in 
connection with problems of public order, aggression, violence and accidents (AP, 
2007:4). The government objective was summarised in the slogan: “drink moder-
ately, sensibly and don’t start too young” (CHL, 2006b:33). A ban on alcohol was 
not considered, since alcohol use is culturally accepted in society. The goal was to 
persuade children to start drinking at a later age, and to lower the number of 
adult problem drinkers (CHL, 2006b:33).  
                                                   
449 In its 2011 memorandum Health Nearby, government stressed physical exercise as a means 
to reduce overweight and obesity. Government also seemed to distance itself from previous 
ambitions to directly intervene in the choices people make with regard to their lifestyle: “Health 
should be a matter of people themselves. This means a restrained use of  bans and orders, unso-
licited advice and choice limitations by government” (HNB, 2011:5). This did not imply a move 
away from prevention, but indicated the politically controversial status of lifestyle interven-
tions: whereas the government coalition of Christian-democrats and social-democrats em-
ployed meddlesome interventions (2007-2010), a coalition between conservative-liberals and 




Again, a broad set of interventions was developed. Repressive instru-
ments included a stricter control on the age limit and a stricter regulation by the 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (AP, 2005:4-5). In terms of the pric-
ing instrument, government sought to raise excises specifically on beer and pre-
mix beverages so popular with adolescents (AP, 2005:8). In addition, alcohol ad-
vertising was subject to even further regulation, which included a ban on televi-
sion alcohol commercials between 6.00 and 21.00 hours (BHSH, 2007a:17). In-
formation campaigns were launched to convey the message that drinking under 
the age of 16 is a violation of the “socially accepted norm” (AP, 2005:6). Govern-
ment held up the change in social acceptance of drunk driving as an example: 
“Drunk driving is socially considered ‘not done’ nowadays” (AP, 2005:6). 
 
Finally, the fifth spearhead action introduced was aimed at the prevention of de-
pression. This was a rather new element in a policy terrain which previously 
stressed physical disease. Mental disorders, such as depression, were rapidly be-
coming commonplace in industrialised countries: “Mental disorders are usually 
the result of a combination of sensitivity, environmental factors, stress and life-
style. Prevention and early detection of mental afflictions can make timely treat-
ment of symptoms possible, which prevents worsening and has less severe conse-
quences for the individual, his social environment and society in general” (LLGH, 
2003:31). To this end, a broader reach of the preventive actions of municipal 
health services was proposed (LLGH, 2003:32) as well as the development of eas-
ily accessible self-help courses on the internet (CHL, 2006b:45). 
 
4.4. Synopsis 
An important consequence of the paradigm shift from disease to health and the 
focus on endogenous lifestyle factors and the quality of life was that the realisation 
of public health ambitions depends on citizen behaviour. Citizen behaviour is simul-
taneously the problem and the solution. In the period from 1983 to 1990, the 
emancipatory ideal formed the core of government’s ambition to realise behav-
ioural change: based on the model of the rational citizen and on the assumption 
that healthy behaviour equals rational behaviour, government emphasised health 
education and information. Over the years, this approach was complemented by 
more and more regulatory and financial measures, especially in the approach to 
tobacco use and alcohol abuse. 
The broader implication of these complementary measures was a farewell 
to the rational citizen and an increased interest in purposeful interventions in 
societal processes. Instead of a clear demarcation between state responsibility 
and citizen responsibility, the boundaries became blurred as the state moved be-
yond mere health protection and beyond the mere provision of health information 
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and education. This issue was only briefly touched upon in the period between 
1991 and 2002, but became the focal point of public health policy from 2003 on-
wards. 
 
Citizens do not automatically adopt a healthy way of life. This presumption served 
as the basis for public health policy from 2003 onwards. The government wres-
tled with this problem, as a poor public health status harms labour productivity. 
Moreover, unhealthy behaviour might undermine the solidarity underlying the 
welfare state: since avoidable health loss could often be traced back to lifestyle, 
and unhealthy behaviour led to unnecessary health care demands. The govern-
ment constructed a convergence between these collective interests and the per-
sonal interests of citizens. A socially active and economically productive life was 
considered to be the desired ideal for individual citizens – therefore, a healthy life 
should be the social norm. 
This construction of shared interests justified the construction of a shared 
responsibility between citizens and state for the improvement of public health. On 
the one hand, citizens were responsible, since they could consciously choose a 
healthy behaviour. On the other hand, the state was responsible, since it could 
incentivise citizens to make healthy choices in a society where non-physical la-
bour is the norm, fast food is available on every street corner, and motorised traf-
fic has banished physical exercise from daily life. Although information campaigns 
could suffice in some cases, often behavioural incentives and disincentives were 
necessary to change unhealthy lifestyles.  
This line of argument created an ambiguous relation between state and 
society. On the one hand, the responsibility of citizens for their own health was 
left untouched: after all, they are free to choose a healthy lifestyle. On the other 
hand, government regarded a healthy lifestyle as the rational choice and the social 
norm – only a lack of willpower in the face of unhealthy temptations was keeping 
citizens from maintaining a healthy behaviour. Hence, a behavioural paradigm was 
applied to influence the societal context in such a way that citizens were not only 
able to choose a healthy lifestyle, but that the healthy choice became the easy 
choice. 
 
In terms of intervention power, the three organisational principles of prevention, 
which were developed in the period between 1991 and 2002, were further re-
fined to meet the demands of the behavioural paradigm. First, the principle of 
proximity not only implied the organisation of state services in local settings, but 
extended to the activation of the entire social context in which citizens lived and 
worked. Ideally, incentives for a healthy life should be omnipresent: at schools 
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through education, in supermarkets by carrying healthy products and in the gen-
eral practitioner’s office, where advice on health could be dispensed.  
Secondly, the principle of coordination not only referred to the longstand-
ing practice of ‘facet policy’, in which health aspects in adjacent policy fields were 
identified (MDP, 1986:216), or to the organisation of comprehensive and varied 
sets of interventions (HP, 1991:3). An additional element was introduced from 
2003 onwards in the response to at-risk adolescents. Individual adolescents and 
the problems they face in growing up became the starting point for an integrated 
approach comprising all relevant policy domains, such as public health, welfare, 
education and crime policy. A national network of Centres for Youth and Family 
served as a low-threshold service for parenting support and advice, and as the 
front office for the identification and assessment of risks in growing up. A child-
based policy perspective is a logical consequence of a preventive approach: the 
basis for unhealthy lifestyles is often laid in childhood, which should therefore be 
the focal point of interventions. 
Third, the principle of timeliness took the form of outreach work directed 
at citizens at risk, such as those in the lower socio-economic strata, and adoles-
cents in general. Since those most at risk tended not to respond to information 
campaigns or make use of low-threshold health services, the public authorities 
sought ways to proactively reach out to these citizens, such as early screening and 
the proactive offer of care, for instance in the form of parenting support. Govern-
ment aimed to detect health risks as early as possible and intervene as quickly as 
possible.  
 
The development of a further mix of interventions was proposed to realise behav-
ioural change: incentives and disincentives characterised policies with regard to 
smoking, drinking, eating and physical exercise. For instance, the approach to 
smoking consisted of information campaigns, advertising bans, age limits, a smok-
ing ban in public places, electronic self-help to stop smoking, health warnings on 
tobacco products, an excise increase , interventions such as science-based infor-
mation about healthy nutrition, ‘exercise cures’ for people with overweight, a 
healthier selection of food products in supermarkets and school canteens, a ban 
on commercial activities promoting unhealthy food products aimed at young chil-
dren, and secure and low-threshold sports facilities. In general, the state’s preven-
tive intervention repertoire included four sets of techniques: 
- Communicative techniques: information; education; health warnings; 
transfer of social norms 
- Facilitative techniques: individual support; self-help facilities; influencing 
the opportunity structure through a supply of healthy food and the design 
of the built-up environment 
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- Financial techniques: excise increases; insurance coverage for preventive 
activities; subsidies for facilities and for information and research activi-
ties 
- Regulatory techniques: bans; legal conditions for the use, sale and adver-
tising of unhealthy products 
 
Dutch public health policy has seen several fundamental changes over the past 
thirty years. In the face of lifestyle diseases, the medical-curative ideal and the 
existing preventive repertoire of protection against exogenous health threats 
proved insufficient to further improve the status of public health. In response to 
endogenous health threats (more specifically: lifestyle threats), government de-
veloped a broad repertoire to make the healthy choice the easy choice.  
In the following, contemporary Dutch policy practices are analysed to 
support the validity of the government’s statements of intent on policy implemen-
tation in the previous historic policy review. In the following description of the 
‘Healthy Together’ programme in the city of The Hague, we expect to see collec-
tive prevention in terms of disincentives for tobacco and alcohol use and incen-
tives for physical exercise and proper nutrition, as well as early detection of and 
subsequent early intervention towards individual risk citizens. 
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3. Healthy Together in The Hague 
 
3.1. In the neighbourhood 
In 2007, the Dutch government issued a list of the nation’s forty most disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods.450 Multiple social problems were concentrated in these 
selected neighbourhoods, including poverty, crime, feelings of insecurity, poor 
housing, early school leavers, and a poor public health – problems, which added 
up to a low level of what is known as  ‘liveability’.451 Four of these neighbour-
hoods were located in the city of The Hague, which, with roughly 500,000 inhabi-
tants,  is The Netherlands’ third largest city.  
Three of the four selected neighbourhoods – Transvaal, Schilderswijk and 
Stationsbuurt – are located close to the city centre and have been working-class 
districts since the late 19th century.452 The fourth neighbourhood – South-West – 
is one of the largest post-war newly-built districts in The Netherlands and boasts 
roughly 65,000 inhabitants. All told, the four neighbourhoods have a total popula-
tion of just under 120,000. From the 1970s onwards, these neighbourhoods un-
derwent a change in demographic profile: the traditional Dutch working class 
population moved away and was replaced by large numbers of immigrants. For 
instance, over 90% of the Schilderswijk and Transvaal districts today consists of 
immigrants or citizens of immigrant origin (mostly Turkish, Moroccan and Suri-
namese).453 Furthermore, the inhabitants of these quarters have a low average 
socio-economic status – some 50% of the population of the Schilderswijk has a 
low level of educational attainment and 40% lives on a minimum income. 
Based on these and other statistics, the four abovementioned neighbour-
hoods became the geographical focal point of both the national and municipal 
authorities on a broad range of policy issues. One of these issues was public 
health: the level of public health is significantly poorer in these neighbourhoods 
than in other parts of The Hague. For instance, 42% of the inhabitants of the 
Schilderswijk and 47% of those in the Transvaal district rated their health as poor 
or mediocre, compared to 20% for the entire city.454 Moreover, the life expectancy 
                                                   
450 The data for the first three paragraphs comes from a local study on public health in the four 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of The Hague, entitled Gezondheid in de Krachtwijken (2010).  
451 In Dutch: ‘leefbaarheid’. 
452 Even though much of the original buildings have been demolished, especially in the 
Schilderswijk, since the late 1970s as part of large ‘restructuring’ projects, these areas have 
remained a home for the city’s lower socio-economic strata. 
453 The typical term used in The Netherlands for immigrants or children of immigrants is 
‘allochthonous’ (in Dutch: ‘allochtoon’). 
454 Other figures include the high percentage of overweight people in the four disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (54% versus 47% for the entire city), the percentage of smokers (29% versus 
28% for the entire city), chance of depression and anxiety disorder (19% versus 9% for the 
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of low socio-economic status groups is, on average, five years shorter. These 
groups are often confronted with illness earlier and more often than citizens with 
a high socio-economic status.455  
 
Socio-economic health disparities between the various districts of The Hague are 
the object of policymaking and subsequent interventions. Since a substantial part 
of the urban population lives in the four selected disadvantaged neighbourhoods, 
the overall welfare of the city is at stake: “The health of the citizens of The Hague 
partly determines the social, economic and cultural possibilities of our city. It de-
termines the city’s vitality”.456  
However, besides this collective interest, a reduction of health differences 
also serves the individual interests of people in the lower socio-economic strata. 
The city of The Hague justifies its interventions to improve the status of public 
health by constructing a convergence of collective and individual interests: “Of 
course you want to be healthy! Good health means you can participate in society. 
The municipality is responsible for guarding, protecting and improving the health 
of the people of The Hague”.457  
Furthermore, the specific attention for people in the lower socio-economic 
strata is justified on the grounds that these people are born in disadvantaged cir-
cumstances: “[...] if you are born in a disadvantaged neighbourhood, you start off 
at a disadvantage”.458 The municipality has a responsibility to eliminate these 
disadvantages. This does not release citizens from taking responsibility for their 
own health. They are not just passive victims of their disadvantaged backgrounds; 
they can actively contribute to improving their own health, as well. The realisation 
of public health objectives depends on behavioural change: “Health begins with a 
healthy lifestyle”.459  
The municipality perceives it as its responsibility to enable citizens to lead 
a healthy life. At the same time, the responsibility of citizens is not understood 
                                                                                                                                 
entire city), loneliness (18% versus 10% for the entire city) and cardiovascular diseases (Samen 
Gezond, 2011:16-17). 
455 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:1 
456 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:1 (my translation, RP). For instance, the esti-
mated social costs of excessive drinking are 2.6 billion euro per year in The Netherlands as a 
result of illness, absence from work, accidents, violent behaviour and care for addicts (see: 
municipal alcohol moderation memorandum Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:9). 
457 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:iii (my translation, RP). The ambition of par-
ticipation relates public health policy to local welfare policy. Since 2007, the Social Support Act 
(in Dutch: ‘Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning’) charges municipalities with the responsibil-
ity to “improve the social participation and self-help of citizens” (Aandacht voor Elkaar, 2007:8; 
my translation, RP). 
458 Samen Gezond, 2011:5. 
459 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:14 (my translation, RP). 
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simply as bearing the consequences of individual decisions made with regard to 
health. Based on the assumption that citizens have a personal interest in leading a 
healthy life, ‘responsibility’ is also understood to mean actively participating in 
behavioural change and personal health improvement: “Our goal is: healthy 
neighbourhoods, where the people of The Hague take responsibility for them-
selves [...]”.460 As the following description of The Hague’s public health policy 
makes clear, the municipal efforts to incentivise citizens to take responsibility for 
their own health can take many forms. 
 
3.2. The coalition ‘Healthy Conscience’ 
The long-term (2010-2018) programme ‘Healthy Together’ plays an important 
role in the organisation of health promotion in The Hague. The main objective of 
this municipal programme is to coordinate the various health promotion efforts 
by the Municipal Health Service,461 schools, general practitioners and subsidised 
welfare organisations in the four aforementioned neighbourhoods.462 Besides the 
specific geographical focus on statistically identified disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods, a second important characteristic of public health policy in The Hague is 
the conviction that there are no ‘golden bullets’.463 No single measure is effective 
enough to realise a substantial improvement in public health. Instead, a combina-
tion of various measures and techniques was developed.464  
The ‘Healthy Together’ programme aims to realise an integrated approach 
to health issues. Policy efforts are only presumed to be effective if they are coor-
dinated and form a ‘closed net’ around citizens. This is the strategy used, for in-
stance, in the alcohol moderation policy: “Experts recommend employing a ‘pre-
vention mix’ of education, early detection, regulation and enforcement to reduce 
excessive drinking in The Hague”.465 This mix of preventive measures aims to 
“change the norm that alcohol use and especially excessive alcohol use is ‘normal’ 
and without negative consequences”.466 Specific activities include educating ado-
                                                   
460 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:7 (my translation, RP). 
461 In Dutch: ‘Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst’ or ‘GGD’. 
462 In Dutch: ‘Samen Gezond’. The development of a coordinated prevention programme is 
based on the ‘Urban Health Governance’ strategy of the WHO, which stresses cooperation with 
citizens and welfare professionals, cooperation between various policy domains, and monitor-
ing and evaluation (Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:4). 
463 Samen Gezond, 2011:14. 
464 Coordination of activities is specifically relevant for the public health domain. Fragmentation 
is often characteristic of this policy domain: “It is difficult to gain insight into the variety of 
initiatives because of the multitude of actors in the neighbourhoods and because it is often 
unclear whether an activity is still being executed, has already terminated or t still has to start” 
(Gezondheid in de Krachtwijken, 2010:51; my translation, RP). 
465 Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:12 (my translation, RP). 
466 Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:12 (my translation, RP). 
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lescents about the dangers and social acceptance of drinking, raising awareness 
among welfare professionals, sports clubs, bars and schools to detect early signs 
of problematic drinking behaviour, and stricter regulation and enforcement of the 
Licensing and Catering Act.467 
 
The Healthy Together programme can best be understood as a coordination 
mechanism to realise an improvement in public health in four selected disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods. Even though the programme has initiated and imple-
mented several measures itself, its main emphasis is on the coordination and in-
tegration of efforts by other organisations involved, under the motto “a complex 
problem calls for cooperation”.468 For this purpose, three organisational mecha-
nisms were introduced. 
The first of these was the establishment of the ‘Healthy Conscience Coali-
tion’,469 a coalition of 27 organisations, including health insurance companies, 
general practitioners, health care services, municipal health service, welfare or-
ganisations, schools, housing corporations, ministries, and the municipality of The 
Hague. This coalition has been active since late 2008 and aims to realise a coordi-
nated effort to banish health arrears in the four disadvantaged neighbourhoods of 
The Hague.470  
The programme does not have a hierarchical position with regard to the 
partners in the coalition. Instead, it appeals to the shared (formal) responsibilities 
and interests of these organisations. The representatives of all coalition members 
meet at least once a year. There is a ‘programme team’ for the day-to-day man-
agement, which meets every month and consists of the municipal programme 
manager, four persons responsible for the four ‘tracks’ of the programme, a repre-
sentative of the municipal policy for disadvantaged neighbourhoods, a represen-
tative of the municipal sports policy, and two municipal ‘health brokers’.471 
                                                   
467 Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:19-21. 
468 Samen Gezond, 2011:9. 
469 In Dutch: ‘Coalitie Gezond Geweten’. Information on this coalition can be found on its web-
site http://www.gezondgeweten.nl/; consulted d.d. 10-5-2011. Besides this coalition, there are 
also networks of welfare and health care professionals. For instance, network and welfare or-
ganisation ‘STIOM’ organises meetings five times a year for, among others, general practition-
ers, physiotherapists, dieticians, welfare workers and municipal health service employees. 
These meetings aim to stimulate interaction among professionals on emerging health issues in 
their daily practice and on new initiatives to tackle these issues. ‘STIOM’ was established over 
10 years ago after several general practitioners found it increasingly difficult to ‘get through’ to 
some of their, especially migrant, patients. Cooperation with welfare organisations was pro-
posed as a means to reach these population groups. 
470 The programme ‘Healthy Together’ and the coalition ‘Healthy Conscience’ have a total esti-
mated budget of 24,7 million euro (Samen Gezond, 2011:4). 
471 In Dutch: ‘gezondheidsmakelaars’. 
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These two ‘health brokers’ are the second organisational mechanism worthy of 
mention. They function as ‘catalysts’ for coordination, cooperation and collective 
action – in fact, one of the interviewed health brokers refers to herself a “health 
lobbyist”. Their responsibility is to create a broad awareness of health issues, and 
to link the various organisations in the ‘Healthy Conscience Coalition’ together, to 
demonstrate that cooperation can lead to a more effective approach to health 
arrears.472  
For instance, the approach to obesity includes efforts by urban planning 
(constructing cycling lanes and sports grounds),473 by schools, in the education of 
children on healthy nutrition and physical exercise, by sports clubs in the organi-
sation of activities in the neighbourhood, and by schools, general practitioners 
and youth health care in the realisation of a quick response to first signs of obe-
sity. Cooperation and coordination is also required to organise interventions fol-
lowing early detection of problems. This usually implies the transfer of a case 
from one organisation to the other. For instance, if a primary school reports that 
one of their pupils is severely overweight, this should be followed up with a per-
sonalised intervention by youth health care. 
 
The third important organisational mechanism is the construction of four interre-
lated ‘policy tracks’ within the broader programme Healthy Together.474 These 
‘tracks’ provide conceptual coherence in a broad and fragmented policy land-
scape: 
- Track 1: ‘a healthy and athletic life’. This track deals with issues such as 
overweight and obesity. Specific activities include the development of 
educational activities at schools, early detection of overweight, individual 
support for adults and children with obesity, and low-threshold sports ac-
tivities. Other issues in this track are smoking (campaigns) and depres-
sion (early detection and training). 
- Track 2: ‘a healthy living environment’. Whereas the first track is largely 
focused on individual support and education, the second track deals with 
the opportunity structure in which citizens make decisions regarding 
their health. Specific areas of concern are playing grounds, cycling lanes, 
public gardens and obstacle-free sidewalks. Furthermore, this track is 
concerned with health aspects beyond the control of individual citizens, 
such as the reduction of atmospheric pollution and the improvement of 
indoor environments in schools and apartment blocks (for instance 
                                                   
472 Samen Gezond, 2011:7. 
473 See for instance the explicit attention to health issues in the municipal mobility policy mem-
orandum Ontwerp Haagse Nota Mobiliteit (2010). 
474 See the long-term programme Healthy Together: Samen Gezond (2011). 
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through improved ventilation or incorporation of health aspects in new 
building projects). 
- Track 3: ‘accessible prevention and care’. Care services can also play an 
important role in prevention and health improvement. First, outreach 
work by community nurses in the neighbourhood is an important means 
to reach citizens who are usually not inclined to report to health services 
themselves. And second, medicine and care can play a role in personalised 
prevention projects, such as courses to help people quit smoking, training 
to deal with the first signs of depression, and exercise programmes and 
professional counselling for obese citizens. 
- Track 4: ‘healthy participation’. Health and participation are two closely 
related issues: health increases the opportunities for social participation, 
and participation can have a positive effect on a person’s physical and 
mental health and wellbeing.475 Reintegration programmes for unem-
ployed citizens and reduction of school absenteeism are two important 
examples of activities in this track. 
 
Underneath the conceptual coherence of these four tracks lies a broad and varied 
pattern of activities and interventions, carried out by a broad range of public au-
thorities and subsidised welfare organisations. Part of these activities and inter-
ventions follow from legal obligations, and part from policy objectives formulated 
at municipal level. According to the 2008 Public Health Act, Dutch municipalities 
are responsible for, among other things, population screening, vaccination pro-
grammes, public hygiene, monitoring of the local health situation476, and setting 
up preventive activities.477 Furthermore, municipalities are obliged to set out 




                                                   
475 There is a close relation in this track between public health policy and local welfare policy. 
The local welfare policy memorandum Attention for Each Other (Aandacht voor Elkaar, 2007:10; 
my translation, RP) mentions the following important objectives: promoting social cohesion and 
liveability in neighbourhoods, preventive support for adolescents with problems, educational 
support for parents, promoting social participation and independency of people with mental or 
non-communicable health issues, the development of mental health care, and social support for 
vulnerable citizens. 
476 The city of The Hague has its own ‘health monitor’ which provides the municipality with 
information on the health situation of the lower socio-economic strata, of specific migrant 
groups and of certain neighbourhoods – also in relation to available provisions (including parks 
and sporting facilities) and level of poverty (Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:31). 
477 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:3. 
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3.3. The three strategies of prevention 
Even though the entire policy approach is very broad and also includes elements 
of health care, labour policy and welfare policy, the following analysis has, for the 
purposes of this study, been narrowed down to the elements related to preven-
tion. Prevention is an important element in the various activities in the four tracks 
of the ‘Healthy Together’ programme: “Prevention is an important focal point of 
the municipal policy approach. Special attention is directed at risk groups”.478 
Prevention especially plays a role where the aforementioned collective and indi-
vidual interests converge: a healthy lifestyle. Priorities to promote a healthy life-
style in The Hague’s disadvantaged neighbourhoods include: 
- health information, for instance through the internet, at schools, in infor-
mation leaflets, in mosques and in coffee houses so that the “citizens of 
The Hague know how to prevent health problems”479 
- a moderate consumption of alcohol in bars and sport clubs 
- non-smoking, through information campaigns and support for people 
who want to stop smoking 
- an active lifestyle through sports campaigns and an expansion of recrea-
tion and sports facilities 
- a healthy weight through early detection of overweight, healthy meals in 
school canteens, improving cycling lanes, and supporting people with 
obesity  
- improvement of the indoor climate in schools and houses through ventila-
tion  
- prevention and early detection of depression in adolescents480 
 
Following the discussion of prevention in the introductory pages of this chapter 
(Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008:192), three preventive policy strategies may 
be distinguished in the municipal approach to promote a healthy lifestyle. 
The first strategy – primary prevention or health promotion – deals with 
averting the development of disease. In the context of the ‘Healthy Together’ pro-
gramme, this strategy includes interventions in the opportunity structure (cycling 
lanes, smoke-free buildings, healthy canteens, visible staircases as an alternative 
to elevators in public buildings and apartments) and the transfer of social norms 
(information campaigns and educational programmes). The second strategy           
– secondary prevention – deals with early detection to enable early interventions, 
through, for example, population screening, monitoring of developments in the 
                                                   
478 Samen Gezond, 2011:15; my translation, RP. 
479 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:9 (my translation, RP). 
480 Haagse nota volksgezondheid 2007-2011, 2007:14-25. 
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status of public health, and regular health checks at schools. And the third strategy 
– tertiary prevention – deals with the prevention of disease progression and the 
treatment of risk citizens. Examples of tertiary prevention in the ‘Healthy To-
gether’ programme include individual support for citizens with early signs of de-
pression, smoking cessation courses and programmes to lose weight. 
Secondary and tertiary prevention have been broadly interpreted in the 
above. Both notions not only include the early detection of diseases and the pre-
vention of disease progression, but also the early detection and progression of 
risk factors for the development of diseases. For instance, the early detection of 
obesity and personalised programmes to lose weight are considered forms of 
prevention, since they aim to avert the progression of a condition that is perceived 
as an important risk factor for the development of non-communicable diseases.481  
 
An archetypal example of prevention is the approach to obesity in children in dis-
advantaged neighbourhoods. Three strategies are employed to reduce overweight 
and to combat obesity: collective prevention of overweight, early detection of 
overweight and personal support for children with overweight.482  
The collective prevention of overweight aims at intervening before over-
weight occurs: “The best way to prevent health problems as a result of overweight 
is, of course, to prevent children from becoming too heavy in the first place”.483 
Information on healthy nutrition and physical exercise are crucial, but not enough. 
Even with the proper knowledge, behaviour is difficult to change. In the words of 
an interviewee: “Everybody has his routines and habits. Informing people is often 
insufficient and complementary activities are necessary to persuade people to 
change their lifestyle. Many people do not even realise they have a problem. It is 
often difficult to convince somebody with overweight who has not yet experi-
enced any health complaints. We should not try to be paternalistic, but instead try 
to activate people by relating to their daily life and their interests”.  
Therefore, several complementary interventions have been developed. 
Some of these aim to influence the opportunity structure: “The municipality of 
The Hague is tackling the ‘fat-making environment’. School canteens should offer 
                                                   
481 Overweight and obesity are important risk factors for the development of non-
communicable diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, asthma, diabetes and cancer. Over-
weight is in most cases caused by an unhealthy lifestyle. At the moment, roughly 10% of the 
Dutch population is overweight. This may not seem much in comparison to the US (31%) and 
the UK (23%), but this does not necessarily make it a minor problem. Moreover, the percentage 
of overweight among Dutch children is considerably higher than the population figure (14%). 
These data were presented at a municipal conference on overweight issues in The Hague d.d. 6-
10-2011. 
482 Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014, 2011:9. 
483 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:10. 
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healthier meals. Cycling routes should be safer. The municipality wants to stimu-
late adolescents to join a sports club. The environment of children and adoles-
cents should be changed in such a way that they will exercise more and eat a 
healthier diet”.484 Implementation occurs in close proximity to citizens: in their 
neighbourhood (for instance by creating sports facilities),485 at school through 
health education, healthy canteens, parental commitment and physical educa-
tion,486 and in the home situation (for instance through educational programmes 
on the local television channel, self-tests on the internet, and a tear-off calendar 
with health tips).487 Furthermore, several activities have been developed to stimu-
late physical exercise among children and adolescents, ranging from outdoor play-
time afternoons and dancing lessons488 to educational programmes with fitness 
tests489 and a national ‘healthy school’ competition.490 
However, in some cases and for some children, collective prevention will 
not be enough to stop the development of overweight. Early detection of over-
weight aims to identify children with overweight as soon as possible: “Because we 
know that overweight occurs increasingly often among children, it is necessary to 
keep a close eye on them and detect possible abnormalities early on. The sooner 
an overweight child can be helped, the greater the chance the tide can still be 
turned”.491 In practice, all children up to four years old are seen a total of 14 times 
by professionals at well baby clinics, and all children between 4 and 19 years old 
are seen five times by a school doctor or school nurse.492 During these regular 
health checks, special attention is paid to a child’s weight. 
If signs of overweight are detected, a form of personal support is offered 
to the overweight child and its parents: “The purpose of these activities is, of 
course, to get overweight children back down to a healthy weight”.493 The activi-
ties for children with overweight aim for a structural lifestyle improvement, as 
                                                   
484 http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/GGD-en-gezondheid/to/  
Actieprogramma-Gezond-gewicht-1.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011, my translation, RP. 
485 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:18. 
486 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:15. 
487 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:11-13. 
488 For instance in the ‘Hopla!’-campaign, specifically developed for children up to four years 
old. See: http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/GGD-en-gezondheid/to/  
Hoplacampagne-brengt-kinderen-en-ouders-in-beweging-1.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011. 
489 For instance in the project ‘Way to go!’ (in Dutch: ‘Goed bezig!’), specifically developed for 
young adolescents. See: Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:24-25. 
490 In the national competition ‘Go for Health!’ (in Dutch: ‘Ga voor Gezond!’), schools can win 
points by paying attention to nutrition, physical exercise, security and hygiene. See: Vier jaar 
Gezond Gewicht, 2010:22. 
491 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:31; my translation, RP. 
492 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:34. 
493 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:40; my translation, RP. 
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well. All professionals working with children can request an extra consultation by 
a nurse or school doctor, if signs of overweight are detected. Based on this consul-
tation, youth health care and the parents decide what course of action to follow. In 
some cases, additional consultations with a school doctor are enough to deter-
mine an action plan for a healthier lifestyle. In other, more severe cases, parents 
are advised to place their child in a support group or even in the hands of a paedi-
atric hospital to undergo behavioural therapy.494 Between 2006 and 2010, a total 
of 6553 children received some kind of personal support to help them lose 
weight.495 
In the following three paragraphs, the three strategies of collective pre-
vention, early detection and personal support in the ‘Healthy Together’ pro-
gramme are discussed in more detail.496 
 
3.4. Collective prevention 
 
3.4.1. Interventions in the opportunity structure 
Citizens make their daily health choices in a given social structure and environ-
ment. This opportunity structure is often full of unhealthy temptations, such as 
fast-food vendors, cigarette vending machines and motorised transport. The 
Health Department of the municipality of The Hague is working to rearrange the 
opportunity structure in such a way that people are stimulated to make healthy 
decisions. For instance, unobstructed walking paths and safe and well-kept cy-
cling lanes will make physical exercise and transport by foot or bicycle more at-
tractive. Furthermore, sports grounds in the neighbourhood create the opportu-
nity for citizens to become active in their own direct living environment. These 
                                                   
494 Vier jaar Gezond Gewicht, 2010:40-47. Specific interventions include swimming lessons and 
dietary advice (http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/to/Funfit-zwemmen.htm; consulted 
d.d. 16-6-2011). And during the ‘Real Victory’-programme children exercise and work on a 
behavioural change over the course of six months under professional supervision 
(http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/to/Real-Victory.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011).  
A final example is the personal support by a school doctor or youth health care em-
ployee: “Youth health care has a number of talks with you and your child. Health, height, weight 
and the eating and exercise pattern are topics during these meetings. We will look for possibili-
ties to change the eating and exercise pattern together with you and your child. You will receive 
a diary to keep track of what your child eats and drinks and how much it exercises. At the next 
meeting, we will go over this diary together and you will receive dietary and exercise advice. 
Another possibility is to refer your child to a dietician, sports club, general practitioner or pae-
diatrician” (http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/to/Individuele-begeleiding-van-de-JGZ- 
bij-overgewicht.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011). 
495 Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014, 2011:8. 
496 Empirical findings for the three descriptions were gathered during observations and inter-




health aspects of urban planning are integrated into municipal policymaking and 
are part of trade-offs in mobility, transport and public housing issues.  
In the following, three examples of interventions in the opportunity struc-
ture are discussed: the ‘Zoneparc’ and the ‘Sports Garden The Hague’, which aim 
to provide sports facilities for primary schools, and the ‘healthy canteen concept’, 
which aims to offer healthy products to students at secondary schools. 
 
The ‘Zoneparc’ is a specially designed playground on the public square in front of 
a primary school in one of The Hague’s disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The main 
objectives of the ‘Zoneparc’ are prevention of health problems as a result of a lack 
of physical exercise, and improvement of the children’s social skills.497 The play-
ground is designed to activate as many children as possible simultaneously498 by 
offering a broad variety of sports and activities. Besides a small football pitch, 
there is a street hockey pitch, a basketball court (all separated by lineation), 
climbing frames and space for activities such as wave boarding, skating and stilt-
walking. The portable goals, balls and other sporting equipment are kept in a con-
tainer located at the side of the playground. During every playtime, the children 
can use all materials and the entire playground.  
Schoolteachers function as general supervisors, but an important element 
in the concept of the ‘Zoneparc’ is the recruitment of the older pupils as assistants 
and referees. In rotating groups of roughly six, these so called ‘heroes’ put all the 
equipment out and function as the supervisor or referee for the various sports 
activities. This way, use of the ‘Zoneparc’ can also help to teach children social 
skills, such as taking responsibility, showing respect towards each other, resolving 
conflicts without fighting, etc. 
                                                   
497 A poor health and a lack of social skills are just two examples of challenges faced by many of 
the children at this school. The approximately 330 pupils, almost without exception, belong to 
lower socio-economic strata and from migrant origin. Out of necessity, the school pays much 
attention to the multiple arrears of many of its pupils. Roughly 70% percent of all classes are 
spent on Dutch language teaching, yet many children still require extra courses and individual 
schooling. Other common problems are related to the home situation and parental rearing style 
and skills. These issues include hanging around with (older) friends in the neighbourhood 
without parental supervision, and annoying and sometimes even criminal behaviour in the 
public domain.  
Moreover, the overall security situation of the neighbourhood is cause for concern. 
Some ten years ago, the school surroundings were often too dangerous to play outside, and it 
was not uncommon for local drug dealers to make small pupils deliver packages in the 
neighbourhood. Thanks to strict police action, the situation has improved and most drug deal-
ers have been removed from the neighbourhood. However, the security situation remains pre-
carious. 
498 Before the construction of the ‘Zoneparc’, the playground consisted of merely two football 




A similar intervention in the opportunity structure is the so-called ‘Sports Garden 
The Hague’, established on the grounds behind a primary school in another disad-
vantaged neighbourhood. A lack of sports courts in their direct living environment 
made it difficult for children to exercise and engage in different types of sport. The 
available public playgrounds hardly qualified as sports facilities. Moreover, the 
public playgrounds are often dangerous. A nearby fenced-off football court is 
hardly used by younger children. Instead, adolescents hang about, drug addicts 
stroll around and their dealers frequent the courts at night. According to one of 
the teachers at the primary school “many parents are afraid to let their child wan-
der off in the neighbourhood to play. It’s simply too dangerous. Many of them now 
literally play on their small balcony or sit in front of the television with a bag of 
crisps”. 
For a number of years, now, the ‘Sports Garden The Hague’ has served as 
an alternative to these public playgrounds. The ‘Sports Garden’ is a closed-off, 
private and CCTV-monitored terrain, located in an area behind several housing 
blocks and a primary school. The roughly 2000 square meters are designed as a 
multifunctional sports complex with four fields, on which a total of 14 sports can 
be practised. Nine primary schools in the neighbourhood as well as local sport 
clubs can sign in for use of the ‘Sports Garden’. Children are offered a broad choice 
of sports lessons. These lessons are not compulsory, but are complementary to 
the regular physical education classes at primary schools. Some 500 children use 
the ‘Sports Garden’ every week. 
The ‘Sports Garden’ offers children the opportunity to exercise in a secure 
environment, in their own neighbourhood and under the supervision of sports 
club coaches, who can instruct them on the specific rules of each sport. The objec-
tive is to activate more children and to motivate them and their parents to join a 
sports club. The ‘Sports Garden’ functions as a bridge between the children and 
parents with whom the primary schools involved have direct contact, on the one 
hand, and the sport clubs on the other hand, which are usually located far outside 
the children’s direct neighbourhood.499 
 
Besides creating the facilities for physical exercise, influencing available food 
choices is typical for interventions in the opportunity structure. For instance, the 
‘healthy school canteen’ concept, which has been introduced at a secondary school 
for vocational education in The Hague, aims to improve and expand the selection 
of healthy foods offered in the canteen. Fast food and energy drinks are popular 
among adolescents, but are also an evident source of overweight. Offering healthy 
meals is a strategy deployed to reduce overweight among adolescents, especially 
                                                   
499 See also http://www.sporttuinschilderswijk.nl/; consulted d.d. 4-10-2011. 
329 
 
since many of the roughly 160 students do not bring a lunch with them from home 
– many of them simply receive a daily allowance from their parents to buy food.  
In the canteen of the school participating in this project, roughly 80% of 
all meals, snacks and drinks are healthy choices. A canteen serving 100% healthy 
food would probably scare off many students. Therefore, the school tries to keep a 
balance between offering healthy food and offering food according to the stu-
dents’ demands. Since the students can leave the school premises during lunch 
breaks, they can easily walk into town and buy an unhealthy meal there. More-
over, unhealthy food is often cheaper than healthy meals. In fact, the flashing 
lights of a cheap pizza place just across the street are visible from the windows of 
the school canteen. In this case, temptation is literally just around the corner. 
However, in the planned construction of a new school building, the courtyard is 
situated in an inner garden. This will allow the school to keep students on the 
premises during lunch breaks. As a result, they will be ‘forced’ to eat the food they 
bring from home or buy in the school canteen. 
 
3.4.2. The transfer of health norms 
A second municipal collective disease prevention strategy is the transfer of health 
norms. This strategy includes providing health information to enable citizens to 
make rational lifestyle choices. But the transfer of health norms is a broader strat-
egy. Several activities have been developed to make healthy living the norm. Be-
sides providing rational information, other activities include education and train-
ing, activating the social context, health projects and activities, and normative 
appeals to citizens in health campaigns. In many of these activities, enticement is 
the main technique used to communicate health norms.  
Since 2006, for example, The Hague has been one of the adopting munici-
palities of the “Healthy Weight for Adolescents Approach”500 – an approach devel-
oped as part of the national ‘Covenant on Obesity’.501 A coordinated set of inter-
ventions, ranging from collective prevention to early detection and personal sup-
port, aims to make “healthy living the norm in a [...] municipality. This is immedi-
ately noticeable in various areas: the sufficient number of cycling paths, the lim-
ited selection of snacks available in school canteens and the fact that healthy 
products are placed at eye level in supermarkets”.502 Also part of this approach 
                                                   
500 In Dutch: “Jongeren op Gezond Gewicht” or “JOGG” (my translation, RP). 
501 in Dutch: Convenant Overgewicht; TK 2004-2005, 22894/51. 
502 http://www.jongerenopgezondgewicht.nl/; consulted d.d. 4-10-2011. This website also 
presents a ‘model week’ of an imaginary child, 10-year old Edwin: “(07.00 hrs) Edwin wakes up. 
He receives a message on his cell phone via a popular social network that two boys from the 
local football club’s first team will be giving a football-clinic in the neighbourhood; (07.30 hrs) 
Since the school’s ‘breakfast week’, Edwin’s mother has bought wholemeal bread during week-
330 
 
are efforts to get the message across that children should “eat a healthy diet and 
get enough exercise”. More specifically, the city of The Hague has formulated six 
“life rules” for parents, children and their social environment: “breast feeding is 
preferred; exercise every day; have breakfast every day; drink water from the tap 
and avoid sweet beverages; [eat] fruit; turn off the television and pc more of-
ten”.503 
An important instrument to communicate these life rules is ‘social mar-
keting’, or the use of commercial marketing concepts to realise behavioural 
change: “Adolescents and their parents are persuaded, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to exhibit healthier behaviour. We do not want to preach, but to per-
suade adolescents to voluntarily make healthy lifestyle choices [...]”.504 Instead of 
merely providing objective information or being overtly normative or paternalis-
tic about healthy behaviour, enticement is regarded as the most effective tech-
nique to realise behavioural change. Enticement appeals to citizens’ self-interest 
in a healthy life (social and economic participation), and does so by showing how 
easy healthy behaviour can be and, especially in the case of children and adoles-
cents, how much fun healthy behaviour can be.  
 
Schools play an important role in the transfer of health norms. A focus on children 
and adolescents is logical from a preventive perspective, since especially children 
are highly receptive to learning a healthier lifestyle. Furthermore, all children can 
be reached through school. Even if parents are not inclined to visit general practi-
tioners or youth health care, their children attend school and are exposed to 
health education.  
Schools have a role as “co-educator” or “co-norm setter”.505 In the words 
of one of the teachers interviewed: “Sometimes you basically have a role as second 
educator. And maybe even the role of first educator in a few cases in which par-
ents fail to take up this role”. This role is justified by the fact that children, on their 
own, do not choose unhealthy behaviours. In more than 95% of all cases, over-
weight is caused by an unhealthy lifestyle: too much food and too little exercise. 
Children do not choose their lifestyle consciously. Parents often decide what their 
children eat and how often and how long they play outside, watch television and 
                                                                                                                                 
days. The bakery, which also participated in the ‘breakfast week’, has plenty of wholemeal 
bread on offer; (08.00 hrs) Edwin cycles to school with a friend on the new cycle path along a 
busy road; (12.00 hrs) The teacher distributed fruit cocktails during the lunch; (14.00 hrs) 
During math class, Edwin calculates how many minutes he has to run in order to burn a ham-
burger; (16.00 hrs) Edwin participates in the football clinic in the local square. Those boys from 
the first team are really good; he wants to become just as good!” 
503 Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014, 2011:14. 
504 Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014, 2011:12. 
505 Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:22 (my translation, RP). 
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exercise. Therefore, children and parents should learn how much fun it can be to 
get enough exercise, and be made aware of the importance of a healthy diet. And 
school can support them in this”.506 
One way to do this is by incorporating health education at the aforemen-
tioned primary school into activities, such as a ‘health week’, during which chil-
dren are introduced to several sports and informed about the dangers of un-
healthy behaviour. Furthermore, according to one of the teachers, it is crucial “to 
keep harping on the fact that energy drinks and soft drinks are unhealthy”. Some-
times, schools deliberately “put the pressure on” by confronting parents to change 
their nutritional and exercise habits, especially when children show signs of obe-
sity.  This technique is sometimes necessary to change the way parents think 
about overweight. For instance, it is not uncommon for Turkish mothers to view 
overweight as a sign of prosperity. Yet information alone is in many of these cases 
not enough to impact on such deeply engrained ways of thinking. 
Another educational example comes from the aforementioned secondary 
school. This school has introduced the ‘Healthy School’ concept,507 a coherent 
approach comprising various activities and measures to improve the students’ 
lifestyle. Sports and exercise, nutrition, health education, parent participation, and 
psychological and social-emotional support are part of the school’s efforts.508 
More specifically, activities at this secondary school include: 
- one hour a day compulsory physical education; 
- a strict monitoring of absenteeism (including house visits in case of re-
peated absence) 
- an outreach approach to all first-year students to assess their home situa-
tion 
- a smoking ban in the school building (smoking cannot be banned outside, 
but the school has passed a rule allowing smoking on the premises only 
behind a small outbuilding out of everybody’s sight) 
- health education according to a ‘show, don’t tell’ strategy (for instance by 
showing how many sugar cubes go into an energy drink, showing pictures 
of smoke-infected lungs, and organising workshops on preparing healthy 
smoothies) 
- collective breakfast in the classroom once a week (since it is not uncom-
mon for students to skip breakfast at home) 
 
                                                   
506 Project ‘meten & wegen’ (2006). 
507 Prisma College Gezonde School: plan van aanpak (2011). This concept is supported by Dutch 
government. Information and tools can be found on the governmental website 
http://www.gezondeschool.info/; consulted d.d. 4-10-2011.  
508 Prisma College Gezonde School: plan van aanpak (2011:8). 
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Another example of the transfer of social norms is directed at adults. In one of the 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, mothers are trained to become “ambassadors” of 
the municipal approach towards overweight and obesity. The objective of this 
training is broader than merely educating these mothers on a healthy lifestyle. 
Instead, it also aims to improve the health literacy rate, especially among migrant 
families. It is not uncommon for migrant families to have little knowledge of the 
importance of healthy behaviour or of the Dutch health care system. Moreover, 
these families are often difficult for regular health services to reach, due to lan-
guage and cultural barriers.  
The objective is to train a group of roughly 14 mothers per session to in-
form, educate and activate other mothers from their own ethnic and cultural 
background. At the end of the training – which consists of eight morning sessions 
– they receive a diploma, and, more importantly, they are equipped to independ-
ently organise activities. The “ambassadors” voluntarily promote the municipal 
approach in a distinctively different way than municipal welfare organisations do. 
What they may lack in organising skills, a knowledge of health issues, and mastery 
of the Dutch language, they make up for in their ability to get through to people 
who are difficult to reach for municipal and welfare professionals.509 Moreover, an 
important side effect is the social activation of these mothers, who often have a 
very narrow social life and only seldom leave their home. 
During the various training sessions, the mothers generate ideas for 
health activities and learn to systematically carry out these activities.510 Specific 
activities include cooking lessons for other mothers, practising how to make a 
healthy shopping list, a workshop on healthy treats for birthdays, a dancing event, 
cycling lessons, a healthy barbecue, hiking trails, and so on. In the words of one of 
                                                   
509 In a similar way, local welfare organisation ‘STIOM’ uses its network of volunteers to reach 
citizens who are usually unreceptive to normal health information, such as advice by the gen-
eral practitioner or information brochures. Typical target groups are migrants, whose mastery 
of the Dutch language is insufficient or whose cultural background favours verbal instead of 
written communication. An example is the project ‘Swarming for an active life’ (in Dutch: 
‘zwermen voor actief leven’), a mass communication method for which a small group of volun-
teers was trained to spread health information (for instance on breast cancer) in their own 
direct social and cultural network. 
510 Four questions are relevant for every health activity: what is the subject? What is the pur-
pose? How can it be organised? What is the planning? During the training sessions, these four 
questions serve as the guideline for the mothers. The supervising welfare professional stresses 
the organising capacities, which is mostly a matter of ‘significant details’: how and when do you 
inform your target group? How do you keep in touch with your participants? What to do when 
people fail to show up for an activity? What to do when participants refuse to pay a small finan-
cial contribution for an activity? Furthermore, the welfare professional serves as a link with the 
Municipal Health Service, which can distribute information leaflets on healthy nutrition or may 
have small budgets for health activities (such as an allowance of 30 euro for expenses made in a 
workshop on healthy birthday treats at a primary school). 
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the mothers, the basic idea is “to stimulate healthy behaviour and change lifestyle 
by giving parents information about healthy nutrition for their children”.  
 
A final example of the activities developed to transfer health norms are informa-
tion campaigns. Here too, arguments other than pure rational persuasion can be 
used. Campaigns are not necessarily limited to merely providing information to 
citizens, but can also express a norm for healthy behaviour. For instance, a recent 
municipal anti-smoking campaign was entitled “Smoking is ‘not done’ in The 
Hague”.511  
Complementary to courses to stop smoking and smoking bans for schools, 
bars and public buildings, information campaigns in citizens’ direct living envi-
ronments (schools, bars and community centres) aim to convey the importance of 
non-smoking: “It is crucial to stop smoking. For your own health and for the 
health of passive smokers”.512  
 
3.5. Early detection 
Collective prevention is not always able to avert health risks or change undesir-
able behaviour. Therefore, the municipal authorities have developed several ac-
tivities to detect risk factors for the development of health problems at an early 
stage. Some of these are part of general youth health care, while other are com-
plementary activities within the ‘Healthy Together’ programme. Early detection is 
preventive in two ways: first, it aims to detect and select risk citizens among the 
general population, and second, it aims to make interventions possible when an 
undesirable future can still be averted. Early detection is the precondition and 
selection mechanism for early intervention. 
Early detection is deemed important because health problems can de-
velop at an early age – for instance, overweight already occurs among pre-
schoolers. There is also a better chance of averting health problems if interven-
tions take place at an early stage, as well as a chance of stopping a ‘vicious cycle’ of 
unhealthy behaviour in families. After all, if people develop overweight at an early 
age, chances are high they will also be overweight as adults. Moreover, overweight 
can be ‘hereditary’: if parents are overweight, the odds are that their children will 
be overweight as well. These realisations led to an emphasis on early detection of 
health risks and problems among children.  
 
                                                   
511 http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/to/Roken-in-Den-Haag.htm; 
 consulted d.d. 16-6-2011. 
512 http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/to/Roken-in-Den-Haag.htm; 
 consulted d.d. 16-6-2011. 
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Schools are an important site for the detection of all sorts of problems in the up-
bringing of children. These range from language arrears to behavioural problems, 
and from parental neglect to overweight. In the words of one of the teachers at a 
primary school in The Hague: “Sometimes we see more than the parents do, since 
their authority over their children often ends at the front door of their house. 
They simply have no idea of what their children do at school or in the streets”. 
Primary schools play a particularly important role in this context,513 since – in the 
words of one of the teachers at a primary school – “conventional wisdom among 
teachers holds that you can still do something about overweight and still prevent 
children from ending up in a youth gang before they go to secondary school. After 
that, you are often too late to turn around certain developments”.  
An example of early detection of children with overweight at primary 
schools is the project ‘The Physical Education Teacher, a Weighty Matter’.514 It has 
long been common practice for school doctors to visit all Dutch children at inter-
vals throughout their school years to check their physical development. However, 
the municipality of The Hague has also invested in a project under which primary 
schools assess their pupils’ body weight on a yearly basis. Gym teachers are edu-
cated and subsidised to “measure and weigh” the pupils at their primary school. 
At the time of this study, a total of 50 primary schools were participating in this 
project.515 If parents do not wish their child to be weighed, they can make this 
known to the gym teacher.516 
A child can fall into several categories according to the BMI-index: ‘un-
derweight’, ‘healthy weight’, ‘overweight’ or ‘obese’. Weighing the pupils on a 
yearly basis enables their weight development to be monitored, and a quick re-
sponse to signs of overweight: “An ever increasing number of children is over-
weight. The sooner we detect this, the easier it is to do something about it. This 
way, we can prevent children with overweight from becoming obese”. ‘Doing 
something about it’ means referring pupils with overweight – after parental con-
sent – to their general practitioner or to youth health care services517 for addi-
tional research. 
                                                   
513 However, early detection is not limited to primary schools. For instance, the aforementioned 
secondary school which has implemented the ‘healthy canteen’ concept strives to visit every 
pupil at home in their first year to talk with the parents and assess the home situation. During 
these visits, welfare workers pay attention to the motivation of parents, to the tidiness of the 
household, to the toys lying around, to the space children have to play, to signs of tension 
among the family members, et cetera. 
514 In Dutch: ‘Gewichtige Vakleerkracht Lichamelijke Opvoeding’. 
515 http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/GGD-en-gezondheid/to/Gewich 
tige-Vakleerkracht-het-project.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011. 
516 Project ‘meten & wegen’ (2006). 
517 In Dutch: Jeugdgezondheidszorg (JGZ). 
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There are also efforts518 to implement a standardised referral protocol for chil-
dren with overweight, based on a national ‘obesity health care standard’.519 This 
protocol aims to organise a ‘chain’ around the ‘patient’, consisting of schools, 
sports clubs, general practitioners, welfare organisations, Centres for Youth and 
Family, municipal health services, and the municipality. The protocol serves as the 
link between early detection and individual support towards identified risk chil-
dren.520 
A core element of this protocol is the central role of the general practitio-
ner in the diagnosis and referral of children with overweight. Schools, welfare 
organisations and youth health care services can refer a child with signs of over-
weight to the general practitioner. In case of minor overweight, general practitio-
ners can refer the child to youth health care services for a support programme to 
lose weight (if necessary with the help of a dietician). In the case of severe over-
weight or obesity,521 the child is referred to a paediatrician at the local hospital, 
who can offer an intensive programme to lose weight, change lifestyle habits and 
improve the child’s general wellbeing. 
 
A final example of early detection comes from the realm of school absenteeism. 
Since 2009, ‘preventive compulsory education officers’ in The Hague’s four disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods have been charged with the task of early detection of 
presumed unauthorised absence.522 They work in close cooperation with schools 
on the basis of a so called “escalation ladder” for absenteeism. After three reports 
of unauthorised absence or truancy, the school sends a letter to the parents of the 
pupil involved; after six reports the school invites the parents for a meeting; after 
seven reports the preventive officer has a “preventive talk” with the pupil; after 
eight reports the preventive officer makes a house call; and only if all this has 
                                                   
518 A proposal for such a referral protocol was presented at a conference on obesity issues in 
The Hague d.d. 6-10-2011. Roughly 200 participants from local health care organisations, youth 
care, schools and various welfare organisations gathered to discuss a more coordinated ap-
proach to early detection and referral of children with overweight and obesity. 
519 In Dutch: ‘zorgstandaard obesitas’ (see http://www.partnerschapovergewicht.nl/site_files/ 
uploads/Samenvatting%20Zorgstandaard%20Obesitas.pdf; consulted d.d. 9-10-2011) 
520 Besides this protocol, there is a municipal workgroup on obesity in which general practi-
tioners, municipal health service, youth care, municipality and children’s hospital meet several 
times a year to discuss and establish the criteria for referral of obese children to the various 
available programmes. 
521 And also in case of neglect, abuse, underlying disorders such as retardation or if a previous 
lifestyle intervention has proved ineffective. 
522 There are also cases in which children are called in sick by their parents that are indicative of 
more structural (and not necessarily health-related) problems at home or in their upbringing. 
These cases are discussed at school in so called ‘care advisory teams’, in which several welfare 
organisations and police decide on personalised approaches towards adolescents to prevent 
them from dropping out of school.  
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proven ineffective, after a ninth unauthorised absence a regular truant officer is 
informed (in accordance with legal regulations). 
The preventive compulsory education officer warns an adolescent and his 
or her parents of the consequences of further truancy, and tries to assess the rea-
sons for prolonged absenteeism (such as problems in the home situation).523 Fur-
thermore, preventive compulsory education officers also organise proactive street 
campaigns in cooperation with the police twice a month. If they suspect an ado-
lescent should be at school instead of hanging around in a shopping mall or a pub-
lic square, the adolescent is detained, and his parents or the school will be con-
tacted on the spot to check whether this is a case of unauthorised absence. 
 
3.6. Personal support 
 
3.6.1. Low-threshold services 
The municipality of The Hague offers or subsidises various services for people 
with beginning health problems or at a high risk of developing health problems in 
the future. These services aim to mitigate the negative effects of the already estab-
lished health problems or aim to prevent the risks from developing into actual 
problems.  
In the following, three examples of services to promote physical exercise, 
support people with developing mental problems, and help people to stop smok-
ing are discussed. Contrary to more ‘outreaching’ forms of care – which are dis-
cussed in the following subparagraph – citizens usually apply for these services 
themselves. The Municipality and welfare organisations involved try to keep the 
threshold for citizens as low as possible. 
 
For 14 years now, a community centre in one of The Hague’s disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods has organised cycling lessons.524 These lessons are mostly at-
tended by migrant women. The course consists of ten lessons. In groups of 
roughly twelve participants, dressed in orange smocks, and supervised by four or 
five coaches, the women learn to ride a bike in a nearby public park and on quiet 
public roads. Among the coaches are several so called ‘cycling buddies’. These 
                                                   
523 By contrast, ‘regular’ truant officers use a more repressive strategy. They have the authority 
to charge an adolescent in the case of twelve unauthorised absences, and to propose community 
service as an alternative sanction. If the parents are not to blame for their child’s unauthorised 
absence, the adolescent himself will be fined. 
524 On average, roughly 200 women participate in the various activities offered by the commu-
nity centre, which range from language courses to sewing lessons. The training for the afore-
mentioned ‘ambassadors’ of the local ‘Healthy Weight for Adolescents Approach’ is also organ-
ised at this community centre. In principle, people apply voluntarily. Only social security recipi-
ents are obliged to do volunteer work, which is also often organised by the community centre. 
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‘buddies’ are women who have completed the course in the past and have re-
ceived extended training to become a coach for new classes. According to a large 
notice board near the entrance to the community centre, these lessons have three 
objectives: “the concept of cycling buddies improves cycling skills, encourages the 
women to get more physical exercise, and stimulates their meeting women from 
other cultures”.  
 
Self-help websites are another form of low-threshold service provision. Especially 
in the realm of mental health care, websites are used to provide information and 
support to citizens. People can visit these websites from the comfort, anonymity 
and privacy of their own home. Besides offering information about the first signs 
of a depression525 or on typical adolescent issues,526 these websites also provide 
the opportunity to interact in group chats or to have an electronic expert consul-
tation. People can receive advice by e-mail, talk about their problems in a private 
chat room, do online tests, and follow an online course. The main objectives of 
these websites are to provide information and to help people (and especially ado-
lescents) to break through certain behavioural patterns or prevent a relapse into 
old habits and problems. 
Phone lines are another technological instrument that are employed to 
provide low-threshold and private services to citizens. For instance, the national 
tobacco prevention centre offers ‘telephone coaching’ for people who want sup-
port in their efforts to quit smoking.527 In the course of seven consultations, 
spread out over a period of three to four months, an employee of the tobacco pre-
vention centre provides information and motivation over the telephone. The first 
consultation is an ‘intake’ of roughly half an hour, during which an employee asks 
about a person’s smoking history, smoking habits and reasons to quit. During the 
following consultations, which last about 15 minutes each, an employee gives 
advice on dealing with withdrawal symptoms to prevent relapse. 
 
Also in the realm of tobacco prevention, courses are organised at the neighbour-
hood level to provide support to people attempting to quit smoking. Participants 
are invited to information meetings where the dangers of smoking are high-
                                                   
525 http://www.gripopjedip.nl/nl/Home/; consulted d.d. 13-10-2011.  
526 http://www.mindyourownlife.nl/; consulted d.d. 13-10-2011.  
527 ‘Stivoro’, active since 1974, develops campaigns to inform citizens about the dangers of 
smoking and activities to help people stop smoking. As of 1-1-2011, health care insurance com-
panies became obliged to compensate their clients for the costs of support to stop smoking. This 
has led to an increase in applicants for ‘telephone coaching’ from 600 to 6000. However, this 
obligation was abolished as of 1-1-2012. Moreover, national government has stopped subsidis-
ing Stivoro as part of its cutback programme. Stivoro does have other sponsors, such as the 
cancer fund, but this still is a significant income reduction.  
338 
 
lighted. These meetings are often organised in community centres or at the places 
where smoking is an important part of a culture, such as coffee houses in disad-
vantaged neighbourhoods. Awareness is the first step to motivate people to give 
up smoking. The second step can take the form of a low-threshold training to mo-
tivate people to stop. 
This ‘Seize Your Chance’ training528 consists of nine group meetings dur-
ing which people are motivated to stop smoking under the professional supervi-
sion of a tobacco prevention centre employee. A typical meeting proceeds roughly 
as follows. In the early evening, several people gather at the ‘health centre’ in one 
of The Hague’s most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The eight participants are 
bound together by a shared ambition: to stop smoking and prevent relapse. Some 
participants have already stopped smoking, other have not (yet). 
A part of the meeting consists of a discussion on topics related to the diffi-
culties people can face when they quit smoking. For instance, the participants 
discuss dealing with stressful situations and finding relaxation in other things 
than smoking. Another part of the meeting consists of measuring each partici-
pant’s level of carbon monoxide by means of a breath analyser. Each participant 
receives his or her result immediately: a low level affirms he or she has not 
smoked recently and serves as a motivation to keep up their discipline, while a 
high level confronts the participant with his still persistent smoking habits and 
with the harmful effects this may have on his health. This smokers’ equivalent of 
the weighing scale provides more than information: it motivates and confronts at 
the same time. 
 
3.6.2. Outreach support 
Besides individual support in the form of low-threshold services, individual sup-
port can also take the form of personalised interventions as a follow-up to early 
detection of health problems or health risks, such as overweight or signs of mental 
disorder. These interventions are not a form of service provision to the general 
public, but are instead a form of outreach support to those who have not sought 
help themselves. People are still free to decide whether or not to accept this offer 
of care, but they are actively approached by welfare workers and general practi-
tioners, who attempt to persuade them to accept the offered care. In the following, 
several examples of this type of support in the ‘Healthy Together’ programme are 
discussed. 
 
                                                   
528 In Dutch: ‘pak je kans training’. 
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An example of a follow-up activity after the early detection of overweight (as dis-
cussed above) is the family-oriented approach known as ‘The Hague buddies’.529 
This is a long-term behavioural intervention for children between 8 and 17 years 
old, who have been identified by a general practitioner as being extremely over-
weight (obese).530 Eligibility criteria are “[...] overweight or obesity, and increased 
risk of co-morbidity (e.g. hypertension, family history of diabetes mellitus and/or 
hypercholesterolemia and/or cardiovascular disease before the age of 55, Hindu-
stani ethnicity531)” (Vos, 2011:21).  
The intervention ‘The Hague buddies’ is more than a weight reduction 
course. The “intervention aims to establish long-term weight reduction and stabi-
lization, reduction of obesity-related health consequences and improvement of 
self-image by change of lifestyle and education using cognitive behavioral tech-
niques” (Vos, 2011:122). The objective is to realise a structural behavioural 
change: “You will be provided with advice and support to learn a healthy lifestyle, 
to which you should stick the rest of your life”.532 A child’s daily life is the starting 
point for the intervention. Opportunities to integrate physical exercise into a daily 
pattern and the way parents determine a child’s nutritional and exercise habits 
are discussed.533  
                                                   
529 In Dutch: ‘Haagse maatjes’. 
530 For less severe cases of overweight, there are other treatments available. The ‘Funfit’ pro-
gramme was developed for children between 5 and 8 years old with overweight, but with no 
medical necessity to lose weight. The programme consists of a combination of swimming les-
sons and nutritional advice. For a personal contribution of 15 euro, children follow ten exercise 
sessions under professional supervision, as well as several information meetings. The child’s 
parents also attend six information sessions (http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/ 
to/Funfit.htm; consulted d.d. 16-10-2011). Similar in approach is the ‘Through thick and thin’ 
programme for children between 9 and 12 years old (in Dutch: ‘Door dik en dun’; 
http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/to/Door-dik-en-dun.htm; consulted d.d. 16-10-
2011). A combination of gym classes and information aims to permanently change an unhealthy 
lifestyle. Furthermore, the ‘Real Victory’ programme provides six months of exercise for chil-
dren between 11 and 17 years old under supervision, as well as several information sessions for 
parents and children (http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/to/Real-Victory.htm; consult-
ed d.d. 16-6-2011). 
531 People with a Hindustani ethnicity have a genetically determined higher chance of develop-
ing diabetes. 
532 Information leaflet ‘Haagse Maatjes’ (my translation, RP). 
533 The programme is supervised by a multidisciplinary treatment team, which consists of a 
dietician, a child physiotherapist, a psychologist, a social worker and a system therapist. The 
latter two members of the treatment team are responsible for achieving a lifestyle change in the 
direct social environment of the child, most importantly in the way parents deal with raising 
their child with regard to exercise and nutrition. Parents participate in several group sessions to 
discuss healthy nutrition, product information, supporting children and setting boundaries: 
“Parents should be a role model for their children, giving a good example through eating healthy 
food, increasing physical activity and decreasing sedentary activity” (Vos, 2011:24). 
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The intervention consists of three stages. First, a paediatrician physically 
examines a child after the referral by a general practitioner. During this examina-
tion, attention is paid to the health effects of being obese, and to possible underly-
ing mental and physical disorders.  
Second, several consultations are held with the child to establish an over-
all view of the family situation, the child’s lifestyle, and the child’s and parents’ 
motivation for the programme. A dietician analyses a family’s weight and diet 
history and provides dietary information. A physiotherapist discusses the balance 
between energy intake and energy expenditure, and provides exercise advice. And 
a child psychologist serves as a therapeutic helper and discusses topics such as 
self-image and confidence.  
An information leaflet describes the objective of these consultations as fol-
lows: “These people want to talk to you and your parents about everything con-
cerned with your lifestyle and your overweight. For instance, how much you eat 
and drink, what the rules and agreements are in the home are with regard to eat-
ing and drinking, what sort of physical exercise do you get and how much your 
overweight bothers you”.534 
The third phase of the intervention is the actual treatment programme. 
Every child has his or her own personal goals. Furthermore, a personal buddy is 
assigned to every child for support and motivation during the programme. Educa-
tion on healthy lifestyle, healthy nutrition, self-confidence and dealing with diffi-
cult moments takes place during seven biweekly group sessions (for between 
eight and ten participants), spread out over three months. As a follow-up, several 
‘booster sessions’ are organised over the course of two years to discuss problem 
solving and relapse prevention techniques. Besides participating in group ses-
sions, every child works on his or her own personal life style change, which in-
cludes integrating physical exercise into their daily life pattern. 
 
While ‘The Hague buddies programme’ is specifically developed for children and 
adolescents, the ‘Exercise on prescription’535 programme is developed for adults 
between 18 and 65 years of age with physical complaints resulting from a lack of 
exercise. The origins of this programme go back to the late 1990s. General practi-
tioners were increasingly being confronted with patients who kept returning 
every few months with the same complaints, such as joint or neck pain. Instead of 
                                                   
534 Information leaflet ‘Haagse Maatjes’ (my translation, RP).  
535 In Dutch: ‘Bewegen op recept’; http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/ 
to/Gezond-bewegen-en-sporten.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011. However, per 1-1-2012 the 
municipal subsidy was stopped as part of a broader set of cutbacks. At the time of the study (fall 
2011), there were talks between two health insurance companies and the municipality about 
developing a stripped down version of ‘Exercise on prescription’. 
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prescribing painkillers to these patients as a temporary solution, they thought 
physical exercise might be a structural answer to their complaints. The objective 
of ‘Exercise of prescription’ was to realise a structural prevention of disease 
through lifestyle change, instead of an incidental cure through medicine. 
The aforementioned group of patients may have access to sports facilities, 
but for many reasons do not use them. Shame stops overweight people from en-
tering a gym, husbands of migrant women do not allow them to visit sports facili-
ties, or lack of support causes people not to follow through on their intentions to 
lose weight. The programme ‘Exercise on prescription’ is specifically developed 
for adults in the lower socio-economic strata (where overweight is a larger prob-
lem than in the higher strata) who do not exercise and, as a result, suffer from 
health problems (such as diabetes, COPD or disorders of joints) or are at a high 
risk of developing health problems. 
General practitioners and physiotherapists can prescribe exercise treat-
ment for their patients. This prescription allows patients to follow an exercise 
programme for only a small fee – most of the costs are covered by a municipal 
subsidy or health care insurance.536 People exercise in small groups with fellow 
patients over the course of 16 weeks for one hour per week in a nearby gym. The 
course is preceded by an intake and a fitness test, and concluded with an evalua-
tion and another fitness test to monitor the progress made. Professional supervi-
sion is present during the programme to motivate the patients and help them get 
past difficult moments.  
The programme also has an educational element. The objective is to sus-
tain a behavioural change after the actual exercise programme has ended and 
thereby prevent people from relapsing into old habits. The ‘healthy lifestyle’ mod-
ule consists of several information sessions with a dietician (also called ‘lifestyle 
advisor’) who advises on healthy nutrition, and of four sessions to acquaint the 
patients with and stimulate enthusiasm for a variety of sports such as active walk-
ing and swimming.  
 
A final example of personal support comes from the realm of mental health care. 
Here too, children are an important target group. Children growing up in unfa-
vourable circumstances (such as parents with mental disorders and families with 
a history of domestic violence), children with mild complaints (such as behav-
ioural problems, eating disorders, and anxiety), and children with underdevel-
                                                   
536 Two health insurance companies with many patients in The Hague’s disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods cover part of the costs of ‘Exercise on prescription’ for their customers. How-
ever, this is only the case if patients already have an ‘indication’, that is, if they are already suf-
fering from an illness. People with a high risk of developing illnesses have more trouble finding 
funds. See: “Eindrapportage Bewegen op Recept Nieuwe Stijl Scheveningen” (2011). 
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oped social skills are eligible for interventions by mental health care.537 Many 
preventive mental health interventions are either subsidised by the municipality 
or covered by health insurance after referral by a general practitioner. 
The ‘Squeak said the mouse’ intervention538 has been developed for chil-
dren between 4 and 7 years old, who are or have been confronted with domestic 
violence, stress, addicted parents, or parents with mild mental complaints. These 
and other circumstances can lead to neglect of a child, anxiety, a child taking over 
household responsibilities, underdeveloped communicational skills, et cetera. 
Statistically, one in three children of parents with addiction or mental problems 
will go on to develop behavioural problems or mental disorders.539 In most cases, 
eligible children are referred to mental health care by youth care, schools, general 
practitioners or the municipal health service.  
Once children have been referred, the mental health care organisation 
seizes this opportunity to bring the entire family into the picture. Before starting 
the ‘Squeak said the mouse’ intervention, a mental health care employee makes a 
house call to assess the family situation and gain the trust of the parents. Getting 
through to parents is not always easy, and house calls “often require patience and 
persistence; sometimes it takes many phone calls, defying broken door bells and 
closed doors before you make it into somebody’s house”.540 However, according to 
one of the employees, once inside “it is in most cases immediately clear whether 
something is wrong in a family, in the way a child interacts with you, its parents or 
other children, and in the way the household is managed”. 
The actual intervention aims to “invest in children’s protective factors”, 
such as a good parent-child relationship, a supportive social network, and in-
creased social and verbal competences of the child.541 Over the course of 15 
weekly sessions, a group of roughly 8 children is trained to recognise problematic 
situations and put them into words, to improve their self-image, and to teach them 
to handle their emotions. This is done in a playful manner: a hand doll in the form 
of a mouse named ‘Squeak’ introduces a new subject each session, such as anxiety, 
anger, sadness, self image, happiness and seeking support. The children are in-
vited to help the toy mouse deal with his emotions.  
In addition, five group sessions are organised for the parents to discuss is-
sues such as regularity, positive attention and security. At the end of the training, 
                                                   
537 http://www.dejutters.com/dejutters_com/db0719727b78273b604fb3a815168637.php; 
consulted d.d. 23-9-2011. 
538 In Dutch: ‘Piep zei de muis’. The intervention is named after a hand doll in the form of a 
mouse, which plays an important role during the sessions. 
539 “Piep zei de muis”, 2011:11. 
540 “Piep zei de muis”, 2011:8. 
541 “Piep zei de muis”, 2011:12-13. 
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the mental health care organisation asks the parents for consent to invite their 
children to participate in future leisure activities organised by the mental health 
care department. Especially if there are severe concerns about a child’s wellbeing, 





3.7.1. Healthy in body and mind 
The objective of the inquiry into the activities of health promotion in The Hague’s 
municipal policy programme ‘Healthy Together’ was to gain insight into the role 
of prevention in these activities, and thereby to support the findings in the afore-
mentioned policy history. An analysis of the intervention repertoire in The Hague 
showed how the perspective of prevention determines both the selection of the 
objects of intervention and the nature of the subsequent intervention repertoire. 
 
To start with the former prevention-related characteristic of the ‘Healthy To-
gether’ programme, of particular concern are non-communicable diseases such as 
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and several forms of cancer. Since these dis-
eases can to a large extent be traced back to unhealthy behaviour such as smok-
ing, excessive drinking, lack of physical exercise and poor nutritional habits, the 
lifestyle of citizens is the logical focal point of the municipal public health policy. 
Citizens are not the passive victims of disease, but can actively contribute to their 
own and to public health. Given this objective of behavioural change, not the hu-
man body, but the human mind is the logical object of interventions.  
Taking the human mind as object of intervention implies that citizens are 
active contributors to their own health. Citizens themselves are responsible for 
changing their lifestyle. The municipal approach is characterised by the strategy of 
enticement. Enticing citizens to change make positive lifestyle changes appeals to 
citizens’ own responsibility and self-interest on the one hand, while enabling the 
municipality to express and actively promote certain health norms on the other 
hand. 
Enticement emphasises the choices which citizens themselves can make 
with regard to lifestyle. It acknowledges that behavioural change often requires 
more than providing objective health information, but at the same time avoids 
promoting health norms in an explicitly normative, preachy or imperative man-
ner. People often do not ‘automatically’ behave rationally, but require comple-
mentary interventions in the opportunity structure (such as cycling lanes and 
healthy canteens), personal motivation to follow through on a lifestyle change 
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(such as personal support in case of obesity), and the transfer of health norms 
through health activities, campaigns and education at schools.  
At the same time, enticement is more like to yield a sustained lifestyle 
change as the changes are not imposed: citizens are persuaded, supported, moti-
vated or called upon to make the change voluntarily. In the words of one of the 
municipal ‘health brokers’, “interventions have more effect if people have the feel-
ing they can choose a healthier life themselves”. Enticement can be understood as 
a pedagogical strategy. It aims to enable people to take responsibility for their 
own health and does so by using a variety of pedagogical techniques. 
 
3.7.2. The closed order of prevention 
The nature of this pedagogical intervention repertoire can be analysed in terms of 
the common distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. 
Primary prevention or ‘health promotion’ aims to avert the development of dis-
eases through population-level measures and interventions. Secondary preven-
tion is the early detection of diseases, but can also be applied to the early detec-
tion of risk factors for the development of non-communicable diseases, such as 
overweight and obesity. And tertiary prevention refers to the aversion of disease 
progression, as well as to personalised interventions towards citizens with a high 
risk of developing non-communicable diseases in the future, for instance as a re-
sult of overweight or smoking. 
 
In terms of collective prevention, a distinction can be made between interventions 
in the opportunity structure and the transfer of health norms. To start with the 
former, the municipality of The Hague intends to rearrange the opportunity struc-
ture in such a way that people are stimulated to make healthy decisions. Citizens 
make their daily health choices in a given social structure and environment. This 
opportunity structure is often full of unhealthy temptations, such as fast-food 
vendors, cigarette vending machines and motorised transport. In short, it is a “fat-
making environment”.542 Interventions to promote healthy choices include the 
construction of unobstructed walking paths and safe and well-kept cycling lanes, 
the development of sports courts in citizens’ direct living environment, and by 
ensuring that healthy foods are offered in schools canteens. 
The transfer of health norms intends to raise awareness among the general 
public on the importance of a healthy lifestyle and appeal to citizens’ self-
discipline. Ideally, the municipal activities make “healthy living the norm in a [...] 
                                                   
542 http://www.denhaag.nl/home/bewoners/zorg-en-welzijn/GGD-en-gezondheid/to/Actie 
programma-Gezond-gewicht-1.htm; consulted d.d. 16-6-2011; my translation, RP. 
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municipality”.543 Providing objective information is one of the techniques em-
ployed, but certainly not the only one. A complementary technique is social mar-
keting, which aims to convey the message that it can be easy and fun to integrate 
“lifestyle rules”544 with regard to nutrition and exercise into a daily living pattern. 
Other techniques include health education at schools, health projects and activi-
ties in the neighbourhood, and training mothers to become “ambassadors” of the 
municipal approach towards overweight and obesity. 
In collective prevention, there are no panaceas to realise behavioural 
change. No single measure or technique is effective enough. Instead, a “prevention 
mix”545 is proposed. The broad range of interventions in terms of collective pre-
vention is not a random collection. Instead, it is a deliberate combination of vari-
ous techniques to increase the chance of ‘getting through’ to citizens. Not every 
citizen responds in the same way to a measure or incentive. For some, information 
is enough. For others, social marketing or rearranging the opportunity structure 
might be more effective.  
 
However, collective prevention is not always successful in preventing diseases or 
stopping the continuation of an unhealthy lifestyle. To select the individual cases 
for which collective prevention is insufficient, several forms of early detection are 
included in the programme ‘Healthy Together’. Early detection enables interven-
tions in a stage when an undesirable future can still be averted. As such, it is the 
precondition and selection mechanism for early interventions. 
Of special importance is the identification of health risks among adoles-
cents and especially younger children. The basis for unhealthy habits and routines 
is often laid at an early age. Moreover, children are more susceptible to behav-
ioural interventions than adults. As such, children form a logical target group for 
early detection of health risks, such as signs of overweight or mental disorders. 
Schools have an important role in this respect.546 Even when parents are not in-
clined to visit general practitioners or youth health care, their children can be 
reached at school. 
                                                   
543 http://www.jongerenopgezondgewicht.nl/; consulted d.d. 4-10-2011. 
544 Gezond Gewicht 2010-2014, 2011:14. 
545 Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 2007:12 (my translation, RP). 
546 Many aspects of the interventions in the programme ‘Healthy Together’ converge at schools 
– and especially at primary schools: collective prevention in the form of health education and 
healthy canteens, early detection in the form of regular monitoring of children’s weight, and 
referral to youth health care or a paediatrician for personal support in case of overweight and 
obesity. Schools have a role as “co-educator” or “co-norm setter” (Natuurlijk: matig met alcohol!, 
2007:22; my translation, RP). Children themselves often do not choose an unhealthy life. Par-
ents have a major influence on children’s habits with regard to nutrition and exercise. Schools 
are especially justified in promoting a healthy lifestyle if parents fail to do so. 
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The purpose of early detection is the identification of individual citizens at a high 
risk of developing non-communicable diseases in the future. These citizens are 
eligible for personal support, such as intensive programmes for children, adoles-
cents and adults with overweight or obesity to lose weight and make structural 
changes in their unhealthy lifestyle. The purpose of these interventions is to miti-
gate the negative effects of an already established health problem or to prevent 
health risks from developing into actual problems. Welfare workers and general 
practitioners do not wait for these citizens to report themselves, but instead try to 
offer care and support as soon as they have detected health risks.547 
 
A general characteristic of this preventive intervention repertoire is its closed 
order. The repertoire presents a ‘closed order’ in the sense that it, at least ideally, 
has an all-embracing range. Citizens are enticed to lead a healthy life through 
population-level interventions in the opportunity structure and through the trans-
fer of health norms. These measures are designed to reach as many people as pos-
sible – which does not imply that all measures ‘affect’ every citizen in the same 
way. 
Ideally, nothing escapes attention in a ‘closed order’. If collective meas-
ures fail to have the desired effect, there is a broad repertoire for early detection 
of health risks among the population, as well as a broad awareness among 
schools, general practitioners and welfare organisations for early signs of health 
problems.  
And finally, the preventive intervention repertoire is a ‘closed order’ in 
the sense that, at least ideally, a follow-up activity is organised for every detected 
health risk. Once a risk is identified, a personalised approach is offered with the 
objective to structurally prevent this risk from developing into a disease. Ideally, 
no identified risk is left untouched. 
  
                                                   
547 Besides these ‘outreaching approaches’, there are also several forms of personal support for 
which citizens can apply themselves. Examples include cycling lessons for migrant women, self-
help websites for mental complaints, and courses to help people quit smoking. The municipality 
and welfare organisations involved aim to make these services as accessible as possible. 
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6. CONCLUSION: THE PREVENTION STATE 
 
 
“Man is not fitted for society by nature, but by discipline.” 
 





The case studies548 on Dutch crime policy and public health policy reveal that the 
transformative force of the preventive gaze for our understanding of the state is 
not just a theoretical presumption, but also an empirical reality. Historically 
speaking, prevention may not be a new phenomenon, but its increasing influence 
on the state is. Over the course of 30 years, the approach to crime became trans-
formed from a judicial reaction to problem-oriented proaction. A broad repertoire 
of technical prevention measures, increased surveillance, interventions in the 
opportunity structure, early detection of problem adolescents, and detention or-
ders for the treatment of habitual offenders has been developed, which have con-
spired to render the judicial response the last resort in crime and security policy. 
And the approach to public health has seen a transformation from a medi-
cal to a behavioural policy paradigm since the 1980s. The 19th century epidemio-
logical paradigm has been expanded from infectious or communicable diseases to 
typical late-20th and early-21st century lifestyle or non-communicable diseases. 
Besides prevention of disease as protection against external threats that are be-
yond the control of individual citizens, prevention concerns the endogenous 
health threats within the control of individual citizens. Interventions in lifestyle 
patterns with regard to nutritional habits, physical exercise, and tobacco and al-
cohol use aim to prevent the development of cardiovascular diseases, diabetes 
and several forms of cancer. 
In the following, these transformations are discussed in more detail to an-
swer the central research question: How can the impact of the increasing domi-
nance of the preventive gaze on the contemporary Western European state be un-
derstood? Given their degree of similarity, the findings on the developments in 
                                                   
548 The conclusions drawn in the following on the impact of the preventive gaze on the state are 
solely based on the two policy genealogies and not on the three policy practices. These latter 
served as illustrations – their methodological status does not allow generalised inferences to be 
made. For a further discussion, see the chapter on the research design. 
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crime and public health policy are discussed together.549 These similarities sug-
gest a common underlying logic of intervention. Based on the case of the Dutch 
state and on the theoretical notions on Western European state development, a 
more general theory on developments in the image of the Western European state 
is presented in the following (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
First, the two tentative or ‘sensitising’ (Blumer, 1954) presumptions regarding 
transformations in the range and depth of state interventions are discussed (cf. 
Finer, 1997:63). Following the immanent logic of the notion of prevention in the 
opening chapter of this study, the introduction of the preventive gaze in the realm 
of the state has been presumed to structurally expand the range of state activities 
and to produce a risk-oriented intervention repertoire. These transformations 
have been analysed in the case studies of Dutch crime policy and public health 
policy along the lines of definition power and intervention power.  
The former type of power is the capability of a sovereign state to deter-
mine the range of its own role and responsibility, as well as the range of politically 
                                                   
549 However, the intervention repertoire in crime policy seems to be broader and more in depth 
than the preventive repertoire in public health policy – even though the latter has seen a politi-
cisation of lifestyle. Several possible explanations suggest themselves for this difference in in-
tervention power. 
First of all, crime is related to victimhood – either directly or indirectly in terms of feel-
ings of insecurity among the general public. In contrast, the relation between unhealthy behav-
iour and societal problems is less obvious. On an aggregated level, poor public health will affect 
society’s labour productivity. A person is the victim of his own unhealthy behaviour, but the 
victim of someone else’s criminal behaviour. As a consequence, citizens’ own responsibility for 
health tends to be a more valid argument than citizen’s own responsibility for preventing his 
becoming a victim of crime (even though citizens are actively spurred to improve technical 
prevention with regard to their property). Support for this argument can be found in the rela-
tively strict approach to smoking: the fact that passive smokers are unwilling victims has served 
as an important justification for more intensive interventions. 
Second, crimes are committed by a relatively small number of citizens, whereas un-
healthy behaviour is a more general societal characteristic. As a result, individual criminals or 
risk citizens can be isolated from the general public as the object of in-depth interventions. 
Deviant behaviour in crime policy is limited to a minority, as a result of which law-abiding citi-
zens tend to feel less affected by many interventions, even if these are directed at the public 
domain. For instance, when, in response to increased surveillance and monitoring, people claim 
they have ‘nothing to hide’, they are expressing the feeling that surveillance is there to protect 
them against a deviant minority. In contrast, unhealthy behaviour is characteristic for a far 
larger part of the population. As a result, more people feel affected instead of protected by pub-
lic health interventions. This might limit the justification for more in-depth state interventions. 
And third, the negative effects of criminal behaviour are more immediate than the 
negative effects of unhealthy behaviour. Health problems tend to become visible after an ex-
tended period of time, whereas victimhood occurs immediately after a crime has been commit-
ted. The visibility of a problem might be a justification for a more intensive policy and the lack 
of visibility might lead to underestimation of a problem. 
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relevant societal phenomena. Constituting elements of definition power are the 
definition of problems for which the state is called into action, the objectives to be 
pursued by this action, and the limitation of responsibility for the approach of 
identified problems. The latter type of power is the capability of a sovereign state 
to determine the nature of state interventions, as well as the depth to which state 
power should penetrate into society. Constituting elements of intervention power 
are the organisational characteristics of the state’s intervention repertoire, the 
identification of objects of intervention, and the repertoire of techniques and in-
struments to exert power. 
In line with the theory-generating objective of this study, the following 
analysis of transformations in Dutch crime policy and public health policy is struc-
tured as an outline of the ‘prevention state’.550 This notion is put forth to give con-
ceptual coherence to the developments described in the two case studies. Next to 
the images of the constitutional state and the welfare state551, the notion of a pre-
vention state is put forward as a means to understand contemporary Western 
European political reality.  
The introduction of this notion does not aim to suggest that every activity 
of the contemporary state can be understood through this lens. Instead, it deliber-
ately focuses on one element of state development in order to show a substantial 
transformation in our understanding of the state. This does not rule out the rele-
vance of other labels, which focus on different important aspects – such as the 
aforementioned constitutional state, welfare state and regulatory state. Moreover, 
a singular notion such as the ‘prevention state’ is always a deliberate simplifica-
tion from a far more heterogenous intervention repertoire. For instance, devel-
opments in crime policy also show an increase in repression and not merely in 
prevention. Also, there might even be examples of practices going against preven-
tion, such as more ‘resilient’ strategies in flood prevention, traffic safety and nu-
clear safety (cf. Wildavsky, 1988) and widespread risk-taking practices by citizens 
in entrepreneurship, sports and gambling. However, these and other counter-
indications cannot divert attention from the transformations described in this 
study.  
 
                                                   
550 This term, or an equivalent thereof, was also used by Denninger (1990), Steiker (1998), 
Krasmann (2007), Van Gunsteren (2008) and Huster and Rudolph (2008) in their analyses of 
contemporary policymaking, most notably contemporary crime policy. 
551 These are, however, not the only possible concepts to refer to the image of the contemporary 
state. For instance, other authors analysing contemporary developments have referred to the 
‘regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994), the ‘surveillance state’ (Lyon, 2007), the ‘panoptic state’ 
(Bannister, 2005) or the ‘empty state’ (Frissen, 1999). 
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Second, the outline of the prevention state is followed by a discussion of the his-
torical context in which its emergence can be understood. This includes an analy-
sis of the way the previously identified mechanisms of state development have 
been actuated by the preventive gaze. In the crime policy case, concerns for the 
state’s role as ultimate arbiter in society and popular concerns for public order 
relate to mechanisms of state development. And in the public health policy case, 
important mechanisms are concerns for the labour productivity, as well as popu-
lar demands for facilities to lead a healthier life. A discussion of these mechanisms 
aims to gain tentative insight into the way the preventive gaze has moved con-
temporary political reality beyond the images of the constitutional and welfare 
state. 
The mechanisms of state development provide an understanding of the 
specific historical trajectory of the prevention state, but do not provide insight 
into the social conditions under which these developments take place, and of 
which these developments are a logical or understandable consequence. For this 
purpose, specific characteristics of the contemporary Western European belief 
system and social system are discussed. The preventive gaze is a defining charac-
teristic of the Western European belief system and determines the way we per-
ceive and deal with risks and vulnerabilities. And the specific characteristics of 
late-modern industrialised, individualisation and urbanised societies determine to 
a large extent the nature of the risks identified by the preventive gaze. Prevention 
is not just a policy strategy, but is part of a broader cultural pattern and is, there-
fore, an almost inescapable way of looking at social reality. 
 
Finally, several implications of the emergence of the prevention state for the rela-
tion between state and society are discussed. The expansive tendencies of the 
preventive gaze have important consequences for the range and depth of state 
interventions. The range of state interventions is broadened to include many 
forms of everyday behaviour and thus silently usurps previously state-free do-
mains of social life. For instance, crime prevention implies an increase of surveil-
lance in the public domain, and prevention of health risks implies a politicisation 
of lifestyle.  
The depth of state interventions is determined by the objective to influ-
ence the perceived causes of potential harm. The preventive gaze identifies risks 
and targets these perceived causes for state intervention. In social policies, this 
implies an emphasis on behavioural interventions and a subsequent politicisation 
of everyday life. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the necessity and 




2. An outline of the prevention state 
 
2.1. Definition power 
 
2.1.1. Beyond the models of the constitutional and the welfare state 
In both crime policy and public health policy, a deliberate change of strategy was 
made in the mid-1980s. According to Dutch government, the traditional modes of 
government were unable to deal effectively with contemporary problems. In its 
1985 Society and Crime memorandum, the government pointed to the overbur-
dening of the judicial apparatus as a consequence of rising crime figures during 
the preceding 15 years. The punitive interventions on the part of  the judicial ap-
paratus had signally failed to achieve a structural reduction in crime figures. In 
other words, the traditional constitutional state and the practices of law enforce-
ment and administration of justice were now regarded being as no longer ade-
quate in the face of high crime figures. A new strategy, complemented by a more 
effective role of police and judicial apparatus was deemed necessary to reclaim 
the state’s role as a credible law enforcer.552 
For public health policy, the 1986 Memorandum on the Development of 
Public Health Policy emphasised the limitations of the health care system. In the 
face of the soaring rates of non-communicable or lifestyle diseases, such as cardi-
ovascular diseases, several forms of cancer and diabetes, the existing strategies to 
improve the status of public health had run up against their limitations. A curative 
approach was ineffective in the case of diseases of a chronic and degenerative 
nature. And the already existing preventive repertoire only dealt with protection 
of the population against the sources of communicable diseases, which lay beyond 
the control of individual citizens. While high crime levels threatened the state’s 
role as law enforcer, a decreasing level of public health was a threat to labour 
productivity.553 Moreover, since the 1983 constitutional law review, the Dutch 
state had been under a constitutional obligation to institute measures to promote 
public health. 
 
                                                   
552 As Ericson and Haggerty (in Baker & Simon, 2002) point out, the police have very little 
chance and insufficient capacity to control crime directly by encountering crimes in progress. 
Without prevention, it is largely dependent on reactive investigative strategies. 
553 Whether prevention of lifestyle diseases is also a valid financial argument is debateable. On 
the one hand, prevention increases life expectancy and thereby increases health care demands 
in the long run. On the other hand, prevention of chronic diseases such as diabetes reduces the 
costs of a sustained use of medication. 
352 
 
In both crime policy and public health policy, an important “temporal shift” 
(Zedner, 2007)554 occurred during the mid-1980s, which gradually permeated 
policymaking in the following years. Crime was no longer approached through a 
merely reactive judicial strategy, but also through a strategy to prevent the occur-
rence of crime in the first place. And disease was no longer approached through a 
merely reactive curative strategy, but also through a strategy to prevent the oc-
currence of diseases resulting from an unhealthy lifestyle – which complemented 
the existing preventive strategy directed at exogenous health threats.  
The temporal shift in policymaking regards the objects and justification of 
state intervention. Thinking about social reality in terms of risks may be charac-
teristic for the modern outlook in general (e.g. Bernstein, 1996), but the specific 
development here concerns the idea that these risks should become the objects of 
state intervention. Whereas the constitutional state brought the risk or chance of 
being penalised following criminal behaviour, and the welfare state introduced 
insurance against risks to compensate for whatever fate may bring, the preventive 
logic of intervention shifts attention to the moment in time when crime or injury 
has yet to occur.  
Reactive strategies – whether judicial or medical – are thus reduced to a 
last resort or ‘ultimum remedium’. Prevention ‘precedes’ the traditional modes of 
government in the constitutional and welfare state.555 As a consequence, this tem-
poral shift broadens the state’s intervention repertoire to all identified determi-
nants of undesirable phenomena. The social risks of crime and disease are the 
focal point and justification for prevention, not the individual crimes or cases of 
disease. 
 
In the face of ever-rising crime figures, it became apparent to the government that 
merely penalising certain behaviour was not enough to deter citizens from com-
mitting crimes – and petty crime, such as burglary and vandalism, was a particular 
cause for concern. According to the government, petty crime thrived in an indi-
vidualised society, where social norms and social control have declined. A crime 
prevention strategy was seen as a means to compensate for these structural socie-
tal transformations – either by prevention of criminal behaviour in general (pri-
mary prevention), by early interventions in geographical areas and in the lives of 
specific individuals with high crime risks (secondary prevention) or by preven-
tion of further criminal behaviour in the future (tertiary prevention). 
                                                   
554 Although prevention has never been completely absent from crime and public health policy. 
For a short discussion, see the research design. 
555 Zedner (2007) refers to “an important temporal shift” in her discussion of the rise of the 
“pre-crime society” (2007:261), which “shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and fore-
stall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so” (2007:262). 
353 
 
Confronted with the emergence of lifestyle diseases, it became apparent to 
government that merely protecting society against exogenous health threats or 
providing care in case of disease did not prevent people from leading unhealthy 
lives. Structural transformations in society and the economy necessitated a new 
approach to disease: it was no longer poverty, but wealth that was contributing to 
health threats, in the guise of the availability of unhealthy nutrition, an economy 
that stressed non-physical labour, and the rise of motorised transportation. Pre-
vention, therefore, not only became relevant for health threats beyond the control 
of individual citizens (such as clean drinking water, food hygiene, sewerage and 
vaccination against contagious diseases), but also for health threats over which 
individual citizens do have control (unhealthy behaviour) – either by averting the 
development of lifestyle diseases in general (primary prevention), by early inter-
ventions towards citizens with an increased risk of becoming ill (secondary pre-
vention), or by preventing disease progression and reducing the negative impacts 
of a disease on an individual’s quality of life (tertiary prevention). 
 
2.1.2. A teleological perspective 
The objective to prevent a certain phenomenon from occurring implies a risk- and 
goal-oriented approach. In the case of social risks, the objectives for intervention 
are identified in societal processes. The traditional judicial response to crime is a 
task-oriented approach, concerned with fulfilling the legal obligation or task of 
meting out just punishment. It is not concerned with influencing the causes of 
crime. The same goes for the medical reaction to disease: it is primarily concerned 
with curing individual diseases, not with disease prevention and the improvement 
of public health. Both the judicial apparatus and the health care services are reac-
tion mechanisms to certain individual societal phenomena, but neither intervenes 
in actual societal processes.  
 
The teleological perspective underlying prevention requires the construction of a 
preventive theory, causal scheme or scenario. Prevention deals with the aversion of 
phenomena which are not (yet) present. Consequently, preventive interventions 
are based on theoretical assumptions regarding the future and its determinants. 
Prevention implies anticipation. A causal scheme consists of an undesirable future 
on the one hand, and the identification of risks on the other.  
These causal schemes are not necessarily watertight: risks are usually 
identified on the basis of statistical correlations (such as the relation between 
obesity and non-communicable diseases) or professional judgement (such as the 
risk of recidivism among juvenile delinquents) instead of validity in every indi-
vidual case. However, the empirical findings show that not every potential risk 
gives immediate cause for prevention: the commonly applied preventive theories 
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rest on indications for future harm, not on mere theoretical possibilities. Even 
though there is only a thin line between indication and possibility, in most cases 
some sort of identifiable cause for concern – be it problems at school, the first 
signs of overweight, or neighbourhoods that appear conducive to crime – is re-
quired to justify the implementation of preventive interventions. 
That said, several examples tend towards a logic of precaution instead of 
prevention. Fundamental uncertainty instead of identifiable risks may especially 
form the justification for action or non-action in the assessment of individual cas-
es. For instance, an uncooperative attitude by parents to outreach social work 
may serve as the argument to scale up to youth care: the not knowing is what con-
stitutes the justification for intervention. A similar logic may be present in the 
considerations of mayors whether to make use of preventive competences such as 
administrative confinement and home bans: preferring to be safe than sorry 
seems a realistic consideration here. A final example comes from the realm of 
surveillance and monitoring: refusal by young parents to fill in a survey, by ten-
ants to allow entrance to an intervention team, and by passengers to undergo an 
airport security scan are often assessed as suspicious and, hence, as justification 
for more intervention. 
 
With regard to crime policy, a preventive theory is constructed between criminal 
behaviour and four types of risks. First, risk citizens such as problem adolescents 
and habitual offenders are identified since their current behaviour gives reason to 
believe they have an increased risk of exhibiting criminal behaviour in the future. 
Several ‘life areas’ are used for the risk assessment of recidivism by delinquents, 
such as the possession of an ID, a job or schooling, financial means, a place to stay, 
and a non-delinquent social network. Problem adolescents are identified on the 
basis of factors such as their social network, absenteeism at school, family issues, 
and personality disorders. 
Second, risky places such as disadvantaged neighbourhoods are selected 
because of the higher risk of criminal behaviour in specific geographical areas. 
Subsequent interventions range from increased police surveillance to redesigning 
the opportunity structure and working on ways to change the population compo-
sition. A third type of risk closely related to risky places is that of risky times, 
which are selected on the basis of a higher risk of criminal behaviour at certain 
times of the day. Nights out are an important example of this. Today, increased 
police surveillance and cooperation between municipality, police and bars are 
frequently used measures to prevent crime or annoyance. Lastly, substances such 
as drugs and alcohol are identified as risk factors, since they can function as cata-
lysts for criminal behaviour. An alcohol disincentives policy is developed to pre-
vent people from drinking too much and at too young an age. 
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Regarding public health policy, a preventive theory is constructed be-
tween disease and endogenous determinants of health. Contrary to exogenous 
determinants of health, endogenous determinants are perceived as determinants 
over which individual citizens have control. Four lifestyle characteristics are iden-
tified as being the most important risk factors for the development of non-
communicable diseases: tobacco use, alcohol use, lack of physical exercise and 
unhealthy nutrition. Broadly speaking, the former two factors are tackled through 
a disincentives policy (including smoking bans in public buildings, higher excise 
duties, and minimum ages for the purchase of alcohol and tobacco products), 
while the latter two factors are tackled by means of an incentives policy (including 
the development of sport facilities in urban neighbourhoods, promoting the sale 
of healthy food in shops and canteens, and personalised support for children with 
obesity). 
 
Of considerable importance for the teleological perspective in the crime and in the 
public health policy is the introduction of, respectively, the security paradigm and 
the health paradigm. Prevention of social risks in itself implies a problem-
oriented, and consequently a societal approach, but the notions of crime and dis-
ease refer to judicial and medical, rather than societal, phenomena. Crime is an act 
defined as such by law. And disease is a physical or mental ailment defined as 
such by medicine. The notions of security and health do not refer to individual 
cases of crime or disease, but instead to a certain status or quality of social life. 
Security refers to the quality of the public domain. Next to crime, im-
portant elements of the security paradigm are annoyance, physical degradation 
and subjective feelings of insecurity. This explicitly societal perspective has ex-
panded the range of relevant objects of state intervention. Instead of concerns for 
the legal order, concerns for the public order now form the justification for inter-
ventions. 
Health is more than the absence of disease – it refers to a quality of life 
that enables citizens to fully participate on the economic and social level, unhin-
dered by physical or mental health problems. Because of this paradigm, the range 
of relevant objects of intervention has broadened from the cure or prevention of 
medical ailments to the promotion of factors contributing to a state of socially 
determined physical and mental wellbeing. 
The notions of security and health share a conceptual affinity with preven-
tion.556 Even though causality between these concepts cannot be determined, the 
                                                   
556 The conceptual affinity between security and health on the one hand, and prevention on the 
other, can be understood as a ‘Wahlverwandtschaft’. The relation between these concepts is 
neither predetermined nor coincidental. Instead, it is based on an elective affinity, as a result of 
certain shared features. Originally, the notion ‘Wahlverwandtschaft’ stems from 18th century 
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relation between them in crime and public health policy is a logical and tight one. 
Not only are they conceptually boundless – security, health and prevention can all 
be applied to a potentially endless range of relevant societal phenomena – but 
they also share an explicitly societal and teleological focus.557 This conceptual 
affinity makes it logical for prevention to be applied to security and health instead 
of solely to crime and disease. Prevention has become more than the absence of 
crime or disease. It also implies the aversion of all threats to public order558 and 
                                                                                                                                 
physics: “Whenever two substances which have some inclination to combine with one another 
are combined with one another and a third which has more affinity for one of the two is added, 
then it will combine with that one and exclude the other” (Ostwald, cited by Howe, 1978:374). 
As such, it was used by Goethe (1809) as a metaphor for social relations, more specifically to 
describe the moral realm of divorce and adultery.  
A century later, Max Weber uses the notion to describe social order and development, 
more specifically the relation between protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism 
(1904/1905). Underlying Weber’s use of the notion is a reversal of the Marxist order between 
base and superstructure (Weber, 2006:94). For Weber, the world is, in the end, structured by 
ideas – without losing sight of the material and personal interests which spur individual behav-
iour: “Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln 
der Menschen. Aber: die ‘Weltbilder’, welche durch ‘Ideen’ geschaffen wurden, haben sehr oft 
als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln 
fortbewegte” (cited in Weber, 2006:12). 
Underlying apparently ‘normal’ or ‘rational’ actions, specific normative ideas consti-
tute our definitions of normality: a structure of ideas which forms the basic rationale for human 
behaviour. These ideas – whether consciously experienced or fully internalised – constitute the 
social norms which oblige people to certain behaviour. For instance, the protestant ethic pro-
duces a structure of values within which people act in a specific way, which differs from the way 
people act in a catholic ethic. 
Idea-structures can share similarities or “intersecting meanings” (Howe, 1978:380). 
These similarities can serve as “transition points” (Howe, 1978:380), which people may choose 
to cross or not (‘wählen’) – which is to some extent a deliberate choice, but becomes an impera-
tive social norm once more and more people cross the intersecting paths. In Die Protestantische 
Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1904/1905), Weber described such a transition point 
between Protestantism and capitalism. The protestant ethic of labour, discipline and sobriety is 
related to the material culture, the idea of self-discipline, the practice of rational planning and 
the notion of ‘Beruf’. It has these features in common with rational means of production in a 
capitalist economy. There is no inherent or causal relation between the protestant ethic and the 
spirit of capitalism, but there is an affinity (‘Verwandtschaft’). Whether these affinities ‘find’ 
each other is not self-evident, but depends on the existence of enough “soziale Träger” to 
emerge, blossom and eventually become an independent force separated from its religious 
roots (cited in Weber, 2006:31). 
557 There are, of course, also differences between security and health on the one hand and pre-
vention on the other hand. For instance, security can also be promoted through retribution and 
reaction (such as administrative fines for disturbances and annoyance) and health can also be 
promoted through medical-curative interventions. 
558 Cf. Zedner (2007:265): “[...] seeking security implies a temporal shift pre-crime. Security is 
less about reacting to, controlling or prosecuting crime than addressing the conditions prece-
dent to it. The logic of security dictates earlier and earlier interventions to reduce opportunity, 
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the aversion of avoidable health loss. More specifically, the range of state inter-
ventions has been broadened to include the prevention of annoyance and feelings 
of insecurity, as well as the prevention of health loss for people who suffer from 
non-communicable diseases. The paradigms of security and health focus not on an 
undesirable phenomenon, but instead on ‘preventing, minimising and displacing 
loss’ (Zedner, 2007:265).  
 
2.1.3. Behaviour and responsibility 
The aforementioned temporal shift is a deliberate move beyond the models of the 
constitutional and the welfare state. The existing repertoires of judicial and medi-
cal responses were incapable of dealing with rising crime figures and a new breed 
of health threats, while the penalisation of certain acts did not cause citizens ‘au-
tomatically’ to behave according to legal norms. And the development of a health 
care system and the protection of the population against exogenous health threats 
did not make citizens ‘automatically’ behave in a healthy fashion.  
The introduction of prevention can be understood as a strategy to pro-
mote law-abiding and healthy behaviour. Therefore, the preventive gaze is also a 
behavioural perspective in policymaking with regard to social issues: the preven-
tion of crime and disease implies a behavioural change of citizens who show a 
tendency to deviate from a law-abiding or healthy lifestyle, or implies at the very 
least measures to stop the display of certain undesirable behaviour. Prevention 
not only broadens the scope of state interventions to cover various social risks, 
but also deepens the intervention repertoire to influence citizen behaviour or the 
societal processes and contexts in which citizens act. 
There are many techniques to influence citizen behaviour. Examples in 
crime policy include surveillance in the public domain, redesigning the opportuni-
ty structure, offering support for parents of problem adolescents, and developing 
reintegration programmes for habitual offenders. And examples in public health 
policy include promoting healthy nutrition through ‘social marketing’, creating 
low-threshold sport facilities, teaching health education at schools, and develop-
ing personal lifestyle programmes for obese adolescents. The common character-
istic of these and other measures is the politicisation of behaviour. Whether it is 
widespread surveillance in the public domain and the monitoring of children in 
crime policy, or lifestyle interventions regarding smoking, drinking, eating and 
exercising in public health policy: everyday activities become part of political con-
siderations.559 
                                                                                                                                 
to target harden and to increase surveillance even before the commission of crime is a distant 
prospect”. 
559 As Steinberger remarks, to define is already to judge: “Wherever the public authority decides 
either actively to interfere or not to interfere with an endeavor, it thereby determines the en-
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In the models of the constitutional and the welfare state, the state only intervenes 
following a breach of law or in response to a personal demand for health care, and 
in the case of risks that are beyond the control of individuals. In the model of the 
prevention state, the state intervenes before any breach of the law has occurred 
and in the form of an unsolicited form of care. This raises the question of what the 
justification for state interventions with regard to citizen behaviour is – especially 
since this new field of state interventions affects what was previously considered 
the autonomous domain of citizens. As the Dutch government sought to expand 
and deepen its preventive repertoire in crime policy and public health policy at 
the start of the 21st century, the rhetorical construction of shared responsibilities 
served as the justification for the redefinition of the role of the state. 
On the one hand, society was perceived as being vulnerable and depend-
ent on state interventions for the realisation of a secure public domain and a 
healthy life. Given the characteristics of contemporary society, government cannot 
leave citizens to their own fate. An individualised and urbanised society is vulner-
able to crime and insecurity. And non-physical labour and the availability of un-
healthy food often make it difficult to lead a healthy life. State interventions were 
presented as being in the interests of society. Crime prevention served the societal 
interests in a crime-free public domain. And a healthy life served every citizen’s 
interest in being able to fully participate in economic and social life. Hence, the 
prevention state was presented as a service-oriented state: there is no opposition 
or antagonism between state and society. In the eyes of Dutch government, the 
politicisation of everyday life is not the expression of an invasive state, but of a 
state which serves the interests of society. 
On the other hand, society was perceived as being part of the problem – 
citizen behaviour was the source of various risks to security and public health.560 
Given at least the practical and constitutional limitations to enforce behavioural 
change, the government also depended on society for the realisation of its preven-
tive ambitions. Therefore, the government made an appeal to citizen responsibility. 
Whereas interventions in the constitutional state were justified by the attribution 
of individual guilt, and interventions in the welfare by the attribution of (possible) 
victimhood, the core notion in the prevention state’s approach to its citizens is 
responsibility. 
‘Responsibility’, in the eyes of the Dutch government, refers not merely to 
citizens bearing the consequence of their own decisions, but also to use their abil-
ity to choose to behave in a specific way – or, more specifically, to choose for pre-
                                                                                                                                 
deavor itself to be a matter of public interest, something to be investigated, analyzed and evalu-
ated in terms of its contribution to the common good” (Steinberger, 2009:177).  
560 Of course, citizen behaviour is problematic in the reactive response to crime as well, but it is 
not regarded as the object of intervention. 
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vention. The government views ‘responsible behaviour’ as active participation in 
creating a more secure neighbourhood and as deliberately choosing for a healthy 
lifestyle. Hence, responsible behaviour implies that citizens freely choose to be-
have according to certain social norms, such as actively participating in security 
and living a healthy life – norms, which are perceived as being in citizens’ own 
best interests.561 
This rather ambiguous conceptualisation of both citizen and state respon-
sibility implies that the state is justified in intervening if citizens are unwilling or 
unable to take care of their own interests – in other words, if citizens refuse to act 
in accordance with certain legal or social norms or in so far citizens lack the will-
power to do so. Specifically for crime policy, the government aims to “become an 
ally of citizens” (CA, 2007:3; CA, 2010:3). This metaphorical alliance emphasises 
the shared interests between state and society as well as the state’s responsibility 
to protect society against threats to public order. And specifically for public health 
policy, government aims to “make the healthy choice the easy choice” (HN, 
2008:5). On the one hand, this motto emphasises citizens’ free choice with regard 
to lifestyle; on the other hand, it justifies state interventions to make citizens be-
have according to the social norm of a healthy life (and thereby, following gov-
ernment reasoning, in their own best interest).562 
 
2.2. Intervention power 
 
2.2.1. The organising principles of prevention 
The aforementioned change in problem definition necessitated a change in inter-
vention repertoire. This led the Dutch government to adopt three basic principles 
in the organisation of its intervention repertoire. These principles stem from the 
teleological nature of prevention, but also reveal the expansive logic of prevention. 
First, the organising principle of proximity expresses the tendency of prevention 
to get as close as possible to the identified risks. Second, the organising principle 
of coordination expresses the tendency of prevention to approach identified risks 
                                                   
561 Typical in this respect is the transformation of ‘solidarity’ in government’s considerations on 
public health policy from 2003 onwards. According to government, the solidarity underlying the 
health care system is at stake. However, solidarity is not required from the taxpayer, but from 
the citizen responsible for incurring unnecessary health care costs as a result of unhealthy 
behaviour. 
562 An almost archetypal example of this understanding of ‘responsibility’ is described by 
Faddegon & Tiemeijer (in Verhoeven & Ham, 2010:89). In public health policy, government uses 
labels on food products to inform customers about healthy products. One of these labels ex-
presses the ambiguity between conscious freedom of choice and explicit government transfer of 




as comprehensively as possible. And third, the organising principle of timeliness 
expresses the tendency of prevention to identify risks as early as possible and to 
develop subsequent interventions accordingly.563  
Government emphasis on these three organising principles in crime policy 
and public health policy suggests an increase in the effectiveness of prevention, as 
interventions are organised in closer proximity to the identified risks, with a more 
comprehensive scope and in an earlier phase of risk development. Ideally, the 
preventive gaze allows no risks to escape its attention and grasp: effective preven-
tion implies the construction of an intervention repertoire which enables a state 
to approach identified risks in an in-depth, all-embracing and swift fashion. 
 
The first organising principle of prevention to be adopted is the principle of prox-
imity, or the strategy to organise interventions as closely as possible to the identi-
fied risks. Three expressions of this principle can be discerned in Dutch crime 
policy and public health policy. First is the  emphasis on the organisation of inter-
ventions at the local or sub-municipal level, enabling interventions to be tailored 
to the specific security and health issues in local communities and neighbour-
hoods, and to be implemented at the times and places with the highest risks. In 
crime policy, a national network of local Security Houses is established, and the 
mayor is granted a pivotal role in the coordination of efforts by the municipality, 
police and public prosecutor. And in public health policy, national networks of 
Municipal Health Services and low-threshold Centres for Youth and Family are 
established for the development of preventive interventions. 
Second, preventive interventions are developed to influence citizens’ di-
rect social contexts or living environments, such as redesigning the physical op-
portunity structure in such a way that the possibilities for criminal behaviour are 
reduced (for instance through street lighting) or by enticing people to make 
healthier choices (for instance, by building sports courts). Another example is an 
intervention to modify the population composition in disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods, to reduce the concentration of inhabitants from the lower socio-economic 
strata, where crime levels are higher than in the middle class. And in public health, 
government might to choose to cooperate with various actors in citizens’ direct 
social context, such as food vendors, schools, sports clubs and general practition-
ers, to increase the availability of healthy food products in shops and canteens, to 
advise people about living a healthy lifestyle, and to entice people to exercise 
more often. 
                                                   
563 However, it should be stressed that especially the organising strategies of proximity and 
coordination are not limited to preventive interventions. 
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A third expression is that of personalised prevention, which is the most 
evident expression of the principle of proximity. Interventions directly aim to 
influence the behaviour of individual citizens identified as posing an increased 
risk for security or public health. Risk citizens, such as problem adolescents and 
habitual offenders, receive support and reintegration programmes that match 
their personal problems and situation. And people with an increased risk of de-
veloping diseases in the future, such as overweight children, are offered personal-
ised programmes to structurally change their unhealthy lifestyle. 
 
The second organising principle of prevention adopted by the government is the 
principle of coordination, or the strategy to approach identified risks as compre-
hensively as possible. This principle has two distinct expressions in policymaking. 
First, preventive interventions are organised through coordination and coopera-
tion between formally separated actors and domains. Prevention is not limited to 
a specific task or discipline. Boundaries between policy fields, between organisa-
tions or between disciplines may be logical from a task-oriented perspective, but 
are often perceived as barriers for effective interventions from a preventive per-
spective.564 If school absenteeism is a risk factor for criminal behaviour, compul-
sory education becomes a relevant element in crime prevention. And if a lack of 
physical exercise is a risk factor for the development of non-communicable dis-
eases, sports clubs become relevant actors in the prevention of disease.  
Several examples of coordination and cooperation between formally sepa-
rated organisations in crime policy can be mentioned. Security Houses are devel-
oped to organise data sharing and cooperation on individual cases between for-
mally separate organisations (including the police, municipality, public prosecu-
tor, compulsory education, and youth care). And the police, public prosecutor, 
correctional facilities and probation offices are aligned in such a way that they 
form an imaginary ‘chain’, in order to realise the seamless transfer of a detainee 
from one organisation to the other. Examples in public health policy include the 
introduction of ‘facet policy’ to identify health aspects in adjacent policy domains 
(such as housing, education, youth and urban planning), and the construction of 
an Covenant on Obesity between public and private actors to promote a healthy 
lifestyle. 
                                                   
564 The prevention perspective transcends existing organisational boundaries, and spawns new 
types of professionals (such as individual supervisors for offenders in their reintegration pro-
gramme), as well as expanding the perspective of professionals involved in prevention. The 
latter is clearly visible in the role of police officers in crime prevention: they are not only ex-
pected to write tickets for offences or arrest suspects, but also to report potential criminals or 
other individuals who are a ‘cause for concern’.  
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And second, the multiple simultaneously implemented measures need to 
be coordinated, since no single intervention is perceived as being effective enough 
to realise the government’s preventive objectives. The objective to prevent unde-
sirable behaviour is often pursued through a comprehensive and mixed set of 
interventions. This can, in part, be traced back to the distinction between primary, 
secondary and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention is realised through collec-
tive or population-level interventions, whereas secondary and tertiary prevention 
require more detailed interventions in geographical locations or individual behav-
iour identified as a source of increased risk. Each form of prevention requires a 
different set of interventions. 
However, mixed sets of interventions have been developed within each 
prevention category, as well. A repertoire of population-based crime prevention 
may consist of increased surveillance, promotion of technical prevention, and 
interventions in the opportunity structure. And a repertoire of personalised crime 
prevention usually consists of a combination of care and punishment (or rather 
support and discipline). For instance, habitual offenders can receive a two-year 
detention order, but this punitive element is combined with an intensive pro-
gramme to realise a structural lifestyle change (including treatment of personality 
disorders, drug and alcohol withdrawal, and daytime occupation).  
In public health policy, the approach to tobacco forms the archetypal ex-
ample of a mixed approach. Government tobacco disincentives policy does not 
ban the act of smoking itself, but aims to procure a change in lifestyle through 
education and information about the dangers of smoking, by raising excises on 
tobacco products, offering courses to help people stop smoking, introducing age 
limits for the sale of tobacco products, smoking bans in public buildings, and strict 
limitations on tobacco commercials. The logic behind such a comprehensive set of 
interventions is that people respond differently to disincentives: some might be 
convinced by adequate information, while others might stop smoking for financial 
reasons, and still others require support to kick their smoking habit. By develop-
ing a comprehensive web of mixed interventions, chances increase that a policy 
will be effective. 
 
The third organising principle of prevention to be adopted is the principle of time-
liness, or the strategy to identify risks at the earliest possible stage and to develop 
subsequent interventions as early as possible. Early detection and early interven-
tion are the two consecutive expressions of this principle. Prevention implies an-
ticipation of future developments and the ability to subsequently avert undesira-
ble future developments. In other words, prevention depends on an anticipatory 
and panoptic capacity for the early detection of risks, as well as on an interven-
tionist capacity for the subsequent approach to deal with these risks. Early detec-
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tion allows risks to be identified at a stage when they can still be prevented. In 
most cases, risks can be more easily averted in an early phase of their develop-
ment. 
Early detection is commonly pursued through research, monitoring and 
screening. On a collective level, research and monitoring can provide insight into 
the development of crime levels and public health levels, and in the identification 
of specific population groups or geographical areas representing an increased 
risk. And on an individual level, monitoring and screening can help to identify risk 
citizens, for instance through population screening of risk groups for various 
forms of cancer, or monitoring the weight development of children to detect 
overweight in an early phase. 
Early detection of individual risk citizens may also be pursued through 
professional assessment of personal problems. Examples of early detection 
through professional judgement include police officers who come across young 
children roaming the streets late at night, welfare workers who are notified of 
possible child abuse, compulsory education officers who suspect unauthorised 
absence by a student, probation officers who assess whether a detainee is eligible 
for probationary release, and housing corporation employees who presume illegal 
habitation. 
Furthermore, early detection also applies to relapse prevention. Examples 
include the detection of early signs of possible recidivism by habitual offenders, of 
relapse into previous addictions by drug users, of renewed domestic violence, of 
problem adolescents hanging out with criminal friends again, and of obese chil-
dren who threaten to lose the self-discipline to follow through a lifestyle change. A 
preventive perspective produces a tendency to permanently monitor identified 
risks for signs of relapse and to keep identified risk citizens in sight as long as 
possible – for instance by keeping files, making house calls, regularly assessing an 
individual’s situation, and organising follow-up sessions after an intervention. 
Early detection is not an end in itself, but serves as a means to realise ear-
ly intervention. Once certain target groups, disadvantaged neighbourhoods or 
individual citizens have been identified as a cause for concern, specific preventive 
interventions are possible. The earlier an intervention can take place in the devel-
opment of a risk, the more effective or easier prevention becomes – hence the 
need for a panoptic capacity to identify risks before they have become irreversi-
ble.  
Two often-used practices in crime policy and public health policy can be 
understood as a logical consequence of the preventive principle of early interven-
tion. First, organisations responsible for prevention ideally do not wait for citizens 
to report themselves if they require care or support. Instead, ‘outreach’ interven-
tions are organised that are aimed at ‘care avoiders’ and risk families who, accord-
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ing to professional judgement, are in need of care. In practice, this may take the 
form of unsolicited house calls by welfare workers to assess an individual’s or a 
family’s situation.  
And second, children and adolescents become a logical target group for 
state intervention. The basis for many behavioural problems – ranging from a 
criminal to an unhealthy lifestyle – is often laid during childhood. Children are 
generally also more susceptible to behavioural interventions than adults. And 
besides the effectiveness of preventive interventions towards children, further 
justification might follow from the vulnerability of children: if parents are likely to 
be incapable of fulfilling the task of preventing their children from developing 
undesirable behaviour (such as an unhealthy or criminal lifestyle) state interven-
tions are justified, to compensate for incompetent parental behaviour. Precisely 
because children cannot always be held responsible for their behaviour are they a 
legitimate object of intervention. 
 
2.2.2. The decent and healthy citizen as object and ideal 
A prevention perspective also transforms the objects and ideals of intervention. 
The reactive-judicial approach to crime has the delinquent as its object and a just 
sentence as its ideal. In contrast, crime prevention has the entire population, in-
cluding all decent and law-abiding citizens, as object of intervention. Not every-
body may be affected by the interventions in the same way and more specific in-
terventions may be developed towards specific geographical areas, target groups 
and individual citizens, but the basic assumption underlying crime prevention is 
that every citizen can, in principle, be a potential victim and a potential perpetra-
tor. There is no a priori exclusion of objects in the way the classical judicial ap-
proach is inherently limited to perpetrators and suspects. 
The decent citizen, who abides by the law and gives no cause to believe 
that he or she might break the law in the future, is the ideal of preventive inter-
ventions. Since the focus on social risks implies a behavioural perspective in poli-
cymaking, a certain standard for citizen behaviour is implicit in preventive inter-
ventions. More specifically, the decent citizen forms the model for interventions: it 
is the image or standard presupposed in practices of surveillance in the public 
domain, reintegration of habitual and juvenile offenders, and outreach interven-
tions geared towards risk families. 
And with regard to public health, the curative-medical approach to dis-
ease has the patient as its object and a recovery from disease as its ideal. Preven-
tion of disease, however, broadens the scope of interventions to the entire popula-
tion, including the healthy citizen. As with crime prevention, there are no a priori 
exclusions of objects of intervention since every citizen can, in principle, fall ill or 
develop an unhealthy lifestyle. Furthermore, the image of the healthy-living citizen 
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is the model for interventions – it is the implicit ideal in health promotion and per-
sonalised approaches towards citizens with an increased risk of becoming ill 
(such as obese or overweight children). In sum, instead of delinquents, citizens 
who have not (yet) committed crimes, and instead of patients, citizens who have 
not (yet) fallen ill are the focal point of preventive interventions. 
 
Collective interventions in the prevention of crime and disease have the entire 
population or the inhabitants of a specific geographical area as the object of inter-
ventions. However, such interventions as those involving the redesigning of the 
opportunity structure, population screening, an increase in tobacco excise duties, 
and surveillance activities do not necessarily affect each citizen equally or in the 
same way. For instance, citizens who already behave in a healthy fashion will not 
be affected by a rise in tobacco excises, and may even feel supported in their life-
style choices by a healthier range of food products in canteens and by smoking 
bans in public buildings. And decent citizens will perhaps experience increased 
surveillance or the monitoring of their children in a national ‘electronic youth 
dossier’ more as a form of protection than as a form of control, or may even feel 
unaffected by it – after all, the decent citizen has ‘nothing to hide’ (cf. Solove, 
2007). 
However, these collective interventions do aim to decrease the opportuni-
ties for deviant behaviour. Prevention implies a certain ideal or form of normality, 
which the decent and healthy citizen represents. The more someone deviates 
from this ideal, the more he or she will be affected by collective interventions. 
Therefore, the inherent flipsides of protection and support are control and disci-
pline: the experience of collective interventions changes as soon as the line be-
tween normality and deviance is crossed – a line, which, in the end, is determined 
by policymaking in general and by professional judgement in individual cases. 
The more someone deviates from the ideals of the decent and healthy citi-
zen or gives cause for assuming that he or she will do so (or continue to do so) in 
the future, the greater the chance he or she will be identified as a risk citizen, eli-
gible for more specific interventions. Risk citizens tend to be more numerous in 
the lower socio-economic strata and in disadvantaged neighbourhoods; a group 
constituted of habitual offenders, early school leavers, children from broken 
homes, children with signs of overweight, smokers, et cetera. But in principle, any 
citizen can be identified as a risk citizen, based on the degree of deviance exhibit-
ed from the norm.565  
                                                   
565 The explicit use of the word ‘risk’ expresses a form of blame and responsibility: “the term 
risk is […] a mechanism for investigating what has gone wrong and for the allocation of blame 
and liability” (Kemshall, 2002:83). This can also refer to a responsibility of organisations and 
professionals with the task to prevent or reduce risks, for instance in cases of family issues, 
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Personalised interventions geared towards risk citizens aim to produce a 
behavioural change, modelled on the ideal of the decent and healthy citizen. As a 
consequence, personalised interventions are a form of normalisation to prevent 
avoidable harm.566 Various examples show that the normalisation of risk citizens 
consists of a combination of care and discipline – especially in long-term and in-
tensive interventions. These two techniques may seem opposites at first sight, but, 
upon closer inspection, are often both necessary for the realisation of behavioural 
change – whether in parenting support, in support programmes for obese chil-
dren, or in reintegration programmes for habitual offenders.  
 
2.2.3. A web of incentives and disincentives 
Prevention has many faces. The objective of behavioural change can be pursued 
through many techniques. Moreover, a mixed and comprehensive approach to 
risk citizens, risky places and risk factors is deemed the most effective strategy in 
this respect. For instance, the government alcohol moderation policy consists of 
regulatory measures (age limits for sale and consumption), communicative 
measures (information campaigns), facilitative measures (discussion groups) and 
financial measures (excise raises).  
Six different preventive techniques can be distinguished in Dutch crime 
and public health policy. All these techniques aim for a behavioural effect. This 
objective gives the commonly identified legal, financial and communicative in-
struments (e.g. Van den Heuvel, 2005), as well as instruments of facilitation, coop-
eration and surveillance, a specific form and expression: they are typically con-
structed as regulatory techniques (cf. Sparrow, 2008) and aim to produce behav-
ioural incentives and disincentives (cf. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Tiemeijer, 2011). 
 
First, legal instruments are typically applied in the form of administrative regula-
tion. The problem-oriented nature of prevention implies a broader use of legal 
instruments than responding to criminal behaviour. Moreover, the use of legal 
instruments transcends the realm of criminal law and general legislation. Rather 
than seeking to penalise acts or attribute rights, administrative authorities com-
monly use legal instruments for the purposes of deterrence, discipline and disin-
                                                                                                                                 
child abuse and the treatment of delinquents with a hospital order. If, despite the efforts of 
professionals, a risk should occur, they may be held responsible: “Families that cannot parent 
and self-regulate will be assisted to do so, and children who are ‘at risk’ will receive state pro-
tection. […] This system not only holds families to account for harmful behaviours; it holds 
workers and managers to account for their decision-making” (Kemshall, 2002:89).  
566 Instead of, for instance, punishment, which can also have a normalising objective, but is 
applied only after a paricular harm has occurred. 
367 
 
centives. Prevention through legal instruments can be seen as the regulation of 
behaviour in the public domain. 
In crime prevention, the intervention repertoire available to mayors has 
been expanded by the introduction of several new and often broadly formulated 
formal legal authorities for preventing disturbances to the public order, such as 
CCTV-surveillance, preventive frisking, administrative confinement, restraining 
orders and temporary home bans (cf. Muller c.s., 2008; Brouwer & Schilder, 
2008). Furthermore, new detention orders have been developed for the treatment 
of habitual and juvenile offenders. And in public health policy, regulation is used 
to impose limitations on tobacco and alcohol use, including age limits, smoking 
bans in public buildings, and advertising constraints. 
 
Second, financial instruments are used to promote certain behaviour, an especial-
ly common practice in public health policy.567 Financial disincentives aim to reduce 
the number of smokers and problem drinkers, for instance, by raising tobacco and 
alcohol excises.568 Furthermore, subsidies are awarded to organisations, which 
promote a healthy lifestyle, such as the Dutch Nutrition Centre569 and the Centre 
for Healthy Living,570 and organisations which develop science-based interven-
tions for local crime prevention, such as the Centre for Crime Prevention and Safe-
ty.571 And finally, insurance companies are allowed to differentiate in their premi-
ums if clients participate in programmes which promote a healthy life style. The 
same financial incentive used by insurance companies may be used in crime pre-
                                                   
567 This study did not include an analysis of available financial means for prevention. Besides 
the fact that it is very difficult to gain insight into state expenditures for the entire repertoire of 
national and local preventive activities, the available financial means only tell a part of the story. 
Prevention does not need to be expensive to be influential, just as the fact that the health care 
system requires more financial means than the judicial apparatus says nothing about the influ-
ence of either of the two.  
In fact, an important argument for prevention is its cost-effectiveness. Prevention was 
presented as the answer to overburdened systems of judiciary and health care. In the case of 
crime policy, structural prevention is more efficient than repeated administration of justice and, 
moreover, reduces the societal costs of crime committed by habitual offenders. In public health 
policy, the situation is more complicated. According to Dutch research healthy behaviour leads 
to a reduction of health care expenditures as a result of improved public health on the one hand, 
and leads to higher health care expenditures as a result of a higher life expectancy on the other 
hand (IBO, 2007). Consequently, normative arguments also form an important justification for 
interventions to improve public health (IBO, 2007:7). 
568 At the same time, excises also make the consumption of these goods an important source of 
income for the state. 
569 In Dutch: ‘Voedingscentrum’. Among other things, the Nutrition Centre provides advice and 
practical guidelines to the general population for a healthy and balanced nutrition. 
570 In Dutch: ‘Centrum Gezond Leven’. Among other things, the Centre for Healthy Living pro-
motes the use of efficient lifestyle interventions in public health policy. 
571 In Dutch: ‘Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en Veiligheid’ (CCV) 
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vention as well, where technical prevention by citizens of their property is pro-
moted. 
 
Third, a broad range of communicative techniques, such as information, educa-
tion, enticement and persuasion, aim for the internalisation of behavioural norms. 
These techniques move beyond the image of the rational citizen. Objective infor-
mation campaigns on, for instance the importance of a proper nutrition, may be 
complemented by education at schools, by the ‘social marketing’ of norms for 
healthy living to the general public, and by moral appeals to the harm smokers 
cause to their fellow citizens.  
Moreover, individual risk citizens are actively persuaded to accept forms 
of care, such as parenting support for risk families, programmes to kick a drug 
addiction for habitual offenders and ‘care avoiders’, or lifestyle interventions for 
obese adolescents. Communication does not stop at rational information, but co-
vers every technique that can incentivise citizens to make the desired lifestyle 
change of their own accord. Besides ignorance, the problems communication 
seeks to overcome often also include a lack of willpower, self-confidence, self-
discipline, awareness or interest. 
 
Fourth, prevention often takes the form of active facilitation or ‘nudging’ (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). This should not be understood as the organisation of a facility, à 
la a correctional institution or health care service. Instead of creating ‘a facility’, 
facilitation deals with designing the proper settings and contexts for desirable 
behaviour. This can take the form of organising the facilities local authorities re-
quire for the implementation of preventive measures, such as Municipal Health 
Services in the realm of public health and Security Houses in the realm of security. 
But it can also take the form of designing the opportunity structure in such a way 
that it forms an incentive for desirable behaviour and a disincentive for undesira-
ble behaviour.  
Examples of facilitation in crime prevention include the ‘restructuring’ of 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods and arranging the public domain in terms of 
proper street lighting, public benches, clear sight lines and maintenance of streets 
and apartment blocks. And examples of facilitation in public health include con-
structing cycling lanes and sports courts, and influencing the ‘architecture of 
choice’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) through healthy canteens and a healthy food 
selection. 
 
Fifth, prevention through shared responsibilities and through the activation of 
citizens can be pursued through forms of cooperation between state and society. 
The implication of societal organisations and citizens as co-operators of policy-
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making can take the form of appealing to the self-interest of societal actors, to 
convince them to align their behaviour with the interests of government. Exam-
ples in the realm of crime policy are cooperation between municipalities and 
housing corporations, the police and bar owners, and the police and active citizens 
for activities of neighbourhood watch. And an example in the realm of public 
health is the Obesity Covenant, in which government cooperates with food pro-
ducers, food vendors, sports federations and insurance companies. 
However, cooperation can also have a less voluntary character. Consider, 
for example, the practice of incorporating behavioural norms into housing tenan-
cies. Housing corporations, in cooperation with police and municipality, aim to 
prevent undesirable or criminal behaviour such as nuisance or running a cannabis 
nursery by making this type of behaviour an explicit cause for home eviction. An-
other example is including an obligation for welfare organisations to contribute to 
personalised crime prevention in municipal subsidy contracts. 
 
Sixth and finally, prevention depends on a certain panoptic capability and sparks a 
desire for surveillance of the public domain and of individual risk citizens. The 
monitoring of everyday life is an important characteristic of contemporary society 
(Lyon, 2001). Surveillance not only contributes to the early detection of problems 
(as discussed above), but is also a subtle form of deterrence and discipline in it-
self. People commonly adjust their behaviour to the accepted norm when they 
know they are or may be observed (Foucault, 1975). Especially in crime preven-
tion, the state aims to make its presence visible in the public domain by increasing 
police and CCTV-surveillance, but also by keeping a close watch on known trou-
blemakers in the neighbourhood, on habitual offenders, and on offenders on pro-
bation. 
 
2.3. Toward a prevention state? 
The analysis of transformations in definition power and intervention power in 
Dutch crime policy and public health policy suggests an understanding of the 
state, which fundamentally differs from the previously distinguished constitution-
al and welfare state. On the basis of the Dutch case, it may be proposed that state 
development in Western Europe, as discussed in the second chapter of this study, 
has gone through an important transformation during the past 30 years. 
Interventions in the constitutional state are justified on the basis of in-
fringements of the law and interventions in the welfare state on the basis of harm 
caused by phenomena outside the control of individual citizens (through health 
care and social security or through equal opportunities for self-development). The 
preventive gaze shifts attention away from these reactive and compensatory 
logics, to the risks or causes of crime and harm. This ‘temporal shift’ (Zedner, 
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2007) transforms the focus of government to a moment in time when crime or 
harm has yet to occur. Instead of a reaction to crime or a compensation for harm, 
the preventive gaze produces a logic of intervention characterised by the selection 
of risks and the idea of avoidable harm. 
Of course, the constitutional state can be said to prevent deterioration of 
the legal order through deterrence by means of adequate law enforcement, ad-
ministration of justice and penalisation of crime; and the welfare state can be said 
to prevent mass poverty through social security and widespread disease through 
health care. The preventive logic of intervention differs with respect to its objects 
of intervention: the justification for state intervention lies in the future – that is, a 
phenomenon which has not occurred (yet). Prevention is justified by the identifi-
cation of risks, whereas the constitutional state’s interventions are justified fol-
lowing the occurrence of an undesirable phenomenon; the welfare state’s inter-
ventions compensate for harm and risks but do not actively have risks as object of 
intervention. 
 
This leads to the following conclusion in terms of the two previously formulated 
‘sensitising’ (Blumer, 1954) presumptions with regard to the consequences of the 
increasing dominance of the preventive gaze. First, the range of state activities is 
expanded by the preventive gaze. Whereas a constitutional state acts following an 
infringement of the law, the preventive gaze broadens the range of interventions 
to risk factors for infringements of the law and, following the security paradigm, 
more broadly to risk factors for disturbances in the public order. And whereas a 
welfare state acts to compensate for harm that occurs beyond the control of indi-
vidual citizens – either by providing insurance and health care or by ensuring 
equal rights to mitigate randomly acquired unequal life chances572 – the preven-
tive gaze broadens the range of interventions to address risk factors of avoidable 
                                                   
572 The difference between the creation of equal starting opportunities in life and the preven-
tion of avoidable harm lies in the teleological perspective of the latter. Creating equal starting 
opportunities aims to compensate for randomly acquired unequal life chances, but is not con-
cerned with what citizens actually do with these equal opportunities. In contrast, prevention of 
avoidable harm is explicitly concerned with the way citizens deal with their life chances.  
However, the latter might also be said of typical welfarist social work and community 
development. The difference with preventive interventions may at times in practice be a matter 
of details or of a different label (cf. Van Twist, 1995), but a fundamental distinction between 
prevention and welfare work lies in the former’s objective of risk aversion compared to the 
latter’s emancipatory objectives: prevention is about reducing possibilities for certain behav-
iour, while welfare work aims to open up possibilities for self-development. 
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harm, such as several diseases, problems in the upbringing of children or general 
threats to the quality of life.573  
Second, the preventive gaze produces a risk-oriented intervention reper-
toire. This is a logical conclusion following the previous remarks on the expanded 
range of interventions, but has several important implications for the depth of 
state interventions. The judicial response mechanism of the constitutional state 
and the facility-oriented compensation mechanism of the welfare state are, by and 
large, organised ‘outside’ or at a certain distance from societal processes. In con-
trast, prevention targets the risks leading to crime and avoidable harm.  
Risks, instead of existing harms are the object of intervention. In the social 
domain, with policy fields such as crime and public health, this implies targeting 
the ways in which citizen behaviour produces risks.574 Here, the risk-oriented 
intervention repertoire is characterised by behavioural interventions. Moreover, 
such an intervention repertoire is commonly organised as closely as possible to 
the identified risks (proximity), as comprehensively as possible (coordination) 
and as early as possible (timeliness). 
The pivot of prevention is administration. The preventive gaze serves as a 
typical example of a ‘telocracy’, rather than a ‘nomocracy’ (De Jouvenel, cited by 
Van der Graaf & Hoppe, 2007) – of rule through positive goals, instead of laws that 
merely set the boundaries for acceptable social behaviour. As a consequence, pre-
vention thrives and expands in the discretionary spaces of the rule of law, such as 
in a mayor’s formal competence to uphold public order, in the individual assess-
ments of street-level bureaucrats, in the broad, constitutional duty of the state to 
promote public health, and in vague notions of security and health. 
 
These transformations in range and depth of state interventions suggest the 
emergence of a new understanding of the contemporary Western European state: 
a prevention state. It is an understanding that does not replace that of the constitu-
tional and welfare state, but one that offers a complementary model to under-
                                                   
573 In the case of public health, this preventive logic of intervention refers to both exogenous 
and endogenous health threats. Since the approach to exogenous health threats stems from the 
late 19th century, prevention in public health predates the medical-curative approach to disease. 
574 However, it should be pointed out that a different case selection might have resulted in a 
different outcome with regard to this second hypothesis. Policy domains which deal with physi-
cal or natural risks, such as industrial accidents and climate change, might identify non-
behavioural risk factors as well. Furthermore, prevention in public health is not limited to en-
dogenous health threats: health protection deals with non-behavioural exogenous health 
threats beyond the control of individual citizens, such as water and food hygiene, and vaccina-
tion against contagious diseases. 
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stand contemporary political reality.575 Based on the empirical findings in the 
Dutch case, the prevention state may be said to have been born out of a desire to 
respond to new societal issues in the 1980s. The existing repertoire of retribution 
had proved incapable of controlling rising crime levels; the existing repertoire of 
health care and protection against exogenous health threats had proved ineffec-
tive in the face of welfare diseases. As the judicial apparatus threatened to become 
overburdened and the health care system threatened to become financially un-
tenable, prevention emerged as a new strategy to deal with crime and disease. 
Instead of reacting to crime and compensating for fate, the preventive 
gaze has produced a model of the state which aims to prevent avoidable harm. And 
more specifically with regard to the social domain, the preventive gaze produces a 
model of the state with aims to prevent citizens from causing avoidable harm to 
themselves or to other citizens. This new type of state responsibility presumes 
neither individual guilt (as in the constitutional state) nor the combination of in-
dividual victimhood and collective solidarity (as in the welfare state) as the justifi-
cation for its interventions. Instead, the prevention state’s justification for inter-
vention lies in the presumed necessity and possibility to make people behave re-
sponsibly and prudently by influencing their living environment and by appealing 
to their capacity to assess the possible consequences and risks of their actions.  
                                                   
575 Compare Baker and Simon (2002), who state the following with regard to the contemporary 
development to make people individually accountable for risk – which they call the ‘embracing’ 
of risk: “Just as individual fault and responsibility remained part of modern legal culture even 
with the growth of spreading risk and social insurance in the early twentieth century, so too will 
risk spreading survive the embrace of risk” (2002:6). 
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3. The passage to the prevention state 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The prevention state has emerged in the historical and spatial context of the con-
temporary Western European constitutional and welfare state. Even though this 
study is primarily diagnostic instead of explanatory, an understanding of the pas-
sage to the prevention state should include an effort “[…] to trace the forces that 
gave birth to our present-day practices and to identify the historical and social 
conditions upon which they still depend” (Garland, 2006:2). A discussion of the 
mechanisms and forces underlying state development can provide insight into the 
conditions that gave birth to the preventive gaze, and provide an understanding of 
the specific impact of the preventive gaze on the state.  
 
The first part of the following paragraph deals with the mechanisms of state de-
velopment, which the preventive gaze is presumed to actuate. These include 
mechanisms that stress the impact of the internal characteristics of the state, as 
well as mechanisms that focus on societal pressures for state development (cf. 
Pierson, 2004). A discussion of these mechanisms seeks to describe the lines along 
which contemporary political reality has moved beyond the images of the consti-
tutional and the welfare state. 
The second part of the following paragraph is concerned with the social 
conditions within which a specific state development takes place and is triggered. 
How we perceive the future and risks, as well as the characteristics of contempo-
rary industrialised, individualised and urbanised society are the ‘social bearers’ 
(Weber, 2006:31) of the prevention state. Whereas the mechanisms of state de-
velopment aim to shed light on how and along which lines state development oc-
curs, the triggers for state development aim to offer indications for the reasons 
why a specific development takes place at a certain time and place. The relation 
between ‘triggers’ and ‘mechanisms’ can be understood as follows: 
 




The nature of state power 
(such as the organisation 
of rule and the objectives 
of governing) 
 
The complexities of rule and gov-
ernance (such as the availability of 
power resources and the govern-




The attitude towards state 
power (such as the justifi-
cation and limitation of 
state power) 
 
The demands and interests of soci-
ety (such as the consequences of 




The argument made in the following is that prevention is not simply a policy 
strategy, but a way of seeing that is seemingly self-evident and virtually inescapa-
ble. It is suggested that the preventive gaze has a transformative force because it 
actuates both state-centred and society-centred mechanisms of state develop-
ment, because it relates to the fundamental characteristics of contemporary socie-
ty, and because its conceptual characteristics produce an expansive logic. 
 
3.2. State mechanisms: governing through freedom 
Earlier in this study, the following four state-centred mechanisms of state devel-
opment were distinguished:576 
1. Power strives for preservation 
2. Power strives for justification 
3. Power strives for the governability of its subjects  
4. Power strives for the acquisition of resources for its preservation and ex-
ertion 
 
Elements of these mechanisms are present in the two case studies: the preventive 
gaze infuses and actuates them. First of all, the preservation of power is explicitly 
mentioned as an argument for preventive interventions in crime policy. The rise 
of petty crime during the 1970s and early 1980s not only threatened the security 
of the population, but also the state’s role as ultimate arbiter of societal conflicts 
and as credible enforcer of the legal and public order. In public health policy, the 
quest for the preservation of power is not as explicit, but still plays a crucial role: 
the rise of lifestyle diseases not only threatened the personal health of citizens, 
but also the societal vitality and economical productivity of society in general. An 
important argument for government to intervene in public health is the strength-
ening of the state through material wealth (cf. Foucault, 2004). 
 
Second, the government’s quest for public justification of preventive interventions 
is characterised by two tightly interrelated arguments. The first of these is the 
protection of the population against harm occurring beyond the scope of control of 
individual citizens. In the crime policy case, victimhood is an often implicit, but 
nonetheless crucial, element of the government’s definition power: the emphasis 
on reclaiming the public domain, on subjective feelings of insecurity among the 
population and on the decline in social cohesion and control suggest that society 
is incapable of protecting itself against crime and other sources of insecurity. The 
state needs to step in to protect a vulnerable society.  
                                                   
576 These should be understood as historical movements and not as a-historical axioms. 
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And in the public health policy case, the initial argument that citizens only 
need to be protected against exogenous health threats outside their own direct 
control was abandoned with the introduction of prevention of lifestyle diseases. 
The subsequent politicisation of lifestyle was initially justified by an emancipatory 
argument: providing objective information about a healthy lifestyle and providing 
facilities for physical exercise were the most important techniques deployed. 
However, this emancipatory approach was gradually complemented by a more 
regulatory approach: whereas the former approach presumed the image of the 
rational citizen, the latter presumes that citizens often lack the willpower to resist 
the many unhealthy temptations in contemporary society. Lifestyle regulation 
aims to protect citizens against these unhealthy temptations. 
The second argument in government’s theory of public justification is ser-
viceability to society.577 Society is not only portrayed as a fragile and vulnerable 
entity in need of state protection, but simultaneously as a source of justified de-
mands for collective action. In the crime policy case, government presents the 
shift to prevention in the 1980s, as well as the decisive approach to insecurity 
from 2002 onwards, as an answer to societal demands for intensified state inter-
ventions.578 And in public health policy, a similar argument is developed in the 
form of the rhetorical construction of a convergence between the interests of the 
state and the interests of citizens. State interventions are justified, since they help 
citizens to become aware of the fact that a healthy lifestyle is in their own person-
al interest – an argument probably best expressed in government’s ambitions to 
“become an ally of citizens” (CA, 2007:3; CA, 2010:3) and to “make the healthy 
choice the easy choice” (HN, 2008:5). 
 
                                                   
577 Typical for political serviceability and the political quest for legitimacy is the design of policy 
memoranda and government’s choice of words from 2002 onwards. It seems as though policy 
memoranda are no longer addressed to Parliament, but instead directly to the population: im-
portant memoranda are printed in full colour, with an attractive design and use of photographs, 
and their pages are filled with powerful language, expressions of subservience towards the 
interests of citizens, and one-liners to summarise policy ambitions. At the same time, many 
implications of policy ambitions are left implicit and are – consciously or not – ‘veiled’ behind 
the communication of ambitions. 
578 There is also the possibility of another explanation for the role of representative politics. 
According to Van Schendelen (in De Beus & Van Doorn, 1984:244-245), politicians and profes-
sionals need a metaphorical ‘smouldering fire’ to permanently justify interventions. If fires 
break out too often, a fire commander runs the risk of being replaced. However, if there has 
never been a fire, the same fire commander runs the risk of cutbacks on personnel and equip-
ment. Any politician or professional who wants to maintain his position needs to find a balance 
between these two extremes. A preventive narrative (‘we have to act now to prevent a disaster 
later on’) is a perfect example of constructing such a ‘smouldering fire’. Moreover, this logic 




Third, prevention can be understood as a new strategy to increase the governabil-
ity of late-modern society. The existing models of the constitutional and the wel-
fare state proved incapable of dealing with new forms of undesirable behaviour. 
In the face of rising crime rates during the 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch govern-
ment realised that penalising certain acts was becoming less and less effective in 
the striving to achieve law abidance. And in the face of diseases of affluence aris-
ing from citizen behaviour and lifestyle choices, the government realised that 
health care and protection against exogenous health threats were ineffective in 
the further improvement of public health.  
Prevention is a new form of ‘governing’, or ‘structuring the possible field 
of action of others’ (Foucault, cited by Hunt, 2009:4).579 Prevention can be seen as 
a new effort to realise an “effective and productive management of populations” 
(Pierson, 2004:75) through techniques such as surveillance, education, facilita-
tion, financial disincentives and regulation. The ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 
2004) of prevention “[…] is not a matter of imposing a law on men, but of the dis-
position of things, that is to say, employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as 
possible employing laws as tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may 
be achieved through a certain number of means” (Foucault, 2007:99). If we un-
derstand the prevention state as a new chapter in the history of ‘governmentality’, 
we can see a direct line from 19th century strategies to civilise and mould the 
character of a large section of the population – through such institutions as pau-
per schools, reformatory prisons and lunatic asylums, and such provisions as pub-
lic parks, museums and bath houses (Rose, 1999:103-104) – via 20th century wel-
fare state services of health care, education and public housing, to early 21st cen-
tury strategies to manage responsibility and solidarity in preventive practices. 
The common thread is the constant concern for self-discipline, self-restraint and 
self-control: “The will is to be trained to master the lower passions” (Rose, 
1999:105).   
Desirable behaviour is not directly enforced, but a web of incentives and 
disincentives is spun around society to extract voluntary obedience. According to 
Rose (2000:323), this type of control or ‘moulding of conduct’ is typically dis-
persed and flows through many networks of authorities and professionals rather 
than being executed from a hierarchical centre. The underlying ‘mentality of rule’ 
aims to work “[...] upon the ways in which individuals regulate their own behav-
                                                   
579 Prevention can also be understood in terms of the development from a ‘nomocracy’ to a 
‘telocracy’ (De Jouvenel, cited by Van der Graaf & Hoppe, 2007). In the classic constitutional 
state and in Weber’s rational-legal authority (1922), rule is typically exercised through laws to 
set the boundaries for acceptable behaviour. In contrast, the emergence of the welfare state 
marked, according to De Jouvenel, the emergence of a type of rule through policy goals and 
problem-oriented interventions to realise those goals. 
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iour to ensure this is consonant with the interests of the state” (Pierson, 2004:75). 
Government works upon self-regulation and self-discipline. It identifies individu-
als and their social contexts as objects of intervention in order to make them gov-
ernable: “To govern humans is not to crush their capacity to act, but to 
acknowledge it and to utilize it for one’s own objectives” (Rose, 1999:4). 
The prevention state understands freedom as justification for and object 
of intervention. In this understanding of government, freedom is not the opposite 
of political power, but an instrument of political power (Rose, 1999). For instance, 
the idea of individual freedom and autonomy forms the basis of our conceptuali-
sations of the constitutional state and the administration of justice, which legiti-
mise state interventions on the presumption of individual accountability; of our 
conceptualisations of capitalism and the free market, in which the free movement 
of goods, capital, services and people is instrumental to the acquisition of (both 
individual and collective) material wealth; of our conceptualisation of the welfare 
state, which introduces presumed boundaries of individual responsibility to jus-
tify a large scale redistribution of wealth; and also of our conceptualisation of the 
prevention state, which avails itself of specific interpretations of ‘responsibility’ 
and ‘solidarity’ to justify interventions. 
 
Fourth, the development of a preventive intervention repertoire can be under-
stood as an expression of the acquisition of resources for the preservation and 
exertion of state power. Society cannot be governed by decree only. Besides defi-
nition power, a state requires intervention power to back up its claims to (pasto-
ral) power.580 Characteristic for the prevention state is the development of strate-
gies which work upon the ways citizen act and choose in their daily lives. These 
provide a repertoire, which aims to govern through freedom, which can be de-
scribed as making people change their behaviour out of their own free will. 
This repertoire consists of regulatory, financial, communicative, facilita-
tive, cooperative and surveillance techniques. More specifically: the formal-legal 
competences of mayors in crime prevention have been expanded. Tobacco and 
alcohol excises have been raised.581 Health education and social marketing cam-
paigns for a healthy lifestyle have been developed, and Security Houses estab-
                                                   
580 In the two case studies, roughly three phases can be distinguished in the development of the 
prevention state’s intervention repertoire. The 1980s were a period of agenda-setting. Preven-
tion was presented as the answer to contemporary crime and health issues. Over the course of 
the 1990s, the initial agenda-setting was followed by a structural implementation of ambitions. 
The ‘institutional void’ (Hajer, 2003) of an undeveloped new governing strategy was gradually 
overcome. And in the 2000s, the initial reluctance to intervene in direct societal processes and 
citizen behaviour had been largely overcome. 
581 However, government also has its financial arguments to keep certain unhealthy products, 
such as tobacco and alcohol, in circulation: excises are an important source of income. 
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lished. Cooperation with societal actors has been organised in covenants and con-
tracts. Police surveillance and systems for the monitoring of risk factors are now 
widely used.  
 
When these efforts to increase the governability of the population are combined 
with the protective role of the state in the government’s theory of justification, the 
image of the state as society’s shepherd emerges (cf. Rose, 2000:323). This image of 
the relation between state and society is derived from Foucault, who described 
this relation along the lines of two ‘games’. The first of these is the ‘city-citizen 
game’ where the image of society as a ‘polis’ and the concern for the ‘res publica’ 
are dominant: “the individual as citizen who exercises freedoms and rights within 
the legal and political structure of the political community on the basis of equality 
with other citizens” (Dean, 1999:82). And the second is the ‘shepherd-flock game’, 
as if the state were a shepherd who has the responsibility to look after the wellbe-
ing of his flock: “the individual as a living being whose welfare is to be cared for as 
an individual and as a part of a population, as one who must be integrated within 
complex forms of social solidarity” (Dean, 1999:82). 
In the prevention state this ‘shepherd-flock game’ is emphasised over the 
‘city-citizen game’.582 The power of prevention is typically ‘pastoral’ in nature: 
“Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the indi-
viduals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer, it goes in search of 
those who have strayed off course, and it treats those that are injured” (Foucault, 
2007:127). The image of the shepherd is a benevolent one: “[…] pastoral power is 
[…] entirely defined by its beneficence; its only raison d’être is doing good, and in 
order to do good. In fact the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation 
[…] of the flock” (Foucault, 2007:126). However, the shepherd demands ‘pure 
obedience’ from the sheep in return (Foucault, 2007:174). 
 
3.3. Societal mechanisms: the enemy within 
Earlier in this study, the following four society-centred mechanisms of state de-
velopment were distinguished:583 
1. A population (or certain parts thereof)584 calls upon authorities for pro-
tection if threats to the existing order are perceived as being beyond the 
control of individual inhabitants  
                                                   
582 According to Foucault, the welfare state played both games simultaneously: people were 
looked after by the state according to a set of social rights. Based upon the empirical findings in 
this study, it is conjectured that the prevention state shifts the balance towards the shepherd-
flock game. The prevention state emphasises discretionary spaces for administration over the 
rights of the city-citizen game. 
583 These should be understood as historical movements and not as ahistorical axioms. 
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2. A population (or certain parts thereof) calls upon authorities for the reali-
sation of interests which are perceived as being unattainable by individual 
or private action 
3. A population (or certain parts thereof) seeks to limit, control, avoid or re-
sist the power of authorities if it is perceived as a threat to societal inter-
ests 
4. A population (or certain parts thereof) seeks alternative forms of collec-
tive action to realise societal interests if the authorities lack the ability or 
legitimacy to do so 
 
In both case studies, the preventive gaze works upon these four mechanisms. The 
first two mechanisms refer to societal demands for state intervention. These can 
stem from either a need for protection or from a desire to realise certain interests. 
The former can be understood as being inherent to the very existence of the state: 
following Hobbes, the state is born out of a population’s quest for protection and 
self-preservation in the face of a latent ‘war of all against all’. In contrast, the latter 
implies a broader understanding of the state as an entity whose power can be 
used for the realisation of more ‘positive’ objectives than merely protecting the 
existing (public or legal) order. For instance, the welfare state serves a popula-
tion’s demands for social security, health and equal opportunities. 
Crime prevention, as well as the broader concern for public order can be 
seen in relation to societal demands for protection. Both the 1985 embracing of 
prevention and the 2002 paradigm shift from crime to security were explicitly 
justified by the government with reference to societal concerns about rising crime 
rates and widespread feelings of insecurity, respectively. The state was called 
upon to act, since the problems had gone far beyond the control of individual citi-
zens or society in general. In contrast, the prevention of lifestyle diseases, as well 
as the broader approach to promote a healthy lifestyle can be seen in relation to 
‘positive’ societal demands for the realisation of interests that are perceived as 
being unattainable by individual or private action. The promotion of a healthy life 
forms the core of government efforts to avert endogenous health threats – efforts 
for which citizens require support by the state in a society characterised by un-
healthy temptations. 
From the perspective of these mechanisms, the aforementioned construc-
tion of shared interests between state and society is not a strategy to justify state 
interventions, but the representation of popular will. Whereas state-centred 
                                                                                                                                 
584 The development of the state is not necessarily determined by the majority of the popula-
tion, but can also be determined by a minority, such as a powerful ruling elite (e.g. Mosca, 1896) 
or ruling class (e.g. Marx & Engels, 1848). 
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mechanisms tend to stress an ‘invasive image’ of the state, society-centred mech-
anisms tend to stress a ‘serviceable image’ of the state (cf. Poggi, 1990). This in-
terrelatedness between the state-centred mechanism to increase the governabil-
ity of society and the society-centred mechanism to realise certain collective in-
terests suggests that the prevention state is a self-evident direction for state devel-
opment, because it is simultaneously responsive to the interests of state and society. 
 
This brings us to the third and fourth society-centred mechanism of state devel-
opment: the question of whether the state is perceived as a threat to societal in-
terest and whether there is an alternative means available to realise collective 
action. The government’s ambition to “become an ally of citizens” (CA, 2007:3; CA, 
2010:3) provides an interesting insight into these two mechanisms. Supposing 
that this ambition is an expression of a will to serve society,585 it implies that soci-
ety is vulnerable to harm without the protective assistance of the state. Society 
depends on the state for protection and the realisation of interests – there are no 
alternatives for collective action available in an individualised society. The meta-
phorical alliance between state and society introduces the image of state and soci-
ety fighting side by side against threats to their shared interests. 
Moreover, the empirical findings suggest that state interventions are not 
perceived as a threat to societal interests, but instead as a necessity to avert 
threats from within society. The rise of petty and violent crime and the rise of 
lifestyle diseases are typical products of a prosperous and individualised late-
modern society. The faltering of the constitutional and welfare state is a conse-
quence of new threats to public order and health caused by citizen behaviour. In 
terms of the metaphorical alliance between state and society: the metaphorical 
enemy is ‘among us’. As a consequence, the alliance between state and society is 
also a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion: inclusion of citizens who comply 
with the shared interests of the alliance, and exclusion of deviant citizens.  
More specifically, images of the decent and healthy citizen underlying 
preventive measures in crime and public health policy serve as the implicit ideals 
for the behaviour of citizens, while simultaneously enabling the identification of 
deviant behaviour. The more an individual deviates from the norm of the decent 
and healthy citizen, the more he or she is affected by state interventions and the 
                                                   
585 The invocation of the popular will is a common political strategy. Politics is a struggle of 
images (Edelman, 1977), of values (Tops & Zouridis, 2002) and of narratives (Van der Steen, 
2009). And politicians tend to speak ‘on behalf’ of a public (Van Middelaar, 2009) to legitimise 
their words and actions. However, the metaphor of the alliance expresses the idea that every 
action by government is justified as subservient to the demands and interests of the electorate. 
Contradictions are ruled out and political will formation is presented as a mirror reflection of 




more he or she is viewed as a justified object of state intervention. The citizens 
who display deviant behaviour are mostly adolescents or members of the lower 
socio-economic strata,586 including many ethnic minorities. Therefore, even if the 
state is conducive to societal interests, this does not necessarily make the state a 
benevolent entity for all citizens. 
 
3.4. Belief system: the dualities of late-modernity 
The aforementioned mechanisms of state development described how the preven-
tive gaze moved contemporary political reality beyond the models of the constitu-
tional and the welfare state. In the following, the specific historical conditions for 
the rise of the preventive gaze are discussed. The contemporary Western Europe-
an ‘belief system’ (including the way we deal with risks) as well as the contempo-
rary Western European urbanised, individualised and post-industrial ‘social sys-
tem’ provide the ‘social bearers’ (Weber, 2006:31) upon which the prevention 
state is built and depends (cf. Garland, 2006:2). 
 
A ‘belief system’ can be constructed from the paradigms and values which make 
up a society’s general outlook on social reality. Based on several sociological stud-
ies, three characteristics of this belief system are discussed, in order to outline a 
context in which the development of a prevention state could take hold. These 
characteristics deal with our attitudes towards future, reason and freedom. 
                                                   
586 This raises the question of whether the rhetorical alliance between state and citizens more 
or less represents the agenda of the middle class. This is the societal class which also historical-
ly speaking, is usually directly affected by deviant behaviour of others: the middle class roughly 
shares the same territorial (urban) space as lower classes and therefore experiences threats to 
health and security more strongly than an upper class, which can afford to back out of vulnera-
ble territories (e.g. De Swaan, 1988).  
Furthermore, the middle class has since long been the ‘favourite’ class of democratic 
rule: decency, a sense of responsibility, stability and productivity characterises this class more 
than criticism, protest and active citizenship (De Haan, in Kloek & Tilmans, 2002:247); bour-
geois and civility instead of political citizenship. In the words of Aerts: “The constant element in 
all descriptions [of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘civility’] is: ordinary, average, common” (Aerts, in Kloek & 
Tilmans, 2002:316; my translation, RP). And in more literate terms, Hermann Hesse describes 
the bourgeois as follows: “Der Bürger ist [...] seinem Wesen nach ein Geschöpf von schwachem 
Lebensantrieb, ängstlich, jede Preisgabe seiner selbst fürchtend, leicht zu regieren. Er hat 
darum an Stelle der Macht die Majorität gesetzt, an Stelle der Gewalt das Gesetz, an Stelle der 
Verantwortung das Abstimmungsverfahren” (1999:64). 
At the same time, the bourgeois middle class can be a strong advocate of collective ac-
tion. For instance, Hunt (1999) describes how social movements since the 19th century have 
aimed for ‘moral regulation’ of indecent behaviour, such as obscenity, alcohol abuse, poor hy-
giene, poor manners and prostitution. A constant element is “[…] the passionate conviction that 
there is something inherently wrong or immoral about the conduct of others” (Hunt, 2009:ix). 
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First, typical for the age of modernity is the “colonisation of the future” 
(Giddens, 1991:111): the belief in man’s possibility to anticipate and control the 
future.587 In the modern age, the future is no longer understood as predetermined 
or purely random, but as manageable by deliberate human action: “The ability to 
define what may happen in the future and to choose among alternatives lies at the 
heart of contemporary societies” (Bernstein, 1998:2). Contrary to ancient times, in 
which fate was incorporated as an inevitable tragic element of the human condi-
tion, and to Christian times, in which fate was humbly accepted as the will of God, 
modern times are characterised by a “domestication of fate” (De Mul, 2006). 
According to authors such as Giddens (1990), Beck c.s. (1994) and Bau-
man (2000), this specifically modern outlook is complemented in contemporary 
‘late-modern’ times by a more nuanced attitude towards the future. We have not 
abandoned the age of modernity, yet have nonetheless become aware of man’s 
limitations to control and plan the future (cf. Ankersmit, 1996; Frissen, 1999). 
Moreover, the very activities undertaken to control the future produce unantici-
pated consequences. This is the age of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck c.s., 
1994),588 in which the consequences of the modernisation process are critically 
examined: “Der Modernisierungsprozeß wird ‘reflexiv’, sich selbst zum Thema 
und Problem” (Beck, 1986:26). The focus of modernisation shifts from the control 
of external/natural threats to the control of man-made threats. In a ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1986), the harms produced by the unintended consequences of modernisa-
tion are the core object of collective action. This can take the form of concerns 
about the consequences of industrial society in terms of public health, environ-
mental pollution, climate change and nuclear energy, as well as concerns about 
human behaviour in a prosperous, individualised and detraditionalised society (as 
we saw in the two case studies). 
Prevention can be viewed as the archetypal late-modern attitude towards 
the future. It expresses both the modernist ideal to control the future by means of 
human anticipation and intervention, as well as the late-modern focus on the risks 
produced by contemporary society. The preventive gaze captures the duality of the 
late-modern attitude towards the future. It implies an orientation towards possible 
                                                   
587 Modern man is equipped with a notion of ‘risk’ to assess the future implications of his ac-
tions: “The notion originated with the understanding that unanticipated results may be a con-
sequence of our own activities or decisions, rather than expressing hidden meanings of nature 
or ineffable intentions of the Deity. ‘Risk’ largely replaces what was previously thought of as 
fortuna (fortune or fate) [...]” (Giddens, 2009:30). 
588 Reflexivity is described by Giddens as follows: “The reflexivity of modern social life consists 
in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reinformed in the light of incoming 




negative futures and a belief in the possibility to avert these by means of collective 
action. 
 
Second, a characteristic of the contemporary belief system closely related to the 
late-modern outlook on the future is the emphasis on reason and rationality as the 
guidelines for the design of human activities. According to Foucault, typical for the 
modern age is a ‘will to knowledge’ (1976) – a will to understand the world sur-
rounding us by means of rational inquiry. Moreover, there is a close relation be-
tween reason and rule – a relation which Foucault termed ‘power/knowledge’ 
(1980). Government in modern societies rests to a large extent on the acquisition 
of knowledge. Statistics provide the state with information about its population. 
And science develops an understanding of the causes and dynamics of social phe-
nomena. For instance, criminology has as objective to explain the causes of human 
behaviour; the objective of public health is to lay bare the determinants of 
health.589  
At the same time, the aforementioned ‘reflexive modernisation’ (Beck c.s., 
1994) is, in many ways, a logical outcome of this will to knowledge: the use of 
reason itself becomes the subject of critical scrutiny. As a result, the will to 
knowledge reveals its own limitations: objectivity has been exposed as contingen-
cy, causality has been exposed as simplification, and certainty has been exposed as 
self-deception. In short, reflexivity is the late-modern product of the will to 
knowledge. 
Prevention is characterised by a duality in the late-modern attitude to-
wards reason. On the one hand, a belief in objective knowledge is abandoned: the 
justification for prevention rests on possibility rather than undisputed facts. In the 
face of possible harm, something must be done. Moreover, the selection and as-
sessment of risks is a highly subjective process (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
On the other hand, preventive strategies are very much a form of pow-
er/knowledge (Foucault, 1980): monitoring, statistical extrapolation and scenario 
studies are developed to gain insight into future developments, and scientific re-
search is used to develop evidence-based interventions. In short, risk selection 
and risk assessment are both rational and subjective. 
 
Third, a striking empirical finding was the transformation of the notion of ‘re-
sponsibility’: citizens are appealed to by the state regarding their ability to con-
sider the consequences of their behaviour in advance, instead of being held to 
                                                   
589 However, the spill-over of scientific knowledge into the political arena is not self-evident: 
even though this is not the place for an analysis of the relation between science and politics, it is 
evident that there is a considerable delay and filtering in the application of knowledge on the 
causes of disease in policymaking (e.g. Mackenbach, 2011). 
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account following certain behaviour (which is central to the state-citizen relation 
in the constitutional state). This transformation can be related to the idea of ‘indi-
vidual freedom’, which is central to the modern western belief system (e.g. Berlin, 
2007). The prevention state does not abandon the value of freedom, but uses it as 
a mechanism to govern society. ‘Free’ citizen behaviour – such as the behaviour of 
people in the free public domain and the choices people make with regard to their 
health – is simultaneously understood to be an important source of risks and an 
important part of the solution. This duality of freedom as something to be con-
trolled and something to be valued characterises the prevention state’s interven-
tion repertoire. 
At the heart of the prevention state “lies the problem of control in a ‘free 
society’” (Rose, 2000:337) and the question: “how can one govern virtue in a free 
society?” (Rose, 1999:46). Typical for preventive interventions is the thin line 
between freedom and discipline. In principle, citizens are not coerced to alter 
their behaviour, but are enticed, persuaded, allured and called upon to do so 
through surveillance activities, education, the design of the opportunity structure, 
parenting support, lifestyle interventions, appeals to citizens’ personal interests, 
and the transfer of social norms via moral appeals and social marketing. Ideally, 
citizens align their behaviour with collective interests of their own accord. Power 
in modern western societies is typically exercised in this way: not through explicit 
or violent coercion, but through techniques to produce voluntary obedience (cf. 
Foucault, 1975).590 
                                                   
590 Illustrative in this respect is the move beyond the rational citizen in Dutch public health 
policy. Man is not perceived as a fully rational being who can be persuaded to choose differently 
by mere objective information, but instead as a being with a structural lack of willpower and 
tendency towards irrationality (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; WRR, 2009:5). Man only has a partial 
free will (Tiemeijer, 2011:89). Incentives and blandishments in people’s environment or oppor-
tunity structure have a major influence on the actual choices people make in their daily lives in 
such areas as health (food choice), finance (savings), mobility (traffic congestion) and energy 
use. Deliberate interventions in this opportunity structure are called ‘choice architecture’ or 
‘nudges’, and the normative justification for these interventions is called ‘libertarian paternal-
ism’ (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The basic question behind this type of interventions is: 
“How much choice should be offered?” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003:1195). 
Instead of the traditional strategy of rational persuasion through information cam-
paigns, the conscious and unconscious transfer of social norms (of what ‘normal behaviour is’) 
takes central stage. People interact and observe other people’s behaviour constantly and have 
an inclination to adapt their behaviour to what is apparently ‘normal’ (Tiemeijer c.s., 2009:17, 
141-142, 146-147). In his broad approach to the psychology of choice making, Tiemeijer 
(2011:96-102) distinguishes two strategies for influencing the flow of incentives and stimuli 
towards individuals.  
The first strategy is to work upon people’s bounded rationality and unconscious psy-
chological processes via influencing affective tags (emotional value of certain behaviour, such as 
the social acceptance of smoking), changing routines and habits (for instance, individuals are 
likely to be more willing to change their lifestyle after first signs of disease), influencing the 
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3.5. Social system: the drawbacks of progress 
A ‘social system’ can be constructed along the lines of the structural characteris-
tics of society. Several sociological analyses of the consequences of the develop-
ment towards a fragmented ‘network society’ (Castells, 1996) provide an under-
standing of contemporary collective problems and their answers. In the following, 
it is suggested that the prevention state may be a response to the drawbacks of 
progress: a globalised and individualised post-industrial society produces new 
types of risk that undermine traditional forms of social control, which subse-
quently calls for new governing strategies. 
 
The modernisation process has brought major social, cultural and moral trans-
formations. The 18th and 19th century process of industrialisation saw the devel-
opment from traditional rural communities to the weak ties of urban communi-
ties. In the contemporary age of late-modernity, this has further developed into a 
process of individualisation. Collective norms, traditions, national identities and 
social cohesion have faded in the face of tightly interwoven societal, technological 
and economical developments towards a further detraditionalisation and 
multiculturalisation of society, a virtualisation of communication, and a globalisa-
tion of the economy (e.g. Castells, 1996; Bauman, 2000; Blokland, 2006).591  
Traces of these broad social developments can be identified in the two 
case studies. The empirical findings show that issues of crime and security are 
often perceived in relation to processes of individualisation, multiculturalisation 
and decline of social cohesion. Prevention of deviant behaviour can be viewed as a 
compensation for the tendencies inherent to contemporary late-modern society: 
when a fragmented society is incapable of upholding implicit social and behav-
ioural norms and guidelines, the state steps in to promote normative ideals of 
                                                                                                                                 
environment (as in the ‘broken window theory’), and choice architecture (such as displaying 
healthy food in canteens).  
The second strategy follows reason, not only in terms of rational persuasion, but also 
in terms of persuasion through subjective norms (informing people that their behaviour devi-
ates from the social norm, such as telling people they have a higher power consumption than 
their neighbours) and appeals to self-control (creating concrete implementation intentions for 
behavioural change, such as taking the stairs as a means to lose weight). 
591 In this respect, Castells (1996) refers to a ‘network society’ in which interaction transcends 
the territorial ‘space of places’ and extends to the virtual and global ‘space of flows’. This has 
significant consequences for the way societies are organised: more around ‘nodes and hubs’ 
than around fixed and vertical institutions and forms of living together. Bauman (2000:31) 
refers to individualisation as the transformation of identity from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’. And 
Giddens (1991) calls late-modernity the end of the age of emancipation and the beginning of the 
age of lifestyle: instead of a struggle over life chances (which also characterised the welfare 
state to a large extent), a constant personal and collective reflection on the proper direction and 
nature of behaviour takes central stage. 
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proper behaviour. The prevention state shifts attention from legal norms as the 
capstone of socially shared norms – the model of the constitutional state – to the 
normative void left behind by societal fragmentation.592 
And with regard to issues of public health, structural economical trans-
formations are an important explanation for the rise of lifestyle and non-
communicable diseases.593 Health issues in late-modern societies do not follow 
from poverty or a lack of health care services, but instead from the huge increase 
in wealth and the accompanying rise of non-physical labour, motorised forms of 
transport, and availability of food. Prosperity and welfare state services have 
tamed those health threats that are beyond the control of individual citizens, but 
have at the same time produced new threats, namely those resulting from indi-
vidual behaviour. The prevention state shifts attention from emancipation in the 
form of equal rights and life chances – a focal point of the welfare state – to influ-
encing the way people deal with their life chances. 
In short, the prevention state may be the embodiment of the political re-
sponse to the undesirable consequences of modernisation and the challenges of 
the late-modern ‘network society’ (Castells, 1996): “the problems is […] the gov-
ernability of the passions of the self-identified individual and collectivities: indi-
viduals and pluralities shaped not by the citizen-forming devices of church, school 
and public broadcasting, but by commercial consumption regimes and the politics 
of lifestyle […]” (Rose, 1999:46). Even though the position of the state has been 
challenged by economical globalisation, the rise of powerful multinationals, forms 
of international government, virtual and globalised forms of communication, and 
the decline of fixed societal norms and institutions, it remains a beacon of stability 
in a seemingly chaotic age (cf. Boutellier, 2011:117-118).  
 
 
                                                   
592 Typical in this respect is the shift in societal attitude in the Netherlands towards state inter-
ventions in crime and security issues. During the 1970s, the state was seen as the main problem 
in the approach to crime: criminal law labelled persons as a criminal and punitive interventions 
merely inflicted unnecessary pain. This changed during the 1980s as the societal dissatisfaction 
with petty crime slowly pushed aside critical attitudes towards the state, authority, police, penal 
system and criminal law (e.g. Smits, 2008). Ironically, many of the changes proposed in the 
1970s with regard to the societal function of punishment – socialisation instead of retribution – 
have been implemented in the prevention state, where they sit side by side more repressive-
preventive approaches. 
593 That said, prevention also serves economical interests. Labour productivity is in the case of 
public health policy an important argument for state intervention as well as for companies to 
improve the health and lifestyle of their employees. Moreover, prevention itself can become an 
economic commodity, for instance in the form of non-police surveillance, technological means 
for surveillance and monitoring, and preventive measures for fire and theft insurance and 
health insurance companies. 
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3.6. The expansive logic of prevention – an immanent mechanism 
Besides the mechanisms of state developments and the characteristics of the con-
temporary Western European belief and social system, the preventive gaze can be 
identified as a mechanism for state development by itself – an immanent mecha-
nism. The effectiveness of prevention increases the more interventions are organ-
ised in close proximity to the identified risks, the more these are characterised by 
a comprehensive scope covering all identified risks, and the earlier these are im-
plemented in the development of the identified risks. A prevention state has an 
immanent tendency towards an increasingly in-depth, all-embracing and swift 
approach to risks. 
The logic of prevention is an expansive logic. Prevention produces more 
prevention. This logic is most clearly evident in the aforementioned three princi-
ples of organisation underlying preventive interventions: 
- The more detailed the better (principle of proximity): prevention has an 
inherent tendency to intervene as closely as possible to the identified 
risks. 
- The more comprehensive the better (principle of coordination): preven-
tion has an inherent tendency towards an all-embracing approach to all 
the identified risks.  
- The earlier the better (principle of timeliness): prevention has an inherent 
tendency to intervene in the identified risks as early as possible. 
 
More specifically, crime prevention starts by stepping up law enforcement efforts 
and technical prevention against petty crimes, and ends up with personalised 
behavioural approaches towards risk citizens. Disease prevention starts with 
health information and education, and ends up with personal support to change 
lifestyles, and choice architecture to ensure that the healthy choice is the easy 
choice. This expansion of prevention does not have to be a deliberate political 
strategy, but is already present in the very logic of the actual implementation of 
preventive policies and measures (cf. Boutellier, 2011:93).  
Furthermore, prevention is to some extent also immune to evaluation. 
This further strengthens its expansive logic. It is never certain that enough is be-
ing done to prevent an undesirable phenomenon from occurring in the future. 
Consider the previously discussed594 example of the threat of terrorist attacks: 
how to evaluate the terrorist attack that never occurred? The absence of an attack 
might lead to a continuation of security measures: the problem is absent precisely 
because preventive measures were taken. And suppose a terrorist attack were to 
occur? The probable response would be an increase in security measures: preven-
                                                   
594 See the introductory chapter. 
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tion has failed because not enough was done. In short, every outcome of an evalu-
ation could lead to arguments for the continuation or further increase of preven-
tion. 
This expansive logic, combined with the previous discussion of state de-
velopment, suggests that prevention is more than a policy strategy, which can be 
deliberately applied to specifically selected social problems. Instead, the preven-
tive gaze has become an almost self-evident mode of thought in politics and poli-
cymaking. The perspective of prevention infuses problem analysis, problem defi-
nition and problem solution in such a way that a systematic approach to the struc-
tural causes of undesirable phenomena seems to be the natural mode of interven-
tion.595 Doing nothing in the face of risks is not an option. ‘Something must be 
done’ (cf. Van Eeten, 2010).  
  
                                                   
595 Hence, the prevention reflex is not a superficial response, but rather an expression of an 





4.1. Introduction: stepping back or stepping in? 
The rise of the prevention state seems in many ways contrary to other well-
documented developments in western states, most notably the emergence of the 
‘regulatory state’ (e.g. Majone, 1997) and the shift from ‘government’ to ‘govern-
ance’ (e.g. Rhodes, 1996; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). The notion of the regulatory 
state evokes an image of a retreating state and of ‘indirect government’ (Majone, 
1997:147). The regulatory state leaves the organisation and management of pub-
lic goods (such as health care, social security and infrastructure) to (semi-) pri-
vate actors and relies on sets of regulations to manage these actors from a dis-
tance, and sometimes even via decentralised semi-autonomous and non-
governmental regulatory agencies (e.g. Black, 2002; Majone, 1994, 1997; Vonk & 
Tollenaar, 2010; cf. Foucault, 1975).  
Risk management and risk-based monitoring do play an important role in 
the regulation of food safety, environmental pollution, health care quality and 
critical infrastructures (e.g. Braithwaite, 2000). Regulation at a distance implies a 
focus on the potential risks produced by other actors. However, the present study 
into the prevention state shows that prevention not only entails regulation at a 
distance, but can also imply the penetration of the state into the social domain and 
into the governance of social relations.596 
The shift ‘from government to governance’ evokes an image of a modest 
state, characterised by “the recognition of the limits of government and govern-
mental steering and the shift towards central government’s reliance upon other 
actors, sectors, and levels of government” (Bekkers c.s., 2007:3). Analyses of gov-
ernance stress that the contemporary Western European state does not have a 
monopoly on the creation of public value, but instead operates in broader net-
works of non-governmental organisations, supranational organisations (such as 
the EU), regulatory agencies, privatised welfare services and multinational busi-
nesses (e.g. Kjær, 2004:22; Pierre, 2006:4).  
The analysis of the prevention state shows how typical techniques of gov-
ernance can be used for interventionist purposes, as well. Efforts to enable, per-
suade, entice, allure or nudge citizens to behave prudently may require citizen 
                                                   
596 It should be noted, however, that certain interpretations of ‘regulation’ include a broader set 
of activities to modify human behaviour. In these interpretations, ‘regulation’ resembles in 
many ways what Foucault (2007) understood under ‘governmentality’. Consider, for instance, 
the following definition of ‘regulation’ by Black: “Regulation is the sustained and focused at-
tempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with the 
intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechan-
isms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification” (Black, 2002:20). 
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cooperation, but are also the product of an ambition of “[...] working upon the 
ways in which individuals regulate their own behaviour” (Pierson, 2004:75). In 
this perspective, ‘governance’ is not so much a form of modest government, but of 
interventionist government, which seeks to manage behaviour: “Governance [...] 
marks the space of a liberal game of assimilation. Where many political discourses 
seek to articulate a field of antagonistic forces as agents of political transfor-
mation, governance seeks to implicate them as ‘partners’ in a game of collective 
self-management and modulated social adjustment” (Walters, 2004:35). 
 
The contemporary Western European state may indeed be modest or even be in 
the process of taking a step backward in certain domains, it is also stepping into 
society with regard to various other social issues. The prevention state evokes an 
image of an interventionist rather than a modest state. In this final section, the 
implications of the prevention state’s rise for the relation between state and socie-
ty are discussed. In line with the theory-generating objective of this study, the 
discussion focuses on the structural effects of prevention for the state as a societal 
phenomenon. And following the distinction between definition power and inter-
vention power, several critical observations are made regarding developments in 
both elements of state intervention. 
In terms of definition power, the introduction of the preventive gaze in the 
realm of the state leads to a usurpation of the state-free domain. Seen from the 
perspective of prevention, the public and private domains are logical objects of 
intervention if risks are identified there. And in terms of intervention power, the 
prevention state takes everyday life as the focal point of its interventions – in 
overt ways towards risk citizens and through more covert techniques towards the 
general public. In other words, the rise of the prevention state coincides with a 
politicisation of behaviour. 
These developments are logical from a preventive perspective – they are 
the response towards a new type of threat to public order and health for which 
the existing repertoires of the constitutional and welfare state were deemed insuf-
ficient. However, the values at the heart of the prevention state are potentially at 
variance with other values, such as privacy, the rule of law, and negative freedom. 
In the following, the oppressed values in the prevention state are made explicit 
and suggestions are made for the moderation of prevention. 
 
4.2. The usurpation of the state-free domain 
Phenomena which were ‘neutral’ or ‘a-political’ in the constitutional or welfare 
state have become a political concern in the prevention state. The identification of 
risks to prevent such undesirable phenomena as crime or disease is the mechan-
ism by which the state’s new range of activities is determined. Instead of crime as 
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such, the risk factors for crime have become the object of intervention. And in-
stead of merely providing health care to cure disease, the state has developed an 
intervention repertoire geared to the risk factors of disease.  
In the two cases studies, more or less fundamental demarcations of state 
responsibilities were replaced by pragmatic attitudes prompted by the ambition 
to approach all relevant risk factors. The preventive intervention repertoire was 
gradually expanded to include such activities as the design of the public domain, 
surveillance of behaviour in the public domain, outreach activities behind the 
front door, health education and the social marketing of healthy lifestyles, and 
personalised programmes for risk citizens to structurally change a certain (e.g. 
criminal or unhealthy) lifestyle. In the most recently analysed policy memoranda, 
there was hardly any mention of arguments for the limitation of the prevention 
state’s responsibilities – at least not within the logic of the prevention state itself.  
When perceived at an aggregated level, the prevention state has an inter-
est in every potential hiding place of risks and, as a consequence of its focus on 
man-made risks, in virtually every aspect of social life and human behaviour. Even 
if this ‘Totalbeachtung’ or ‘total regard’ does not necessarily lead to a totalitarian 
approach, it does make virtually all behaviour and virtually every aspect of social 
life relevant for the state. In short, inherent to a prevention state is the tendency to 
become an all-embracing state, encompassing previously a-political spheres of 
public and private life (cf. Trommel, 2009). In a prevention state, there is no such 
thing as an uncontested state-free domain. 
 
Moreover, now that the targets of intervention have shifted from established facts 
to risks, the question arises as to what the justification for state interventions is. 
The issue at stake here is the limitation of state power: if the basis for state inter-
vention is boundless, there are no arguments to limit the exertion of state power. 
In the constitutional state and under the rule of law, a prior legal infringement is 
the justification for intervention. And in the welfare state, a prior individual de-
mand for care or protection against phenomena outside the control of individual 
citizens is grounds for state intervention. However, interventions in the preven-
tion state are justified by statistical correlations between present phenomena and 
future harm, by professional judgement of causes for concern, and by broad dis-
cretionary spaces for administrative action. Moreover, taking risks as the object of 
intervention always implies a subjective selection of risks and a subjective as-
sessment of the severity of risks. As a consequence, the prevention state is ex-
tremely vulnerable to an arbitrary exertion of power. 
An analysis of risk assessment of psychiatric delinquents can serve as an 
analogy to lay bare three fundamental differences between hewing to facts versus 
risks: “First, it is not about legal categorization but administrative decision-
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making. Second, it is not about binary distinctions but location on a continuum. 
Third, it does not identify something fixed, stable, inherent, and hence predictable 
to all futures, but implies continuous day-to-day risk management of the poten-
tially risky person” (Rose, in Baker & Simon, 2002:211; cf. Castel, in Burchell c.s., 
1991; Rose, 2000:332). In much the same way, the prevention state approaches 
risks with a politico-administrative apparatus, assesses behaviour, not in terms of 
a clear distinction between health and disease or between legality and crime but 
in terms of potentially harmful behaviour, and develops a repertoire to systemati-
cally monitor developments in this potential for harmful behaviour (which may 
also imply a focus on a person’s entire social context and living environment). 
 
The usurpation of the state-free domain does not necessarily make the prevention 
state a totalitarian state. The fact that virtually every aspect of social life is in some 
way of political concern does not imply that every aspect of social life is fully con-
trolled by the state.597 However, the tendency towards an all-embracing state fits 
Tocqueville’s analysis of democratic societies as being vulnerable to a fading of 
the boundaries between state and society and thereby to the development of a 
‘mild’ form of despotism (Tocqueville, 1835/1840; cf. Kruiter, 2010).598 This type 
of despotism does not seek to oppress, but is benevolent. It does not support dif-
ference, but promotes equality. It does not follow from a ‘totalitarian temptation’ 
(Revel, 1976), but is serviceable to the general will of the people. And it is not 
realised by an explicit political agenda, but by the silent and slow expansion of the 
administrative state apparatus (Tocqueville, 1835/1840; cf. In ’t Veld, 1982; 
Frissen, 2007; Kruiter, 2010). 
 
4.3. The politicisation of behaviour  
An important ground for the case selection in this study was the distinction be-
tween the paternalistic sphere of state intervention, characterised by values of 
order and retribution, and a maternalistic sphere of state intervention, character-
ised by values of emancipation and care. The constitutional state forms a histori-
                                                   
597 Moreover, even the most totalitarian regime will always fall short of complete control. As 
Goffman showed in his studies on ‘total institutions’ (1961), even in the most densely regulated, 
fully controlled and strictly disciplined environments, people find voids in the system to use for 
their private purposes, find places they can retreat to in some sort of privacy, and find comfort 
in the realisation that their personal thoughts are beyond full control of external influences. In 
short, every social system has its ‘underlife’ (Goffman, 1961:305).  
598 To some extent, the state is stronger under democratic rule than under dictatorship, since 
the exertion of state power is justified by society. This also abolishes the antagonism between 
state and society, which may counterbalance the power of the state: “Kings may be murdered or 
expelled, aristocrats may be stripped of their privileges and churches may be burned. But what 
to do against the majority?” (Kruiter, 2010:86; my translation, RP). 
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cal manifestation of the state with paternalistic characteristics, and the welfare 
state a historical manifestation with maternalistic characteristics. However, sev-
eral of the activities formerly associated primarily with the one or the other have 
become more difficult to pin down in the prevention state. 
Consider, for instance, the detention and treatment order developed to 
reduce recidivism among habitual offenders (‘ISD’). On the one hand, this is an 
explicitly paternalistic intervention because of its punitive element. On the other 
hand, its objective to treat detainees and help them change their lifestyle is explic-
itly maternalistic in nature. Within an ISD, punishment is part of a treatment and 
vice versa. Another example is the smoking disincentives policy, in which pater-
nalistic smoking bans are combined with maternalistic information campaigns 
and support programmes to help people quit smoking.  
Furthermore, an organisation such as the Care and Security House is spe-
cifically designed to make cooperation possible between organisations from tradi-
tionally separate and, to a large extent, opposite sides of the state’s intervention 
repertoire. Here and elsewhere, ‘integrated approaches’ are designed to overcome 
organisational barriers that may be logical in the perspective of the constitutional 
and the welfare state, but hamper effective interventions in the prevention state. 
Prevention produces mutual ‘permeability’ of previously separated policy do-
mains and organisations. 
What emerges in the prevention state is a hybrid intervention repertoire, 
which moves beyond the conceptual and factual boundaries between the constitu-
tional state’s and the welfare state’s intervention repertoire. Care and discipline 
are complementary rather than opposite values – they can both be instrumental 
in prevention. The prevention state’s intervention repertoire consists of equal 
parts of surveillance, support, education and disincentives – often within the same 
practices.  
The relation between the prevention state and society seems in many 
ways to mimic the relation between parents and their child599 – especially when 
risk citizens are involved. The prevention state emphasises regulation over coer-
cion. It emphasises ‘pastoral power’ (Foucault, 2007:127) over rule by laws. It 
emphasises intervening in schools, work places, families and neighbourhoods 
over governing through distant bureaucratic services. It emphasises duties and 
obedience over rights and freedom. And it emphasises alliances (CA, 2007:3; CA, 
2010:3) over antagonisms between state and society. As a consequence, the pre-
vention state tends towards a pedagogical state, which has the human mind as its 
most important object of intervention. 
                                                   




The prevention state’s hybrid intervention repertoire is instrumental in promot-
ing the pedagogical objective of many policy measures and activities. Paternalistic 
and maternalistic values are simultaneously applied to undesirable behaviour, 
with the ultimate objective of structurally changing certain lifestyles, or at least 
preventing people from exhibiting undesirable behaviour. Underlying this inter-
vention repertoire is a very specific notion of the citizen, as seen through the eyes 
of the state. Whereas interventions by the constitutional state are justified by the 
attribution of individual guilt, and interventions by the welfare state by the attrib-
ution of victimhood (for which collective arrangements can be made), the core 
notion through which the prevention state approaches its citizens is responsibility.  
The notion of ‘responsibility’ has its etymological origins in the Latin 
‘respondere’, meaning answering or responding. It is associated with both the 
rendering of account and holding someone accountable. In this respect, Hart 
(1968) distinguishes four forms of accountability: responsibility as cause (author 
of certain harm), liability (legal accountability), ability (capacity to give account) 
and role (formal responsible function).600 However, responsibility in the preven-
tion state has a different meaning. It does not refer to a ‘passive’ ex post accounta-
bility, but to an ‘active’ ex ante quality. Bovens (1990) calls this responsibility a 
virtue, which “emphasises acting in the present and preventing undesirable situa-
tions and events” (Bovens, 1990:35; my translation, RP). The notion of responsi-
bility is transformed in the prevention state from accountability to the capacity of 
individuals to assess the consequences of their actions ex ante. 
Seen through the eyes of the citizen, the experience of the constitutional 
state is determined by the notion of individual accountability: “one person cannot 
transfer to another the burden of what happens to him” (Ewald, in Baker & Simon, 
2002:274). The experience of the welfare state is determined by the notion of 
solidarity: in the welfare state, suffering is not one’s own fault but something to be 
compensated through (compulsory) collective insurance and by spreading the 
costs of harm (Ewald, in Baker & Simon, 2002). In contrast, risks are not compen-
sated, but have become the objects of intervention in the prevention state. And 
since citizens are perceived as at the same time being the cause and solution, the 
experience of the prevention state is constituted by an imperative of prudence 
with regard to collectively defined risks. The ideal of citizenship in the prevention 
state is the “homo prudens” (Adams, 1995): “[…] not to engage in risk avoidance 
constitutes a failure to take care of the self” (Hunt, in Ericson & Doyle, 2003:182). 
                                                   
600 Baker (in Baker & Simon, 2002:33-51) distinguishes the following five meanings of respon-
sibility: 1) responsibility as formal (individual) accountability, 2) responsibility as trustworthy 
behaviour, 3) responsibility as causality (who has caused a certain harm?), 4) responsibility as 
freedom or individual autonomy and self-determination, and 5) responsibility as solidarity with 
the common good. The prevention state emphasises Baker’s third and fifth meaning.  
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With the rise of the prevention state, individual responsibility is trans-
formed from ex post accountability to an ex ante virtue. This, for instance, implies 
a fundamentally different understanding of the delinquent: “the pervasive image 
of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor 
that of the bio-psychological subject of positivist criminology, but of the responsi-
ble subject of moral community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering 
mechanisms” (Rose, 2000:321). In more general terms, this implies a fundamen-
tally different understanding of the individual: on the one hand, the individual is 
presumed to have an internal moral compass, on the other hand, government 
intervention is required to bring about self-restraint, self-control and self-care. 
The prevention state’s quest is that of “shaping the conduct of free individuals in 
the direction of civility” (Rose, 1999:73). 
Analogous to the transformation of ‘responsibility’ is the transformation 
of the idea of ‘solidarity’: whereas the welfare state called for solidarity with the 
victim, the prevention state calls for solidarity from the deviant individual with 
the community. Solidarity is asked from the citizen who burdens welfare state 
provisions as a result of avoidable behaviour. For example, whereas disease was 
associated with a form of victimhood in the welfare state, it is seen as a lack of 
solidarity with the taxpayer in the prevention state: collective health care expend-
itures as a result of welfare diseases are portrayed as ‘avoidable costs’, not as an 
expression of solidarity.  
 
As said before, not every citizen is affected in the same way by the interventions of 
the prevention state. Those who already comply with the normative ideals of the 
decent and healthy citizen are less likely to be identified as risk citizens and will 
probably feel less or differently affected by surveillance activities and by collective 
interventions in the opportunity structure. The prudent citizen (cf. Adams, 1995) 
is the other half of the aforementioned metaphorical alliance which Dutch gov-
ernment aims to establish – the citizen who represents the ‘normality’ from which 
at-risk citizens deviate. 
However, the imperative of prudence is also binding for the non-deviant 
citizen, who voluntarily and of his own accord complies with the collective inter-
ests as defined by the state.601 The government objective to “become an ally of 
citizens” (CA, 2007:3; CA, 2010:3) implies a strong bond between state and citi-
zen, and a high price is set on breaking this bond. After all, the logic of every alli-
                                                   
601 In certain aspects, the logic of preventive measures does not differ radically from what 
Goffman saw in total institutions: “When an individual co-operatively contributes required 
activity to an organization and under required conditions […] he is transformed into a co-




ance is a clear one: ‘you’re either with us or against us’. Even if citizens are per-
ceived as entering into this alliance freely and willingly, membership implies a 
sense of mutual loyalty between the contracting parties. Therefore, citizenship in 
the prevention state in many ways has become a policy instrument: citizens are 
implicated as co-operators of political will formation. 
The opportunities to deviate from the established social norm have been 
reduced: voluntary compliance is backed by the prevention state’s intervention 
repertoire. As such, the prevention state not only intervenes as a response to de-
viancy, but also prevents deviancy by proactively ‘raising the price’ of deviant 
behaviour. The metaphor of the Panopticon602 is applicable here: since every-
body’s behaviour is monitored, the only way to escape sanctions and intervention 
is to behave according to the politically defined norms.  
 
4.4. The moderation of prevention 
The discussion of the silent usurpation of the state-free domain and the politicisa-
tion of behaviour reveals several objections against the prevention state. These 
include: 
- Increased possibilities for an arbitrary exertion of state power: when 
‘possibility’ instead of ‘certainty’ becomes the basis for the exertion of 
state power, this creates a justification for interventions based on subjec-
tive assessments and geared towards specific target groups which consti-
tute an increased risk; 
- The disciplinary effect of transformations in our understanding of respon-
sibility and citizenship: the governance techniques used by the state to 
‘nudge’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) citizen behaviour are prompted by an 
imperative of prudence and by an ambition to work upon “[...] the ways in 
                                                   
602 Placing people under surveillance in a Panopticon is a subtle form of control. The Panopticon 
is a blueprint for modern prison, developed by utilitarianist Jeremy Bentham and used by Fou-
cault (e.g. 1975) as an example of ‘governmentality’. The circular prison layout of the Panopti-
con consists of individual cells, all internally facing towards the centre of the building where an 
observation post is located. Instead of the idea of a dungeon where prisoners were kept group-
wise and in the dark, the design of the Panopticon is based on the idea of the transparent and 
illuminated cell, which makes it possible to observe each separate prisoner in all his actions.  
A crucial detail in the design of the Panopticon is that while the prisoners are com-
pletely visible from the central observatory, the prisoners themselves are not able to see 
whether the observatory is manned or not. The mere possibility of being observed has an im-
portant disciplining effect. This makes the idea of the Panopticon a crucial metaphor for Fou-
cault: power can be exercised in a very subtle way through a rational and technological design 
of surveillance. As a metaphor, the logic of the Pantopicon is visible in present-day practices 




which individuals regulate their own behaviour to ensure this is conso-
nant with the interests of the state” (Pierson, 2004:75); 
- Tampering with the presumption of innocence: preventive interventions 
and administrative authorities such as administrative confinement, stop 
and search, home bans, restraining orders and forms of proactive policing 
require no prior infringement of the law; sufficient justification is found in 
a presumption of future criminal behaviour; 
- Undermining parental authority: the preventive focus on children and ad-
olescents implies an increased role of the state in upbringing and educa-
tion, and thereby directly or indirectly influences parental authority; 
- The invasion of privacy (e.g. Rathenau Instituut, 1998, 2007; Koops & 
Vedder, 2001; Bennett & Raab, 2003; Solove, 2007): the panoptic capacity 
necessary for the identification of risks and risk citizens leads to increased 
state efforts in the monitoring and screening of society in general and of 
individual citizens in particular; 
- The instrumentalisation of the law (e.g. Zouridis, 2008): the teleological 
nature of preventive policies tends towards an instrumental use of regula-
tion instead of law as a safeguard against arbitrary or disproportionate 
exertion of state power. 
 
However, prevention is also a response to the rise of a specific type of problem in 
contemporary Western European societies. Before, say, the 1970s, there was no 
epidemic of lifestyle diseases. There was no economy dominated by non-physical 
labour. There was no individualisation. The erosion of the traditional modes of 
living together and accompanying decrease of social control had not yet got under 
way. There was no mass petty crime.603 There was no globalisation or mass immi-
gration. And there was no multicultural society. To a large extent, a response by 
the state to these ‘Forderungen des Tages’604 is justified. The prevention state 
                                                   
603 However, the rise of crime levels cannot be solely attributed to a rise in actual crime. For the 
Dutch case, Van den Brink (2006:20) mentions contributive effects of increased police efforts, 
improved registration of crime, an increased willingness of citizens to report crimes, increased 
media attention for crime and insecurity, and stricter norms with regard to the quality of the 
public domain. 
604 The term is derived from Thomas Mann’s novel Der Zauberberg (1924). Hans Castorp, the 
novel’s main protagonist, spends seven years in seclusion in a Swiss sanatorium elevated high 
above the flat-lands of his birth – despite only vague signs of disease – and fills his days with the 
dialectic discussions between two of his fellow patients: the humanist Ludovico Settembrini and 
the nihilist Leo Naphta. The panorama of ideas displayed for him on the magic mountain capti-
vates Castorp. His endless search for truth and his desperate hope for the love of Clawdia 
Chauchat (another fellow patient) distract him from his societal responsibilities for which he 
was educated.  
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might be the answer to risks, which cannot be fully left to citizens to deal with 
themselves and that cannot be dealt with by insurance and compensation, just as 
the welfare state was the answer to the social problems left untouched by the 
constitutional state. To criticise the rise of the prevention state without to some 
extent taking into account the transformations in the societal ‘risk portfolio’ 
would discredit several valid concerns about contemporary social order. 
At the same time, the aforementioned points of criticism are also warrant-
ed. Prevention may be an understandable reaction to the questions of this time 
and to the complexities of contemporary society,605 but it is also a product of a 
specific perspective on social reality. Garland suggests that what has changed 
most “is not the risks we face but the perceptions and sensibilities we bring to 
bear upon them” (in Ericson & Doyle, 2003:76). This specific way of looking tends 
to push other important perspectives on the role of the state in contemporary 
society aside, such as the constitutional and liberal state’s values of limited gov-
ernment, of a separation between the private and public spheres of life, and of a 
certain ‘Nichtbeachtung’ in the face of threats to social order. Moreover, these 
values are not only grounded in normative principles on individual freedom (e.g. 
Berlin, 2007), but may also contribute to peaceful co-existence: “Lack of interest, 
ignoring each other, is often a successful way of dealing with plurality” (Van 
Gunsteren, 1998:123). 
 
Given these objections against the prevention state and given the immanent ex-
pansive logic of prevention, an active moderation of prevention would appear nec-
essary to protect the core values of the liberal constitutional state. This active 
moderation does not aim to abolish the prevention state or deny the valuable 
                                                                                                                                 
Nothing seems to break the time-consuming spell Castorp is under: not the death of 
his cousin Joachim, not his own near-death in a blizzard, not the futility of his love for Clawdia, 
not the arrival of Clawdia’s lover Peeperkorn, not the practical wisdom of Peeperkorn who 
reminds him of the importance to face the ‘Forderungen des Tages’. As the flat-lands call for 
action, Hans Castorp ponders on the freedom of philosophy and on the freedom not to take a 
position in the intellectual struggle between Settembrini and Naphta. Thus, he spends his time 
on the magic mountain, where time floats by unhindered by practical concerns. In the end, only 
the outbreak of the First World War can force him back to the flat-lands – an event which struck 
Castorp as a bolt from the blue. In a flash, his quest for truth and love (or beauty) is rendered 
useless as he slowly disappears from the reader’s sight under a shower of bullets.  
605 However, the ‘complexity thesis’ has always been an argument for an increase of state inter-
ventions – in both democratic and totalitarian rule. Consider, for instance, the similarities be-
tween the following two quotes. The first quote comes from the 1996 Dutch policy memoran-
dum Law Enforcement and Security: “The more complex a society, the more complicated the 
system of norms and the more elaborate the rules to organise society” (LES, 1996:6). The se-
cond quote comes from Benito Mussolini: “[…] the more complicated the forms of civilisation, 




contribution of prevention to the government of contemporary society. However, 
it does aim to emphasise and introduce several mechanisms by which the preven-
tion state can be limited. In the following, three suggestions for an active modera-
tion of prevention are discussed.  
A first suggestion for the moderation of prevention is making explicit po-
litical reasons to avoid accountability and responsibility for prevention. Politics can 
be a catalyst for prevention, as in the case of a strong public demand to take pre-
ventive measures against terrorist attacks, or the case that politicians seize the 
opportunity to plead the necessity of strong government action before the eye of 
the camera (e.g. Elchardus, 2002; Lloyd, 2004). However, politicians also tend to 
avoid responsibility for things outside their control and downplay system acci-
dents for which they are held accountable as being minor incidents in an other-
wise properly functioning system or policy (Perrow, 1984). This political self-
interest can also be applied to prevention – which usually implies the possibility 
of attributing blame in the case that a risk does occur (Douglas, 1992).  
Consider, for instance, the case of involuntary psychiatric treatment606 in 
Dutch criminal law. Its objective is to treat delinquents with a psychiatric disorder 
to prevent recidivism. This treatment is to some extent also a promise of cure, 
which can backfire in the case that an ex-convict commits a crime years after the 
end of his treatment and release from the institution. A similar question may be 
posed in the light of increased monitoring practices to early detect cases of, for 
instance, child abuse: to what extent do these imply a promise of prevention, and 
thereby political responsibility for  failed prevention? 
 
A second suggestion for the moderation of prevention is the protection and, if 
necessary, introduction of institutional checks and balances. These include, most 
importantly, elements of the constitutional state such as the rule of law, the sepa-
ration of powers, and the legal safeguards of citizens against state interventions; 
more specific examples are increased legal safeguards against surveillance and 
monitoring, the right of individuals to gain access to data collected by the state on 
their person, and the freedom to make unhealthy choices or otherwise to behave 
‘irresponsibly’ without state repercussions. This strategy to moderate prevention 
follows Zouridis (2008), who argues that every expansion of the state’s interven-
tion repertoire should be compensated and mitigated by a legal or institutional 
‘counterpoint’. 
                                                   
606 In Dutch: TBS (‘Ter Beschikkingstelling’). A criminal can receive such a treatment order 
under the conditions that the crime committed is related to a psychiatric disorder, that there is 
a high chance of recidivism, and that the convict cannot or only partially be held responsible for 
his actions. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Involuntary_commitment#Netherlands; consult-
ed d.d. 14-9-2011.  
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Other, non-legal checks and balances are critical governmental advisory 
boards, a moderate and non-politicised civil service, and an active public sphere, 
which functions independently of the state and not as part of the aforementioned 
alliance between state and society. Since the preventive gaze has an expansive 
logic, other, more or less autonomous forces that are not easily susceptible to po-
litical willpower or public demands for collective action may prove effective in the 
moderation of prevention.  
 
A third suggestion is to arrange policies in such a way that they are limited in ad-
vance by arguments outside the logic of prevention. This may take the form of set-
ting a priori limitations on the target group of preventive interventions. A group 
of the most active habitual offenders in a municipality might be selected, for 
whom personalised interventions could be developed to prevent recidivism. The 
fixed number provides an opportunity to limit the available capacity of public 
authorities involved.607 Even if there are more potential offenders in the city and 
even if the assessment of one these offenders should reveal yet another at-risk 
family member, the preventive temptation may be counteracted by reference to 
the a priori limitations in the policy design. 
Another means to moderate prevention through policy design concerns 
the reaction to incidents. As discussed in the introductory chapter, crimes or acci-
dents which shock the public opinion often lead to what has been termed a ‘pre-
vention reflex’ in the introductory chapter and the ‘risk regulation reflex’ else-
where (WRR, 2011): proposing state interventions immediately to prevent a simi-
lar crime or accident from happening again. Instead of rushing to pass new legisla-
tion or to take policy measures, politicians might react differently: by expressing 
their disgust while simultaneously gaining time by promising a thorough investi-
gation and a well-considered proposal for measures within a few weeks. 
 
4.5. The essential imperfection of the prevention state 
Next to the active moderation of prevention, some comfort may also be derived 
from the essential imperfection of the prevention state. Every society is to some 
extent characterised by what Ankersmit calls “an element of insurmountable iner-
tia” (1997:101; my translation, RP), or “[…] the acceptance of a domain in the po-
litical-social reality which will forever remain out of the grasp of even our collec-
tive will” (1997:100; my translation, RP). A society is, to a large extent, an essen-
tially spontaneous development, rather than planned order. In the words of Adam 
                                                   
607 This strategy might also improve the general effectiveness of prevention. There is always a 
limited capacity for state intervention. Instead of spreading out this capacity over an ever wid-
ening target population, it might be more effective to concentrate the efforts on the worst cases. 
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Ferguson, the development of society is “[…] the result of human action, but not 
the execution of any human design” (1768:187).  
This element of ‘insurmountable inertia’ has several aspects. First of all, 
the prevention state faces the impossibility of full foresight (cf. Van der Steen, 
2009). There is always the possibility of the unimaginable occurring – both in 
terms of unexpected and unexplainable events and developments. Second, there 
are ‘natural’ boundaries to the capacity to control human behaviour. Even in the 
most densely regulated, fully controlled and strictly disciplined environments 
(such as prisons), people find voids in the system to use for their private purpos-
es, find places they can retreat to in some sort of privacy, and find comfort in the 
realisation that their own thoughts are beyond full control of external influences 
(Goffman, 1961). And third, there is no such thing as a perfect system of preven-
tion. Flaws are inherent to any complex system. Human failures cannot be ruled 
out, coordination between the various elements of the system is not self-evident, 
and the adequate tackling of every exceptional situation is highly unlikely (cf. 
Perrow, 1984; Wildavsky, 1988; Frissen, 1999:263-267). 
 
And finally, the imperfection of the prevention state follows from the impossibility 
of full risk avoidance. Without any selection of specific risks as objects of interven-
tion, the preventive gaze would, logically speaking, prevent us from undertaking 
any action whatsoever (cf. Sunstein, 2006:14). José Saramago sums up this ‘com-
forting thought’ perfectly in his novel Blindness: “[…] if, before every action, we 
were to begin by weighing up the consequences, thinking about them in earnest, 
first the immediate consequences, then the probable, then the possible, then the 
imaginable, we should never move beyond the point where our first thought 
brought us to a halt” (Saramago, 2005:78). 
Without the acceptance of any form of risk, the only ‘behavioural’ option 
left would be inertia. If we do decide to act, we necessarily accept risk. And if we 
decide to live together, we necessarily accept risks produced by others. This ac-
ceptance may frustrate or frighten us, but is in the end the only reasonable option 
for life in a free society. Prevention may come across as a promising therapeutic 
reaction to these frustrations and fears. It is the late-modern equivalent of the rain 
dance: its function is collective sensemaking, not the actual promised result. How-
ever, prevention will also hold a society hostage in a pattern of an ever-returning 
desire for its temporarily calming effect. If a society is obsessed with the future, it 
will never find peace of mind in the here and now.  
 
But regardless of how widespread prevention has become, society is always char-
acterised by multiple and often contradictory perspectives and sets of values. 
Besides risk aversion, there are also inclinations towards risk taking (such as in 
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financial investments, stock markets, extreme sports and gambling), trial and er-
ror (such as in parenting), acceptance of ‘bad luck’ (such as in gambling), resili-
ence in the face of risks (cf. Wildavksy, 1988), and a ‘refusal to be terrorised’ 
(Schneier, 2006). There are strong indications that politics has a more unambigu-
ous outlook than society (e.g. Boutellier, 2002), tends not to question its own role 
in the response to societal problems (e.g. Terpstra, 1997:175-178) and serves as a 
strong trigger for ‘greedy governance’ (Trommel, 2009). In the contemporary 
media-political landscape, fatalism does not seem to be a politically attractive 
option (Van Eeten, 2010).  
Seen through the preventive gaze, ‘something must be done’ in the face of 
risks. This study was an effort to step outside this frame of prevention and reflect 
on its consequences for contemporary political reality. The arguments put forth 
here will hopefully be a modest contribution to a richer political and public debate 







The Preventive Gaze 
 
How Prevention Transforms Our Understanding of the State 
 
Prevention is better than cure. This adage has become an important guideline for 
government in recent years. Prevention of terrorist attacks, of recidivism among 
habitual offenders, of dropouts among problem adolescents, or of obesity among 
children: the existing repertoires of the constitutional state and the welfare state 
are complemented by a preventive intervention repertoire in a broad range of 
policy domains. But what does this transformation imply for our understanding of 
the state in late-modern society? 
This study reconstructs the emergence of ‘the preventive gaze’ in politics 
and policymaking and discusses its consequences for the relation between state 
and society. Prevention seems to be a logical answer in the face of contemporary 
social issues such as security, education, welfare and public health. However, pre-
vention also has an expansive logic and pushes the state towards an ever more 
detailed, comprehensive and timely approach to risks. As a consequence, the 
emergence of the ‘prevention state’ tends towards a slow and silent politicisation 





How you look at the world determines what you see. This is the simple assump-
tion underlying this study, which places the prevention perspective in politics and 
policymaking central. Seen through a preventive gaze, the world becomes a place 
filled with avoidable harms instead of, for instance, neutral phenomena or un-
avoidable harms. Furthermore, how you look at the world often also determines 
how you act.608 The prevention perspective is not just a way of looking at the 
world, it also implies a desired course of action: risks are perceived as avoidable 
by human intervention. 
A potentially endless range of phenomena may be seen through this per-
spective. Caught in the preventive gaze, a public bench is no longer simply a rec-
reational facility, but a place with an increased risk of public annoyance or even 
criminal behaviour by adolescents. Moreover, the idea that this risk can be 
                                                   
608 E.g. Foucault, 1963; Goffman, 1974; Edelman, 1977; Schön & Rein, 1994; Scott, 1998. 
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avoided transforms the criteria for the design of the public space. Caught in the 
preventive gaze, childhood is no longer a carefree period but is instead sur-
rounded by dangers that threaten a thriving development of the child in terms of 
health and behaviour. Measures are required to avert these dangers. And caught 
in the preventive gaze, critical infrastructures are not just understood as instru-
mental to mobility, but also places prone to terrorist attacks. Again, the course of 
action following from this perspective is taking measures with the intention to 
avoid those attacks. 
 
In our daily lives, we constantly take preventive measures. We take an umbrella if 
rain is expected, we lock our bicycles to prevent theft and we avoid dark allies at 
night because we fear being mugged. In addition, public authorities also take pre-
ventive measures. We see, for instance, how incidents may evoke prevention: a 
failed terrorist attack sparks increased security checks at airports, a child murder 
serves as the trigger for implementing at-risk files for the early detection of chil-
dren in danger, a deadly shooting leads government to impose stricter gun laws, 
and a child abuse case is the motive for a thorough screening of day nursery staff. 
This study starts from the assumption that Western European states are 
increasingly taking preventive measures as a governing strategy and that this 
development has far-reaching consequences for the role these states play in socie-
ties. Prevention is not only a common reaction to incidents, but is a broader pat-
tern in politics and policymaking. This pattern is rooted in a societal context in 
which prevention has become the normal way of dealing with risks. This explor-
ative study aims to identify and understand the impact of an increased dominance 




2. The transformative force of prevention 
 
Prevention is not the only possible way of dealing with risks. Acceptance of fate or 
a strategy of trial and error are well-known alternatives. However, prevention fits 
the modern age, which has a dominant orientation towards the future and has a 
strong belief in the abilities of man to control nature and his living environment. 
The prevention perspective transforms ‘fate’ into a matter of ‘avoidable loss’. Pre-
vention is the intentional aversion of an undesirable development of a phenome-
non. Prevention has the future – or rather: a possible negative future – as its ob-
ject of intervention. A not yet existing reality justifies acting in the present. More 
specifically, not the criminal but the potential criminal, not the patient but the 
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potential patient, and not the accident but the potential accident are the focal 
points of the preventive gaze. 
Three forms of prevention can be distinguished. Primary prevention aims 
for the full aversion of risks. The design of the built environment to reduce the 
opportunities for criminal behaviour is an example here. Secondary prevention is 
the detection of risks in an early phase, followed by interventions to prevent their 
further development. One example is the early detection of at-risk adolescents, 
who are likely to develop a criminal lifestyle if no intervention takes place. And 
tertiary prevention aims to avert a further worsening or continuation of an al-
ready undesirable situation. An example here is the development of detention 
programmes to prevent recidivism by criminals. 
 
Prevention is based on a causal scheme, which constructs a relation between a 
possible future and factors in the present, which might contribute to this future. 
Prevention implies a responsibility to act in the present in order to avert a certain 
scenario. If this undesirable and deemed avertable future does occur, a certain 
form of guilt or accountability can be attributed to those charged with its preven-
tion.  
Important in this respect is that certainty of a future development is not 
required for a prevention responsibility. Prevention rests on chance and possibil-
ity, not on undisputable facts. Moreover, a certain level of subjectivity with regard 
to the selection and assessment of risks is inherent to prevention. A big risk of 
minor harm and a small risk of major harm might be assessed differently. More-
over, certain risks might be taken for granted (such as the risks involved in entre-
preneurship, in sports and in gambling), whereas we go to great lengths to pre-
vent others (such as the risks of crime, illness and accidents). There is no such 
thing as a risk ‘as such’ – the selection and assessment of risks is always a matter 
of interpretation.  
Moreover, there is no natural limitation to prevention. On a conceptual 
level, prevention is boundless, since virtually every phenomenon and every form 
of human behaviour might involve or produce some kind of risk. Prevention is 
also immune to evaluation since there is no way of establishing whether enough 
has been done to prevent a risk. Moreover, how do you assess the relation be-
tween preventive measures and the accident which has not occurred? And an-
other conceptual characteristic of prevention is its self-reinforcing logic. The im-
manent trigger is to intervene as early as possible, to identify and isolate risks as 
precisely as possible, and to subject as many risks as possible to prevention. These 
conceptual characteristics underline the relevance of studying the impact of the 
preventive gaze on the role of contemporary Western European states. If politics 
and policymaking are increasingly influenced by the prevention perspective, not 
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only will this alter the objects of state intervention, but it will also alter the range 
and depth of intervention. 
 
The objective of this study is to contribute to our understanding of the state as a 
societal phenomenon. It is assumed that the contemporary image of the state is no 
longer understandable without taking into account the ways in which politics, 
policymaking and professional behaviour are infused with the preventive gaze. 
Existing conceptualisations of the state, such as the constitutional state, welfare 
state or regulatory state are insufficient to grasp the ways in which state power is 
exerted. Hence, this study relates to several academic debates: it contributes to 
understanding how late-modern societies deal with risks,609 how prevention 
transforms the nature of specific policy domains (such as crime policy, youth pol-
icy and public health policy),610 and how the role of the state is gradually trans-
forming.611 
A second objective of this study is to contribute to a public debate on the 
relation between state, society and citizen. An increased dominance of the preven-
tive gaze in politics and policymaking may have substantial consequences for the 
way society is being governed. What does it mean when the state not only re-
sponds to crime through the administration of justice, but also intervenes before a 
crime has occurred in the lives of potential criminals such as at-risk adolescents? 
When the state does not wait for problems to occur, but monitors society and 
proactively reaches out to detect risk factors for possible future problems? And 
when the state not only offers health care and health protection in the face of ill-
ness, but also aims to incentivise citizens to make healthier lifestyle choices? The 
point is not that prevention is something inherently bad, but that the preventive 
gaze might drive out core values of liberal societies, such as lawfulness, privacy 
and individual autonomy. 
 
 
3. Research strategy 
 
The preventive gaze transforms the way government perceives societal phenom-
ena and the way it subsequently deals with them. In other words, both the state’s 
                                                   
609 E.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Beck, 1986; Beck c.s., 1994; Bernstein, 1996; Bauman, 2000; 
Douglas, 2002; Ericson & Doyle, 2003; De Mul, 2006; Schinkel, 2007; Giddens, 2009. 
610 E.g. Boutellier, 2002; Garland, 2006, Keller, 2008; Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008; Van 
Dijk c.s., 2009. 
611 E.g. Weber, 1922; Foucault, 1975, 1997, 2004; Majone, 1994; Frissen, 1996, 2007; Rhodes, 
1996; Finer, 1997; Power, 1997; Giddens, 1998; Braithwaite, 2000; Ewald, in Baker & Simon, 




definition power and intervention power are subject to change. The idea of the 
‘state’ itself refers to institutions and organisations which, taken together, exer-
cise sovereign rule over a certain geographical territory and its population.612 
How this sovereign power is exercised is a matter of government and politics.613 
In this study, transformations in the exercise of sovereign rule are analysed 
through two case studies within the Western European context. 
This study focuses on social risks, leaving aside preventive measures with 
regard to natural or technological risks, such as floods, climate change, accidents 
and nuclear disasters. Social risks deal with the negative social effects of human 
interaction and behaviour, such as crime, terrorism, child abuse, addiction and 
unhealthy lifestyle. These risks are a product of human behaviour. Government 
intervention in these risks can be found in policy domains such as youth policy, 
crime policy, welfare policy, education policy and public health policy. 
In order to trace the impact of an increased dominance of the preventive 
gaze on the image of the state, two policy domains were selected: one which is 
commonly associated with repressive-punitive interventions (crime policy) and 
one which is commonly associated with care and welfare (public health policy). In 
both domains, the preventive gaze is presumed to have a substantial impact on 
both the level of problem definitions and the level of specific policy proposals. 
Both cases were studied in the Dutch context, which is taken as exemplary for 
developments across Western Europe. Conclusions were drawn after comparing 
the findings for both cases. This study intends to be explorative: its main objective 
is to make a diagnosis of the contemporary state. 
Developments in crime policy and public health policy were reconstructed 
from the 1980’s onward – the moment at which preventive reasoning caused a 
significant change in both domains. A broad selection of policy memoranda, com-
plemented by Queen’s speeches, government declarations of policy and coalition 
agreements, forms the empirical basis for the policy genealogy. The state’s defini-
tion power, understood as the capability to determine the range of its own role 
and responsibility and the range of politically relevant societal phenomena, is 
expressed in these documents in problem definitions, policy objectives and con-
ceptions of state responsibility. The state’s intervention power, understood as the 
capability to determine the nature of state interventions and the depth of the ex-
ertion of state power into society, is expressed in proposals for the organisational 
structure of interventions, the selection of objects of intervention and the choice 
for specific policy techniques and instruments. Furthermore, three local policy 
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practices were studied to support the findings in the policy genealogy. These prac-
tices offer insight in the way the preventive gaze can structure actual policy im-
plementation and professional judgement. 
 
 
4. An outline of the prevention state 
 
4.1. Beyond the models of the constitutional and the welfare state 
In the mid-1980’s, a significant transformation took place in Dutch crime and pub-
lic health policy. According to government, the classic mechanisms of the constitu-
tional and welfare state had become insufficient in the approach to crime and 
illness as a result of certain structural societal developments. The number of reg-
istered crimes increased tenfold in the years between 1965 and 1980. Govern-
ment concluded that further investments in the capacity of police and justice ad-
ministration would not lead to the desired reduction of crime levels. An increase 
in material welfare (and therefore in the circulation of goods) and a decline of 
societal ties were given as the main causes for the increase in crime and the sub-
sequent structural overburdening of police and judiciary. In response to societal 
concerns about the level of especially petty crimes and to concerns about the 
credibility of the state as law enforcer, government introduced a new strategy 
next to the existing repertoire of prosecution, adjudication and punishment: ad-
ministrative prevention. 
In the public health domain, the increase in non-communicable or welfare 
diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and several forms of cancer, 
urged government to reconsider its existing emphasis on the medical-curative 
approach to improve the level of public health. Further investments in the health 
care system were perceived as ineffective in the face of degenerative and chronic 
illnesses. For reasons of labour productivity and solidarity, government proposed 
the introduction of a new form of disease prevention. Since the late 19th century, 
public authorities have developed preventive strategies in the form of protection 
against exogenous health threats (such as sewerage, food hygiene and water puri-
fication). Now, government proposed the prevention of endogenous health 
threats. Contrary to exogenous factors, endogenous factors are perceived as 
within the control of individual citizens, as a result of which government focus 
was transferred to influencing citizen behaviour and lifestyle choices. 
 
The two selected policy domains refer to two classic images of the state, which are 
still constitutive for our contemporary understanding of the state. The state’s re-
sponsibility for fighting crime fits within the image of the constitutional state, in 
which interventions are only justified if they can be traced back to a general legal 
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task or competence.614 And the state’s responsibility for the promotion of public 
health fits within the image of the welfare state, which introduces compensation 
mechanisms for the arbitrary distribution of risks and life chances over the popu-
lation, for instance with regard to unemployment, illness, poor housing or lack of 
education.615 
Both the constitutional and the welfare state are not principally character-
ised by a preventive objective or a preventive intervention repertoire. The consti-
tutional state incorporates the very reason for the existence of states and their 
original task – namely, upholding the societal order – within a system of legal and 
constitutional safeguards against tyranny and arbitrariness. Within the frame-
work of the constitutional state, the Leviathan expresses itself through a legally 
defined reaction mechanism to breaches of law – commonly known as law en-
forcement and administration of justice. The welfare state can be understood as a 
compensation mechanism for fate, either by creating provisions in case of illness 
and unemployment, or by creating equal opportunities regardless of descent, 
gender, religion or socio-economic position. The welfare state does not aim to 
prevent fate, but instead aims to mitigate its effects or give citizens the means to 
escape its most cruel expressions. 
However, the social phenomena which are acted upon by the constitu-
tional and welfare state can also be approached from a preventive perspective. 
This, though, creates a fundamentally different image of the state. For instance, 
the state assumes an interest in identifying at-risk adolescents, in developing pro-
grammes to prevent recidivism among delinquents, in designing the opportunity 
structure, and in using surveillance in the public domain to deter potential crimi-
nals next to – or rather: preceding – the existing judicial reaction to crime. And the 
state also aims to influence unhealthy nutritional habits, increase physical exer-
cise among citizens and detect early signs of illness next to the medical-curative 
reaction to illness. The classic models of the constitutional and welfare state re-
main, but they are complemented by a preventive repertoire and, as a result, re-
duced to a last resort in case prevention proves impossible or ineffective. 
 
4.2. Definition power: the politicisation of behaviour 
Contrary to the judicial paradigm in crime policy and the medical paradigm in 
public health policy, prevention implies a societal orientation on the causes of 
crime and illness. As a consequence, active interventions in social processes are 
characteristic for preventive policies, whereas the health care system and judicial 
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apparatus are organised outside these social processes. Moreover, preventive 
policies do not emphasise the execution of a task according to medical or judicial 
criteria, but instead the problem-oriented or teleological design of interventions. 
Important in this problem-orientation are two conceptual transformations in 
crime policy and public health policy. In the former domain, the paradigm shift 
from ‘crime’ to ‘security’ during the 1990’s considerably expanded the scope of 
government interest. Contrary to the legally defined notion of crime, security 
came to involve a broad and subjective interpretation of the quality of the public 
domain, including degradation of the living environment, annoyance and feelings 
of insecurity. And in public health policy, the paradigm shift from ‘illness’ to 
‘health’ in the 1980’s brought about a similar broadening of scope: next to the 
medically defined notion of illness, a broader concern for the physical and mental 
wellbeing of citizens became the guideline for policymaking. 
The notions of ‘security’ and ‘health’ share a conceptual affinity with pre-
vention. In the first place, both notions imply an absence of undesirable phenom-
ena (respectively crime and illness), and in the second place, they are directed at 
preventing avoidable loss of a certain subjectively experienced quality of life. As a 
consequence, the scope of preventive policies is broadened: attention shifts from 
mere crime prevention to prevention of infractions on public order, and from 
mere illness prevention to prevention of avoidable health loss. 
The teleological nature of prevention expresses itself in an orientation on 
risks as the objects of intervention. Prevention rests on a theory, causal scheme or 
scenario between an undesirable possible future and its possible causes in the 
present. Commonly used means for the assessment of possible future harm are 
statistical extrapolation (such as the identification of risk groups for criminal be-
haviour or the development of welfare diseases), screening and monitoring of 
individual citizens (such as the early detection of cancer, obesity and behavioural 
problems) and professional judgements of individual cases (such as the decision 
to intervene in a risk family or to grant a habitual offender probation). 
More specifically, prevention in crime policy is directed at four types of 
risk: risk citizens, who might show criminal behaviour in the future (for instance 
problem adolescents, truants, causers of public annoyance, drug addicts and ha-
bitual offenders), risky places, that have a higher chance of crime (for instance, 
train stations or problem neighbourhoods), risky times (for instance, nights out or 
festivals) and risk factors, which might induce crime (for instance weapons, drugs 
and alcohol). And, more specifically for prevention in public health policy, the 
objects of intervention are endogenous determinants of health (next to the exist-
ing preventive approach towards exogenous health threats), such as nutrition 
habits, tobacco and alcohol use and physical exercise. The identification of these 
risks forms the necessary condition and justification for subsequent interventions 
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in social processes or citizen behaviour. Not the outcome of certain citizen behav-
iour, such as illness or crime, but the behaviour itself or the contexts in which this 
takes place become the object of problematisation and intervention. 
 
Underlying this politicisation of behaviour is an image of the good citizen. The 
construction of the ‘decent citizen’ in crime policy takes place through interven-
tions such as surveillance in the public domain (to deter deviant behaviour), re-
designing the opportunity structure, supporting parents of problem adolescents, 
preventing early school leaving, gathering and sharing information among rele-
vant organisations on at-risk children in electronic files, expanding the formal 
competences of mayors (such as preventive frisking and administrative confine-
ment) and developing reintegration programmes for habitual offenders.  
And the construction of the ‘healthy citizen’ in public health policy is pur-
sued through social marketing of a healthy lifestyle (i.e. transfer of health norms), 
creating low-threshold sport facilities in the neighbourhood, introducing smoking 
bans in several public places, health education at schools, early detection of over-
weight, allowing insurance companies to offer financial incentives for customers 
who invest in a healthy lifestyle, and developing personal support programmes 
for obese children. 
On a more general level, this repertoire of interventions implies a shift in 
the division of responsibilities between state and society. The justification for 
state intervention has moved from a breach of law or an individual demand for 
care to the construction of an undesirable future and the belief this can be averted 
through state action. The basis for state intervention has shifted from fact to pos-
sibility and, as a consequence, the responsibility of the state has expanded to in-
clude citizen behaviour which might lead to problems in the future. In terms of 
concrete interventions, the state aims to influence the choices citizens make or the 
social and physical contexts in which these choices are made. Hence, the respon-
sibility of the state becomes intertwined with the responsibility of citizens. On the 
one hand, citizens are expected to make a behavioural change of their own accord. 
On the other hand, the state incentivises citizens to make the desired choices. 
This ‘game’ of intertwined responsibilities is structured along the line of 
transformations in our understanding of the notions ‘responsibility’ and ‘solidar-
ity’. Within the model of the constitutional state, ‘responsibility’ was understood 
as holding individuals accountable for the consequences of their own actions. 
However, within the model of the prevention state, the presumed ability of indi-
viduals to assess the consequences of their actions beforehand is appealed to. And 
within the model of the welfare state, taxpayers are asked to demonstrate ‘soli-
darity’ with the victims of illness, unemployment or any other form of fate. How-
ever, the model of the prevention state demands solidarity from citizens who bur-
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den the welfare state provisions as a result of avoidable behaviour. The transfor-
mations from ex post to ex ante responsibility and from solidarity with the victim 
to solidarity with society form the justification for a specific type of state interven-
tion: the presumption that citizens are in principle able to act responsibly and 
solidarily legitimises interventions towards citizens who are either unable or un-
willing to adapt their behaviour. 
 
4.3. Intervention power: the expansive logic of prevention 
The repertoire of interventions, which follows from the prevention perspective in 
crime and public health policy, is directed at incentivising citizens – to steer, influ-
ence, nudge, facilitate and manage responsibility and solidarity. The development 
of this repertoire is guided by three organising principles. The first of these is the 
principle of proximity, or the organisation of interventions as close as possible to 
the source of risks. Generally, prevention tends to be organised in citizens’ direct 
living environment (such as through neighbourhood-level parenting support cen-
tres), in their social contexts (by designing opportunity structures or activating 
societal organisations) and in personalised programmes (such as outreaching 
work towards ‘care avoiders’ and reintegration programmes for offenders). 
The second organising principle of prevention is the principle of coordina-
tion. It is generally assumed that one single measure is hardly ever effective 
enough to prevent undesirable behaviour. Instead, a web of coordinated incen-
tives and disincentives is spun around the lifeworld of citizens. A good example is 
the tobacco policy, in which incentives such as education, courses to quit smoking 
and ‘social marketing’ are used next to disincentives such as raising excises, ban-
ning advertisements, introducing age limits for the sale of tobacco products and 
introducing smoking bans in several public places. Furthermore, the principle of 
coordination is expressed in new forms of cooperation between formally sepa-
rated organisations. For instance, personalised interventions in crime prevention 
require the efforts of the police, youth work, public prosecutor, housing corpora-
tion, youth care, welfare work, custodial institution, municipality and the proba-
tion office. Seen from the prevention perspective, organisational divides that are 
logical from a disciplinary, constitutional or bureaucratic perspective are often 
experienced as a barrier. 
The third organising principle is the principle of timeliness. Early detec-
tion and subsequent early intervention reflect the adage that prevention is most 
effective when interventions take place as soon as possible. Early detection im-
plies an anticipatory ability, which is constructed in practices of surveillance in 
the public domain, population screening and monitoring of risk citizens, but also 
in new professional roles: police officers no longer merely prosecute summary 
offenses or investigate crimes, but also signal risk factors and draw up ‘concern 
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reports’; and welfare workers no longer merely act on an individual demand for 
care, but also develop outreach methods to act on presumptions of welfare or 
health problems. 
Taken together, these three principles constitute an expansive logic. Ac-
cording to the principle of proximity, prevention increases in effectiveness as in-
terventions are organised closer to the source of risks. According to the principle 
of coordination, prevention increases in effectiveness as interventions cover a 
broader range of risks. And according to the principle of timeliness, prevention 
increases in effectiveness as interventions are organised earlier in the develop-
ment of a risk. In other words: prevention tends towards a detailed, all-embracing 
and swift approach to risks. The immanent logic of prevention is a logic of expan-
sion. 
 
The preventive gaze also transforms the selection of objects of state intervention. 
In crime policy, it is no longer the delinquent but the entire population that is the 
object of intervention. Even though not everybody is affected in the same way or 
to the same extent by preventive measures and even though not every citizen is 
identified as a risk citizen, the basic premise underlying crime prevention is that 
every citizen is a potential victim or delinquent. Likewise, in public health policy, 
instead of the ill, the healthy part of the population becomes the object of inter-
vention. Here, too, every citizen is understood to be potentially susceptible to 
endogenous health threats. Contrary to the classic judicial or medical reaction to 
crime and illness, prevention does not imply an a priori exclusion of possible ob-
jects of intervention. However, prevention does have a ‘favourite’ target group: 
children and adolescents are of special interest, since the basis for undesirable 
behaviour is often laid in childhood, but also because they are more susceptible to 
behavioural incentives than adults. 
In terms of instrumentation, prevention has many faces. Managing re-
sponsibility and solidarity requires a set of behavioural incentives and disincen-
tives, either as a form of persuasion and support or as a form of discouragement 
or obstacle. Care and discipline often go hand in hand in preventive practices. 
Prevention is both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ and is not characterised by the uniformity of 
judicial punishment or medical care. Moreover, prevention is often both ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ within the same policy domain: crime prevention is as much a matter of sur-
veillance and discipline as it is of youth care and parenting support; and disease 
prevention is not merely pursued through education and family support, but also 
through regulation and financial disincentives. In more general terms, the preven-
tive repertoire is characterised by the following six types of interventions: 
1. Administrative regulation: judicial instruments may be used to regulate 
the sale and use of potentially harmful products such as alcohol and to-
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bacco, or to expand the formal competences of mayors to prevent in-
fringements on the public order before actual crimes are committed. 
2. Financial incentives: financial instruments may be used to promote or 
discourage certain behaviour, such as raising tobacco and alcohol excises 
or introducing financial benefits in insurance premiums if clients invest in 
burglary prevention or early detection of diseases. 
3. Transfer of behavioural norms: communicative instruments may, espe-
cially in public health policy, not only be used to transfer objective infor-
mation regarding health risks, but also to transfer behavioural or health 
norms through ‘social marketing’ or moral appeals to citizens (and espe-
cially parents) to choose a healthy lifestyle. Governments move beyond 
the image of the rational citizen: the assumption is that citizens often 
make unhealthy choices, not only because of a lack of information, but es-
pecially because of a lack of willpower in the face of the unhealthy tempta-
tions in our society. 
4. Designing the opportunity structure: government offers facilities to either 
promote or obstruct certain behaviour, for instance by redesigning the 
public domain to prevent crime (street lighting and clear sight lines) or by 
offering a healthy food selection in canteens and by building sport facili-
ties in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
5. Activating societal partners: prevention is not an autonomous task of gov-
ernment, but is also organised in cooperation with societal organisations, 
businesses and individual citizens. The objective is to activate citizens’ en-
tire social context, for instance by organising joint efforts by police, mu-
nicipality, housing corporation, private businesses and occupants to pre-
vent burglary, or by closing covenants with food producers, food vendors 
and sport associations to promote a healthy lifestyle. 
6. Surveillance: a necessary precondition for prevention is the identification 
of risks through surveillance, screening and monitoring. Moreover, sur-
veillance is in itself a subtle form of prevention: people behave differently 
when they know they might be watched, for instance in the form of police 
surveillance, CCTV, a ‘very irritating police approach’ towards notorious 




5. Conclusion and discussion: toward a prevention state? 
 
Preventive practices are not a novelty in the intervention repertoire of Western 
European states. Several examples dating from the Middle Ages or early modern 
415 
 
times might be mentioned, such as the closing of city gates to prevent night time 
attacks on the city and its population, or attempts to rehabilitate delinquents in 
disciplining institutions like the ‘Rasphuis’ and ‘Spinhuis’ in 17th century Amster-
dam. Also, prevention has been an explicit part of several policy domains, such as 
the concern for public hygiene in public health policy, from the 19th century on-
ward. Moreover, some restraint is required in generalising the aforementioned 
empirical findings. Even though there are strong indications that prevention has 
become a dominant perspective in other Western European states as well,616 it 
cannot be ruled out that prevention thrives particularly well in the Dutch context 
or is expressed in a very specific way there. 
That said, this study shows how an increased dominance of the preven-
tion perspective can transform the way a government perceives societal issues 
and relates to them. The developments in the Dutch context since the 1980’s show 
a fundamental and structural change of the state, which can only be understood as 
an expression of the prevention perspective. Instead of being confined to certain 
niches of state intervention, prevention has moved to the very heart of governing 
late-modern society. Both in terms of definition power and intervention power, 
the prevention perspective distinguishes itself from the models of the constitu-
tional and welfare state. 
The prevention perspective has yielded an image of the state, which is not 
characterised by reactions to violations of the law (as in the constitutional state) 
or by compensation for fate (as in the welfare state), but by efforts to avert a nega-
tive future scenario. The justification for state intervention does not follow from 
the attribution of individual guilt (as in the constitutional state) or from the com-
bination of individual victimhood and collective solidarity (as in the welfare 
state), but from the presumption of future harm in case of non-intervention and 
the expectation that this undesirable future is avoidable by state intervention. 
And, more specifically in the social domain (of care and punishment), the preven-
tion perspective has yielded an image of a state, which has as objective to prevent 
citizens from inflicting avoidable harm on themselves, on others or on society in 
general. Consequently, the intervention repertoire of the prevention state is dedi-
cated to eliciting desirable behaviour from citizens. 
 
The prevention state is a product of a specific time and place. Even though this 
study is primarily explorative and not explanatory, several contextual factors can 
be mentioned, which form the logical conditions for the emergence of this specific 
image of the state. Based on sociological and political-philosophical literature, 
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characteristics of both the late-modern social system – the mechanisms which 
structure society – and the late-modern belief system – the values which structure 
the societal and political perspective on social reality – can be termed the ‘social 
bearers’ of the prevention state.617  
The late-modern social system forms a basis for the prevention perspec-
tive, since it increasingly reveals the drawbacks of a quest for progress. Structural 
societal transformations spark new questions, to which prevention seems a logical 
answer. If we understand contemporary Western European societies as a pro-
gression of the modernisation process, we can construct an evolution from the 
industrialisation and individualisation of the 18th and 19th century to the current 
rise of the post-industrial network society. On the one hand, this development has 
led to an unprecedented increase of wealth and life opportunities. On the other 
hand, it has also led to a decline of social institutions (such as church) and social 
control (which is often mentioned as a breeding ground for crime) and to an in-
crease of welfare diseases. In the light of these new challenges to social stability, 
the state emerges as an institution capable of compensating for a lack of societal 
self-regulation and self-correction. For this, a reactive state intervention reper-
toire does not suffice. 
The late-modern belief system forms the mirror image of this social sys-
tem. It is characterised by several dualities. Three of these are of special interest 
for the emergence and existence of the prevention state. The first duality concerns 
our attitude towards the future. On the one hand, an orientation on the future is 
characteristic for a modern outlook on life. On the other hand, this future is often 
perceived in terms of risks. We have become aware of the fact that our very efforts 
to control the future – and to reduce dependence on fate, nature or God – produce 
all sorts of risks and unintended consequences themselves (such as mentioned 
above in the discussion of the late-modern social system). Moreover, this reflexive 
attitude towards human intervention seems to spark a higher level of risk sensi-
bilities. The prevention perspective may be understood as a logical response to 
this ambivalent attitude: it combines a suspicious outlook on the future with a 
firm belief in the aversion of negative future scenarios by human intervention. 
A second duality in the late-modern belief system concerns our attitude 
towards reason and rationality. The use of reason forms the basis of modernity 
and of modern governing strategies, which emphasise statistical data, scientific 
problem analysis and evidence-based interventions, next to political will forma-
tion. The prevention perspective fits the modern tradition which makes society 
                                                   
617 E.g. Foucault, 1975, 1976, 1980; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1986; Beck c.s., 1994; Ankers-
mit, 1996; Castells, 1996; Furedi, 1997; Bernstein, 1998; Frissen, 1999; Bauman, 2000; Rose, 
2000; Garland, 2001; De Mul, 2006; Berlin, 2007; Trommel, 2009; Boutellier, 2011. 
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the object of both ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’.618 However, this perspective also ex-
plicitly moves beyond this tradition by taking possibilities instead of undisputed 
facts as a justified basis for intervention. Risk selection and risk assessment are 
both rational and subjective.  
A third duality in the belief system concerns the appreciation of individual 
freedom and autonomy as the basis for the structuration of state and society. This 
appreciation can be understood as an extension of the centrality of human reason: 
man is believed to be free if he bears the responsibility for his own choices and 
actions. This coincides with the image of the classic constitutional state: the state 
refrains from intervention, but attributes individual guilt in case of legal violation. 
We can see a transformation of this understanding of individual freedom in the 
prevention state: individual responsibility is not understood as a form of ex post 
(judicial) accountability, but as the capability of citizens to ex ante assess the pos-
sible consequences of their actions. The intervention repertoire of the prevention 
state in the social domain is organised around this duality: it calls upon individual 
autonomy, but simultaneously incentivises citizens in order to elicit ‘voluntary 
obedience’. 
In this sense, the prevention state fits a society which emphasises freedom 
in its conceptions of justice, but also in a tradition of government which under-
stands freedom as a justification for and object of intervention.619 In this tradition, 
freedom is not the opposite of government, but an instrument of government. For 
instance, the idea of individual freedom and autonomy forms the basis of our con-
ceptualisations of the constitutional state and the administration of justice, which 
legitimise state interventions on the presumption of individual accountability; of 
our conceptualisations of capitalism and the free market, in which the free move-
ment of goods, capital, services and people is instrumental to the acquisition of 
(both individual and collective) material wealth; of our conceptualisation of the 
welfare state, which introduces presumed boundaries of individual responsibility 
to justify a large scale redistribution of wealth; and also of our conceptualisation 
of the prevention state, which avails itself of specific interpretations of ‘responsi-
bility’ and ‘solidarity’ to justify interventions. 
 
Prevention is not simply a policy strategy, but is part of a broader cultural pattern. 
The preventive gaze cannot be easily brushed aside or adjusted: in the face of 
imminent threat, something must be done. If we combine this observation with 
                                                   
618 Foucault, 1980. 
619 See Rose on ‘powers of freedom’ (1999) and Foucault on ‘pastoral power’ (Focault, 2007) 
and ‘governmentality (Foucault, 2004). The emergence of the prevention state can be under-
stood as a new chapter in the history of ‘governmentality’ and as a new strategy to civilise and 
mould the character of a large section of the population. 
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the aforementioned expansive logic of prevention, the question then arises as to 
whether and how prevention can be moderated. After all, a gaze which tends to 
push out other perspectives and considerations may also invade upon core values 
of a free society. The political discourse surrounding the prevention state empha-
sises serviceability and modesty. At the same time, the rise of the prevention state 
implies a significant usurpation of the state-free domain and a politicisation of 
citizen behaviour. Next to the image of a retreating state, which leaves the organi-
sation of public tasks to (semi) private organisations and has to accept the power 
of supranational institutions, we can also place the image of an interventionist 
prevention state.  
This development is far from innocent or harmless. More specifically, the 
prevention state is extremely vulnerable to an arbitrary exertion of state, since 
there is no firm basis for the justification of interventions and no clear limitation 
on the range and depth of interventions. This leads to a permanent threat of viola-
tion of the innocence principle in the domain of crime and security, of parental 
authority in the domain of education and upbringing, of privacy in the domain of 
surveillance and control, and of professional autonomy in the domain of educa-
tion, welfare and youth care. The preventive gaze thrives in the discretionary 
spaces of the constitutional state: in the formal competences of mayors to prevent 
crime, in the broad interpretation of social rights, and in the justification of sur-
veillance and intervention on the basis of possible negative futures. Moreover, the 
prevention state tends towards an instrumentalisation of citizenship: the ideal of 
citizenship is not the independent public sphere, but the loyal contribution to 
political will formation and policy proposals. 
Institutional and constitutional ‘checks and balances’ are an important 
means to moderate the expansive logic of prevention. Societal ‘checks and bal-
ances’ can play a moderating role as well: an independent public opinion, critical 
scientific scrutiny, and citizens who continue to accept risks as a normal part of 
everyday life (such as in entrepreneurship, traffic, sport, gambling and enjoying 
unhealthy habits). Moreover, reassurance may come from the realisation that full 
prevention is a necessary impossibility. Risks are an inevitable part of human life 
and of living together – without accepting some form of risk, the only remaining 
option would be complete inertia. Seen from this perspective, prevention may 
seem an attractive strategy to avert future harm, but is upon closer inspection also 
a therapeutical illusion for a society obsessed with a fear of the future and unable 










Hoe het preventiedenken het aanzicht van de staat verandert 
 
 
Voorkomen is beter dan genezen. In toenemende mate neemt de overheid dit ada-
gium als richtsnoer voor haar handelen. Of het nu gaat om het voorkomen van 
terroristische aanslagen, van recidive door veelplegers, van schooluitval bij risico-
jongeren, of van overgewicht bij kinderen: de klassieke repertoires van de rechts-
staat en verzorgingsstaat worden op tal van terreinen aangevuld met een preven-
tief interventierepertoire. Maar wat betekent deze transformatie eigenlijk voor de 
rol van de overheid in de hedendaagse samenleving? 
Deze studie reconstrueert de opkomst van het preventiedenken in politiek 
en beleid en bespreekt de gevolgen ervan voor de relatie tussen overheid en sa-
menleving. Preventie lijkt een logisch antwoord op de nieuwe sociale vraagstuk-
ken van deze tijd, zoals veiligheid, opvoeding, welzijn en gezondheid. Tegelijker-
tijd kent preventie een expansieve logica, waardoor de overheid naar een steeds 
vroegere, gedetailleerdere en alomvattendere benadering van risico’s tendeert. 
Daarmee leidt de ‘preventiestaat’ op sluipende wijze naar een vergaande politise-





Hoe je kijkt bepaalt wat je ziet. Deze eenvoudige assumptie ligt ten grondslag aan 
deze studie, die het preventieperspectief in politiek en beleid centraal stelt. Als je 
door de bril van preventie naar de wereld kijkt zie je plots vermijdbare risico’s 
waar je voorheen wellicht neutrale of onbeduidende fenomenen zag of juist on-
vermijdbare risico’s. Bovendien bepaalt wat je ziet vaak ook hoe je handelt.620 Het 
preventieperspectief is niet slechts een manier van kijken, maar impliceert ook 
een handelingsperspectief: risico’s worden voorgesteld als vermijdbaar door 
menselijke interventie.  
Het preventieperspectief kan zich op een vrijwel oneindig aantal fenome-
nen richten. Dat kan bij voorbeeld de inrichting van de publieke ruimte zijn, waar 
een bankje bij een speelplaats niet meer een plek voor ontspanning is, maar een 
                                                   
620 E.g. Foucault, 1963; Goffman, 1974; Edelman, 1977; Schön & Rein, 1994; Scott, 1998. 
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plaats met een verhoogd risico op overlastgevende of criminele activiteiten. De 
idee dat dit risico kan worden voorkomen transformeert vervolgens de criteria 
voor de inrichting van de publieke ruimte. Of de opvoeding van kinderen, die niet 
langer een zorgeloze periode is maar juist is omgeven met gevaren voor de voor-
spoedige ontwikkeling van het kind in termen van gezondheid en gedrag. Maatre-
gelen zijn nodig om deze gevaren af te wenden. Of de zorg voor cruciale infra-
structuur, die behalve vanuit het belang van mobiliteit ook vanuit risico’s op ter-
roristische aanslagen wordt bezien. Ook hier is de vanzelfsprekende vervolgstap 
het nemen van maatregelen met de intentie dergelijke aanslagen te voorkomen. 
 
In ons dagelijks leven nemen we voortdurend preventieve maatregelen. We ne-
men een paraplu mee als het mogelijk gaat regenen, we zetten onze fiets op slot 
om diefstal te voorkomen en we vermijden donkere steegjes uit de vrees om 
overvallen te worden. Maar daarnaast neemt ook  de overheid preventieve maat-
regelen. Op allerlei terreinen zien we bij voorbeeld dat incidenten vaak preventie 
uitlokken. Zo leidt een mislukte terroristische aanslag tot verscherpte passagiers-
controle op vliegvelden, leidt een kindermoord tot het aanleggen van dossiers om 
risicofactoren in de ontwikkeling van kinderen vroegtijdig op te sporen, leidt een 
dodelijke schietpartij tot voorstellen voor aanscherping van de wapenwet, en leidt 
kindermisbruik tot de introductie van diepgaande screening van personeel op 
kinderdagverblijven.  
Dit onderzoek is ingegeven door het vermoeden dat overheden in West-
Europa steeds vaker preventieve maatregelen nemen en dat dit vergaande conse-
quenties heeft voor het handelingsrepertoire van deze overheden. Daarbij is pre-
ventie niet alleen een kenmerk van de reactie op incidenten, maar juist van een 
dieperliggend patroon in overheidshandelen. Dit patroon is geworteld in een 
maatschappelijke context waarin preventie een vanzelfsprekende manier is ge-
worden om met risico’s om te gaan. De centrale vraag van dit onderzoek is hoe de 
groeiende betekenis van het preventiedenken de rol van hedendaagse West-
Europese staat transformeert. 
 
 
2. De transformerende kracht van preventie 
 
Preventie is niet de enig mogelijke manier om met risico’s om te gaan. Acceptatie 
dat het noodlot nu eenmaal kan toeslaan of waardering van tegenslag als een 
leermoment zijn bekende andere omgangsvormen met risico’s. Preventie past 
echter bij uitstek in de moderne tijd, die zich laat kenmerken door een dominante 
oriëntatie op de toekomst en een geloof in de menselijke beheersing van zijn 
leefomgeving. Het preventiedenken transformeert ‘noodlot’ en ‘pech’ tot een zaak 
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van ‘vermijdbaar risico’ of ‘vermijdbaar verlies’. Preventie is het actief en doelbe-
wust proberen af te wenden van een ongewenste ontwikkeling of ongewenst fe-
nomeen. Daarmee is de toekomst – of althans: een negatief toekomstscenario – 
onderwerp van reflectie en aangrijpingspunt van handelen. Een nog niet bestaan-
de werkelijkheid vormt de rechtvaardiging voor handelen in het hier en nu. Con-
creet is niet de crimineel, maar de mogelijk toekomstige crimineel; is niet de pati-
ent, maar de mogelijk toekomstige patiënt; en is niet het ongeluk, maar het moge-
lijk toekomstige ongeluk object van interventie.  
Grofweg kunnen drie vormen van preventief handelen worden onder-
scheiden. Ten eerste primaire preventie, die zich richt op het volledig voorkomen 
van risico’s die kunnen leiden tot een ongewenste toekomst. Een voorbeeld hier-
van is de inrichting van de publieke ruimte, zodat de gelegenheid tot crimineel 
gedrag wordt verkleind. Een tweede vorm is secundaire preventie, ofwel de op-
sporing van risico’s in een zo vroeg mogelijk stadium gevolgd door interventies 
gericht op het voorkomen dat deze risico’s uitgroeien tot een probleem. Hierbij 
kan gedacht worden aan de identificatie van risicojongeren, waarvan wordt ge-
vreesd dat ze crimineel gedrag gaan vertonen als er niet tijdig wordt ingegrepen. 
En tenslotte tertiaire preventie, die gericht is op het voorkomen van verdere ver-
ergering van een op zich al ongewenste situatie of het voorkomen van een her-
haald optreden van een ongewenst fenomeen. Concreet kan het hierbij gaan om 
het aanbieden van detentieprogramma’s aan criminelen gericht op het voorko-
men van recidive. 
 
Preventie rust op de constructie van een causaal schema, waarin een relatie wordt 
gelegd tussen een mogelijke toekomst en factoren in het heden die tot die toe-
komst zouden kunnen leiden. Preventie impliceert een verantwoordelijkheid tot 
handelen in het hier en nu om een bepaald toekomstscenario af te wenden. En als 
een vermijdbaar geachte ongewenste toekomst zich toch voordoet kan daar een 
zekere mate van schuld of aansprakelijkheid aan worden verbonden. Belangrijk 
hierbij is dat er voor preventie geen sprake hoeft te zijn van zekerheid dat een 
ongewenste toekomst zich zal voordoen.  
Preventie vertrekt niet vanuit reeds vaststaande feiten, maar vanuit kan-
sen en mogelijkheden. Daarmee is een zekere mate van onzekerheid ten aanzien 
van de toekomst en een zekere mate van subjectiviteit ten aanzien van de selectie 
en inschatting van risico’s inherent aan preventie. Het maakt uit of het gaat om 
een grote kans op kleine schade of juist om een kleine kans op grote schade. En 
bovendien nemen we bepaalde risico’s voor lief of waarderen we deze zelfs (zoals 
in ondernemerschap en in sport en spel) terwijl we andere risico’s juist bestrijden 
(zoals risico’s op criminaliteit, ziekte en ongelukken). Er is dus geen risico ‘an 
sich’, maar altijd sprake van interpretatie.  
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Bovendien is preventie in potentie grenzeloos, immuun voor evaluatie en 
zelfversterkend. Preventie is grenzeloos aangezien aan vrijwel elk fenomeen en 
elk menselijk handelen zekere risico’s kleven. Preventie is immuun voor evaluatie 
aangezien er geen mogelijkheid is om zeker te weten of je genoeg doet om een 
bepaald risico te voorkomen. Bovendien: hoe beoordeel je de relatie tussen pre-
ventieve maatregelen en de ramp die zich niet heeft voorgedaan of het leed dat 
niet is geleden? En preventie is zelfversterkend aangezien er een prikkel is om in 
een zo vroeg mogelijk stadium te interveniëren, om zoveel mogelijk risico’s af te 
dekken en om zo effectief mogelijk risico’s te bestrijden. Deze kenmerken van 
preventie zetten de vraag naar de betekenis van het preventiedenken voor de rol 
van hedendaagse West-Europese overheden op scherp. Als er in politiek en beleid 
vanuit het preventieperspectief naar de wereld wordt gekeken verandert niet 
alleen het aangrijpingspunt van overheidsinterventies, maar verandert ook de 
reikwijdte en aard van deze interventies.  
 
Dit onderzoek wil in theoretische zin bijdragen aan een begrip van de staat als 
maatschappelijk fenomeen, waarbij de stelling is dat de rol en het beeld van de 
hedendaagse staat niet meer begrepen kan worden zonder aandacht te hebben 
voor de manier waarop preventie bepalend is voor wetgeving, beleid en concrete 
interventies. Bestaande conceptualisaties van de staat, zoals rechtsstaat, verzor-
gingsstaat of reguleringsstaat, volstaan daarbij niet. Dit onderzoek sluit aan op 
verschillende wetenschappelijke debatten. Ten eerste sluit het aan op onderzoek 
dat zich richt op de analyse van de omgang met risico’s in onze hedendaagse mo-
derne cultuur,621 ten tweede op onderzoek dat preventie centraal stelt in analyses 
over transformaties in specifieke beleidsterreinen,622 en ten derde op onderzoek 
dat transformaties in de rol en het handelen van de staat in algemene zin bestu-
deert.623 
Daarnaast wil dit onderzoek in maatschappelijke zin bijdragen aan een 
discussie over de manier waarop staat en samenleving zich tot elkaar verhouden. 
Een toegenomen belang van preventiedenken in politiek en beleid heeft mogelijk 
substantiële gevolgen voor de manier waarop de samenleving wordt bestuurd. 
Wat betekent het als de overheid niet enkel reageert op crimineel gedrag via op-
sporing en berechting, maar ook risicojongeren tot object van interventie maakt? 
                                                   
621 E.g. Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Beck, 1986; Beck c.s., 1994; Bernstein, 1996; Bauman, 2000; 
Douglas, 2002; Ericson & Doyle, 2003; De Mul, 2006; Schinkel, 2007; Giddens, 2009. 
622 E.g. Boutellier, 2002; Garland, 2006, Keller, 2008; Mackenbach & Van der Maas, 2008; Van 
Dijk c.s., 2009. 
623 E.g. Weber, 1922; Foucault, 1975, 1997, 2004; Majone, 1994; Frissen, 1996, 2007; Rhodes, 
1996; Finer, 1997; Power, 1997; Giddens, 1998; Braithwaite, 2000; Ewald, in Baker & Simon, 




Als de overheid niet afwacht tot problemen zich voordoen, maar via surveillance, 
monitoring en ‘outreachend werk’ actief op zoek gaat naar gedragingen die in de 
toekomst tot problemen kunnen leiden? En als de overheid ziekte niet enkel via 
zorg achteraf, maar ook via preventieve levensstijlregulering richting gezonde 
burgers wil bestrijden? Preventie is niet per definitie goed of slecht, maar de logi-
ca van preventie kan zich wel spanningsvol verhouden tot andere waarden zoals 





Het preventiedenken beïnvloedt de manier waarop in politiek en beleid naar 
maatschappelijke fenomenen wordt gekeken en de manier waarop de overheid 
haar interventierepertoire inricht. Het gaat, met andere woorden om de defini-
tiemacht en de interventiemacht van de staat. De idee van de staat verwijst daar-
bij naar de verzameling instituties en organisaties die tezamen de soevereine 
macht uitoefenen over een afgebakend territorium en zijn bevolking.624 Hoe deze 
soevereine macht vervolgens wordt aangewend en uitgeoefend is een kwestie van 
bestuur.625 Transformaties in dit bestuur als gevolg van het preventiedenken zijn 
onderzocht aan de hand van twee cases binnen de West-Europese context. 
Een belangrijke afbakening van het onderzoek is de focus op sociale risi-
co’s. In tegenstelling tot preventie ten aanzien van natuurlijke of technologische 
risico’s, zoals overstromingen, klimaatverandering, vliegtuigongelukken of nucle-
aire ongelukken, gaat het hierbij om de negatieve sociale effecten van menselijke 
interactie en gedrag, zoals misdaad, terrorisme, kindermishandeling, verslaving 
en ongezonde leefstijlen. Deze risico’s zijn een bijproduct van menselijk gedrag en 
alom aanwezig. Overheidshandelen gericht op de preventie van dergelijke risico’s 
vinden we terug in onder meer jeugdbeleid, criminaliteitsbeleid, welzijnsbeleid, 
onderwijsbeleid en volksgezondheidsbeleid. 
Om na te gaan of het preventiedenken inderdaad een transformerende in-
vloed heeft over de volledige breedte van het interventierepertoire van de staat 
zijn een met veelal ‘harde’ overheidsinterventies geassocieerd beleidsterrein 
(criminaliteitsbeleid) en een met veelal ‘zachte’ interventies geassocieerd beleids-
terrein (volksgezondheidsbeleid) geselecteerd. Op beide terreinen heeft de intro-
ductie naar verwachting een belangrijke impact gehad op zowel probleemdefini-
ties als concrete beleidsvoornemens. De bevindingen in beide cases zijn met el-
                                                   
624 E.g. Machiavelli, 1513; Bodin, 1576; Hobbes, 1651; Jellinek, 1900; Weber, 1922; Schmitt, 
1934; Poggi, 1978, 1990; Pierson, 2004; Loughlin, 2006. 
625 E.g. Burchell c.s., 1991; Finer, 1997; Foucault, 1998, 2007; Hunt, 2009; Steinberger, 2009. 
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kaar vergeleken om algemene conclusies te trekken over de implicaties van het 
preventiedenken. Beide beleidsterreinen zijn onderzocht in de Nederlandse con-
text, die hier als exemplarisch voor West-Europa wordt beschouwd. Het onder-
zoek is exploratief van aard: het beoogt een diagnose van de hedendaagse staat te 
formuleren. 
De ontwikkelingen in criminaliteitsbeleid en volksgezondheidsbeleid zijn 
gereconstrueerd vanaf de jaren ’80 van de 20e eeuw, het moment waarop preven-
tie in beide terreinen voor een belangrijke kentering zorgde – al zijn er zeker 
voorbeelden van oudere vormen van preventie te vinden. Deze reconstructie 
vindt plaats aan de hand van belangrijke beleidsnota’s, aangevuld met de troonre-
des, regeringsverklaringen en regeerakkoorden. De definitiemacht van de staat, 
opgevat als het vermogen om de reikwijdte van de eigen rol en de aard van poli-
tiek relevante fenomenen te bepalen, komt in deze documenten tot uiting in op-
vattingen over probleemdefinities, beleidsdoelstellingen en begrenzing van 
staatsverantwoordelijkheden. De interventiemacht van de staat, opgevat als het 
vermogen om de vorm en het karakter van machtsuitoefening in de samenleving 
te bepalen, komt tot uiting in opvattingen over de organisatievorm van interven-
ties, de selectie van aangrijpingspunten van interventies, en de keuze voor de 
inzet van bepaalde technieken en instrumenten. Ter ondersteuning van de bevin-
dingen uit de beleidsanalyse is een drietal lokale beleidspraktijken onderzocht, 
waarin tot uitdrukking komt hoe het preventiedenken het concrete handelen van 
de overheid kan structureren. 
 
 
4. De contouren van de preventiestaat 
 
4.1. Voorbij de sjablonen van de rechtsstaat en verzorgingsstaat 
In het midden van de jaren ‘80 van de 20e eeuw vindt in zowel het Nederlandse 
criminaliteitsbeleid als volksgezondheidsbeleid een omslag naar preventie plaats. 
In het licht van maatschappelijke veranderingen werden de klassieke mechanis-
men van de rechtsstaat en verzorgingsstaat als ontoereikend gezien door de 
toenmalige regering. Na een vertienvoudiging van het aantal geregistreerde mis-
drijven tussen 1965 en 1980 constateert de regering dat verdere investeringen in 
enkel het politieke en justitiële apparaat onvoldoende zullen zijn om reductie van 
criminaliteit te bewerkstelligen. Toegenomen welvaart en individualisering wor-
den gezien als voornaamste oorzaken. De regering bezint zich op een manier om 
recht te doen aan maatschappelijke zorgen over criminaliteit en aan politieke 
zorgen over de geloofwaardigheid van de staat als rechtshandhaver. Naast het 
klassieke rechtsstatelijke mechanisme van opsporing, berechting en bestraffing 
plaatst de regering een nieuwe strategie: bestuurlijke preventie van criminaliteit. 
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In het domein van de volksgezondheid brengt de toename van welvaarts-
ziekten, zoals hart- en vaatziekten, diabetes en bepaalde vormen van kanker, de 
regering tot een vergelijkbare koerswijziging. Verdere investeringen in het stelsel 
van gezondheidszorg worden als ineffectief gezien in het geval van degeneratieve 
en chronische aandoeningen. Om redenen van arbeidsproductiviteit en solidari-
teit complementeert de regering het al sinds de eind 19e eeuw bestaande preven-
tierepertoire gericht op exogene gezondheidsdeterminanten (met name de zorg 
voor publieke hygiëne via waterzuivering, riolering en voedselkwaliteit) met een 
preventierepertoire gericht op endogene gezondheidsdeterminanten. Naast het 
stelsel van gezondheidszorg en de bescherming tegen gezondheidsfactoren buiten 
de invloedssfeer van individuele burgers introduceert de regering een strategie 
gericht op de beïnvloeding van gezondheidsfactoren die binnen de invloedssfeer 
van individuele burgers liggen. 
 
De twee geselecteerde beleidsdomeinen verwijzen naar twee klassieke beelden 
van de staat, die nog steeds constituerend zijn voor ons hedendaagse staatsbegrip. 
De verantwoordelijkheid van de staat voor de bestrijding van criminaliteit past bij 
uitstek binnen het beeld van de rechtsstaat, waarin overheidsinterventies enkel 
gerechtvaardigd zijn indien ze berusten op een algemeen geldende wettelijke taak 
of bevoegdheid.626 En de verantwoordelijkheid van de staat  voor het bevorderen 
van de gezondheid van de bevolking past in het beeld van de verzorgingsstaat, die 
compensatiemechanismen introduceert voor de willekeurige verdeling van risi-
co’s en levenskansen over de bevolking, zoals arbeidsongeschiktheid, werkloos-
heid, ziekte of gebrek aan deugdelijke bewoning en onderwijs.627 
Zowel de rechtsstaat als de verzorgingsstaat zijn in hun wezen niet ge-
kenmerkt door een preventieve doelstelling of een preventief interventierepertoi-
re. De rechtsstaat incorporeert de bestaansgrond en oorspronkelijke opdracht van 
de staat, te weten de handhaving van de maatschappelijke orde, binnen een stelsel 
van juridische en institutionele waarborgen tegen willekeur en tirannie. In een 
rechtsstaat uit de Leviathan zich als een juridisch ingebed reactiemechanisme 
voor inbreuken op het recht – algemeen bekend in de vorm van rechtshandhaving 
en rechtspraak. En de verzorgingsstaat kan worden begrepen als een compensa-
tiemechanisme voor het noodlot, hetzij door het creëren van voorzieningen in 
geval van ziekte en werkloosheid, hetzij door het garanderen van gelijke kansen 
ongeacht afkomst, geslacht, geloof of sociaaleconomische positie. De verzorgings-
staat heeft niet zozeer ten doel om het noodlot te voorkomen, maar wil de gevol-
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gen ervan opvangen of burgers de middelen geven zich aan de wreedste uitingen 
ervan te onttrekken. 
Echter, veel van de sociale fenomenen waarover rechtsstaat en verzor-
gingsstaat zich buigen kunnen ook vanuit een preventief perspectief worden be-
naderd. Dat preventieperspectief leidt tot een ander beeld van de staat. Zo komen 
behalve enkel een justitiële reactie op misdaad ook de identificatie van probleem-
jongeren, programma’s ter bestrijding van recidive onder veelplegers, de inrich-
ting van de gelegenheidsstructuur en de afschrikwekkende werking van surveil-
lance in de publieke ruimte in beeld. En zo maken naast het bieden van zorg als 
reactie op ziekte ook interventies gericht op ongezond gedrag, ongezonde voe-
ding, gebrekkige hygiëne, onvoldoende lichaamsbeweging en vroegsignalering 
van ziekte hun intrede. De klassieke sjablonen van de rechtsstaat en verzorgings-
staat blijven bestaan, maar worden gecomplementeerd door een expliciet preven-
tief repertoire, en daarmee idealiter gereduceerd tot een ‘ultimum remedium’ 
voor het geval preventie onmogelijk of ontoereikend blijkt.  
 
4.2. Definitiemacht: de politisering van gedrag 
In tegenstelling tot het justitiële paradigma op criminaliteit en het medische para-
digma op ziekte impliceert preventie een maatschappelijke oriëntatie op de oor-
zaken van misdaad en ziekte. Dit heeft als logische consequentie dat preventie 
gepaard gaat met actieve interventies in maatschappelijke processen, terwijl het 
justitiële apparaat en het stelsel van gezondheidszorg vooral ‘buiten’ maatschap-
pelijke processen geplaatst zijn. Bovendien ligt de nadruk bij preventie niet op een 
taakgerichte afhandeling van problemen volgens juridische en medische waarden 
en maatstaven, maar op interventies die voortkomen uit een probleemgerichte of 
teleologische oriëntatie.  
Belangrijk voor de teleologische oriëntatie van preventie zijn twee con-
ceptuele transformaties in beide onderzochte beleidsterreinen. In het criminali-
teitsbeleid gaat het om de omslag van ‘criminaliteit’ naar ‘veiligheid’ in de loop 
van de jaren ‘90. Daarmee wordt behalve een juridisch omlijnde notie van crimi-
naliteit ook een brede en subjectieve interpretatie van de kwaliteit van het pu-
blieke domein leidend voor beleid, inclusief verloedering, overlast en gevoelens 
van onveiligheid. En in volksgezondheid werd reeds bij de omslag naar preventie 
in het midden van de jaren ’80 ‘ziekte’ vervangen door ‘gezondheid’ als dominant 
beleidsparadigma. Behalve een medisch omschreven notie van ziekte wordt ook 
een breder gevoel van lichamelijk en geestelijk welbehagen, ten dienste van de 
volledige participatie in samenleving en economie, leidend voor beleid.  
De noties ‘veiligheid' en 'gezondheid’ kennen een conceptueel verwant-
schap met preventie. In de eerste plaats impliceren beide begrippen de afwezig-
heid van respectievelijk criminaliteit en ziekte, en ten tweede zijn ze gericht op 
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het realiseren van een zekere subjectief ervaren kwaliteit van leven en dientenge-
volge ook op het voorkomen van vermijdbaar verlies aan kwaliteit. Daarmee 
wordt ook de reikwijdte van preventie verbreed. In plaats van criminaliteitspre-
ventie en rechtshandhaving verschuift de aandacht naar bedreigingen voor het 
publieke domein en ordehandhaving, en in plaats van ziektepreventie verschuift 
de aandacht naar vermijdbaar gezondheidsverlies. 
Het teleologische karakter van preventie uit zich in de oriëntatie op risi-
co’s als aangrijpingspunt voor interventies. Preventie rust altijd op een theorie, 
causaal schema of scenario tussen ongewenste toekomst en haar mogelijke oor-
zaken in het heden. De mogelijkheid van schade wordt veelal vastgesteld op basis 
van statistische extrapolatie, zoals de identificatie van risicogroepen voor bepaal-
de welvaartsziekten of voor toekomstig crimineel gedrag, op basis van structurele 
screening of monitoring, zoals de vroegsignalering van kanker, overgewicht en 
opvoedingsproblemen, of op basis van professionele inschattingen over indivi-
duele gevallen, zoals de beslissing om preventief te interveniëren in een pro-
bleemgezin of om een recidivist met proefverlof te sturen. 
Meer concreet gaat het bij criminaliteitspreventie om vier typen risico’s: 
risicoburgers die een grote kans hebben om in de toekomst crimineel gedrag te 
vertonen (zoals probleemjongeren, spijbelaars, overlastgevers en veelplegers), 
risicoplaatsen (achterstandswijken, stationsgebieden), risicotijden (uitgaans-
avonden) en risicofactoren (drugs, alcohol, wapens). En bij ziektepreventie gaat 
het om de endogene determinanten van gezondheid (naast de exogene, die wor-
den bestreden door preventie als gezondheidsbescherming), met name eetge-
woonten, roken, drankgebruik en lichaamsbeweging. De identificatie van sociale 
risico’s rondom ziekte en criminaliteit vormt daarmee het voorportaal van inter-
venties in maatschappelijke processen en in gedrag van burgers. Niet de uitkom-
sten van bepaald handelen, zoals een ziekte of een misdaad, maar de gedragingen 
zelf of de contexten waarin deze plaatsvinden worden object van problematise-
ring en interventie.  
 
De leidraad voor deze politisering van gedrag is een impliciet beeld van de goede 
burger. De constructie van de ‘brave’ burger in het criminaliteitsbeleid vindt 
plaats via interventies zoals surveillance in de publieke ruimte (ter afschrikking 
van crimineel gedrag), beïnvloeding van de gelegenheidsstructuur (inrichting van 
de publieke ruimte), opvoedingsondersteuning voor ouders van probleemjonge-
ren, de aanpak van vroegtijdig schoolverlaten, het bijhouden en delen van infor-
matie over risicofactoren bij kinderen in elektronische kinddossiers, het uitbrei-
den van formele bevoegdheden van burgemeesters (zoals preventief fouilleren en 




En de constructie van de ‘gezonde’ burger in het volksgezondheidsbeleid 
vindt plaats via een repertoire van onder meer ‘social marketing’ van een gezonde 
levensstijl (overdracht van gezondheidsnormen), het creëren van laagdrempelige 
sportvoorzieningen in de wijk, gezondheidseducatie op scholen, leeftijdsgrenzen 
voor de verkoop en consumptie van alcohol en tabak, rookverboden op diverse 
publieke plaatsen, vroegtijdige signalering van overgewicht, toestaan dat zorgver-
zekeraars financiële prikkels voor hun klanten inbouwen als ze investeren in een 
gezonde levensstijl, en het aanbieden van programma’s voor leefstijlverandering 
voor kinderen met overgewicht.  
Onder dit type preventieve maatregelen ligt een transformatie in de ver-
antwoordelijkheidsverdeling tussen staat en burger. De rechtvaardiging voor 
overheidsinterventies is verschoven van een inbreuk op de wet of een individuele 
zorgvraag (of bescherming tegen ziektebronnen buiten de invloed van individuele 
burgers) naar een te verwachten toekomst en de idee dat deze kan worden afge-
wend door overheidsingrijpen. Daarmee is de grondslag voor overheidshandelen 
verschoven van feit naar mogelijkheid en in het kielzog daarvan is de verant-
woordelijkheid van de staat uitgebreid naar het beïnvloeden van gedrag dat on-
gewenste sociale risico’s met zich meebrengt. Dit doet de staat door aan te grijpen 
op de keuzes die burgers maken of de sociale contexten waarin deze keuzes ge-
maakt worden. En daarmee raakt de staat weer direct aan de verantwoordelijk-
heid van burgers. Enerzijds zijn het burgers zelf die hun gedrag dienen te veran-
deren, anderzijds is het de staat die gewenst gedrag probeert te ontlokken aan 
burgers.  
Dit ‘spel’ tussen staat en burger wordt gestructureerd aan de hand van 
een transformatie van de noties ‘verantwoordelijkheid’ en ‘solidariteit’. Waar 
‘verantwoordelijkheid’ binnen het sjabloon van de rechtsstaat wordt opgevat als 
het achteraf verantwoording afleggen over het eigen handelen, daar wordt ‘ver-
antwoordelijkheid’ hier juist opgevat als het vermogen van individuen om vooraf 
te reflecteren op de consequenties van het eigen handelen. En waar binnen het 
sjabloon van de verzorgingsstaat ‘solidariteit’ wordt gevraagd van de belastingbe-
taler met het slachtoffer van een willekeurig en onvermijdelijk noodlot, daar 
wordt hier juist ‘solidariteit’ gevraagd van de burger die door vermijdbaar gedrag 
onnodige aanspraken op collectieve middelen maakt. De transformaties van ex 
post naar ex ante verantwoordelijkheid en van solidariteit met het slachtoffer 
naar solidariteit met de samenleving vormen tevens de rechtvaardiging voor een 
bepaald type overheidsinterventies: de presumptie dat burgers in staat zijn tot 
verantwoordelijk en solidair handelen legitimeert interventies richting burgers 





4.3. Interventiemacht: de expansieve logica van preventie 
Het interventierepertoire dat voortvloeit uit het preventiedenken in criminali-
teitsbeleid en volksgezondheidsbeleid is gericht op het sturen, beïnvloeden, facili-
teren en managen van verantwoordelijkheid en solidariteit. De ontwikkeling van 
dit nieuwe repertoire vindt plaats langs drie lijnen of organisatieprincipes. Het 
eerste van deze principes is het principe van nabijheid: het organiseren van inter-
venties waar risico’s zich voordoen. Meer concreet krijgt dit principe vorm door 
de organisatie van preventie in de directe leefomgeving van burgers (bij voor-
beeld via Veiligheidshuizen en Centra voor Jeugd en Gezin wijkniveau), in de soci-
ale context waarin burgers zich begeven (zoals aanpassing van de gelegenheids-
structuur en activering van maatschappelijke organisaties), en in persoonsgerich-
te programma’s (zoals ‘outreachend’ werk richting zorgmijders en recidivepre-
ventie richting veelplegers).  
Het tweede organisatieprincipe van preventie is het principe van coördi-
natie. Vanuit de assumptie dat er zelden één maatregel effectief genoeg is om ge-
dragsverandering te realiseren wordt er een breed web van samenhangende in-
terventies gecreëerd om via verschillende technieken gedrag te beïnvloeden. 
Exemplarisch is hier het tabaksontmoedigingsbeleid, waarin positieve prikkels 
van educatie, stopondersteuning en ‘social marketing’ worden ingezet naast nega-
tieve prikkels van accijnsverhoging, regulering van leeftijdsgrenzen en reclame-
uitingen en rookverboden in publiek gebouwen. Het principe van coördinatie uit 
zich ook in nieuwe vormen van samenwerking, bij voorbeeld rond persoonsge-
richte criminaliteitspreventie: politie, jeugdwerk, verslavingszorg, OM, woning-
corporaties, jeugdzorg, welzijnswerk, justitiële inrichtingen, leerplicht, gemeente 
en reclassering zijn alle betrokken bij persoonsgerichte criminaliteitspreventie. 
Wat vanuit disciplinair, rechtsstatelijk of bureaucratisch perspectief logische 
scheidslijnen zijn, blijken vaak barrières vanuit preventieperspectief. 
Het derde organisatieprincipe van preventie is het principe van tijdigheid: 
preventie is het meest effectief als het zo vroeg mogelijk kan worden ingezet. Dit 
principe komt tot uiting in vroegsignalering en daaropvolgende vroeginterventie. 
Vroegsignalering impliceert een anticiperend vermogen, vormgegeven door prak-
tijken van surveillance van de publieke ruimte, screening van de bevolking en 
monitoring van risicoburgers, maar ook door nieuwe rolopvattingen van professi-
onals: politieagenten bekeuren niet alleen, maar signaleren ook risicofactoren en 
maken ‘zorgmeldingen’; welzijnswerkers handelen niet alleen op basis van een 
zorgvraag, maar in de vorm van ‘outreachend werken’ ook op basis van vermoe-
dens nog voordat er een expliciete zorgvraag van een burger ligt.  
Tezamen genomen vormen deze drie organisatieprincipe een expansieve 
logica. Volgens het principe van nabijheid is preventie effectief als het zo gedetail-
leerd mogelijk en zo dicht mogelijk op de geïdentificeerde risico’s plaatsvindt. 
430 
 
Volgens het principe van coördinatie is preventie effectief als het zo veelomvat-
tend mogelijk is en intervenieert op alle geïdentificeerde risico’s. En volgens het 
principe van tijdigheid is preventie effectief als het in een zo vroeg mogelijk stadi-
um van de ontwikkeling van risico’s kan plaatsvinden. Met andere woorden: pre-
ventie tendeert naar zo gedetailleerd mogelijke, zo alomvattend mogelijke en zo 
vroeg mogelijke interventies. De immanente logica van preventie is een logica van 
expansie. 
 
Het preventiedenken verandert ook de selectie van objecten van interventie. In 
criminaliteitspreventie is niet de delinquent, maar de gehele bevolking het aan-
grijpingspunt. Hoewel niet iedereen in gelijke mate wordt getroffen door preven-
tieve maatregelen en hoewel niet iedereen als risicoburger wordt geïdentificeerd 
is de grondgedachte van criminaliteitspreventie dat in principe iedere burger 
zowel dader als slachtoffer kan worden. En het aangrijpingspunt in ziektepreven-
tie is niet de patiënt, maar het gezonde deel van de bevolking. Er is geen a priori 
uitsluiting van objecten van interventie, zoals de klassieke justitiële of curatieve 
reactie die wel kennen. In het bijzonder zijn overigens kinderen en jongeren ob-
ject van preventie bij uitstek. Niet alleen wordt in de jeugd veelal de basis gelegd 
voor een ongewenste levensstijl, maar jongeren zijn ook vatbaarder voor gedrags-
interventies dan volwassenen. 
In termen van concrete instrumentering kent preventie vele gezichten. 
Het managen van verantwoordelijkheid en solidariteit vraagt om gedragsprikkels 
in zowel positieve als negatieve zin: ofwel in de vorm van verleiding en aanmoe-
diging, ofwel in de vorm van belemmering en ontmoediging. Disciplinering en 
ondersteuning gaan in veel gevallen hand in hand. Preventie is ‘hard’ en ‘zacht’ 
tegelijk en kent niet de eenduidigheid van de repressieve justitiële reactie of de 
curatieve medische zorg. Vaak is preventie bovendien ‘hard’ en ‘zacht’ binnen 
hetzelfde beleidsterrein. Criminaliteitspreventie is een zaak van surveillance en 
disciplinering, maar ook van opvoedingsondersteuning en jeugdzorg. En ziekte-
preventie is niet enkel een kwestie van educatie en ondersteuning, maar ook van 
regulering en financiële ontmoediging. In grote lijnen kenmerkt het preventieve 
handelingsrepertoire zich door zes typen interventies: 
1. Bestuurlijke ordening: juridische instrumenten kunnen worden ingezet 
voor de uitbreiding van formele bevoegdheden van burgemeesters bij de 
preventie van inbreuken op de openbare orde, of voor de regulering van 
verkoop en gebruik van mogelijk schadelijke producten zoals alcohol en 
tabak.  
2. Financiële prikkels: financiële instrumenten kunnen worden ingezet ter 
ontmoediging van bepaald gedrag (bij voorbeeld in de verhoging van ac-
cijnzen op tabak en alcohol), of ter bevordering van gewenst gedrag (bij 
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voorbeeld het mogelijk maken dat verzekeringsmaatschappen zaken als 
inbraakpreventie en vroegsignalering van ziekten opnemen in hun polis-
sen). 
3. Normoverdracht: communicatieve instrumenten kunnen, met name in het 
volksgezondheidsbeleid, niet alleen worden ingezet voor de overdracht 
van objectieve informatie, maar ook voor ‘social marketing’ of voor een 
moreel appèl op burgers (en vooral ouders) om te kiezen voor een gezon-
de levensstijl. Daarbij gaat de overheid voorbij aan het beeld van de ratio-
nele burger: de onderliggende assumptie is dat de burger niet alleen kiest 
voor ongezond leven vanwege een gebrek aan informatie, maar vooral 
ook vanwege een gebrek aan wilskracht in het licht van alom aanwezige 
ongezonde verleidingen. 
4. Inrichting van de gelegenheidsstructuur: preventie krijgt eveneens vorm 
door het bieden van faciliteiten, die via indirecte weg bepaald gedrag en 
bepaalde keuzes bevorderen of ontmoedigen. Concreet gaat het om zaken 
als de inrichting van gezonde kantines op school en werk, om goede 
straatverlichting ter ontmoediging van crimineel gedrag, en om de inrich-
ting van sportvelden ter bevordering van een actieve levensstijl. 
5. Activering van maatschappelijke organisaties: preventie is niet alleen een 
autonome zaak van de overheid, maar wordt ook georganiseerd in sa-
menwerkingsverbanden met maatschappelijke organisaties, bedrijfsleven 
en individuele burgers. Doel hiervan is het activeren van de gehele sociale 
context van burgers. Zo kan inbraakpreventie vorm krijgen door samen-
werking tussen politie, gemeente, woningcorporaties, bedrijfsleven en 
bewoners. En zo kan een gezonde leefstijl worden bevorderd door het 
sluiten van convenanten met voedselproducten, zorgverzekeraars en 
sportverenigingen. 
6. Surveillance: de identificatie van risico’s via toezicht, screening en moni-
toring is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor preventie. Bovendien is toe-
zicht zelf ook een subtiele vorm van preventie: mensen gedragen zich an-
ders als ze weten dat ze mogelijk in de gaten worden gehouden, bij voor-
beeld in de vorm van cameratoezicht, politiesurveillance, het ‘hinderlijk 




5. Conclusie en discussie: op weg naar een preventiestaat? 
 
Preventie is nooit volledig afwezig is geweest in het handelingsrepertoire van 
West-Europese staten. Men kan denken aan het sluiten van stadspoorten om aan-
432 
 
vallen van buiten op de stad en haar inwoners te voorkomen of aan vroege pogin-
gen tot heropvoeding van delinquenten in het Amsterdamse Rasphuis of het 
Drentse Veenhuizen. Bovendien is preventie in enkele domeinen zelfs al lange tijd 
expliciet onderdeel van een beleidsdomein, zoals de zorg voor publieke hygiëne 
vanaf het eind van de 19e eeuw. En hoewel er sterke aanwijzingen zijn dat preven-
tie ook in andere West-Europese staten een grote vlucht heeft genomen,628 kan 
niet worden uitgesloten dat preventie bij uitstek gedijt in de Nederlandse context 
of daar althans een specifieke uitdrukkingsvorm krijgt. 
Tegelijkertijd laat het onderzoek zien hoe het preventiedenken kan leiden 
tot een transformatie in de manier waarop de overheid maatschappelijke vraag-
stukken benoemt en benadert. De ontwikkelingen in de Nederlandse context sinds 
de jaren ’80 van de 20e eeuw laten een fundamentele en structurele transformatie 
van de staat zien, die enkel begrepen kan worden als een uitdrukking van preven-
tiedenken. In plaats van een uitzondering in bepaalde niches van overheidshande-
len heeft het preventiedenken zich naar het hart van politiek en beleid verplaatst. 
Zowel in definitiemacht als interventiemacht onderscheidt het preventiedenken 
zich sterk van de sjablonen van de rechtsstaat en de verzorgingsstaat. 
Het preventiedenken heeft een beeld van de staat voortgebracht dat zich 
niet kenmerkt door een reactie op wetsovertredingen (zoals in de rechtsstaat) of 
door een compensatie voor het noodlot (zoals in de verzorgingsstaat), maar door 
het voorkomen van vermijdbaar geachte schade. De rechtvaardiging voor staats-
interventie vloeit niet voort uit individuele schuld (zoals in het beeld van de 
rechtsstaat) of uit de combinatie van individueel slachtofferschap en collectieve 
solidariteit (zoals in het beeld van de verzorgingsstaat), maar uit het vermoeden 
van toekomstige schade bij non-interventie door de staat en de verwachting dat 
deze onwenselijke toekomst vermijdbaar is. En meer specifiek voor het sociale 
domein (van zorg en straf) geldt dat het preventiedenken een model van de staat 
voortbrengt dat tot doel heeft om te voorkomen dat burgers vermijdbare schade 
aan zichzelf, anderen en de samenleving als geheel toebrengen. Het uiteindelijke 
interventierepertoire dat uit het preventiedenken voortvloeit kenmerkt zich dan 
ook door technieken gericht op het ontlokken van gewenst gedrag aan burgers. 
 
De preventiestaat is een product van een specifieke tijd en plaats. Hoewel dit on-
derzoek primair verkennend is en niet tot doel heeft om de opkomst van de pre-
ventiestaat te verklaren kan wel een aantal factoren worden genoemd, die de logi-
sche condities voor zijn opkomst en voortbestaan vormen. Op basis van sociologi-
sche en politiek-filosofische literatuur kunnen zowel kenmerken van het laat-
                                                   
628 E.g. Garland, 2001; Krasmann, 2007; Huster & Rudolph, 2008; Van Dijk & De Waard, in Craw-
ford, 2009:130; Boutellier, 2011:87. 
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moderne sociale systeem – de mechanismen waarlangs een samenleving is ge-
structureerd – als kenmerken van het laat-moderne geloofsysteem – het geheel 
aan waarden dat het maatschappelijke en politieke perspectief op de sociale wer-
kelijkheid structureert – worden genoemd als ‘sociale dragers’ van de preventie-
staat.629  
Het sociale systeem van laat-moderne samenlevingen vormt een voe-
dingsbodem voor het preventiedenken doordat in toenemende mate de schaduw-
zijden van vooruitgang zichtbaar worden. Structurele transformaties in de samen-
leving produceren nieuwe vragen, waarop preventie een logisch antwoord lijkt te 
zijn. Als we de hedendaagse West-Europese samenlevingen bezien als een voort-
zetting van het moderniseringsproces, dan kan een ontwikkeling worden ge-
schetst van de 18e en 19e eeuwse aanzetten tot industrialisering en individualise-
ring tot aan de hedendaagse post-industriële netwerksamenleving. Enerzijds is 
deze ontwikkeling gepaard gegaan met ongekend grote levenskansen en een on-
gekende welvaartsgroei, anderzijds heeft het eveneens geleid tot een neergang 
van sociale instituties (zoals de kerk), een erosie van sociale controle (vaak ge-
noemd als voedingsbodem voor criminaliteit) en een toename van welvaartsziek-
ten. In het licht van dergelijke kwesties treedt de staat naar voren als compensatie 
voor een gebrek aan maatschappelijke zelfregulering en zelfcorrectie. Daarbij 
volstaat een reactief handelingsrepertoire niet. 
Het geloofsysteem van laat-moderne samenlevingen vormt in zekere zin 
de spiegel van het sociale systeem en laat zich kenmerken door een reeks van 
dualiteiten. Drie van dergelijke dualiteiten zijn van bijzonder belang voor het ont-
staan en voortbestaan van de preventiestaat. De eerste dualiteit behelst onze 
houding ten aanzien van de toekomst. Enerzijds is een oriëntatie op de toekomst 
kenmerkend voor de moderne levenshouding, anderzijds wordt deze toekomst in 
laat-moderne samenlevingen vooral in termen van risico’s begrepen. Deze duali-
teit komt voort uit het bewustzijn dat juist onze pogingen om controle over de 
toekomst uit te oefenen – en niet afhankelijk te zijn van toeval, God of natuur – 
zelf allerlei risico’s en onbedoelde neveneffecten produceren. Bovendien lijkt deze 
reflexieve houding ten aanzien van menselijk handelen een grotere risicogevoe-
ligheid te produceren. Het preventiedenken grijpt aan op deze ambivalentie: het 
combineert een wantrouwende houding ten aanzien van de toekomst met een 
geloof in de controleerbaarheid van die toekomst door menselijk handelen. 
Een tweede dualiteit in het laat-moderne geloofsysteem betreft de om-
gang met de rede. Het gebruik van de menselijke rede staat aan de basis van de 
                                                   
629 E.g. Foucault, 1975, 1976, 1980; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1986; Beck c.s., 1994; Ankers-
mit, 1996; Castells, 1996; Furedi, 1997; Bernstein, 1998; Frissen, 1999; Bauman, 2000; Rose, 
2000; Garland, 2001; De Mul, 2006; Berlin, 2007; Trommel, 2009; Boutellier, 2011. 
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moderniteit en aan de basis van modern staatsbestuur, waarin niet alleen politie-
ke wilsvorming maar ook statistische kennisvergaring, wetenschappelijke pro-
bleemanalyse en ‘evidence based’ beleidsvoorstellen een belangrijke rol spelen. 
Het preventiedenken past enerzijds in deze moderne traditie die de samenleving 
tot object van zowel ‘macht’ als ‘kennis’ maakt.630 Anderzijds gaat het preventie-
denken ook voorbij aan deze traditie door nadrukkelijk mogelijkheid in plaats van 
zekerheid als uitgangspunt te nemen. Risicoselectie en risicowaardering zijn ge-
lijktijdig rationeel en subjectief.  
En een derde dualiteit in het geloofsysteem betreft de waardering van in-
dividuele vrijheid en autonomie als grondslagen van samenleving en staatsinrich-
ting. Deze waardering van vrijheid ligt in het verlengde van de waardering van de 
menselijke rede: de mens wordt geacht vrij te zijn als hij zelf nadenkt en verant-
woordelijkheid voor zijn keuzes draagt. Dit is het beeld van de klassieke rechts-
staat: de overheid onthoudt zich zoveel mogelijk van interventie, maar attribueert 
individuele schuld in het geval van wetsovertreding. In de preventiestaat zien we 
echter een transformatie van dit vrijheidsbegrip: de staat ziet individuele verant-
woordelijkheid niet als een vorm van ex post (juridische) aansprakelijkheid, maar 
als het vermogen van burgers om ex ante de gevolgen van hun keuzes te overden-
ken. Het interventierepertoire van de preventiestaat in het sociale domein is exact 
rond deze dualiteit georganiseerd: het doet een beroep op individuele autonomie, 
maar introduceert tegelijkertijd gedragsinterventies om ‘vrijwillige gehoorzaam-
heid’ te ontlokken. 
In die zin past de preventiestaat bij een samenleving die vrijheid centraal 
stelt in haar denken over rechtvaardigheid, maar ook bij een traditie van staatsbe-
stuur die vrijheid als aangrijpingspunt voor interventie ziet.631 In deze traditie is 
vrijheid niet tegengesteld aan staatsmacht, maar is ze er juist een instrument van. 
Zo ligt de idee van menselijke vrijheid en autonomie ten grondslag aan onze con-
cepties van rechtsstaat en rechtspraak, waarin leedtoevoeging wordt gelegiti-
meerd door de constructie van individuele aansprakelijkheid; aan onze concepties 
van kapitalisme en vrije markt, waarin het vrije verkeer van goederen, mensen, 
kapitaal en diensten vooral wordt begrepen als middel voor het vergaren van 
(zowel individuele als collectieve) materiële welvaart; aan onze conceptie van de 
verzorgingsstaat, waarin veronderstelde grenzen van individuele verantwoorde-
lijkheid de rechtvaardiging vormen voor een grootschalige herverdeling van mid-
delen; en dus ook aan de notie van de preventiestaat, waarin een specifieke opvat-
                                                   
630 Foucault, 1980. 
631 Zie Rose over ‘powers of freedom’ (1999) en Foucault over ‘pastorale macht’ (Focault, 2007) 
en ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 2004). Vanuit dit perspectief is de opkomst van de preventie-
staat een nieuw hoofdstuk in de geschiedenis van ‘governmentality’ en een nieuwe strategie 
voor de beschaving en vorming van grote delen van de bevolking. 
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ting van verantwoordelijkheid wordt gebruikt als rechtvaardiging voor en aan-
grijpingspunt van interventies. 
 
Het bovenstaande laat zien dat preventie niet simpelweg een beleidsstrategie is, 
maar onderdeel van een breder cultureel patroon. Het is daardoor een manier van 
denken die zich moeilijk laat bijsturen en waaraan moeilijk te ontsnappen is. In 
het licht van dreigend onheil is niets doen geen optie. Als we die constatering 
combineren met de hierboven besproken immanente expansieve logica van pre-
ventie dringt een discussie over de begrenzing van preventie zich op. Als het pre-
ventiedenken zo’n dwingende logica kent, kan het ook de waarden verdringen die 
de basis van een onze samenleving en staatsstructuur vormen. De preventiestaat 
presenteert zich als dienstbaar en bescheiden, maar bedient zich tegelijkertijd van 
een interventierepertoire dat in vergaande mate het gedrag van burgers politi-
seert en nieuwe terreinen usurpeert van wat ooit staatsvrije ruimte was. Naast de 
vaak afgekondigde terugtredende staat, die de uitvoering van publieke taken aan 
(semi-)marktpartijen overlaat en de macht van supranationale instituties boven 
zich moet dulden, kunnen we nu dus ook het beeld van intredende preventiestaat 
stellen.  
Deze ontwikkeling is allesbehalve onschuldig. Meer concreet is de preven-
tiestaat uitermate vatbaar voor willekeur, aangezien er geen heldere rechtvaardi-
ging voor interventie is en er geen heldere afbakening van de reikwijdte en diepte 
van interventies is. Daarmee dreigt voortdurend een aantasting van het onschuld-
principe in het domein van criminaliteit, van ouderlijke macht in het domein van 
opvoeding, van privacy in het domein van surveillance en toezicht, en van profes-
sionele autonomie in domeinen van onderwijs, welzijnswerk en jeugdzorg. Het 
preventiedenken gedijt in de discretionaire ruimten van de rechtsstaat: in de be-
voegdheden van burgemeesters om misdaad te voorkomen, in de ruime interpre-
tatie van sociale grondrechten, en in de rechtvaardiging van toezicht en interven-
tie op basis van een mogelijke toekomst. Bovendien tendeert de preventiestaat 
naar een instrumentalisering van burgerschap: niet de onafhankelijk van de staat 
opererende publieke sfeer, maar de loyale bijdrage aan beleidsdoelstellingen 
wordt het burgerschapsideaal.  
Een belangrijke rol voor de matiging van deze tendensen is weggelegd 
voor institutionele en rechtsstatelijke ‘checks and balances’. Ook kan worden ge-
wezen op maatschappelijke ‘checks and balances’, zoals op een kritische blik van 
publieke opinie en wetenschap, en op burgers die risiconeming als een normaal 
onderdeel van hun dagelijks leven blijven zien, bij voorbeeld in ondernemerschap, 
verkeer, sport, gokken en genieten van ongezonde gewoonten. Daarnaast is het 
wellicht een geruststellende gedachte dat volledige preventie van risico’s noodza-
kelijkerwijs zal falen. Risico’s zijn immers een onvermijdelijk onderdeel van men-
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selijk leven en van samenleven – zonder een zekere aanvaarding ervan blijft enkel 
de ‘handelingsoptie’ van totale inertie over. In dit licht bezien lijkt op het eerste 
gezicht preventie een aantrekkelijke strategie om onheil af te wenden, maar is het 
uiteindelijk ook een therapeutische schijnremedie voor een samenleving die ge-






DUTCH POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
The analysis of crime policy and public health policy is set against the background 
of developments in the Dutch political context. In the introductions to both policy 
analyses, the case-specific contexts are described. These are complemented by a 
short general overview of Dutch cabinets since 1966 and their general perspec-
tives on society, based on the analysis of the various Queen’s speeches (QS), gov-
ernment declarations (GD) and coalition agreements (CA). 
 
Until roughly 1966, Dutch society was characterised by ‘pillarisation’ (in Dutch: 
‘verzuiling’): the vertical segregation of society along religious and ideological 
lines. Catholics, Protestants and Social Democrats formed strongly organised so-
cial groups, with their own political parties, broadcasting organisations, newspa-
pers, sports clubs, schools, universities and hospitals. Personal contact between 
members of different pillars was rare. However, there was cooperation and ac-
commodation among the political elites of the pillars (Lijphart, 1968).  
As these pillars gradually disintegrated into a more individualised and 
secularised Dutch society, democratisation and egalitarian tendencies would 
come to characterise the Dutch political landscape in the 1970s. Despite concerns 
about the increasing costs of the welfare state (which was rapidly developed after 
the Second World War), the political discourse stressed the importance of welfare 
policy as a mechanism for the emancipation of societal groups in danger of be-
coming isolated or ‘left behind’ (e.g. CA, 1977:87; GD, 1967:27).  
In 1976, government envisioned “[...] a society with work for everyone, 
with less inequality and with equal opportunities for self-development” (QS, 
1976). Recreation, sports, media and art were important means for the “develop-
ment of creativity, a critical attitude, political consciousness and relaxed social 
relations” (CA, 1973:11). The state had a crucial role in accommodating the nega-
tive effects of a rapidly modernising society: “In modern society, many people feel 
lost, controlled by forces they cannot understand and often experience as hostile” 
(GD, 1971:140). 
 
The political tide changed at the dawn of the 1980s. Economic recession and 
budgetary deficits prodded governments to cut welfare state expenditures. Eco-
nomic policy took central stage during the 1980s, pushing welfare policies to the 
background of the political discourse (CA, 1982; GD, 1982; CA, 1986; GD, 1986). At 
the same time, the first signals of a faltering administration of justice and law en-
forcement started to seep through. In the words of the government, the “condi-
tions under which the police are required to perform their duties are growing 
increasingly grim” (GD, 1981:337), while the apparatus of law enforcement has 
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become increasingly “overburdened” (QS, 1982). Within a few years, concerns 
about the level of crime burgeoned into a major government concern: “Govern-
ment is currently reassessing our welfare state. [...] In recent years, other govern-
ment tasks have also started to cause increasing concern. Especially the security 
of citizens and the quality of the constitutional state are at stake. Crime must be 
reduced” (QS, 1984). 
By the end of the 1980s, the focus on crime was complemented by con-
cerns about the living conditions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods of the major 
Dutch cities. Previously, urban development had mainly been characterised by 
housing construction and the realisation of overdue maintenance (GD, 1965:1310; 
GD, 1971:142; GD, 1973:1569; GD, 1981:329). In 1989, specific attention for the 
social aspects of urban development entered the political discourse. “Social re-
newal” aimed to “integrate people into society” through work, but also through a 
healthy lifestyle, proper housing, a clean environment, education and opportuni-
ties for cultural and social participation (GD, 1989:316). In the wake of this urban 
renewal movement, broader concerns grew with regard to social structures and 
social disintegration, especially in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods (e.g. GD, 
1994:5810). 
 
During the 1990s, the political discourse was dominated by a favourable econom-
ic tide and a neo-liberal economic agenda. Politicisation was further reduced by 
the fact that the former political adversaries of the liberal-conservative and social-
democratic parties formed the major part of the coalition which governed the 
Netherlands from 1994 to 2002. For the first time in modern Dutch political histo-
ry, the Christian-democratic party was not part of the government coalition.  
At the same time, concerns were expressed about social disintegration 
(QS, 1996), juvenile delinquency (QS, 1994), the liveability of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (GD, 1994:5810), an increasing level of unhealthy lifestyles (QS, 
1997), and the consequences of the multicultural society (QS, 1999): “Our society 
is changing rapidly. This demands a lot from both the citizens’ and government’s 
adaptability” (QS, 2001). Despite a general optimism about the economic prosper-
ity, over the course of the 1990s, government concern about the “shared values 
and norms” a certain “social cohesion” (QS, 1999) in Dutch society also broad-
ened: “No matter how important, more than merely economic prosperity is re-
quired for the wellbeing of citizens. A sense of security, knowledge and education, 
as well as social cohesion, are important social needs” (QS, 1996). 
 
In 2002, these issues of security and social cohesion became, apparently out of the 
blue, the focal point of political discourse. Before the 2002 Parliamentary elec-
tions, ‘populist’ political leader Pim Fortuyn had gained a large public following 
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with his critiques on previous governments, which he accused of neglecting secu-
rity and immigration issues. Fortuyn was murdered days before the election. 
However, his newly formed political party garnered 26 out of the 150 seats in 
Parliament. Even though the eventual coalition between Fortuyn’s party, Chris-
tian-democrats and conservative-liberals was short-lived, the issues advanced by 
Fortuyn would dominate the political agenda in the years to follow. 
Whether in the vocabulary of a coalition between Christian-democrats 
and social-democrats (2007-2010) or in the vocabulary of a coalition between 
Christian-democrats and (conservative-)liberals (2002-2007), concerns about 
immigration, integration, security and social cohesion dominated the Dutch politi-
cal discourse in the first decade of the 21st century (GD, 2002; QS, 2003; GD, 2007; 
QS, 2007). In general, civic conduct became a political issue: “Social cohesion was 
often taken for granted in Dutch society. In recent years, we have come to realise 
this is not the case. [...] A harmonious society is built on respect, tolerance and 
politeness. This requires giving and taking, tolerance but also adaptation. This is 
the responsibility of us all” (QS, 2010).  
Furthermore, successive governments tried to find a new balance be-
tween rolling back government and increasing government interventions: “Gov-
ernment should let go and hold on. Letting go by reducing regulation and bureau-
cracy in fields such as education, health care, entrepreneurship and spatial plan-
ning. Holding on by taking care of core tasks in the fields of security, law enforce-
ment, integration and setting boundaries” (GD, 2002:5467). Governing in the 
Netherlands at the beginning of the 21st century means governing a country in 
which “faith in the future is under pressure” (GD, 2007:2630). 
 
Overview Dutch cabinets since 1965, named after the prime-minister:632 
- 1965-1966: cabinet Cals (coalition: Catholic party KVP, Protestant party 
ARP, social-democratic party PvdA) 
- 1966-1967: cabinet Zijlstra (coalition: Catholic party KVP, Protestant par-
ty ARP) 
- 1967-1971: cabinet De Jong (coalition: Catholic party KVP, Protestant par-
ties ARP and CHU, liberal-conservative party VVD) 
- 1971-1972: cabinet Biesheuvel I (coalition: Catholic party KVP, Protestant 
parties ARP and CHU, liberal-conservative party VVD, social-democratic 
party DS’70) 
- 1972-1973: cabinet Biesheuvel II (coalition: Catholic party KVP, 
Protestant parties ARP and CHU, liberal-conservative party VVD) 
                                                   
632 Retrieved from http://www.parlement.com/, consulted d.d. 25-7-2011.  
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- 1973-1977: cabinet Den Uyl (coalition: social-democratic party PvdA, 
progressive-green party PPR, liberal-progressive party D’66, Catholic par-
ty KVP, Protestant party ARP) 
- 1977-1981: cabinet Van Agt I (coalition: Christian-democratic party CDA, 
liberal-conservative party VVD) 
- 1981-1982: cabinet Van Agt II (coalition: Christian-democratic party CDA, 
social-democratic party PvdA, liberal-progressive party D’66) 
- 1982: cabinet Van Agt III (coalition: Christian-democratic party CDA, lib-
eral-progressive party D’66) 
- 1982-1986: cabinet Lubbers I (coalition: Christian-democratic party CDA, 
liberal-conservative party VVD) 
- 1986-1989: cabinet Lubbers II (coalition: Christian-democratic party CDA, 
liberal-conservative party VVD) 
- 1989-1994: cabinet Lubbers III (coalition: Christian-democratic party 
CDA, social-democratic party PvdA) 
- 1994-1998: cabinet Kok I (coalition: social-democratic party PvdA, liber-
al-conservative party VVD, liberal-progressive party D’66) 
- 1998-2002: cabinet Kok II (coalition: social-democratic party PvdA, liber-
al-conservative party VVD, liberal-progressive party D’66) 
- 2002-2003: cabinet Balkenende I (coalition: Christian-democratic party 
CDA, liberal-conservative party VVD, populist party LPF) 
- 2003-2006: cabinet Balkenende II (coalition: Christian-democratic party 
CDA, liberal-conservative party VVD, liberal-progressive party D’66) 
- 2006-2007: cabinet Balkenende III (coalition: Christian-democratic party 
CDA, liberal-conservative party VVD) 
- 2007-2010: cabinet Balkenende IV (coalition: Christian-democratic party 
CDA, social-democratic party PvdA, protestant-democratic party CU) 
- From 2010: cabinet Rutte (coalition: liberal-conservative party VVD, 
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